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 i 
Abstract 
 
 
Our understanding of enterprise restructuring in a transition context is 
predominantly drawn from the ex-communist countries of Europe.  Those 
countries have their own cultural values, social structures, were subject to the 
Soviet political and economic management styles and had their own political 
and economic reasons to move to the free market system.  Without doubt, 
these factors had influenced their enterprise restructuring and its 
determinants.  Given this influence, our understanding of enterprise 
restructuring and its determinants can be considered limited especially when 
one takes into consideration the fact that many developing countries with 
centrally planned economic systems had moved to the free market system 
almost at the same time as the ex-communist countries. Very important, the 
restructuring behaviour of their state and privatised enterprises and the 
determinants of their behaviour have been considerably neglected by 
researchers.  This neglect was, indeed, a stimulus to carry out a research 
study on enterprise restructuring and its determinants in Algeria. 
     
The aim of this research study was to develop an understanding of the kind of 
restructuring taking place in the state enterprises slated for privatisation in 
Algeria and the factors that stimulated or hindered their restructuring from 
1990 to 2005.  Algeria is a country that combines a mixture of historical 
backgrounds.  It has a history of more than one hundred years of French 
colonial rule and has a deep rooted link with the Arab and Islamic culture.  It 
is also a country which had followed, after gaining independence from the 
colonial rule in 1962, its own style of socialism where the private sector in 
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light manufacturing and some service industries was tolerated and workers in 
the state-owned enterprise were given the power to share the decision 
makings with management.  More significantly, Algeria was and still is a 
country where almost 90 percent of its foreign revenues come from 
hydrocarbons export.  Its move to the free market in 1989 came as a result of 
the sharp drop in the price of oil and therefore in its foreign revenues.  It was 
a move imposed by the IMF in return for the extension of its debts repayment 
and the provision of fresh loans.  With these socio-cultural, political and 
economic characteristics of Algeria, it was expected that the restructuring 
behaviour of the enterprises under investigation and the determinants of this 
behaviour would exhibit some differences from those experienced in the 
transition countries of Europe.   
 
The investigation was carried out on three enterprises operating in different 
industries: Saidal in pharmaceuticals, the SNVI in heavy vehicles and Eriad 
Alger in wheat processing and manufacturing.  The data were collected and 
analysed using qualitative and quantitative research strategies.  Semi-
structured and unstructured interviews were used to collect data on the 
restructuring actions and their determinants.  They were carried out with 
senior managers at the head offices, divisions and functional departments of 
the enterprises; managers at the trade union (UGTA); managers at one state-
owned consultancy organisation called CNAT; managers at the ministry of 
industry; two visiting managers at the trade union (UGTA); and a small 
number of workers of the three enterprises under investigation.  A survey 
using a self-completion questionnaire was also used to investigate the 
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characteristics of the top management teams of the three enterprises.  Primary 
documents such as state, private company and media reports and secondary 
documents such as journal articles and books were also used.   
 
The findings drawn from the study reveal that Saidal was the only enterprise 
that restructured effectively despite the strong competition in its market.  This 
was possible through the determination of Saidal‟s President General 
Manager and his top management team to restructure and through the 
enterprise partnership with many multinational firms.  The findings also 
indicate that controllable and uncontrollable factors had a significant impact 
on the restructuring behaviour of the three enterprises.  The controllable 
factors were the corporatisation of the state enterprise and the 
underdevelopment of the institutional environment.  Corporatisation was an 
important incentive that encouraged effective restructuring but this was 
possible only when the enterprise was financially healthy, as was the case 
with Saidal.  The financial autonomy of Saidal reduced the intervention of 
the government administration in its internal affairs.  Government 
intervention was strong when the enterprise was perceived by the government 
as strategically important as was the case with the SNVI or when the 
government intended to totally privatise the enterprise as was the case with 
Eriad Alger.  The underdevelopment of the institutional environment, 
especially corruption, the shortage of technical skills and the lack of adequate 
market information, hampered competition and slowed down effective 
restructuring.  The uncontrollable factors were the trend in the market and the 
cultural values. The growing market for pharmaceuticals in Algeria was a 
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stimulus for attracting foreign investment in Saidal which consequently 
encouraged effective restructuring.  As for the cultural values, the family and 
friendship ties, the social responsibility stemming from religious belief, the 
regional belonging and the legacy of French colonial rule in Algeria played a 
significant role in the selection and recruitment of managers and workers, in 
slowing down the progress of shedding worker surplus and in slowing down 
foreign participation in privatisation.   
 
Future research on enterprise restructuring and its determinants in Algeria 
should be carried out on a larger sample of enterprises with different 
ownerships using quantitative and qualitative research strategies.  Research 
should also explore enterprise restructuring and its determinants in other 
developing countries which moved to the free market system and in countries 
which share similar cultural and social structures with Algeria.   It is time for 
researchers to move away from exploring effective and ineffective enterprise 
restructuring and concentrate more on exploring how partnership with 
foreign firms, the shortage of technical skills, the lack of adequate market 
information and particularly cultural values, be it religious beliefs, customs or 
the legacy of colonialism, affect the restructuring behaviour of state, 
privatised and private enterprises and the determinants of this behaviour.          
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
  
Since the early 1990s, dramatic changes have taken place in most countries 
with the centrally planned economic system.  The changes involved 
abolishing the centrally planned system and replacing it with mechanisms of 
the free market such as liberalising trade, prices, the convertability of the 
local currency and reforming the policies of employment.  The essential 
elements in the process of economic transition of these countries was the 
transfer of state ownership to private hands and the fundamental restructuring 
of the state and privatised state enterprises in response to the new economic 
environment.  With restructuring, the enterprise sought to reduce its losses 
and improve its financial and operational performance in order to be able to 
compete in domestic and international markets and consequently lead the 
national economy into growth.   
 
A vast literature (which will be examined in more detail in chapter two and 
three) is available on enterprise restructuring in transition economies. 
Researchers such as Simeon Djankov, Stijn Claessens and Gerhard Pohl tried 
to understand how an enterprise whose decisions and operations were totally 
subject to the instructions of the government administration had managed to 
deal with the threat of competition especially from goods from the developed 
economies and in an environment where the mechanisms of the free market 
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had just been created.  They had also tried to understand why some countries, 
although they were slow to privatise their state-owned enterprises, enjoyed 
faster economic growth than those that privatised fast.  Accordingly, the 
extent of restructuring varied between transition countries and also between 
industries in the same country.  Restructuring, according to this literature, had 
taken place in four broad areas of activities of the enterprise:  the contraction 
of enterprise assets by closing down the less productive units and 
divisionalising the core activities; the expansion of activities by modifying 
the existing products or introducing new ones, introducing new functional 
departments such as marketing, sales and finance; cutting the surplus of 
workers, abolishing the social benefits that the workers enjoyed during the 
planned economic system and implementing the practices of human resource 
management; and the replacement of top managers that served during the 
planned system with market-oriented managers.   
 
What is also interesting in the literature on enterprise restructuring is that the 
bulk of the research studies had concentrated trying to understand the factors 
inside and outside the enterprise that had determined its restructuring 
behaviour.  Five major determinants seemed to have been at play in 
enterprise restructuring:  Privatisation of the state-owned enterprise, the type 
of owners in control of the privatised enterprise, managers‟ stake in the 
privatised enterprise and their career concerns, the budget constraints and the 
extent of product market competition.  Each of these determinants had 
contributed, according to Claessens et al., (1997a), an essential but often a 
statistically marginal aspect to enterprise restructuring.     
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Despite the fact that many developing countries with the centrally planned 
economic system had moved to the free market system almost at the same 
time as the ex-communist countries in Europe, our understanding of 
enterprise restructuring and its determinants is predominantly drawn from the 
experience of the ex-communist countries in Europe and this made as a 
consequence our understanding on this issue limited.  The purpose of this 
study was therefore an attempt to expand our understanding on this issue by 
looking at the experience of a developing country: Algeria.  Algeria was an 
interesting case to study for two main reasons.  The first reason was the fact 
that the state and privatised enterprises in this country had never been 
investigated in terms of their restructuring behaviour and the determinants of 
this behaviour since the country moved to the free market system in 1989 and 
since the state enterprise was slated for privatisation in 1994.  So far, the 
research on the context of transition of Algeria to the free market system had 
concentrated almost exclusively on exploring the impact of the programmes 
for structural adjustment, imposed by the IMF, on the country economic 
activity and the social life of the population (Oufriha 1997a, 1997b; Abedou, 
1999; Abdoun, 1999; Arhab, 1999; Benabdallah, 1999; Boukella and Brabez, 
1999; Djenane, 1999; Kabri and Guendouzi, 1999; Medikoune, 1999; 
Musette and Hammouda, 1999; Oufriha, 1999) and only few researchers had 
explored the methods and institutions of privatisation (Belattaf, 1997; Sadi, 
2005).   The second reason was the fact that Algeria is a country different 
from the ex-communist countries in Europe in terms of its socio-cultural 
structure and its political and economic developments in pre and post 
transition making it as a result a country with its own characteristics.       
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To briefly highlight Algeria‟s characteristics; in its modern history, Algeria 
was subject to French colonial rule for more than one hundred years (1830-
1962).  This rule was fundamentally based on a strategy of „Apartheid‟ 
similar to that followed by the white settlers with the Native Americans in 
North America (Clegg, 1971).  It tried to wipe out the majority of the 
Algerian population and to eradicate its Islamic and Arab identity.   More 
significant, it created a society deprived of basic human rights such as 
education, housing and health services and a labour force predominantly 
based on primitive agricultural skills.  After independence in 1962, the newly 
created state of Algeria was faced with serious economic and social 
problems.  These problems were partially resolved through the adoption of 
socialism.  The government owned and controlled the means of production 
and therefore the state-owned enterprise was expected to play an economic 
and social role.  It was expected to be productive to increase the national 
economic growth, to create jobs, to reduce the economic and social disparity 
between the different regions of the country, and to provide the social 
benefits to the workers and their families.  Through the huge revenues drawn 
from the export of hydrocarbons - which was and still is the major 
commodity of Algeria for export - during the seventies, many of the 
objectives assigned to the state-owned enterprise were achieved.  Huge 
investments were made on projects to expand the activities of the state-
owned enterprise, predominantly with the assistance of experts and the 
technology from both capitalist and communist countries, more jobs were 
created and the standard of living of the population had improved.   
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But the inflow of revenues drawn from hydrocarbons did not last long.  The 
heavy drop in the price of oil in the mid eighties had led to a sharp drop in the 
government foreign revenues and as a consequence this led to a sharp drop in 
the production of the state-owned enterprise resulting in a dramatic decline in 
the nation‟s economic growth.  The drop in foreign revenues put pressure on 
the Algerian government to ask for more loans from international capital 
markets to keep the operations of the state-owned enterprise running.  And by 
1988, it became very clear that Algeria was overburdened with heavy foreign 
debts which were very difficult to repay.  This situation forced the 
government to enter into negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank to 
secure loans in return for abolishing socialism and introducing reforms to 
create the free market system where the privatisation of the state-owned 
enterprise was a major ingredient of these reforms and where its restructuring 
to cope with the threat of competition in its product market has become 
essential to secure its future survival.     
 
Based on these socio-cultural, political and economic backgrounds, the 
research study tried to answer the following question:  What kind of 
enterprise restructuring and its determinants one would expect in the Algerian 
state enterprises slated for privatisation, given the fact that Algeria is a 
country differnt from the ex-communist countries in its cultural and social 
structures as well as its political and economic developments in pre and post 
transition?  It was expected that the answer to this question would bring to 
light some new insights on the topic of enterprise restructuring and its 
determinants in a transition context.  To answer this question, a combination 
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of qualitative and quantitative research approach was used.  Since the 
restructuring actions were constructed by the individuals in direct and 
indirect links with these enterprises, the interpretation of these actions by 
these individuals was very important.  Therefore, a qualitative research 
strategy was the suitable strategy to use.  Also, since the purpose of the 
research was to see whether the Algerian enterprises would exhibit 
restructuring behviour and its determinants different from those experienced 
in the ex-communist countries in Europe, the research was in fact inductive.  
Semi-structured and unstructured interviewings were the main qualitative 
methods used in the collection and analysis of data.  In addition, as the 
replacement of top managers in the enterprises slated for privatisation would 
form an important part in their restructuring actions, a survey was used to 
explore the extent of changes taking place in the characteristics of their top 
management teams.  Clearly, though the main approach used in this research 
study was interpretative and inductive, the approach was complemented by 
quantitative methods such as a survey as well as by primary documentation.   
 
The research was carried out on three state enterprises slated for privatisation 
operating in different manufacturing industries from 1990 to 2005.  The 
enterprises were Saidal operating in the pharmaceuticals industry, the SNVI 
operating in the heavy vehicles industry and Eriad Alger operating in the 
wheat processing and manufacturing industry.  Purposive sampling was used 
to select the participants.  Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 
thirty-nine participants.  The participants were senior managers at the head 
offices, at the divisions and at the functional departments in the three 
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enterprises.  The interview questions covered issues such as the ownership 
structure of the enterprises, the perception of managers of their product 
markets, the product market strategies followed by the enterprises as well as 
their organisational structures and their employment practices.  As for the 
survey, the respondents were selected using a quota sampling.  Only senior 
managers who had direct involvement with the corporate strategic decision 
makings were selected.  These were the chief executives, the general 
secretaries, the division managers and the functional managers from 
planning, marketing, production, human resources, finance and research and 
development departments.  Seventy nine questionnaires, out of a sample of 
one hundred and eleven respondents, were filled in and returned.  The data 
collected from the interviews and the questionnaires were cross-checked 
using participants outside the enterprises who had direct and indirect links 
with the three enterprises and also using primary documents such as state, 
private company and media reports.  The participants outside the three 
enterprises were managers at the headquarters of the trade union (UGTA), 
managers in a consultancy organisation called the National Centre for 
Technical Assistance (CNAT), managers in the sponsoring departments of 
the enterprises under investigation located at the ministry of industry, one 
retired President General Manager of the enterprise called Giplait, a manager 
from the holding enterprise known as CABELEQ and six workers belonging 
to the three enterprises.  The interviews with these participants took the form 
of unstructured interviews.  In total, fifty-four semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews were carried out in this research.  The data collected 
from the interviews were coded in order to generate new issues not covered 
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by the literature on enterprise restructuring in the ex-communist countries.  
The data collected from the questionnaires were analysed using a univariate 
analysis with frequency tables to establish the similarities and differences 
between top management characteristics in the three enterprises.  Other 
materials such as state, private company and media reports; journal articles 
and books were also used to review enterprise restructuring in the ex-
communist countries and the evolution of the state-owned enterprise in 
Algeria during the socialist period and the reforms introduced in the 
macroeconomic environment and the state enterprise during the transition to 
the free market system.      
 
The study was divided into nine chapters.  Chapters two and three reviewed 
the main previous research focus on enterprise restructuring drawn from the 
experience of the ex-communist countries in Europe.  Chapter two discussed 
the dimensions of enterprise restructuring and chapter three discussed the 
determinants which stimulated or hindered enterprise restructuring.  A 
detailed discussion and analysis of the political-economy of Algeria since 
independence to the present day were given in chapter four and five.  Chapter 
four discussed and analysed the political-economy of Algeria during the 
period of socialism.  In this chapter the focus was particularly on the 
government/state-owned enterprise relationship.  This was done purposely.  
This discussion and analysis helps the reader to understand not only the 
evolution of the internal management of the state-owned enterprise in Algeria 
since independence but also to clearly see, through the findings drawn from 
the three case studies, how much the mechanisms of the centrally planned 
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system were still present in the enterprises investigated.  In chapter five, the 
period of transition to the free market system, which started in late 1987 and 
has been going on to the present day of writing this work, was discussed.  
Chapter six discussed the methodology used in the collection of data required 
for this research.  The analysis of the data collected was covered in chapter 
seven and eight.  The restructuring behaviour of the cases was analysed in 
chapter seven and the determinants of their restructuring behaviour were 
analysed in chapter eight.  Chapter nine concluded. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 Dimensions of Enterprise Restructuring 
                       
 
2.1.  Introduction  
  
The only experience which tells us how an enterprise restructures in a context 
of transition from socialism to capitalism and the determinants which 
stimulate or hinder its restructuring is predominantly drawn from the ex-
communist countries in Europe.  However, after two decades since these 
countries have moved to the free market system, we have now an 
understanding on how different countries proceeded in their strategies to 
move to the free market system and how their state and former state-owned 
enterprises adjusted themselves to cope with competition.  The experience of 
these countries also tells us that the transition to the free market system was 
not easy as thought of by some politicians and economists and not without a 
high price to pay.  This chapter discussed, in brief, the economic growth and 
the response of the state enterprise to the economic shocks of the early years 
of transition.  It also discussed in detail the main dimensions of enterprise 
restructuring in different countries.  This was followed by a discussion of the 
empirical evidence on the effect of restructuring on the enterprise economic 
and operational performance. 
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2.2. Economic Growth and the Response of the State Enterprise to 
the Economic Shocks in the Early Years of Transition 
 
In the early years of the transition, all countries, though with varying degrees 
between them, had seen a sharp decline in their economic outputs.  The 
decline, in comparison to 1989 or a year before the transition, reached on 
average between 13 and 25 percent in Central and Eastern countries 
respectively, about 40 percent in the Baltic countries, 45 percent in Russia 
and a little more in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet 
Union, and 65 percent in the Ukraine (Svejnar, 2002).  This decline was 
triggered by two major macroeconomic reforms:  the liberalisation of trade 
and the hard budget constraints.  The liberalisation of trade exposed the state-
owned manufacturing enterprises to strong competition from goods imported 
from the developed economies.  As the products of the state-owned 
enterprises suffered from poor quality, the demands for their products 
dropped sharply and many of them became in serious financial troubles to a 
point where some were unable to pay their suppliers and their workers.  In 
addition to competition from imports, many state-owned enterprises found 
themselves in deep financial deficits because of the hard budget constraints 
imposed upon them by their state treasuries and banks.  In countries suffering 
from heavy foreign debts, like for example Poland and Hungary where their 
debts were estimated to reach around 50 percent of their Gross Domestic 
Products (GDPs), the state treasuries of these countries cut drastically their 
subsidies to loss-making state-owned enterprises, as a measure to reduce the 
country budget deficit, stimulating as a consequence many enterprises to 
engage in restructuring to survive.   
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Studies on enterprise restructuring in transition countries (Carlin et al., 1995; 
Pohl et al., 1997; Estrin et al., 1995; Brada and Singh, 1999) reported that 
enterprises had engaged in a wide variety of restructuring in pre and post 
privatisation period.  In the early years of transition, the state-owned 
enterprises coped with the adverse conditions created by the transition by 
taking adjustment measures in their internal operations to reduce costs.  This 
type of adjustment is often referred to as „reactive/defensive‟ restructuring 
(Carlin and Aghion, 1996) which is in contrast with 
„strategic/comprehensive/deep‟ restructuring.  The latter entailed the 
redeployment of assets based on a forward-looking business strategy.  The 
empirical findings available to date show that this type of restructuring took 
place, at least in the early years of transition, only in the privatised state-
owned enterprises and particularly those owned by foreign investors (Carlin 
and Aghion, 1996; Djankov, 1999).  Though restructuring can encompasse 
many dimensions of activities at different levels of the enterprise, research on 
enterprise restructuring in transition countries had concentrated on only four 
dimensions which this chapter will discuss in detail in the next section.   
    
2.3. The Main Dimensions of Enterprise Restructuring       
 
Restructuring is a complex process.  This complexity makes it almost 
impossible to give an exact definition to the concept „restructuring‟.  In the 
context of transition, the concept is defined broadly.  Djankov and Murrell 
(2000) define it as the actions undertaken by enterprises as they adapt for 
survival in a market economy.  Pohl et al. (1997: 1), on the other hand, define 
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it as “Firms in all countries must continuously restructure to monitor 
profitability in the face of a changing economic environment, technological 
progress and competition from other firms”.  These two broad definitions 
make it clear that restructuring is the only way that allows an enterprise to be 
profitable and survive in a competitive market.   Studies of Carlin et al., 
(1995), Hendley (1998), Djankov and Pohl (1997), Czaban and Whitley 
(2000) and Linz (2001) used four dimensions to understand restructuring in 
transition countries.  These dimensions were also used in most case studies 
surveyed by Estrin et al., (1995) and by Brada and Singh (1999).  The first 
dimension encompassed the shedding of unproductive assets - such as the 
disposal of social assets such as social housing, canteens, kinder gardens and 
recreational services - and the closing down of production plants with no 
markets.  The second dimension encompassed changes introduced in 
production processes and technology and in the output related activities such 
as introducing marketing, sales and finance departments and new products. 
The third dimension encompassed changes brought in employment practices 
such as downsizing the number of workers, introducing new procedures in 
recruitment and selection, compensation and rewards and training and 
development.  And the fourth dimension dealt with changes in control, in 
other words, the replacement of managers from the communist period with 
managers with market-oriented managerial skills.  Below, is discussed each 
of these four dimensions in more detail. 
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2.3.1.  Asset Contraction Policies 
 
The common wisdom shared by most economists is that managers in the 
transition countries should design a business strategy that should focus on the 
most productive assets in the enterprise in order to achieve the enterprise 
efficiency and its competitiveness.  Under communism, however, the state-
owned enterprise was highly integrated.  It was in the form of an association, 
or what was commonly called in many communist countries a „Kombinat‟ 
(Berliner, 1957).  The Kombinat encompassed several state-owned 
enterprises operating in different activities.  In Czechoslovakia, for example, 
after the industrial reforms of the early 1960s, the whole manufacturing 
sector was divided into 100 Kombinats, each with an average of some 30,000 
workers.  In engineering industry, for example, the United Automobile 
Works association was composed of tens of medium and small enterprises 
employing some 140,000 workers (Jirasek, 1972: 140).   
 
During the sixties and seventies, big was perceived better.  Even in market 
economies, many private and public enterprises were large in size.    In the 
communist context, however, the large size of the state-owned enterprise was 
motivated by political, economic and social considerations.  Politically, the 
ruling communist party was in control of all the means of production in order 
to concretise the communist ideology in society.  Under a central planning 
government organ, the broad outputs for the national economy were planned 
as well as the allocation of the outputs and resources of each sector of the 
economy and the outputs and resources of each state-owned enterprise.  To 
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exercise its tight control over the whole national economic activity, the 
government put at the head of each Kombinat a director who acted as 
mediator between the communist party and the government administration 
and the managers in the various enterprises in the Kombinat.  It was assumed 
that by having one director to deal with, the directives of the government 
would be communicated easily to the state-owned enterprises and the 
government would be more informed with the problems of these enterprises.    
Economically, the Kombinat was a monopoly operating in a non-competitive 
market.  Under communism, competition was condemned.   The communist 
ideology believes that resources can be optimised by achieving economies of 
scale and as a result managers of the state-owned enterprises should strive 
first and foremost to increase the volume of outputs.  The quality of outputs 
came only second in importance.     Also important to mention here is the fact 
that under the national planning system, resource allocation was a serious 
problem.  Inputs supply was unreliable and suffered from low quality.  To 
avoid the shortage of supplies, most state-owned enterprises built up their 
own input manufacturing units and increased the number of their warehouses 
to store surplus of raw materials (Berliner, 1957) increasing as a result the 
size of the state-owned enterprise.  As for the social consideration, the state-
owned enterprise was assigned the objective to concretise the social policies 
of the ruling communist party.  It was required to provide a number of 
welfare services to its workers and their families.  The result was that a large 
number of units with no production functions were created such as housing, 
cafeterias, health care centres, cooperatives to sell goods at cheaper prices, 
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sport centres, and vacation resorts.  These were all integrated in the structure 
and expenditures of the state-owned enterprise.   
 
With the collapse of communism, the Kombinats in many countries had to be 
broken down into medium and small state-owned enterprises.  Many of the 
newly created state-owned enterprises inherited unproductive units, 
unprofitable activities and a large surplus of assets which included unsold 
inventories from cancelled orders, material inputs and equipment no longer 
used.  In their sample of 21 large manufacturing and trading enterprises with 
different  ownership structures operating in Slovakia for the period 1991-
1996, Djankov and Pohl (1997) found that all the enterprises sold their 
housing to employees or transferred it to their municipalities.  And the 
majority of the enterprises sold or contracted out their recreational facilities 
and cafeterias.  As for the surplus of assets, only few enterprises retained 
them.  The majority of enterprises scrapped them or sold them to small 
private firms.  Similar findings were reported by Czaban and Whitley (2000) 
in their case study of 18 enterprises with different ownership structures in 
Hungary for the period 1990-1996.  Their study revealed that the majority of 
enterprises in their sample closed their unproductive activities and only very 
few enterprises sold them to private investors.  And they pointed out that the 
control type, the financial position of the enterprise and its size played a key 
role in the disposal behaviour.  Foreign controlled firms and financially 
troubled state-owned enterprises tended to close these activities whereas 
financially stable state-owned enterprises and manager controlled enterprises 
tended to sell them.  They also added that most enterprises, regardless of their 
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ownership type, concentrated on a single major production line such as buses 
or particular kinds of drug that contributed over 75 percent of their total sale 
revenues.     
 
The disposal of unproductive units and the concentration mainly on the core 
activities was tailored to achieve several objectives.  Among these objectives 
was to allow the enterprises to be flexible to changes that might occur in their 
product markets and also to make it easy to break up the core activities into 
divisions often as a first step to their privatisation.  The break up into 
divisions was also an organisational structure which would enable managers 
to clearly see the performing and non-performing production plants.  Non-
performing plants with future potential would be restructured and those 
without would be closed down.  In addition, the concentration on the core 
activities was a strategy used to attract foreign investors. There is a body of 
literature now available on the motives of foreign firms investing in transition 
countries (Fahy et al., 1998; Bartley and Minor, 1994).  In addition to the 
investment facilities provided to them by the governments of these countries 
such as tax concessions and the freedom to dispatch profits outside these 
countries, foreign investors tended to be more willing to invest in enterprises 
that were specialised in their production and had reduced significantly the 
surplus of their labour force.         
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2.3.2. The Expansion Policies 
 
The modernisation of equipments, the construction of new production lines, 
the creation of new functional departments such as marketing and finance 
and the production of goods that are competitive in domestic and 
international markets were all investments needed in the transition period.  
With the collapse of communism, the state-owned enterprise found itself 
overburdened with a high obsoleteness of its fixed assets, products with 
quality not recognised by international standards and products that their 
markets disappeared especially with the collapse of the CMEA - Under 
communism, the CMEA was a market created to regulate the trading 
relations between the Eastern and Central countries and the Soviet Union and 
it had instigated a degree of specialisation within the CMEA member 
countries.  Certain countries became the main supplier of particular products 
for the entire CMEA members.  For example, Hungary was the major 
supplier for buses, pharmaceuticals products and Bulgaria the major supplier 
of electronics.  To survive competition, managers had to seek for ways to 
upgrade their products and protect their markets or create new products and 
look for new markets.  In their case study of Slovakian enterprises, Djankov 
and Pohl (1997) found that only a handful of enterprises in their sample 
maintained in 1996 the products that existed in 1991.  Most enterprises 
introduced products tailored for the markets in Western Europe in particular.  
The outputs destined to the CMEA markets which were on average around 46 
percent in 1991 dropped sharply.  The revenures drawn from these markets 
became only about 15 percent of the total revenues of these enterprises in 
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1996.   About 47 percent of their revenues were drawn from Western 
markets.  The reorientation to markets in Western Europe was possible 
because many enterprises in the sample became subcontractors of West 
European, particularly German and Austrian, firms.  Under the influence of 
the contractors, these enterprises made substantial investments in appropriate 
technology, marketing, sales and quality control systems.  Many enterprises 
obtained as a result international total quality assurance certifications such as 
ISO 9001 and ISO 14001.  The investment in technology and quality 
processes was possible through the easy access to capital from foreign and 
domestic private banks under the guarantees of their foreign partners.  The 
case study of Czaban and Whitley (2000) of the 18 Hungarian enterprises 
also revealed that the easy access to capital had been responsible for the 
modification and creation of new products in the foreign firms which 
operated in Hungary during the first half of the 1990s.  The authors argued 
(2000: 12) that “Access to resources was clearly a crucial condition for 
relative market success.  The companies that had little or no debt and were 
making some profits were the ones that managed to introduce new products 
and improve existing ones”.  Their study also suggested that enterprises that 
did not have a change in their customer base were the ones that did not 
introduce major shifts neither in their products nor in their suppliers.           
 
2.3.3. Changes in Employment Policies 
 
Under communism, the labour surplus was endemic in the state-owned 
enterprise.  To quote the former East Germany as an example, the surplus of 
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labour in the state-owned enterprise in this country was estimated to be 
between 50 and 70 percent (Lumley, 1993: 26) and a large number of this 
surplus was made up of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.  Under 
communism, worker surplus was ideologically and socially motivated.  
Marxism does not believe in unemployment and therefore one of the most 
important missions of the government was to guarantee work to every citizen 
(Godson, 1981).  More significant, the majority of workers enjoyed 
permanent work contracts (Redman and Keitley, 1998).   
 
The closure and sale of unproductive units and some core activities during 
the early years of transition had resulted in a massive reduction in the number 
of employees in the state-owned enterprises (Uwe, 1996; Nesporava, 2002; 
Socha and Weisberg, 2002) especially in countries where restructuring had to 
precede privatisation like in East Germany, Poland and Hungary - in some 
countries like for example Czechoslovakia asset restructuring was not 
allowed before privatisation to ensure Lizal et al., (2001) explained “Against 
unfair dealing by managers”.  It was feared that managers would strip for 
themselves and their friends the best assets of the state-owned enterprises.  In 
their case study of 21 Slovakian manufacturing and trading enterprises, 
Djankov and Pohl (1997) found that the enterprises cut on average half of 
their labour force.  Similar findings were reported earlier by Carlin et al., 
(1995) and Claessens et al., (1996).  Claessens et al., (1996) explained that 
labour reduction in the Slovakian manufacturing enterprises was high 
because of the absence of labour unions.  
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One should point out that East Germany had the highest level of workers lay 
offs.  More than three million workers lost their jobs during a short period of 
1990-1994 (Uwe, 1996: 4).   Russia on the other hand was slow to lay off 
workers despite the decline in sales.  Instead of cutting the number of 
workers, Russian managers preferred to cut the workers‟ wages and their 
working hours.  Commander and Tolstopiatenko (1996) gave two 
explanations for this employment behaviour in Russian enterprises.  One was 
the explicit and implicit subsidies provided by the government to state and 
former state enterprises a fact which did not urge managers to reduce workers 
costs to contain losses.  Two, was the feeling of managers that they had social 
responsibility towards their workers and keeping them in their jobs was a 
necessity.  According to these two authors, despite the decline in sales in 
most Russian manufacturing enterprises during the period 1991-93, the social 
benefits provided to workers was roughly around 30 percent of their total 
labour costs and enterprise spendings in social assets was roughly around 4 
percent of Russia‟s GDP.         
 
To reduce the negative effect of workers downsizing on the income 
distribution in society, many transition countries introduced the systems of 
unemployment protection.  The systems were funded by the IMF and were 
modelled on those systems found in West European countries.  In Russia, for 
example, two systems of unemployment protection were used:  insurance 
benefits and welfare.  The insurance benefit linked the amount of 
unemployment benefits with the earnings that a person received and the 
length of paid employment prior to unemployment.  The welfare system 
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provided several types of social benefits to unemployed workers and their 
families (Chetvernina, 2003).  But the unemployment protection systems 
proved to be difficult to implement in many transition countries.  Benefits 
were often not provided at the right time and with the right amounts as 
prescribed by the laws and often the benefits did not go to people who were 
entitled to.   
 
Though in many Central and Eastern transition countries, the implementation 
of the unemployment protection systems have improved significantly in 
recent years, East Germany was the most successful in implementing these 
systems.  In order to achieve parity with the income of the West German 
citizens, the same social benefits provided to the unemployed in West 
Germany were provided in East Germany.  Also, those in employment had 
seen their income increased since the unification in 1990.  Between 1991 and 
1995, workers income in East Germany increased by 42 percent (Uwe, 1996: 
11).  Comparing the household income between East Germany and the rest of 
the transition countries, Uwe (1996: 20) argued that in East Germany “There 
exists a relative comfortable and egalitarian position, whereas in other post-
communist countries, a broad majority of households have serious trouble to 
make ends meet”.  The decline in the standard of living in most transition 
countries was also discussed by Beleva (quoted in Nesporava, 2002).  
According to this writer, more than 6 percent of the Bulgarian population 
lived in 2001 on US$ 2.15 per day.  This figure was four to five times higher 
if the poverty threshold of US$ 4.2 per day was used.                            
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The transition to the free market system had created an income differentiation 
not only between those who work and those without work but also between 
those in employment.  Many enterprises had introduced the practices of 
Human Resource Management (Koubek and Brewster, 1995; Tung and 
Havlovic, 1996; Garavan et al., 1998; Mills, 1998; Taylor and Walley, 2002; 
Weinstein and Obloj, 2002) and therefore workers were rewarded according 
to their performances and their skills.  Carlin et al., (1995) reported that 
managers in many enterprises in their sample had rewarded workers with 
good performances high wages and bonuses.  These monetary incentives, 
according to Fidrmuc (2007) had been responsible, more than anything else, 
for the productivity increase in the 737 enterprises he surveyed in the Czech 
Republic.  High wages and bonuses were also provided as a policy in many 
state-owned enterprises to retain their skilled workers fear from losing them 
to the private sector which offered high wages.  The disappearance of the 
production targets followed by the state-owned enterprise during the 
communist era meant that the privileged position and the high wages enjoyed 
by production workers (Seeger, 1981; Lane and O‟Dell, 1978) during this era 
had tremendously been reduced during the transition period.  To face the 
threat of competition, workers with skills in marketing, procurement, finance 
and management were regarded the most important human capital in the 
enterprise and had consequently been compensated more than anybody else 
and had been offered more training.  One has to point out that the most 
beneficiaries from the introduction of the Human Resource Management and 
the transition to the free market system had been the managers especially 
those at senior levels such as Chief Executive Officiers.  According to 
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Soulsby and Mark (1998), the wages of senior managers in the Czech 
Republic had been three times or more than those offered to line managers 
and much more higher than those offered to skilled workers.                   
 
2.3.4. Replacement of the ‘Red’ Directors 
 
The association between management replacement and performance 
improvement of firms is well documented in the literature in the developed 
economies (Denis and Denis, 1995).  In a transition context from 
communism to a free market system, the replacement of managers from the 
communist (often referred to them in the literature on transition countries as 
red directors) period was suggested to be desperately needed for two reasons.  
The first reason was the fear that if the „red‟ directors remained in charge of 
the state and privatised enterprises, their close ties with the government 
administration built up during the communist period would slow down the 
process of transition and significantly would not lead to enterprise 
restructuring. How?  The red directors would lobby for the restriction of the 
entry of new private firms in the market because these firms were likely to be 
much more efficient than their enterprises and would be a threat to the 
survival of their enterprises in the competitive market (Kaufmann and 
Siegelbaum, 1997; Schleifer and Vishny, 1994).  The restriction of entry of 
new firms would reduce competition and therefore would not urge the „red‟ 
directors to restructure their enterprises.    
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The second reason was the little knowledge of the „red‟ directors about 
management skills needed in a competitive market.  Communist managers 
were mostly from engineering backgrounds and knew their enterprises 
operations in depth but lacked the skills in marketing (Savitt, 2001; Shipley 
et al., 1995; Pribova and Savitt, 1995) and sales, customer service, corporate 
planning and how to control finance (Ivancevich et al. 1992; Avraham, 1993; 
Luthans et al., 1993; Longenecker and Popovski, 1994; Vlachoutsicos et al., 
1990; Longenecker, 2001).  At the beginning of the transition, it was 
expected that privatisation would push the new owners of the privatised state-
owned enterprise to bring in new managers who better match the enterprise 
productive assets and would introduce the proper incentives to stimulate 
managers to restructure and improve the performance of their enterprises.  
Until recently, the evidence has shown that the market for managers in the 
transition countries has remained underdeveloped (Djankov and Pohl, 1997; 
Claessens and Djankov, 1999).  Claessens and Djankov, for example, found 
that out of the 21 Slovakian enterprises they investigated for the period 1991-
1996, 20 enterprises saw their managers replaced by the ministry in 1991-
1992.  The authors did not explain the reasons for their replacement but they 
explained that the underdevelopment of the managerial labour market in 
Slovakia forced many enterprises to bring back the fired general managers 
and to promote new ones from inside their enterprises.  Out of the 20 
managers who were fired in the period 1991-1992, 19 came back in 1996.   
 
Keeping managers from the communist period had serious implications in the 
internal management of the enterprise.  In the case study of Chirikova (2001), 
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though Russian managers had by the year 2000 showed signs of adaptation to 
the free market system such as seeking to increase their export, concentrating 
on a very limited number of products to win new market niches, by 
modernising their production processes and by looking for new partners, their 
management control had remained still centralised like at the time of 
communism.  All the strategic, financial and commercial decisions were 
centralised in the hands of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).  In Hungary 
too, centralisation of control was a common practice among the enterprises 
investigated by Czaban and Whitley (2000).   Though all the enterprises in 
their sample reorganised their core activities into divisions, these divisions 
were essentially production plants which lacked financial and commercial 
autonomy.  The division managers operated under close supervision of the 
management team located at the head office and particularly of the CEO.  
They were required to report fortnightly to the CEO detailed information on 
outputs, stocks, costs, employment and all their internal operations.  
Interestingly, the centralisation of control was also practiced in enterprises 
owned by foreign investors.  Foreign-owned enterprises made sure to give 
significant power to the finance manager, who was recruited from outside the 
country, to set budgets for the various levels of management in the enterprise.  
Two fundamental reasons the authors gave for the centralisation of control.  
For the enterprises owned by domestic owners, the reason was the difficulties 
to raise capital from the banks.  For the foreign-owned enterprises, the reason 
was the unpredictability of the economic environment in the country.  The 
authors also found that foreign-owned enterprises did not keep managers 
from the communist period.  They tended to recruit their CEOs and members 
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of their management teams from outside the enterprise they acquired and in 
some cases they recruited them from outside Hungary as a measure to 
improve the performance of their enterprises.  The surveys of Barberis et al., 
(1996) on Russian shops and Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2007) on Czech 
enterprises provided evidence that bringing in new managers had contributed 
to the improvement in the financial performance of the enterprises in their 
samples.  
 
2.4. Impact of Enterprise Restructuring on Performance:                                    
Empirical Evidence 
  
Two papers (Djankov and Pohl, 1997; Pohl et al., 1997) have looked at the 
effect of enterprise restructuring on the financial and operational performance 
of the restructured enterprise.    In their survey of 21 Slovakian enterprises, 
Djankov and Pohl (1997) used three measures to evaluate enterprise 
restructuring.  These were:  Labour Productivity (LP) defined as value added 
(value of sales less cost of non-labour inputs) divided by the man-hours of 
labour employed, Operating Profitability (OP) defined as the sales revenue 
less the cost of inputs and wages, and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
defined as the total outputs divided by (capital, wage, inputs).  The authors 
indicated that significant improvement between 1991 and 1996 took place in 
the labour productivity, total factor productivity and operating profitability of 
most enterprises in their survey.  Similar conclusion was found in the survey 
of 700 to over 1,000 manufacturing state and privatised state enterprises 
drawn from each of the seven transition countries (Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia) that 
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were investigated by Pohl et al., (1997) for the period 1991-1996.  They used 
the same financial measures as Djankov and Pohl (1997) and they added 
another measure which was the degree of profitability and loss that the 
enterprises in their sample recorded from 1991 to 1996.  Under the 
profitability and loss measure, the authors categorised the enterprises into 
five categories, ranking from A to E where category A represented 
enterprises with a positive net profit after tax and category E with enterprises 
that they did not have enough revenues to even cover for the costs of material 
inputs.  Their findings indicated that in almost all the seven countries, 
enterprise profitability increased significantly between 1991 and 1996 with 
more than half of Czech and Hungarian enterprises or 74 percent and 70 
percent respectively and 50 percent of Polish enterprises fell in category A.  
Enterprises in Romania were the least to be profitable with only 24 percent 
falling in category A.  Only very few enterprises fell in category E.  They 
also pointed out that some enterprises which were profitable in 1991 became 
unprofitable in 1996 and some were unprofitable in 1991 and remained so in 
1996 and some had completely ceased to exist.  They concluded that 
restructuring is influenced by many random factors that cannot be controlled 
such as the location of the enterprise, the trend in the industry in which the 
enterprise operated, the level of debts of the enterprise at the beginning of the 
transition.  They also argued that other factors that can be controlled might 
stimulate or hinder the restructuring behaviour of the enterprise.  The next 
chapter will discuss these determinants in more detail.        
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2.5.  Conclusion 
 
In the early years of the transition to the free market, the economic growth of 
most transition countries declined sharply.  The outputs of the majority of 
manaufacturing enterprises dropped sharply because of competition from 
goods imported from the developed economies and the hard budget 
constraints imposed upon them by their state treasuries and banks.  This 
resulted in shedding off unproductive activities and activities that lost the 
CMEA markets which consequently a large number of workers became 
unemployed.  To survive competiton, some enterprises especially those that 
became subcontrators to West European firms introduced many of the 
practices used in the advanced economies such as the installation of 
marketing, finance and human resources management departments.  As 
managers with market-oriented skills were in short supply in most transition 
countries, many enterprises were still managed by managers from the 
communist period.  Empirical evidence in Central and Eastern transition 
countries showed that restructuring had led to improvement in the financial 
and operational performance of most enterprises in these countries.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Determinants of Enterprise Restructuring  
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter clearly shows that state and privatised state enterprises 
embarked in restructuring with different approaches.  These approaches were 
determined by certain factors inside and outside the enterprise.  The literature 
on the determinants of enterprise restructuring in transition countries took 
two directions.  The first dealt with the pre-privatisation period.  It shedded 
the lights on the institutional reforms that should be put in place to incite 
managers in the state-owned enterprise to restructure and survive in the 
transition context.  This included the necessity to privatise the state-owned 
enterprise, giving a stake of ownership in the privatised enterprise to senior 
managers, imposing the hard budget constraints on the state-owned enterprise 
and creating the mechanisms to stimulate competition.  The second direction 
tried to establish, almost exclusively, the impact of the type of owners on 
enterprise restructuring.  This chapter discussed in detail these five 
determinants from the theoretical point of view, their application in transition 
countries and their impact on enterprise restructuring and enterprise financial 
and operational performance as provided by empirical evidence.         
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3.2. Privatisation of the State-Owned Enterprise 
 
At the beginning of the transition, the initial emphasis was on privatisation as 
the key institutional measure to improve the economic and financial 
efficiency of the state-owned enterprise.  The superiority of private 
ownership over the state ownership in resource allocation is not new.  It goes 
back to the work of Hayek (1935).  During the fifties and the early sixties, a 
small scale privatisation of state assets took place in some Western countries 
such as West Germany, Italy, Ireland and the UK (Parker, 1998).  These early 
privatisations were not a systematic programme aimed at slimming down the 
state sector.  In West Germany, for example, it aimed at curtailing the power 
of the trade unions and it was also an initiative to spread share ownership 
among the general public (Esser, 1998).   
 
The ability of the public enterprise to be efficient was increasingly 
questioned in the developed economies during the sixties and the seventies 
because during this time, the performance of the public enterprise started to 
decline as a result of the strong competition it faced in the international and 
domestic markets.  And consequently, various theoretical approaches were 
put forward debating whether or not the private firm was superior to the 
public enterprise.    
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3.2.1. Private versus Public Ownership:  The Theoretical Debate 
 
In his theory „Some Economics of Property Rights‟, Alchian (1965) argued 
that the private firm was more efficient than the public enterprise because the 
former had the right incentives to monitor managers which were not found in 
the latter.  According to his theory, in the private firm, the owners were 
clearly identified and their goal was clearly defined which was profit 
maximisation.  To align the goal of the owners with the interests and goals of 
manager, the owners constantly monitored the behaviour of the manager.  
This behaviour was monitored via the stock market.   A low value of the firm 
share in the stock market sent a signal to the owners of the poor performance 
of the firm.  The owners might threaten the manager by selling their shares if 
the performance of the firm did not improve.  This threat would force the 
manager to increase his/her efforts to improve the efficiency of the firm.  
Another incentive that monitored managers was the threat of takeover by a 
competing firm.  In the public enterprise, these two incentives were not 
available.  The shares of the public enterprise had no value and might not be 
sold and therefore the manager had no pressure to improve the efficiency of 
the enterprise. Also, one of the main problems in the public enterprise was 
the absence of a well defined goal for the enterprise.     Profit might be a goal 
but it was not the major one.  The owners of the public enterprise were highly 
diffused (all the citizens were owners), their goals were multiple and 
conflicting a situation which often led the manager to play one goal against 
another.  Often, the manager followed the goal of the group of owners with 
more power, in other words the politicians.  Because the public enterprise 
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was constantly subjected to political influence, the consequence was that its 
economic and financial efficiency would always be inferior to that of the 
private firm.        
 
The superiority of private ownership over public ownership had found great 
support, as it seems, in the British Conservative government under Thatcher.  
Under this government, a large scale privatisation took place.  The first sector 
to be privatised was telecommunications and this happened in 1984.  This 
was followed by gas in 1986, electricity in 1990-1991 and the railways in 
1995-1997.  By the end of 1997, the total of privatisation sales was estimated 
to reach some £65 billion and the share of the nationalised industries in the 
GDP dropped to less than 2 percent (Parker, 1998: 12).  Many developed and 
developing countries found the lure of revenues from sales of the public 
enterprise very attractive.  By the year 2000, the cumulative value of 
privatisation sale proceeds received by governments around the world was 
estimated to fall around $US 1.180 trillion (D‟Souza et al., 2001).  Such sales 
had helped, as it seems, reducing the fiscal deficits of many governments.     
   
But some economists were still not convinced of the supremacy of private 
ownership over the public ownership in resource allocation (Yarrow, 1986; 
Lin et al., 1998; Kay and Thompson, 1986).  These economists argued that 
without changing the ownership of the public enterprise, the public enterprise 
could be efficient if it operated in a vigorous competitive market.  The 
competitive market provided information about costs and manager‟s efforts 
to the enterprise owners who would otherwise be in the dark.  With this 
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information, the owners could design better incentive systems and evaluated 
the efforts of managers more accurately and therefore aligning managers‟ 
interests with their own.  For Kay and Thompson (1986), when the 
competitive market was equipped with hostile takeovers and bankruptcy, 
both private and public enterprises promoted their production efficiency.  
They also considered that both private and public enterprises were good in 
competitive markets and sluggish in non-competitive markets.              
 
Competition as a mechanism to enhance the efficiency of the public 
enterprise was strongly rejected by Vicker and Yarrow (1991), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994), Boycko et al., (1996) and Shleifer (1998).  According to 
Vicker and Yarrow (1991), even in a competitive market, politicians used the 
public enterprise to promote their political party and to win the elections.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) provided a model which held that managers of 
the public enterprise and politicians tried to maximise their own benefits.  
They argued that in order for politicians to increase the government financial 
assistance to the public enterprise, managers of the public enterprise must 
increase employment and wages and these were sufficient to increase public 
support to the politicians and the government policies.  Increasing 
employment and wages without any economic justification were, according 
to them, one of the factors that contributed to the economic and financial 
inefficiency of the public enterprise.  Boycko et al., (1996) agreed with their 
argument and recommended the privatisation of the public enterprise as the 
best solution to stop the intervention of politicians in the affairs of the public 
enterprise and to increase its efficiency.  In addition to efficiency, 
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privatisation was regarded as an institutional mechanism that would help 
develop factor and product markets as well as securities markets (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001).  In developed and developing market economies, 
efficiency and the development of securities markets were the main 
objectives attributed to privatisation.  In transition countries, privatisation 
was perceived to be the main instrument that would create the foundations of 
the free market system by reducing the power of the government in the 
economic activity, creating a large base of local entrepreneurs, and creating 
the institutional environment that would support the private property. 
       
3.2.2. Privatisation of the State-Owned Enterprise in Transition                                                                                       
Countries: The Major Models of Privatisation 
 
One of the key ingredients of the economic reforms of the ex-communist 
countries was the privatisation of the state-owned enterprise.  However, the 
strategies followed in the privatisation process differed between these 
countries for historical and technical reasons.  Though grouped together, the 
transition countries are different countries in term of their historical 
backgrounds in the pre-communist period and during the communist period 
and in terms of their governments‟ commitment to privatisation especially of 
large-size industrial state-owned enterprises.     
 
Before the Second World War, the former East Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia and the south of Poland were capitalist countries with well 
established free market legal systems and institutions and had a strong 
industrial and scientific base.  Czechoslovakia, for example, was amongst the 
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ten most industrialised country in the world (Hanon, 1996).  By contrast, the 
Balkan countries were predominantly agricultural countries dominated by the 
Ottoman Empire.  They inherited the Turkish feudal economic and legal 
systems and a very primitive industrial base.  As communism was imposed 
by the Soviet Union on Eastern and Central countries, many of these 
countries adopted communism with a „modifier‟.  In Poland, for example, the 
private sector was tolerated in some service activities but predominantly in 
agriculture.  The private sector owned some 80 percent of the agricultural 
lands contributing in 1988 to some 10 percent of the country GDP and 
employing around 10 percent of the total workforce (Rapacki, 1995).   
 
In Poland as well as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and many other 
communist countries, strong resentment among many segments of the 
population to the Soviet style of economic management was present since 
communism was implemented in these countries after the Second World 
War.  Consequently, in the 1960s and 1970s reforms of the state-owned 
enterprise were introduced in these countries giving some autonomy to senior 
managers to take product decisions based on consumer demands (Vincent 
and Lawrence, 2000; Pintilie, 1972; Jirasek, 1972; Lavigne, 1995).  The 
reforms allowed some state-owned enterprises to enter into business 
collaboration with some Western firms to market their products in Western 
markets.  The relaxation of trade with Western Europe had opened up the 
door wide for some political movements in these countries and also in the 
neighbouring countries to criticise the communist system and had increased 
their calls to be again part of the capitalist system.  The first sign of the 
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collapse of communism came with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 when 
East Germany united with its neighbour West Germany.  Quickly, many 
other communist countries abandoned communism and established the free 
market system.       
 
With the collapse of communism, all the communist systems and institutions 
were dismantled and replaced by the free market ones such as the 
democratisation of the political system, the liberalisation of trade, price and 
capital.  They all precipitated in the privatisation of the state property to 
reduce the role of the government in the economic activity and to expand 
private ownership.  In their approach to privatise the state property, the 
transition countries had taken almost a similar approach when it concerned 
restitution and small privatisation but different approaches when it concerned 
the privatisation of medium and large-size state-owned enterprises.  
Properties confiscated or nationalised during the communist period were 
returned to their original owners or their heirs.  The return of the properties 
took the form of assets return, compensations in cash or ownership of shares 
in the privatised state-owned enterprises   As far as small privatisation is 
concerned, this involved the privatisation of shops, restaurants and various 
service activities.  Some of these properties were transferred to 
municipalities, some sold under long-term lease arrangements and some were 
sold by auction for cash.  Foreign investors were not encouraged to 
participate in small privatisation.  In Czechoslovakia, for example, foreigners 
were allowed to participate only when a minimum price threshold could not 
be reached among the local bidders (Dana, 2000).  The intention from the 
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whole process of privatisation in transition countries whether in the form of 
restitution, small privatisation, the creation from scratch (de novo) of private 
firms and the privatisation of medium and large-size state-owned enterprises 
was to expand rapidly the number of domestic entrepreneurs.  In Poland, for 
example, by the end of 1992, or only two years since the beginning of the 
transition, nearly 80 percent of retailers and wholesalers, 50 percent of 
transport companies and 40 percent of construction companies were in the 
hands of the private sector (Simoneti, 1993).  The number was in steady 
increase in Poland and other transition countries since then.   
 
In all transition countries, governments faced a number of technical problems 
when they engaged in the privatisation of medium and large-size state-owned 
enterprises.  The institutions to support privatisation were absent in some 
countries and in others they were still at their embryonic stage of 
development.  The stock markets and the laws to protect the private property 
and the institutions to enforce these laws were just created and the banks 
were still functioning as if they were under the communist regime.  Also, the 
majority of the local population did not have enough savings to purchase the 
assets of the enterprises offered for sale.  Though foreign investors were 
allowed to invest in these countries, their participation in privatisation was 
strongly resented by the majority of the population.  There was also the 
problem of the strong opposition to privatisation by managers and workers of 
state-owned enterprises and also their supporters in parliaments.   Faced with 
these problems, the governments in these countries approached privatisation 
by using strategies and methods of privatisation to circumvent some of these 
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problems.  Below, the five major models of privatisation adopted in the 
transition countries are discussed.         
        
The Czech Model.  Advisers from the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) preferred to see privatisation in this country on a case-
by-case basis as was practiced in many privatisations in Western Europe.  
They recognised that the process would be slow but effective since the 
process would focus on selling the state-owned enterprise to the best possible 
private investors who would bring to the enterprise not only the capital 
needed in restructuring but also the technical and management know-how.  
The political leaders in Czechoslovakia were against the EBRD advice.  
Represented by the Prime Minister Klaus, privatisation in Czechoslovakia 
was to be carried out fast and with minimum costs.  For Klaus, rapid and 
mass privatisation would lead to faster restructuring.  For him (cited in 
Hoekman and Pohl, 1995: 3) “It is unnecessary to design techniques and 
legislations with respect to the objective of selecting perfect owner.  An 
objective like this is far beyond the capacity of post-communist governments 
and first (initial) owners may not be the final ones, anyway”.  Though some 
large enterprises like Skoda car factory, Skoda electronics and many others in 
heavy machinery, detergents and other industries, had seen their shares sold 
to foreign and domestic investors and to financial institutions (the 
participation of workers in privatisation had been very marginal or only about 
5 percent of shares in large enterprises), Czechoslovakia introduced the most 
innovative approach to privatisation ever seen in the history of economic 
restructuring:  the voucher privatisation.  The approach entailed the 
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distribution, through vouchers, of shares of the state-owned enterprise to the 
general public.   
 
This approach was designed by an economist named Dusan Triska (Nellis, 
2002). Though there was, from the beginning, serious unanswered questions 
about the long-term effects of this approach on restructuring and the 
performance of the privatised enterprise (Ellerman, 2001; Pavlinek, 2002), 
the Czechoslovakian government as well as many other governments in 
transition countries had implemented this approach.  During this time, there 
were some convincing arguments for the adoption of the vouchers 
distribution to the general public such as: 
 
 Because the nomenklatura - the communist élite composed of senior 
managers of state-owned enterprises, high level army officers, the communist 
party officials and high level state bureaucrats - had easy access to financial 
funds to purchase the public enterprises, there was fear that if this élite 
became the new owners of the public property, their ownership would 
undermine the transition reforms (Estrin, 1993).  The only way to stop the 
nomenklatura taking the largest slice of the privatised state property was to 
rapidly distribute the shares of the state-owned enterprises to the general 
public; 
 
 Though the stock markets were installed in most transition countries, it 
was perceived that it would take a long time before these markets would start 
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to function properly.  There was a fear that floating the shares of the state-
owned enterprises in these markets would be ineffective; 
 
 The distribution of shares would sidestep the difficult, costly and time 
consuming process in the valuation of state enterprises which investors, 
especially foreigners, often required to see whether the state-owned 
enterprise put for sale was economically and financially healthy; 
 
 There was a fear amongst the reformists, or what Ellerman (2001) called 
the „Post-revolutionaries‟, that moving slowly in the privatisation process 
would give enough time to workers in the state-owned enterprises and their 
supporters in the government administration and in the parliament to block 
privatisation and eventually reverse the transition to the free market 
economic system.  Giving a stake in the state-owned enterprise to workers 
and the general public was perceived to provide legitimacy to the reforms and 
give strong support to the reformists.  The reformists strongly believed that 
their victory in the political elections would not be complete unless the state 
properties were totally and rapidly transferred to the hands of the private 
sector.  On this point, Ellerman (2001: 7) argued that “Voucher 
privatisation…was a brilliant political strategy for the post-revolutionaries to 
reverse the decentralising reforms of the past and to pull power back to their 
new and clean state”. 
 
Based on these arguments, the process of privatisation in Czechoslovakia was 
indeed fast and with little costs.  As early as 1992, the government launched a 
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programme for the distribution of vouchers to all citizens above the age of 18 
to purchase the shares of some 3,000 state-owned enterprises (Dana, 2000).   
Each citizen was entitled to purchase a book of 1,000 voucher points for a fee 
of Krs 1,000 which was an equivalent of a one week worker‟s income 
(Hanousek and Kocěnda, 2003: 283).  Before the shares of the state-owned 
enterprise were put for distribution, the enterprise had to be first converted 
into a joint stock company.  The managers and the employees of the stock 
company as well as other interested investors were required to prepare the 
privatisation plan for the company.  The plan had to include a relevant 
financial and market analysis of the company and its future financial 
development (Simoneti, 1993).  One of the most important parts in the plan 
was to provide propositions of whether the whole company or only part of it 
should be privatised and by what method(s).  The elaborator of the 
privatisation plan could choose amongst the following methods (Hanousek 
and Kot‟nda, 2003): 
 
 Transfer of assets to employees; 
 Direct sale to domestic and foreign investors; 
 Public auction; 
 Public offering of shares in the stock market; 
 Voucher distribution. 
 
Since voucher distribution was a priority in the government privatisation 
policy, there was a strong pressure from the government administration on 
the managers of the joint stock companies to include in their privatisation 
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programmes the voucher privatisation method.  And it seemed that, Pavlinek 
(2002: 1129) explained, “A privatisation project which did not offer any 
shares for vouchers had little chance of being approved by the Ministry of 
Privatisation”.  Of the 2,400 enterprises listed for privatisation in 1991, 
nearly 1,000 included the voucher distribution method.  The number of 
shares to be distributed through vouchers was negotiated between the 
Ministry of Privatisation, the enterprise Founding Ministry, the Centre for 
Voucher Privatisation and the enterprise management.   
 
From the start, however, the designers of the voucher distribution were aware 
that this distribution would create a dispersed share ownership in the 
privatised enterprise and in the absence of a well functioning stock market 
and an effective enforcement of the bankruptcy law, monitoring of managers 
in the privatised enterprise would be difficult.  It was feared that the lack of 
monitoring would create a fertile ground for asset stripping by managers and 
their close allies in the government administration.  As a result, the designers 
of voucher privatisation had introduced the Investment Privatisation Funds 
(IPFs).  These Funds were supposed to act as intermediate capital market 
institutions standing between the general public as shareholders and the 
management of the privatised enterprises.  Some 264 Funds were created.  
Through a massive campaign, the citizens were called to deposit their 
voucher points in the IPFs to manage their shares.  About 56 percent of the 
voucher points ended up controlled by 13 largest Funds, controlling as a 
result some 57 percent of shares in some 473 privatised enterprises (Pavlinek, 
2002).  By the end of 1994, privatisation was almost complete in the Czech 
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Republic.  More than 80 percent of the state property was transferred to 
private hands (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003: 431).  The Czechoslovakian 
approach to privatisation and to the whole transition to the free market 
system was praised for being rapid and without negative macroeconomic 
consequences.  Inflation as well as unemployment were low and export 
especially to the European Union markets increased.  But since 1995, these 
encouraging macroeconomic indicators had been reversed.  The GDP growth 
in the Czech Republic had been in steady decline and unemployment in 
steady increase leading to an increase in the discontentment of the Czech 
population (Dana, 2000) and some economists (Coffee, 1999; Nellis, 2002) 
to the way the transition was handled in this country.  The whole blame was 
put on the voucher privatisation itself.  In the absence of sufficiently 
regulated Investment Funds, the majority of the Funds ended up controlled by 
major domestic banks and insurance institutions where the government 
already retained a controlling or a majority stake (Perotti, 1994) and by 
managers of the privatised enterprises (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003).  For 
Nellis (2002: 25), because the IPFs were not sufficiently regulated, “This 
opened the door to a variety of highly dubious and some overtly illegal 
actions…to expropriation of firm assets by Investment Funds and firm 
managers.  The expropriation and inefficiencies in the capital and financial 
markets retarded needed restructuring in the privatised firms, leaving them 
overstaffed, undercapitalised, unable to raise investment funds and poorly 
managed”. 
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The Russian Model.   Voucher distribution scheme was also followed in 
Russia but managers and workers were the benefiaries from the scheme.  
Early in 1993, the Russian government launched the first wave of 
privatisation by selling, through vouchers, the assets of the state-owned 
enterprises to the general public. Around 29,000 enterprises were listed for 
privatisation.  By the mid 1994, more than 19,000 enterprises were sold 
benefiting some 40 million citizens (McCarthy et al., 2000).   A second wave 
of privatisation started in the second half of 1994 but this time the assets had 
to be sold for money to the highest bidder in open auctions.  In the voucher 
privatisation, however, privileged terms and conditions were granted to 
managers and workers of the state-owned enterprise slated for privatisation.  
Managers and workers were allowed to purchase the shares of the state-
owned enterprise through three options (Filatotchev et al., 1995: 79):   
  
 Workers could obtain 25 percent of shares of the enterprise free of charge 
and the next 10 percent with a 30 percent discount.  The 10 percent of shares 
could be paid for by instalments over a period of three years.  Managers 
could buy a 5 percent of shares at their face value; 
 
 Workers and managers could buy a 51 percent of the shares of the 
enterprise at their face value; 
 
 All workers of the enterprise could buy 20 percent of the shares of the 
enterprise with a 30 percent discount.  Payment would be done by 
instalments over a period of three years.  And if a group of workers promised 
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to maintain the volume of outputs after privatisation, this group was allowed 
to buy for cash on the top of the 20 percent another 20 percent of the shares 
of the enterprise at their face value.     
 
More than 80 percent of the enterprises listed for privatisation chose option 
two. Consequently, more than 15,000 enterprises ended up in the hands of 
managers from the communist period and their workers.   
 
Managers had also increased their share ownership of state-owned enterprises 
following the „loans-for-shares‟ scheme.  Under this scheme, the shares 
which the government detained in the most attractive privatised enterprises 
were handed over to a handful of large banks which enjoyed a particularly 
close relationship with the president of the country and his entourage.  The 
shares were handed over in return for bank loans which the government 
desperately needed to pay the arrears in salaries and other benefits to some 10 
percent of the Russian workforce (Kuznetsova and Kuznetsov, 1999).  Since 
the government was in heavy budget deficits, it was unable to repay its loans 
and therefore the shares were sold to the banks at ridiculously lower prices.  
As many of the newly created commercial banks were owned by their former 
clients the state-owned enterprises, this meant an increase in the ownership of 
the privatised state-owned enterprises by managers from the communist era.  
Kuznetsova and Kuznetsov (1999) warned against the aggregation of control 
in the hands of managers.  They felt that this aggregation would endanger the 
success of the transition.  By the end of 1994, however, about two-third of 
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the shares of the privatised enterprises in Russia were controlled by managers 
and their workers (Blasi et al., 1994).     
   
The Hungarian Model.  Unlike the Czech Republic and Russia, Hungary did 
not proceed in mass privatisation through vouchers.  The government opted 
for a case-by-case privatisation and consequently the state assets were 
transferred to private investors through various methods such as restitution, 
assets transferred to managers and workers on preferential sale price, public 
offering of shares, sales by auction and direct sales to strategic investors.   
  
The privatisation in Hungary proceeded fast.  Some 50 percent of the state 
properties were slated for sale in a short period of four years (1990-1994). 
Under the supervision of the State Property Agency (SPA), the state-owned 
enterprises were transformed into joint stock companies - some were already 
transformed following the enterprise reforms of 1988 - and in collaboration 
with international consultants, the managers of these companies prepared 
proposals of what should be privatised and how it should be privatised.  They 
could choose by either issuing shares for public offering in the stock market, 
closing down unproductive assets, transferring the assets to the local 
municipalities, liquidating the whole or part of the company, and selling the 
whole or part of the company to domestic or to foreign investors.  To reduce 
the opposition of the workers, the privatisation law had also provided 
workers of the enterprise put for privatisation to purchase under favourable 
terms a 10 percent of the value of their enterprise.  Out of a total of 1,858 
listed for privatisation, 1,188 enterprises or 68 percent were fully transferred 
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to private investors and 700 were liquidated.  Direct sales to strategic 
investors and the floatation of shares in the stock exchange were the main 
methods of privatisation.  The main outcomes sought by using these two 
methods was to increase the government revenues drawn from privatisation 
in order to reduce the budget deficit, to bring fresh capital to the privatised 
enterprise which was desperately needed for its restructuring and survival, 
and to create a concentrated ownership in the hand of one or few investors 
which was perceived as the best incentive that would monitor the behaviour 
of managers and align their interests with the interests of the shareholders.   
 
By 1997, almost 80 percent of Hungary‟s GDP was produced by the private 
sector.  Almost 40 percent of the country‟s assets were in the hands of 
domestic investors and almost the same proportion in the hands of foreign 
investors (Voszka, 1999).  One has to note that unlike other transition 
countries, Hungary was able to attract foreign investment for various reasons.  
It is a country which has close borders with Western Europe particularly 
Austria, it had a long history of dealing with Western markets, was politically 
stable, had a stable macroeconomic environment and had introduced a legal 
system as early as 1991 to protect private property rights and provided many 
investment incentives to foreign investors such as profit despatch outside 
Hungary and reduced taxation.  After less than ten years since privatisation 
was introduced in Hungary, the size of the state sector had dramatically been 
reduced to almost 10 percent in 1999 (Voszka, 1999) and the market became, 
through the increasing mergers between firms, concentrated in the hands of 
few private monopolies operating at national and regional levels.   
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The East German Model.   Privatisation in East Germany was a unique 
experience in the transition countries. It was quick (1990-1994) and, 
significantly, effective.  Its speed and effectiveness were possible because the 
reunification with West Germany in 1989 provided East Germany with the 
needed legal, financial and human resources required in privatisation 
(Leysen, 1991; Manfred, 1991; Dyck et al., 1999).  Following the 
reunification, the West German free market legislations were established with 
high speed in East Germany and the West German companies were expected 
to play a decisive role in the privatisation process.   
 
The main objective of privatisation was not to create a popular capitalism as 
was the case in Czechoslovakia or Russia, but to sell the state-owned 
enterprises to investors who could guarantee their long-term development.  
The search for these investors was entrusted to a government agency called 
Treuhandanstalt or in short the THA.  The THA was created by the East 
German government and after the reunification it was put under the West 
German control.  All the East German state property was put under the 
control of the THA which included some 8,000 state-owned enterprises with 
44,000 production units and employing nearly 7 million workers (Leysen, 
1991), in addition to lands, forests, properties that belonged to the police, the 
army, and the government institutions.  The large portfolio of the THA made 
it the largest industrial holding company in the world.    
 
The THA was a joint stock company wholly owned by the government but 
with the rights to sue and be sued and to borrow freely from the capital 
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markets.  It was governed by two bodies:  the Supervisory Board and the 
Management Board.  The Supervisory Board was composed from 
representatives of different ministries, the trade union and some businessmen.  
As for the Management Board, it was composed in its majority of managers 
from West German companies (Carlin, 1994: 138).  To make privatisation 
easier and quicker, the THA was divided into regional and provincial 
departments where the majority of the 3,000 of its staff were West Germans.  
The main task of this staff was to look for potential buyers for the state-
owned enterprises for sale.    To make the sale attractive, the Kombinats were 
broken down into medium and small enterprises.  Some enterprises were 
closed downs because they were unviable, some were returned to the local 
government authorities or to their original owners and those with the future 
potential were financially restructured.  Some DM 30 billion was spent by the 
THA in their restructuring.  To avoid joint ownership of government and 
private investors, the privatised enterprise was sold wholly to private 
investors who were selected for their knowledge with the activities of the 
enterprise and enjoyed sound financial and managerial resources.  
Consequently, nearly 74 percent of the enterprises were bought by West 
Germans, 20 percent by East Germans especially managers and workers and 
only 5.9 percent by foreigners (Dyck et al., 1999: 4).  The buyers were 
allowed to buy the enterprise but the lands and buildings attached to the 
enterprise were leased out on a long-term contract.   Also, the new owners 
had to promise in the sale contract to keep the activity of the enterprise, to 
make capital investment, and to protect jobs or create new ones.  In return for 
this promise, the THA had to assume all the liabilities of the state-owned 
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enterprise put for sale, to provide a favourable sale price of the enterprise and 
a number of tax concessions to the interested buyer. In the event that the new 
owner of the privatised enterprise failed to keep up with the promise, the new 
owner had to make compensatory payments.  A survey on the performance of 
the privatised manufacturing enterprises in East Germany was carried out by 
Eickelpasch et al., (1998).  The authors found that the growth of the 
privatised manufacturing enterprises had been since 1993 in steady growth 
especially for those enterprises serving the East German markets.  Compared 
to their counterparts the West Germans, on average, the productivity of the 
East German enterprises remained lower than the West German.  The same 
could be said with export.  The authors concluded that on the whole 
“Productivity has expanded at high rates and unit labour costs have been 
drastically reduced…The integration of the East German manufacturing into 
an open economy is still a long way to go”.                                    
                
The Polish Model.   Poland is considered the country which was the slowest 
in its progress to privatisation but at the same time it was the country which 
has been doing so far, with the exception of East Germany, better than the 
rest of the transition countries in term of economic growth (Nellis, 2002).  
However, at the beginning of the transition in 1990, Western economic 
advisers to the Polish government like Lipton and Sachs (Lipton and Sachs, 
1990) recommended that privatisation should be fast.  The state-owned 
enterprise should be transformed into a joint stock company with the state 
treasury as its unique owner.  The shares of the company should be 
distributed with different methods.  Some shares should be distributed for 
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free or at a nominal price to workers, some should be distributed for free to 
financial intermediaries, and some should be kept by the government.  The 
government should not keep these shares for ever but it should sell them off 
as a block to core investors.  The recommendation of Lipton and Sachs was 
stimulated as it seems from their fear that if privatisation did not proceed fast, 
workers, through their Workers Councils and their allies in the parliament, 
would block privatisation and the whole process of transition.  Their fear 
proved right as workers were against any form of privatisation and this 
created a lot of political and social tensions.  In the parliament, politicians 
could not agree on what method of privatisation they should introduce that 
would be welcomed by workers and other parties in society.  After too many 
debates in parliament, the government was able to create a programme where 
some 4,480 enterprises of different sizes were listed to be privatised through 
different methods, including public offerings of shares, direct sales to 
strategic investors, transfer to employees, distribution of vouchers to the 
public and liquidation (Blaszczyk, 1999).   
 
What makes Poland different from many transition countries in its strategy of 
privatisation is the way voucher privatisation was carried out.  Voucher 
privatisation in Poland differed from that used in the Czech Republic in terms 
of quantity and quality.  Only a limited number of enterprises, about 512, or 
11 percent of all state-owned enterprises listed for privatisation were sold 
through voucher (Woodruff, 2004) and only 15 Investment Funds were 
created to manage the shares bought by vouchers.  In addition, the Funds in 
the Czech Republic were founded by public, private companies and 
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individuals, but in Poland, all the 15 Funds were owned by the state treasury.  
Rather than distributing the shares to the general public, the shares of the 512 
state enterprises (these were converted into joint stock companies to allow 
the distribution of shares) were distributed amongst three owners:  the Funds, 
the state treasury and the employees.  In each enterprise, the Funds owned 60 
percent, the state treasury 25 percent and the employees owned for free the 
remaining 15 percent.  The sixty percent share ownership was divided 
between a „lead fund‟ which received a 33 percent of the shares and the 
remaining 27 percent were divided between the remaining 14 Funds or 1.93 
percent of shares for each Fund (Hashi, 1999; Dockery, 2000).  As suggested 
by Lipton and Sachs (1990), the government did not keep the shares for ever 
but sold many of them to strategic investors or transferred them to the 
pension funds.  What is important to mention here is that the general public 
was allowed to take part in the ownership of the state-owned enterprises only 
when their shares were sold in the stock market.  Before this would happen, 
the Investment Funds were required to restructure the companies in their 
portfolios and make them efficient.  Once these companies were financially 
sound, their shares should be floated in the stock market where the general 
public would buy the shares in exchange for „Universal Share Certificates‟.  
Every Polish citizen aged eighteen and over was allowed to collect one 
„Universal Share Certificate‟ for a fee of PLN20 (US$8).  This certificate 
entitled its owner to own one share in each Fund (Hashi, 1999). Many Fund 
companies, following improvement in their efficiencies, started to sell their   
shares since 1997 where foreign investors were able to acquire block 
ownership in many of them.     
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In addition to share distribution, liquidation was another method of 
privatisation which seems to have worked well in Poland.  It was a method 
designed by the Poles without the intervention of Western economic experts 
(Ellerman, 2001).  The decision to liquidate the state-owned enterprise was 
made by the state treasury own initiative or on the request of the Workers 
Councils of the enterprise.  Often when the enterprise was a loss-making, the 
initiative came from the treasury, and when the enterprise was profitable, the 
managers and workers of the enterprise requested its liquidation.  The 
liquidated assets were either sold to private investors or leased out to 
managers and workers.  The sale took place through tender, sale offer 
published in the national press or direct negotiation between the treasury and 
the purchaser.  As far as leasing is concerned, managers and workers were 
required to create their own companies which would lease the equities of 
their liquidated enterprises. The leasing contracts were signed between the 
founders of these companies and the treasury.  The contract provision 
stipulated that upon repayment of all the capital instalments and leasing fees, 
only then the liquidated enterprise would become the property of the manager 
and employee companies.   More than a thousand, or 1,021, of small, medium 
and some large state-owned enterprises were liquidated for the benefit of 
managers and workers (Blaszczyk, 1999).  Though the state sector has shrank 
considerably in Poland, some 500 large enterprises were by the year 2000 
still in the hands of the government producing in 1999 around 25 percent of 
the country‟s GDP. 
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Clearly, transition countries had proceeded differently when the privatisation 
of medium and particularly large state-owned enterprises was concerned.  
The different methods used in privatisation had inevitably created different 
types of owners of the privatised state-owned enterprise and this had indeed 
influenced the governance structure of the enterprise, a structure which had 
implicitly and explicitly an impact on the enterprise restructuring behaviour 
and its financial and operational performance as the next sections will clearly 
explain.     
 
3.3. The Impact of Different Owners on Restructuring   
 
Enterprise restructuring is believed to take place when the owners exercise an 
effective control over the behaviour of managers.  The degree of control over 
managers is determined by whether the shares are owned by enterprise 
managers/workers (insiders) or by domestic and foreign investors (outsiders) 
and by whether share ownership is concentrated or dispersed.  A long time 
ago, however, Berle and Means (1933) contended that when the ownership in 
the private firm was dispersed (the shares were owned by too many 
investors), this yielded significant control in the hands of managers whose 
interests did not coincide with the interests of the shareholders.  Later, 
researchers carried out studies to understand whether managers should own a 
high proportion of shares in their firms or a minority shares as an incentive to 
align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders.  Holstrom 
(1976) and Shavell (1979) suggested that managers should be given a high 
proportion of ownership of shares in their firms to incite them to make 
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decisions that were close to the shareholder interest which was the 
maximisation of firm‟s profit.  Their suggestion was against what Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) believed.  Jensen and Meckling believed that the 
concentration of ownership in the hands of managers was very costly.  These 
managers would pursue projects that shape their firms according to their own 
preferences.  These preferences might entail excessive growth, 
diversification, expansion of the production lines and expenditures on 
perquisites which could be enormously expensive to the shareholders.  
Another reason for avoiding the concentration of ownership in the hands of 
managers was the management entrenchment.   With ownership 
concentration, managers would become both owners and controllers of their 
firms a fact which would make it difficult to fire managers who would not 
perform well.  This was one of the fundamental reasons for not allowing 
managers in the big private corporation in the advanced economies to own 
100 percent ownership in their corporations.   
 
In the context of transition countries, an important part in the design of the 
privatisation strategies in many transition countries was the transfer of state 
ownership to insiders.  Blanchard and Aghion (1996) warned against 
managers owning more than half of the shares of the privatised enterprise 
because the concentration of shares in their hands would make it impossible 
for outside investors to acquire control of the privatised enterprise.  
Ownership by outsiders, especially foreigners, was assumed to be necessary 
because they had the capital and the know-how as these were the main 
resources needed in the restructuring process.  Russia as already mentioned 
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had taken the lead in privatisation for the benefits of managers and workers.  
In their survey of 127 privatised enterprises in Russia, Blasi et al., (1994) 
reported that 90 percent of the enterprises had majority employee ownership 
and managers had an average of 8.6 percent of all employee share ownership.  
One important point to mention here is that when the Russian government 
designed the voucher programme, it was hoped that the dominance of 
managers/workers in the privatised enterprise would be temporary and should 
be reversed for the benefits of outsiders.  Since vouchers were tradable (Giles 
and Baxton, 1996; Volgin and Milner, 1996), politicians expected that 
workers would be tempted to sell their vouchers for cash to outsiders and 
consequently the sale would introduce block investors in the privatised 
enterprise who would bring a better monitoring of managers and force them 
to carry out effective restructuring or be fired.  What really happened, 
managers made sure not to lose their control over the privatised state-owned 
enterprise (Blasi et al., 1994).  They put pressure on workers not to sell to 
outsiders but to them.  Most workers were also reluctant to sell to outsiders 
based on what Nellis (1999) described “The better the devil we know - that is 
the existing managers - than some cost-cutting and perhaps job slashing 
outsider”. 
  
Even when workers owned the majority of shares in the enterprise, the 
Russian experience shows that managers prevented workers to exercise their 
rights in the decisions of the Board of Directors.  Based on the UK/US model 
of internal control, the Board of Directors in Russian privatised state-owned 
enterprises was supposed to monitor the behaviour of managers.  Represented 
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in the Board of Directors, the workers were supposed to decide on the 
objectives of the firm, its long-term strategy, the appointment of senior 
executives and external auditors, and the compensation and performance 
evaluation of senior executives.  But this was not the case.  Their votes in the 
shareholder meetings were controlled by managers and they were in many 
enterprises implicitly threatened by managers to be sacked if they went 
against their decisions (Blasi et al., 1994; Earle and Estrin, 1996; Shleifer and 
Vasiliv, 1996; Nellis, 1999; Sprenger, 2002).  The explanation that can be 
given for why workers did not actively participate in the decision-making 
process is that under share distribution, workers purchased the shares either 
free or at discounted prices and this as it seems gave them low incentives to 
exercise their control over managers.  Since they did not invest a high price 
to buy the shares, this was enough not to stimulate them to put pressure on 
the managers to restructure the enterprise in order to increase the efficiency 
of the enterprise so that the returns for their shares would increase.  Also, in 
an environment where unemployment especially in the early years of 
transition increased at a staggering rate, a worker would be foolish to 
challenge the decisions of his/her manager in the shareholder meetings fear 
from being sacked.  Researchers like Estrin and Wright (1999) and Boardman 
(1999) found in the concentration of ownership in the hands of 
managers/workers as one of the obstacles standing against effective 
restructuring in the Russian privatised enterprise.  According to Boardman, 
ownership by insiders had led to fraud and corruption, to wage manipulation 
and to the inability of the enterprise to attract investment. 
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Unlike in Russia, in the early years of transition, the voucher distribution in 
the Czech Republic was praised for being an instrument which was 
responsible for the country‟s economic growth.  This distribution created 
Investment Funds which, according to Claessens et al., (1997), had exercised 
an effective monitoring over enterprise managers and forced them to improve 
the performance of their enterprises.  The Investment Funds were primarily 
created to circumvent the corporate governance problem that faced the Czech 
Republic and all other transition countries.  The absence of properly 
functioning stock market, take over, bankruptcy, and a legal system to protect 
minority shareholders, the bank and financial institutions-sponsored 
Investment Funds were created and this in imitation to the German model of 
corporate governance structure where banks, through their strong 
representation in the Supervisory Boards of the corporations, actively 
monitor the behaviour of managers.   
 
Like in Germany, both the Investment Funds and their portfolio companies 
were governed by a two-tier governance structure: a Supervisory Board and a 
Management Board.  The Supervisory Board was responsible for overseeing 
and monitoring the actions of the Management Board and the Management 
Board was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the enterprise.  The 
Supervisory Board of the Investment Fund was supposed to be active player 
in monitoring the behaviour of the manager and aligning his/her interests 
with the interests of the shareholders, which was to restructure and make the 
enterprise profitable (Coffee, 1999; Stephen and Backhaus, 2003).  Though 
some enterprises in the Fund portfolios restructured and improved their 
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financial performances, the Country Study report published by the World 
Bank in 1999, concluded that the governance and performance of many 
enterprises in the Czech Funds were until 1999 still poor.    This was related 
to the fact that the Funds lacked the professional knowledge about the 
activities of enterprises in their portfolios as these enterprises operated in 
different industries and this resulted in poor monitoring of managers.  More 
significant, it was related to the fact that the Funds were predominantly 
owned by banks and financial institutions which were still either wholly or 
majority owned by the government.  Out of the 14 major Funds, 8 were 
owned by banks and financial institutions where the government owned more 
than 40 percent of their shares (Stephen and Backhaus, 2003: 434).  With the 
presence of the government in the Funds, many enterprises benefited from 
government subsidies which resulted in low manager‟s willingness to 
undertake effective restructuring.  More important, it is widely reported in the 
literature on the Czech Investment Funds (Dobrinsky, 1996; Coffee, 1999; 
Stiglitz, 1999; Nellis, 2002) that the Funds were a fertile ground for fraud and 
corruption where enterprise managers and their allies in the government 
administration had stripped the best enterprise assets for their personal gains. 
 
Perhaps the only exception, as revealed in the literature on Investment Funds 
in transition countries, for this scenario of the Funds weakness to monitor 
managers and corruption was that experienced in the Polish Investment 
Funds.  The majority of enterprises in the portfolios of these Funds were able 
to introduce restructuring and increase their efficiency because they were 
basically managed by foreign managers.  These Investment Funds were 
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managed by management companies which were predominantly composed of 
foreign experts mainly from the banking and financial sector.  They were 
hired for a period of ten years.  To ensure that the managers of these 
companies would act in the best interests of the Fund enterprises, their 
managers were remunerated around 3.5 to 4.5 percent of the value of assets 
they managed.  They were initially paid a fixed management fee of 
approximately 2 to 3 percent of the value of assets and bonuses linked to the 
financial performance of the enterprises they managed.  To actively manage 
the Fund enterprises, these management companies appointed their 
representatives in the Supervisory Boards of the enterprises they managed 
and replaced a number of their ex-communist managers (Hashi, 1999; 
Kruczalak and Kruczalak, 2003).  They had also introduced many changes in 
the operations of these enterprises, turning many of them profitable.  What is 
important to mention is that their tight monitoring over the managers had 
considerably reduced the opportunities of asset stripping by managers.     
 
In addition, effective monitoring of managers was associated with the 
privatised enterprise majority owned by outsiders, particularly foreign 
investors (Carlin et al., 1995; Brada and Singh, 1999; Frydman et al., 1999;   
Djankov, 1999, Hanousek et al., 2007).  In their revision of case studies on 
restructuring and corporate governance in Central and Eastern transition 
countries, Brada and Singh (1999), for example, concluded that privatised 
enterprises owned by foreign investors exercised tight control over managers 
and pushed them to restructure because these investors were skilled at 
evaluating managers and had no sentimental ties that sustained their loyalty 
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to ineffective management teams.  These owners, Carlin et al., (1995) argued, 
made sure to place people they could trust to represent them in the boards of 
the companies they acquired.  These were nominated either from inside or 
outside the companies.  In fact, in some cases, the foreign owners had to 
import their representatives from the boards of directors in their parent 
companies in their country of origin.  The tight control over managers 
together with the foreign owners‟s capital had encouraged comprehensive 
restructuring and consequently the improvement in the financial performance  
of the acquired enterprises.  
 
3.4. Managers’ Stakes in the Privatised State-Owned Enterprises 
and their Career Concerns 
 
Economists were puzzled to see that a country like Poland where 
privatisation was very slow and foreign direct investments was low recovered 
quickly as early as 1992.  State-owned enterprises in this country responded 
quickly to the threat of competition in the early years of transition (Pinto et 
al., 1993; Estrin et al., 1995).  Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess (1996) 
provided a model in which they identified the conditions under which the 
state-owned enterprise was more likely to restructure before its privatisation.  
They assumed that managers would be unwilling to embark in restructuring if 
the benefits drawn from the privatisation of their enterprises were small.  
Since one of the main elements of enterprise restructuring was asset 
contraction, this according to these researchers would inevitably create strong 
opposition by those affected by the contraction.  Where the workers had 
control of their enterprises through Workers Councils or powerful trade 
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unions, the decision of managers to embark in asset contraction would be 
faced by worker strikes, sabotage or firing the managers.  To alleviate the 
pressure from the opposition to restructuring, these researchers proposed that 
the government should design a privatisation method which should provide 
managers a large stake in the shares of their privatised enterprises.  The 
shares could be voting or non-voting shares.  Allowing managers to have a 
stake in their enterprises would encourage managers to reveal their 
managerial abilities.     
           
Showing their managerial abilities would also increase the chances of 
managers to be hired anywhere.  Roland and Sekkat (2000) provided a model 
in which they presented the prospect of privatisation as a mechanism which 
would affect the incentives of managers to restructure.  If the future owners 
of the state enterprises slated for privatisation would hire only good 
managers, managers of the state enterprises would make strong efforts to 
restructure their enterprises to show to the enterprises future owners their 
managerial abilities to ensure that they would remain in their managerial 
positions once the new owners took over their enterprises.  Their managerial 
abilities would also increase their chances to be recruited in the private sector 
where wages were higher than in the state sector.  One has to point out that 
research on the link between restructuring and manager career concerns has 
been very limited.  
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3.5. The Budget Constraints  
 
Under communism, the state-owned enterprise enjoyed government subsidies 
and bank credits without any difficulties. But with the transition to the free 
market economic system, many transition countries had introduced since the 
early years of the transition tough financial policies as a strategy to stabilise 
their economies.  They reformed the banking system by breaking up their 
monobanks - the monobank acted during the socialist period as a central 
bank, as a commercial bank and as a saving bank - into central banks and 
commercial banks.  The first country which embarked in these reforms was 
Hungary.  In 1987, the monobank was broken up into a central bank and 2 
commercial banks.  These banks were transformed into joint stock companies 
with great autonomy allocated to their managers and with banking 
regulations hardening the provision of credits to loss-making enterprises. 
Similar bank reforms were introduced in Poland in 1989 and by 1995 almost 
all transition countries had reformed their state-owned banks (Thorne, 1993).  
As a measure to reduce the government-bail out to banks burdened with bad 
debts, many state banks were privatised. A cross ownership between 
domestic and foreign investors was widely found in the newly created private 
banks.  In the majority of cases, foreign investors had majority ownership in 
these banks.  They controlled, on average, more than 40 percent of shares in 
Hungarian banks, nearly 51 percent in Czech banks and 53 percent in Polish 
banks (Berglöf and Bolton, 2002: 85).    With the restructuring of state banks 
and the growing number of private banks, the commercial banks were 
supposed to lend only to profitable enterprises and to play an active role in 
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restructuring the financial conditions of indebted enterprises to turn them 
from loss-making into profitable and to liquidate those enterprises where the 
prospect for their future viability was impossible and their financial 
indebtedness was beyond repair.         
 
In the early years of transition, most state-owned enterprises were heavily 
burdened by debts inherited from the socialist period but mostly accumulated 
during the early years of transition as enterprises were borrowing heavily to 
contain their losses which were a direct result from the loss of the CMEA 
markets, the fall in domestic demands because of competition from imports, 
high inflation and other economic dislocations.  Long and Rutkowska (1995: 
4) estimated that bad debts accumulated by the state banks in Central and 
Eastern countries, though with a considerable variation by country and bank, 
ranged between 20 and 40 percent of total bank loans.   Poland was the first 
country which tackled the bad debts accumulated by state banks.  In early 
1993, the government introduced a programme called the „Enterprise-Bank 
Restructuring Programme (EBRP)‟.  One of the major elements in the EBRP 
was the Bank Conciliation Procedure.  In this procedure, both the bank and 
the state-owned enterprise entered into negotiations to restructure the debts of 
the enterprise.  Gray and Holle (1996) studied the application of the Bank 
Conciliation Procedure in 62 Polish enterprises and found that in most cases 
debts were either written off or the time for the debts repayment was 
extended and only in few enterprises the banks used the debt/equity swap and 
the debt settlement through the courts.  Interestingly, one of the conditions 
for a state-owned enterprise to enter into the Conciliation Procedure was to 
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be converted into a joint stock company and to prepare a restructuring plan.  
Most of the restructuring plans were, according to these authors, vague and 
unrealistic and their application did not increase enterprise profitability.  In 
some enterprises, profitability became worse than before when these 
enterprises entered the conciliation procedure.   
 
There are, however, a number of empirical studies which showed the 
effectiveness of the bank lending in Poland since the early transition which 
was one of the stimulus for restructuring of state-owned enterprises. In the 
study of 75 Polish manufacturing state-owned enterprises for the period of 
1989-1991, Pinto et al., (1993) found that because of the difficulties that the 
state-owned enterprises faced for securing loans from the banks and their few 
chances to be rescued by the government, managers of these enterprises 
engaged in restructuring.  They got rid of the social assets by giving some to 
the local municipalities, some rented out and some sold; unbundling 
unproductive production lines; looking for new markets for their core 
products; and worked harder to collect overdue receivables.  Earle and Estrin 
(1996) also found that because of the hard budget constraint, the enterprises 
in their sample engaged in employment shedding to reduce costs.  
  
One interesting finding in the study of Gray and Holle is the fact that while 
enterprises in Poland became less indebted to their banks and their suppliers, 
overdue payable to the government authorities in the form of tax arrears and 
social insurance payments and to workers in the form of wage arrears 
increased.  But one should emphasis that government and worker arrears in 
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Poland as well as in Hungary were negligible, even during the early years of 
the transition, when compared, for example, with Russia.     
 
Studies carried out on the bank lending system and the government transfers 
in Russia showed that until 1996 state-owned enterprises even those loss-
making were still having a privileged position when it comes to securing 
financial resources.  In Russia, more than anywhere else in transition 
countries, the growth of the private commercial banking sector was rapid.  By 
the year 1995, around 2,500 commercial banks were in operation (Fan, Lee 
and Schaffer, 1996).  These banks were in their majority created from the 
spin offs of the former state banks.  They were supposed to put in place an 
effective lending system where the economic and financial position of an 
enterprise must be thoroughly scrutinised before the release of a loan.  In 
practice, the lending was dependent on the enterprise-bank relationship.  
State-owned enterprises even those with heavy debts found it easier to get 
access to loans than the best performing private firms.  Lobbying was 
regarded as the most effective instrument to obtain state transfers by the 
state-owned enterprises in Russia.  Though the business environment in 
Russia and most transition countries has improvement significantly, the 
surveys of the World Bank (Hellman et al., 2000) and of the EBRD (Fries et 
al., 2003) indicated that lobbying for state transfers was still widely used by 
state-owned enterprises in Russia and the NIS more than in Central and 
Eastern countries, extending as a result the survival of these enterprises and 
creating an unfair competitive market.     
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3.6. Product Market Competition 
  
The relationship between competition and firm efficiency is well established 
in economics literature.  Competition is regarded as a good thing, reducing 
monopoly power and forcing firms to be efficient and to innovate (Nickell, 
1996).  In the transition countries, the main ingredient of the transition was 
the expansion of the private sector.  This expansion was perceived to 
stimulate competition which necessarily would lead to the national economic 
growth.  The growth of domestic and foreign investment, though with a 
varying degree between countries, had grown rapidly in transition countries.    
Bratkowski et al., (2000) surveyed the number of private firms in Central and 
Eastern transition countries during the early years of transition.  According to 
their survey, the number of small and medium firms increased in the Czech 
Republic from 1,600 in 1990 to over 7,100 in 1994; in Poland, it increased 
for the same period from 36,000 to 95,000; and in Russia it reached more 
than 2 millions.   
 
The expansion of the private sector was also accompanied in most transition 
countries by the introduction of laws that support competition.  Between 
1990 and 1996, 22 out of 26 transition countries had introduced competition 
laws (Dutz and Vagliasindi, 1999) and many had also introduced during this 
period the law of bankruptcy to exit non-performing firms from the market 
and lifted a large number of barriers on trade and the access to foreign 
exchange.  Imports and exports in most transition countries especially in the 
advanced countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics - 
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expanded dramatically.  As early as 1994, the contribution of the private 
sector to the GDP of Poland, Hungary, Russia, the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Albania had been over 50 percent 
(Estrin, 2002: 110).  The trade, especially to West European markets, had 
increased in Poland from 32.7 percent of GDP in 1991 to 43.6 percent in 
1999; Hungary from 54.9 percent to 93.8 percent and in the Czech Republic 
from 66.9 percent to 104.2 percent (Estrin, 2002: 116).  
 
Though the advanced transition countries, especially Poland, have been 
praised for the rapid growth of the private sector, there were until recently 
still institutional bottlenecks which slowed down competition.  Entry and exit 
barriers were still high and the enforcement laws to protect competitors were 
still poor.  In a study of regulations of entry in 85 countries, Djankov et al., 
(2001) made a comparison between transition and developed countries on the 
number of procedures that a person had to go through when applying for a 
business registration and the time it took before the business was finally 
registered.  It took longer to open a business in transition countries than in 
developed ones.  In the USA, for example, a person had to go through 4 
procedures and it took one week to open a new business whereas in Poland a 
person had to go through 10 procedures and had to wait 27 days.   
   
Russia and the NIS were described to do worse than anywhere else in 
transition countries in terms of business registration and law enforcement.  A 
person wishing to open a business had to go through 16 procedures and had 
to wait for more than two months before the business was finally registered.  
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Private entrepreneurs in Russia were also discouraged to engage in business 
activities because of the high taxation they had to pay and the growing 
organised crime.  According to Judith and Nedezhda (1996), Russian 
enterprises were required to pay some 27 different taxes.  Often, the burden 
of taxation led many Russian enterprises even those operating in the state 
sector to resort to illegal practices to hide the true performance of their 
enterprises such as giving false accounting statements to tax collectors to 
avoid paying taxes or to operate in the shadow economy (Leitzal et al., 1995; 
Gregory et al., 2000).   
 
Russia and the NIS had also been described to do worse than anywhere else 
in terms of law enforcement to protect competitors.  In Russia, for example, 
despite the bankruptcy law was implemented since 1998, Sprenger (2000: 13) 
argued that “Extremely few enterprises have been declared bankrupt despite 
the widespread non-payment problems”.  The failure to implement the 
legislations to protect the private property had been strongly related to the 
poor functioning of the law enforcement system. The judiciary institutions 
which were supposed to apply the laws in all transparency and fairness were 
highly influenced by politicians and influential groups.  Many judges and 
lawyers were corrupted.  The transition to the free market economic system 
had in fact created not only in Russia but in most transition countries a fertile 
ground for corruption.  The report of the World Bank (2000) and the works 
of Dob et al., (2003), Hellman et al., (2000),  and Gray et al., (2004) 
provided lengthy analyses of the origin of corruption in transition countries 
and its effects on the economic and social structures of these countries.  
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Corruption was exercised by individuals and by different interest groups to 
bribe the officials in the various government institutions to create laws and 
regulations to protect their interests.  For example, enterprises that had close 
connection with government bureaucrats, especially state-owned and 
privatised enterprises, were in a better position to be protected from 
competition creating as a result a concentrated market structure.  In Russia, 
for example, by the end of the 1990s, around 43 percent of industrial 
production came from state-owned enterprises and 40 percent came from the 
privatised enterprises where the government held a significant share 
ownership (McCarthy et al., 2000). Though the burden of taxation has been 
reduced in recent years, state-owned enterprises and enterprises with strong 
link with the Russian government had remained protected from competition 
through subsidies and tight control over private investment in the country. 
       
3.7. Impact of Determinants on Enterprise Restructuring and 
Performance:  Empirical Evidence 
 
 
Most empirical studies tried to understand the impact of the determinants of 
enterprise restructuring on the enterprise restructuring and its financial and 
operating performance.  Carlin and Landesmann (1997), Djankov and 
Murrell (2000) and Commander et al., (2000) surveyed the empirical studies 
that looked into this impact.   They reported that the effect of privatisation on 
the financial performance of the privatised enterprise was positive.  The 
studies that looked at the relationship between privatisation and enterprise 
performance had compared the financial performance of enterprises owned 
by different types of owners.  In their sample of 200 privatised and state-
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owned enterprises in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary for the period 
1994, Frydman et al., (1999), for example, found that when the state-owned 
enterprises were owned by insiders (managers and workers), their 
performance in terms of sale revenues, labour productivity (revenue per 
employee) and labour and material costs (per unit of revenues) did not differ 
from that of the state-owned enterprises except when it concerned 
employment behaviour.  Insider enterprises tended to lay off fewer workers 
than the state-owned enterprises and enterprises privatised through other 
methods.  Their findings also revealed that the impact of privatisation on 
enterprise performance was stronger in enterprises owned by outsiders 
(domestic and foreign investors).  According to them, privatisation to an 
outside owner added on average nearly 10 percentage points to the annual 
rate of revenue growth of a firm.  Moreover, in their analysis of 89 empirical 
studies that looked into the impact of privatisation on enterprise performance, 
Djankov and Murrell (2000) concluded that performance improvement after 
privatisation was recorded more in enterprises operating in Central and 
Eastern transition countries than in Russia and the NIS, though Estrin and 
Rosewear (1999) had, earlier, found evidence of performance improvement 
in the privatised Russian and NIS enterprises.   
 
All authors (Carlin and Landesmann, 1997; Djankov and Murrell, 2000; 
Commander et al., 2000; Megginson and Netter, 2001) who had reviewed the 
empirical studies that explored the impact of privatisation on enterprise 
performance in transition countries and in developed and developing 
countries had questioned the robustness of the findings of these empirical 
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studies.  They argued that the methodologies used in these studies suffered 
from the sample selection bias.  They related the bias to the fact that in most 
countries, governments engaged in privatisation, especially of large-size 
enterprises, by selling first the best performing state-owned enterprises as a 
strategic policy to make privatisation „looks good‟.  They also reported that 
the financial data of enterprises operating in transition countries used in most 
empirical studies were incomplete and were often manipulated by enterprise 
managers to give a good image about the performance of their enterprises.   
 
While the relationship between privatisation and enterprise performance had 
taken a strong interest of researchers, only few researchers had explored the 
impact of career concerns of managers on enterprise restructuring.  In their 
study of 75 large Polish manufacturing state-owned enterprises, Pinto et al., 
(1993) found that one of the reasons that encouraged managers to engage in 
restructuring was the prospect of privatisation of their enterprises.  Since 
managerial skills were in short supply in Poland, managers, according to 
Pinto and Wijinbergen (1994), were confident that their managerial abilities 
would secure their jobs in their enterprises after privatisation and they had no 
problems finding jobs elsewhere. 
 
Beside the impact of privatisation on enterprise performance, researchers had 
also paid strong attention to investigate the link between management 
replacement and the enterprise productivity after privatisation (Claessens and 
Djankov, 1999; Barberis et al., 1996; Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2007) and 
enterprise restructuring under different types of owners (Belka et al., 1995; 
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Zimplinerovă, 1995; Earle and Estrin, 1996; Djankov, 1999).  In their study 
of 706 Czech enterprises investigated for the period 1993-1997, Claessens 
and Djankov (1999) found that enterprises that replaced their managers after 
privatisation experienced the largest profitability (0.102) and productivity 
increases (0.054) relative to the average changes in their respective sectors.  
In Contrast, enterprises which did not experience any management turnover 
reported larger decline in profitability (-0.043) and productivity (-0.06) than 
their industry peers.  Their findings supported the study published earlier by 
Barberis et al., (1996).  In their survey of 452 Russian shops for the period 
1992-1993, Barberis et al., showed that the privatisation of Russian shops 
promoted restructuring when new managers were brought in to run the shops.  
These managers were not all share owners in the enterprises.  They had 
money and access to loans which the old managers did not have at least in the 
short run.  They concluded that continued control of old managers presented 
a problem for restructuring and that more attention should be paid to 
management turnover as opposed to shareholder oversight over the existing 
managers.  In their survey of 200 private, privatised, state-owned and 
corporatised state-owned enterprises in Poland, Belka et al., (1995) found 
that replacement of managers did not take place in state-owned, corporatised 
state-owned and enterprises owned by workers.  According to them, 
replacement was common in enterprises owned by foreign investors.  Out of 
8 firms where foreigners were majority owners, 4 had 1 or 2 foreign directors 
in their boards of directors.  Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2007) had also explored 
how frequent management replacement was in the Czech enterprises.  In their 
survey of 917 enterprises carried out for the period 1993-1998, they found 
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that 56.5 percent of firms replaced their managing directors at least once 
during the first 5-6 years since the privatisation and the chairman of the board 
of directors was more frequently changed than the managing director.  They 
concluded that the changes in the managing director and the chairman of the 
board of directors had improved enterprise productivity but only when the 
management had relatively strong control over their enterprises and were 
closely linked with the board - i.e. the general manager being a member of 
the board of directors or its Chairman.    They added that management 
replacement took place in enterprises with poor financial performance.  The 
replacement occurred in enterprises owned by one owner holding at least a 
blocking stake in the enterprise (between 33 and 50 percent of equity or 
more) and especially when the block holder was a company or a financial 
institution other than a bank or a Fund.  Concentrated ownership and strong 
executive authority in the hands of the general managers made a difference in 
efficiency and profitability of the privatised enterprise.       
 
Looking at the relationship between the different forms of ownership and 
adjustment behaviour in 200 Polish manufacturing enterprises, Belka et al., 
(1995) concluded that newly created private firms - de novo - and privatised 
enterprises restructured more than state-owned and corporatised state-owned 
enterprises.  Though both the state-owned and corporatised state-owned 
enterprises had laid off more workers than the privatised and de novo firms, 
labour hoarding in the state-owned enterprises in particular was still endemic 
because of workers resistance.  Because of the competition over labour skills, 
both the state-owned and the corporatised state-owned enterprises had 
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difficulties recruiting skilled workers because the wages they offered were 
lower than those provided in the privatised and de novo firms.  Both the de 
novo and the privatised enterprises were financially healthier, with fewer bad 
debts and no problem to secure credits from the banks which was not the case 
with the state-owned and corporatised state-owned enterprises.  The type of 
owners was also a determinant of restructuring behaviour in the survey 
carried out by Zemplinerovă et al., (1995) on the manufacturing enterprises 
in the Czech Republic for the period 1991-1993.  Enterprises predominantly 
owned by managers, workers, foreign and domestic investors changed their 
production programmes more radically than enterprises owned by the 
government and the Funds.  In terms of sales, profits, exports and 
investments, concentrated private enterprises performed better than other 
types of enterprises.  Also, enterprises privatised through vouchers had 
restructured less than those privatised through direct sale.   
 
Hanousek et al., (2007) extended their research by looking into the effect of 
ownership by outsiders on the enterprise restructuring and productivity in the 
Czech Republic for the period 1996-1999.  Contrary to the studies made in 
the early years of transition that showed that enterprises owned by majority 
domestic owners had high productivity performance, the authors found that 
concentrated foreign owners yielded superior performance in terms of growth 
of sales and profits than any other concentrated ownership reflecting the 
presence of strategic restructuring.  Defensive restructuring, reflected in 
employment reduction, was found in concentrated domestic ownership - 
industrial companies and Investment Funds.  The positive effect of 
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concentrated foreign ownership on the enterprise restructuring and financial 
performance was already confirmed by the study of Carlin et al., (1995) and 
that of Djankov (1999).  Foreign owners had the capital and management 
know-how which were key ingredients for strategic restructuring and 
increased efficiency and profitability of the enterprise in transition.   
 
 
Clearly, the foregoing studies indicated that the enterprises still owned by the 
government had engaged in defensive restructuring more than strategic 
restructuring and recorded poor financial performance.  State-owned 
enterprises were viewed to do worse in restructuring and financial 
performance than enterprises owned by employees - managers and workers.  
Against the prediction made by the literature in the market economies that 
ownership by workers would lead to poor performance because workers 
would only be interested in keeping their jobs and increasing their wages 
which would systematically reduce the opportunities for investments, Earle 
and Estrin, 1996) found that ownership by workers could be a good thing for 
enterprise restructuring.  In their survey of 200 Polish privatised, private and 
state-owned enterprises (corporatised and non-corporatised), they found that 
enterprises majority owned by workers were superior to state-owned 
enterprises and any other types of enterprises.  They concluded (1996: 55) 
that “Enterprises with employee ownership have the best financial health of 
any of the organisations.  Their profit margins are higher, their receivables 
are lower, they are never classified by banks as „uncreditworthy‟, they are 
seldom refused bank credits and they have the newest capital stock.  
Particularly in contrast with the state firms, employee-owned firms are in 
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remarkable good conditions”.   Their findings did find some support in the 
comprehensive analysis made by Wright et al., (2002) on studies that 
explored the employee buy-outs in developed and transition countries.  
According to Wright et al., in transition countries, employee buy-outs did not 
lead to higher wages for their inside owners.  Employee buy-outs led in some 
Central and Eastern countries to reduction of workers more than the 
reduction carried out by state-owned enterprises but less than that carried out 
by enterprises owned by outsiders.  The authors pointed out that in Russia, 
workers surplus was endemic because managers felt they had a social 
responsibility not to lay off their workers.  They concluded that “In transition 
economies, employee ownership is so far associated with reduction in 
employment levels.  Although the evidence is mixed, the extent of lay-offs 
outside Russia and Ukraine appears to be less in insider owned privatised 
firms than in outsider owned firms…The performance of privatisation buy-
outs may be affected by access to finance”.          
 
The impact of budget constraints on enterprise performance had also been 
explored empirically.  In the survey of Pinto et al., (1993) on Polish state-
owned enterprises, the managers were stimulated to restructure their 
enterprises because of the difficulties to secure loans from the state banks and 
also the sudden cuts in the government subsidies.  Djankov and Murrell 
(2000) analysed 10 papers that explored the relationship between hard budget 
constraint and productivity, sale growth and labour productivity.  Enterprises 
in Central and Eastern transition countries were more constrained by 
financial difficulties than those in Russia and the NIS.  Easy loans from 
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banks and informal government subsidies especially to state-owned and large 
former state-owned enterprises were strongly found in Russia and the NIS.  
In their survey of enterprises overdue payables to banks in Russia for the 
period of 1994, Fan et al., (1996) found that between 32 and 42 percent of 
total bank credits were loans provided to loss-making state-owned 
enterprises. These loans were to cover for the losses and not for restructuring 
projects.  In their analysis of the World Bank survey of 439 industrial 
Russian enterprises, Alfandri et al., (1996) found that state-owned enterprises 
operating in defence, energy and heavy machinery industries received 
government subsidies in the form of budget, investment grants, credits and 
tax benefits on a regular basis.  According to these authors, transfers were 
likely to be received by enterprises which exercised strong pressure on the 
government authorities, or which provided social services to their workers, or 
when the prices of their outputs were controlled (such as electricity and fuel), 
or when the enterprises operated in industries that the government wanted to 
protect from liquidation because their liquidation could create large 
unemployment or when the enterprises were regarded by the government as 
strategic.   
 
Competition, particularly from imports, was also reported to be a stimulus to 
restructuring in many enterprises in Central and Eastern transition countries.  
Carlin et al., (2001) carried out a survey of 3,300 enterprises in 25 transition 
countries to explore the factors that influenced restructuring and firm‟s 
performance.  They found that sales and productivity growth were higher in 
firms facing between 1 and 3 competitors in the market for their main 
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product than firms that either faced no competition at all or that faced more 
than 3 competitors.  Firms facing between 1 and 3 competitors reported 
growth between 10 percent and 13 percent higher than other firms.  The 
authors also found that one-quarter of the firms in their sample had no 
pressure of competition in their domestic market for their main product.  The 
relationship between firm performance and the pressure of competition in 
transition countries has also been explored by Vagliasindi (2001).  In her 
survey of over 3,000 private, privatised and state-owned enterprises, 
Vagliasindi found that privatised and state-owned enterprises were better 
protected from competition due to implicit and explicit subsidies.  Also, 
manufacturing industries were less opened to competition than service and 
trade industries.  The author concluded that privatisation policies did not lead 
to more competition.  Rather, the way the competition policy was 
implemented played a key role in the extent of competition.  Later, Pittman 
(2004) investigated the implementation of anti-monopoly legislation in 11 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe for the period 1996-2001.  He found 
that there was a decrease of firms, particulary big firms, having monopoly 
over their market prices.  But he argued (2004: 256) that “It is possible that 
the competition agencies had trouble recruiting and retaining qualified staff 
so they are unable to successfully prosecute abusive behaviour [price 
monopoly]...It is much more likely that some abusive behaviour is taking 
place in these countries without sanction”.              
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3.8. Conclusion 
 
 
From the foregoing, it was clear that a vast amount of research had been done 
on enterprise restructuring and its determinants in the ex-communist 
countries.  This research showed how the different countries proceeded in the 
privatisation of their state-owned enterprise and how the different methods 
used in privatisation had influenced the internal control structure of the 
privatised enterprise.  Enterprise restructuring had also been influenced by 
the macroeconomic environment and the institutional mechanisms put in 
place to create the free market system.  Emphasis had been put, particularly, 
on ownership types, the hard budget constraints and competition in the 
product market.  Enterprises privatised to outsiders, particularly foreign 
investors with majority ownership, were found to have restructured 
effectively and had better financial and operational performance.  Also, 
privatised enterprises in Central and Eastern countries particularly Poland 
and Hungary performed better than those in Russia and the NIS because they 
were exposed to tight budget constraints since the early years of the transition 
and also to mechanisms that regulated competition.   
 
However, though many developing countries had also moved from the 
centrally planned economic system to the free market system almost at the 
same time as the ex-communist countries, restructuring of their state and 
privatised state enterprises had hardly been touched by researchers which 
consequently made our understantding of enterprise restructuring limited.    
This research study attempted to fill this gap by investigating the 
restructuring behaviour and its determinants in the state enterprises slated for 
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privatisation in Algeria.  Algeria is a country which is different from the ex-
communist countries in terms of its cultural values, its social structure and 
also in terms of its political and economic developments in pre and post 
transition periods.  Consequently, the question that guided this research study 
looked like this:  What kind of enterprise restructuring and its determinants 
one would expect in the Algerian state enterprises slated for privatisation 
given the fact that Algeria is a country different from the ex-communist 
countries in its cultural and social structures as well as in its political and 
economic developments in pre and post transition?    It was expected that the 
answer to this question would bring to light some new insights on the topic of 
enterprise restructuring and its determinants in a transition context.  
However, before proceeding to discuss how this question was answered in 
terms of the research methodology used in the collection and analysis of data, 
it was perceived important to first discuss the political and economic context 
in which the Algerian state-owned enterprise evolved, particularly its place in 
building the national economy and its relationship with the government, 
during the socialist period and the political and economic reforms introduced 
since 1987 to move to the free market system.            
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Chapter 4 
    
The Place of the State-Owned Enterprise in the Development 
Strategies of the Algerian Government during the Planned 
Economic System (1962-1986) 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The Algerian economy in general and the state enterprise in particular have 
been in crisis since the independence of the country in 1962 until today.  This 
crisis has its origins going back to the economic and social structure of the 
country built up during the colonial rule and significantly to the inability of 
the Algerian government to design a strategy for economic and social 
development capable to use the country‟s resources in a rational and effective 
manner.  However, in this chapter, a brief description was given on the 
negative effects of the French colonial rule on the Algerian economy and 
society.  This was followed by a detailed discussion of the internal 
managerment of the state enterprise through the self-management system and 
later through the socialist management system.  A detailed discussion was 
also given on the reforms introduced in the public sector before the transition 
to the free market system. 
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4.2. The Socio-Economic Problems left by the French Colonial Rule 
    
When the French invaded Algeria in 1830, their main objective was, if 
possible, to eradicate the Algerian identity.  The whole country infrastructure 
was destroyed.  Houses were burnt down.  Schools and mosques were 
destroyed and some were converted into churches or stables.  The arable 
lands in the coastal regions were confiscated from their owners for the 
benefits of settlers coming from different countries in Western Europe 
pushing the indigenous population into the arid lands and particularly into the 
mountains where life was harsh and unbearable.  To protect and secure the 
presence of France for ever in Algeria, the colonial rulers followed a strategy 
of „Apartheid‟ separating between the European settlers and the indigenous 
population.  The Algerian citizen was not allowed to get access to French 
schools or to dissent jobs and housing.  In fact the Algerian citizens did not 
have the same legal systems to protect their rights as those provided to the 
European settlers.  After independence, the newly created Algerian 
government under the leadership of Ben Bella inherited serious economic and 
social problems.  As an example, there was more than 2 million unemployed 
or a rate of unemployment of the male labour force as high as 70 percent 
(Lawless, 1984: 157), more than 85 percent of the population illiterate, a fast 
rising population growth estimated as high as 10 percent per year (Ministère 
de l’Industrie Légère, June, 1979), an economy based in its majority on 
agriculture, almost a total absence of technical and management skills among 
the Algerian population, and an acute shortage of  financial funds (Clegg, 
1971) following their transfer to France as a result of the departure of the 
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colonial settlers.  To tackle these problems, the government followed, under 
Ben Bella and particularly under Boumedienne after 1965, a strategy to 
exploit to a maximum the country‟s natural resources particularly oil, gas and 
iron and to increase the government control over the means of production.     
 
4.3.       The First Sign of the Government Intention to Increase its 
Control over the National Economy 
 
Since independence, the government had showed many signs of its 
willingness to establish its control over the economy.  The first sign was its 
reluctance to support the self-managed enterprise which was created by 
workers and farmers.  After independence, the sudden departure of the 
European settlers out of Algeria left hundreds of factories, retail stores, 
restaurants, hotels, transportation firms and agricultural farms vacant (Dieter, 
1982).  Desperate for survival, factory workers and land farmers took the 
matter in their hands and appropriated the vacant properties to recommence 
production, provide employment and safeguard the national assets (Clegg, 
1971: 44).  Under the influence of the Union Générale des Travailleurs 
Algeriens (the National Union of the Algerian Workers), (UGTA), and some 
left wing groups in the single political party, the Front de Libération 
Nationale (Front of National Liberation), (FLN), these properties were 
managed collectively.  Workers organised themselves into workers 
management committees in the form of self-managed enterprises.    It took 
more than six months before the government under the leadership of Ben 
Bella officially recognised the self-management system.  In March 1963, the 
government enacted a set of decrees which became known as the „March 
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Decrees‟ recognising the self-management system as an integral part of the 
country economic development programmes.  Clegg (1971) reckons that the 
government administration under Ben Bella was forced to accept the self-
management system for two reasons.  First, the workers who were strongly 
supported by the UGTA were determined to keep their control over the 
appropriated properties.  Trying to confiscate these properties from the 
workers would inevitably lead to social tensions which the government was 
not prepared to face.  Second, many members of the government 
administration including Ben Bella himself expected the fact that once the 
political chaos created by the attacks against the settlers which ravaged the 
country in 1961 and 1962 was settled down, foreign owners who fled the 
country would soon come back and take over their abandoned properties and 
participate in the reconstruction of the Algerian economy.  Until 1963, there 
was no sign of their return and this forced Ben Bella and his supporters to 
accept the self-management system as a temporarily solution to 
unemployment.     
 
When the government recognised the self-management system, it made sure 
not to let the whole control of the enterprise in the hands of its workers and 
farmers.  Though the workers exercised their control through three organs 
which were the General Assembly, the Workers Council and the Self-
Management Committee - This control structure was modelled on the 
Yugoslavian self-management system - the Decrees of March made sure to 
include the participation of the government in the management of the self-
managed enterprise by nominating a general manager who should share the 
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control of the enterprise with the president of the Self-Management 
Committee.  The decrees clearly stated that the president of the Self-
Management Committee was the one who was in charge of all the decisions 
of the enterprise in terms of its investment programmes and its policies for 
production, distribution and employment.  And the presence of the general 
manager in the enterprise should act as an intermediate between the self-
Management Committee and the government administration.  The role of the 
general manager was supposed to focus on examining the lawfulness of all 
economic and financial transactions carried out in the enterprise, signing all 
the documents, and vetoing on all decisions unless otherwise provided by the 
law (Seibel and Damachi, 1982).  In practice, the general manager was 
almost in complete control of the self-managed enterprise creating as a result 
confusion in the daily duties of the president of the committee and conflicts 
between the president and the general manager over the simple day decisions 
such as releasing a worker payroll or an invoice order.   
 
The increasing control of the general manager in the self-managed enterprise 
was possible for two main reasons.  One, was the fact that the general 
manager had explicit and implicit back ups from the government 
administration.  Two, the general manager was a person who knew how to 
read and write which was not the case with most if not all the presidents of 
the committees.  The majority of the presidents were elected in the self-
managed enterprises because of their good track record in the war for 
liberation.  The poor educational and technical capabilities of the presidents 
were an issue which was raised in many occasions by some government 
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ministers.    In one occasion, the Minister of Information and Culture (cited in 
Seibel and Damachi, 1982: 284) stated that “The presidents of the 
Management Committees have no competence whatsoever in assuming the 
management of the estate because they are incapable of comprehending the 
economic side of it.  During the days of the settlers, the worker was a worker 
in the true sense of the term, i.e. a labour force and not an associate of 
production”.   
 
The coming of Boumedienne to the government office in June 1965 
following a bloodless Coup d’ Etat, put the self- management system under 
strong criticism.  It was criticised for being corrupted, unproductive and 
unsuitable with the ideals of the Algerian revolution.    Corruption was 
widespread in the elections of the members of the three organs of the self-
managed enterprise.  In the majority of elections, worker representatives were 
elected based on tribal and family ties and were fiddled by members of the 
FLN and the general manager and his allies.  In addition, there was a 
widespread fraud in the payrolls and most lands and houses attached to the 
self-managed enterprises were appropriated by the worker representatives 
and the general managers.  This situation increased the mistrust of workers 
and farmers in the workers representatives and the general managers and 
made them lose all interest in the elections for workers representation.  
Gradually, the self-management system started losing popularity amongst 
workers and farmers (Helie, cited in Zartman, 1973) and losing the financial 
support of the government.    
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Under Boumedienne, the ideals of the economic revolution as explained in 
the National Charter of 1976 were to create a strong economy based on 
industrialisation, the integration between the different sectors of the economy 
and self-reliance to make the country less dependent on capitalist countries 
and in particular France.  Though the self-management system had 
temporarily lifted some of the pressure of unemployment where in 
agriculture, for example, the 2.3 million hectares run by the self management 
system produced some 75 percent of the gross agricultural production and 
employed some 60 percent of agricultural workers (Lazreg, cited in Seibel 
and Damachi, 1982: 280), the government of Boumedienne regarded the self-
management system not insuitable with the ideals of its economic revolution 
because it lacked a clear strategy and could not be managed effectively.  The 
system was created spontaneously by workers and farmers who were in their 
majority illiterate lacking any pre-determined plan for what should be the 
role of the self-managed enterprise in their development and the development 
of the national economy.  Even the government of Ben Bella lacked a clear 
strategy on how the self-managed enterprise should participate in the building 
of the economy of the country.  In fact the spread of the self-managed 
enterprise in different regions of the country was the result of a massive 
campaign carried out by the UGTA activists.   The self-management system 
spread quickly particularly in the agricultural sector where more than 70 
percent of the population lived in rural areas.  Before the end of 1963, out of 
a total of 2.7 million hectares of arable lands, about 800,000 hectares were 
controlled by the self-management system (Griffin, 1965: 398).  In the 
following year, between 2.3 and 2.7 million hectares, mostly in the coastal 
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regions of the country, were managed by some 2,300 self-managed 
enterprises employing some 135,000 permanent and 50,000 seasonal workers 
(Lawless, 1984: 159).    Compared to agriculture, the number of the self-
managed enterprises in the manufacturing sector was relatively small.  It was 
introduced in enterprises of small and medium size operating in light 
industries like textiles, food processing, leather, plastics and materials for 
construction which were mostly located in the three main cities:  Alger, Oran 
and Constantine.  It was not introduced in manufacturing companies with 
economic importance like hydrocarbons, mechanical engineering, electricity 
and iron and steel (Benachenhou, cited in Lawless, 1984).  These were still 
owned and controlled by their foreign owners who were still living in 
Algeria.  The exact figure of enterprises in the manufacturing sector that were 
controlled by the self-management system is not available.  Benachenhou 
(1980, cited in Lawless, 1984) estimated that in 1964, the number of self-
managed enterprises was 300 employing some 3,000 workers.  Lazreg (cited 
in Seibel and Damachi, 1982: 88) estimated the number to be higher or 
around 700 self-managed enterprises were in existence in 1962.  Laks (1970: 
17-32), however, estimated the number to fall between 370 and 550 in 1964.  
In terms of the number of workers employed, these enterprises were small in 
size.  According to Lawless (1984: 159), there was 500 self-managed 
enterprises employing some 15,000 workers, 421 of these enterprises 
employed less than 20 workers.  For the remaining 79, 74 of them employed 
between 20 and 100 workers and only 5 employed more than 100 workers 
(Clausen, 1969:  67).   
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The ideals of the economic revolution designed by the regime of 
Boumedienne was to create an industrial base and this would be achieved by 
putting in place clear and cohesive economic and social development plans 
where the state-owned enterprise should play a key role.  Consequently, the 
government started gradually withdrawing its financial support from the self-
managed enterprises.  In the agricultural self-managed enterprises, for 
example, the government financial support dropped from 803 million dinars 
in 1963 to 118 million in 1966 (Clegg, 1970: 85).  Many self-managed 
enterprises in the agricultural sector were converted into cooperatives and 
some were distributed for the benefits of war veterans.  The government 
withdrawal was more pronounced in the manufacturing sector.  By 1973, the 
manufacturing self-managed enterprises represented no more than 1.7 percent 
of employment in the self-managed sector as a whole and less than 0.3 
percent of total employment in the country (Benachenhou, cited in Lawless, 
1984).  Many self-managed enterprises in manufacturing were transformed 
into state-owned enterprises in the form of sociétés nationales (National 
Companies).      
 
4.4.       The Société Nationale (National Company) as an Instrument for 
the Government Strong Control  
        
At the time of independence, there were few state-owned enterprises 
established by the colonial government.  Between 1963 and 1965, their 
number grew to 37 enterprises (MIR, 1996) and it grew further after 1965 
especially in key economic sectors.  Two types of state-owned enterprises 
existed before the Socialist Management System was introduced in 1971:  
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Etablissements Publics à Caractère Industriel et Commercial (Public 
Establishments with Industrial and Commercial Characters), (EPICs) - these 
were public corporations - and the Sociétés Nationales which were joint stock 
companies governed by commercial private laws with the government as the 
only shareholder or a majority owner in the case of mixed companies 
(Causey, 1984).   
 
The sociétés nationales had occupied since the first three years plan (1967-
1969) a big importance in the government development strategies.  They 
were intended to control and dominate fully the manufacturing and service 
sectors.  The National Charter of 1976 considered the sociétés nationales as 
“The highest form of state ownership capable to concretise regional 
equilibrium and social equality”.  Based on these two economic and social 
objectives, their number grew faster particularly through the nationalisation 
of foreign companies. The nationalisation affected every industry (De Bernis, 
1971).  Between 1966 and 1970, some 700 French owned companies were 
nationalised (Lawless, 1984: 160). The strong wave of nationalisation 
culminated in 1971 by the nationalisation of oil and gas.  By mid 1970,  18 
sociétés nationales (Sari, 2002) - 2 in hydrocarbons (SONATRACH and 
SONALGAZ), 5 in heavy industry (SONACOME, SONAREM, SNS, 
SNMETAL, SONELEC) and 11 in light industry (SNSEMPAC, SOGEDIA, 
SNEMA, SNTA, SONITEX, SONIPEX, SNIC, SNLB, SONIC, SNAT, 
SNMC) - were in existence controlling some 90 percent of the manufacturing 
sector (Sutton, 1981: 353).  The number increased further to 70 sociétés by 
the end of the 1970s and following the organisational restructuring taking 
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place in 1982, Bouzidi (1985) estimated the number of the sociétés operating 
at national level in both manufacturing and service sectors to reach 140 and 
about 271 operated at regional and local levels.     
 
With the growing increase in the hydrocarbon revenues since 1973 following 
the fourfold rise in the oil price, the sociétés nationales were progressively 
directed not only to create jobs, reduce the disparity between urban and rural 
areas, increase production but also to be an instrument for technology transfer 
or what is called the „Téchnologie de pointe (Advanced Technology)’.   The 
objective sought from the téchnologie de pointe would allow Algeria, 
Guichaoua (1979:  822) explained to have “Contact with the „modern life‟ 
and the progress, to compensate for the shortage of skilled professionals, and 
to be able to compete in international markets”.  Consequently, the 
government allocated huge funds for the development of the sociétés 
nationales.  More than half of the total investment funds allocated in the first 
(1970-73) and the second (1974-77) four years plans or 52 percent 
(Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire, 1970) and 62 percent 
(Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire, 1974) respectively were 
absorbed by the sociétés nationales operating especially in hydrocarbons and 
heavy industry.  The development of hydrocarbons dominated by the société 
nationale SONATRACH contributed some 40 percent to the GDP and 98 
percent to export and it employed before its organisational restructuring in 
1982 more than 100,000 workers.  As for the heavy industry, the five sociétés 
nationales - SNMETAL, SONAREM, SNS, SONACOME and SONELEC - 
contributed between 1970 and 1973 to an increase in manufacturing growth 
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from 9 percent to 20 percent (Melki, cited in Sutton, 1976:  84) and employed 
around 100,000 workers.  By the end of 1984, the state sector with all 
industries combined contributed to some 70 percent to the GDP and 
employed more than 2 million workers.     
 
One has to note, however, that before its conversion into a socialist managed 
enterprise following Ordinance 71-74 dated 16 November 1971, the société 
nationale was managed almost in the same way as any private multinational 
company.  It was large in size, highly integrated and its general manager had 
large discretion in decision makings like his counterpart in the private sector.    
The société inherited the French control structure.  It was governed by a 
board of directors with the general manager as a president of the board 
(Journal Officiel de la République Algerienne, 13 April, 1965).  Both the 
president general manager and members of the board were nominated by the 
sponsoring minister.  While the members of the board had to be civil 
servants, the general manager was often selected for his technical skills.  The 
duties and responsibilities of the president general manager were defined by 
decrees.  Given the realities of Algeria after independence where illiteracy 
was at its highest level and the labour market suffered from an acute shortage 
for skilled managers and also given the fact that members of the board were 
not paid for their presence in the boards meetings, it was difficult to nominate 
the directors and also to have regular board meetings as many of the directors 
were too busy managing their own sociétés and trying to solve their operation 
problems.  Consequently, the boards of directors as control bodies were 
gradually abolished from most sociétés.  All the decisions - investment, 
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personnel policies and practices, export, negotiations with the trade union 
representatives and the banks, and acquisition and reduction in the size of the 
société  -  became invested in the hands of the general manager.  In some 
cases, the general manager was assisted by a commission called Commission 
of Control and Orientation in which the general manager was a member.  The 
commission was composed of representatives of the sponsoring ministry and 
from the various ministries that had links with the activities of the société 
such as commerce, labour, finance and representatives of the UGTA and 
workers.  The commission was located at the head office of the société but 
very often it was located within the sponsoring ministry department.  The 
power of the commission was to advise but not to decide.  The final decision 
was from the prerogatives of the general manager given the fact that he was 
the one who was in close touch with the activities of the société and knew 
best its problems.  Often, when the general manager had a strong personality 
and was equipped with the political skills to influence the government 
administration and significantly when the activities of the société formed an 
important part in the government economic and social development 
programmes, the general manager exercised a strong power over the 
decisions of the sponsoring minister as was the case with the general 
managers of SONACOME and SONATRACH.  In the case of 
SONATRACH, its general manager Ahmed Ghozali, for example, was not 
only in total control of the société but was also selected to be the Minister of 
Energy and Petrochemicals.  This duality of functions of the general manager 
of SONATRACH continued to be a common practice until recently (Causey, 
1984).  Without doubts, the increasing power of the technocratic élite in the 
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sociétés nationales and over the economy had found resentment from 
workers and was not to be tolerated for long as the government 
administration under Boumedienne engaged since 1970 into the centrally 
planned economic and social system to materialise socialism in the Algerian 
society.  The approach to socialism was manifested by the introduction of the 
Socialist Managed Enterprise system. 
           
4.5. The Government Increased its Control through the Socialist 
Managed Enterprise   
    
With the exception of the self-managed enterprises and the cooperatives 
operating in agriculture and the mixed state-foreign commercial enterprises 
even if the government had the majority in shares ownership like in the case 
of Air Algerie, for example, where the government owned 82.14 percent and 
Air France 17.74 percent (Maille, 1972), all state enterprises whether 
operating in commercial, service or cultural activities were required to be 
transformed into socialist enterprises.  The socialist managed enterprise, as it 
came in the Charter of the Organisation of the Socialist Managed Enterprise 
and Ordinance 71-74 dated 16 November 1971 related to the Socialist 
Managed Enterprise (Recueil des Textes Fondamentaux Portant Géstion 
Socialiste des Entreprises, 1976), was meant to achieve three main 
objectives: 
 
 To create a homogeneous legal framework for all state enterprises which 
were until then subjected to various control structures making most of the 
state enterprises escaping the control of the government; 
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 To increase popular participation by increasing the direct involvement of 
workers in the decision making process in the enterprise with the hope to 
increase productivity and reduce financial wastage and significantly to give 
legitimacy to Boumedienne‟s regime; 
 
 To tighten the government control over the enterprise to concretise the 
objectives set in the four years national plans, to create coordination between 
the different sectors of the economy and to guarantee as stated by the 
National Charter (1976) and the Constitution (1976) the „Socialist Spirit‟. 
 
By these objectives, the Algerian legislators tried to give wide control to the 
government over the manufacturing and service sectors.  In fact, in the same 
year when the law on the socialist managed enterprise was promulgated, the 
nationalisation of lands was introduced through the government programme 
known as the Agrarian Revolution.  In this way, the government was ablt to 
spead its control over almost all the means of production in the country. The 
monopoly of the government over the industrial and agricultural sectors was 
supposed to act as an important instrument through which a close integration 
between these sectors could be established in order to create a balanced 
national economy.  It was clearly stated in the first (1970-1973) and second 
(1974-1977) four years plans that the ideal of the Algerian socialist 
revolution was to create a strong national industrial base that would create 
jobs, increase the standard of living of the population and fundamentally 
reduce the import bills for raw material, equipments and machineries 
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required in industrial and agricultural production.  The system of the socialist 
managed enterprise was put in place to make this ideal a reality.  And to 
make this system work, a radical change was introduced in the structure of 
the relationship between the management and the government and the 
relationship between the management and workers.   
 
4.5.1.   Management-Government Relationship under the Socialist Managed 
Enterprise System 
 
Unlike before when each state-owned enterprise reported to its sponsoring 
ministry, the Ordinance 71-74 introduced a unique ministry - the Ministry of 
Industry and Energy - which was in charge of all socialist managed 
enterprises.  In article 3 of Ordinance no. 75-76 dated 21 November 1975 
(Recueil des Textes Fondamentaux Portant Géstion Socialiste des 
Entreprises, 1976), the responsibility of the unique ministry was “To make 
sure that the actions of the enterprises conform with the general policy [the 
four years plans] set by the state and with the legislations, the regulations and 
the directives emanating from the different state administrations”.  The 
responsibilities of the ministry as they came in article 9 of the same 
ordinance were to define for each socialist enterprise the policies and 
objectives assigned to the sector to which the enterprise belonged.  
 
Though the socialist managed enterprise was the main instrument used to 
build up socialism in the Algerian society, the government did no assign any 
production targets as practised for example in the Soviet Union that the 
socialist enterprise had to fulfil.  Rather, the socialist managed enterprise was 
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required to set itself its production targets in its annual plans.  These targets 
should be elaborated within the framework of the policies and objectives 
assigned for its sector.  The drafting of the annual plan was a long process 
and sometimes it took several months before the final draft was created.  The 
first step in the process had to start with the general manager of the enterprise 
mobilising a large number of the enterprise staff from the different 
departments, divisions, production plants and representatives of workers and 
the FLN to form Ad-hoc commissions at different levels of the enterprise to 
discuss what objectives should be set in the annual plan and what resources 
should be mobilised to achieve these objectives.  All the drafts elaborated by 
the different Ad-Hoc commissions had to be submitted to the Conseil de 
Diréction (Management Board) of the enterprise for discussion and 
evaluation.    The board then elaborated a final draft of the plan that would be 
submitted to the Ministry of Industry and Energy for evaluation.  The 
Ministry of Industry and Energy would then submit a copy of the draft to the 
different ministries which had links with the activities of the enterprise.   It 
was natural to see a lot of bargaining taking place between the Ministry of 
Industry and Energy and other ministries especially the Ministry of Finance 
to settle any conflicting objectives.  Once all the conflicts were settled, an 
amended version of the draft had to be created by the Ministry of Industry 
and Energy which had to be submitted to the central planning organ which 
was the Secretariat d’Etat au Plan (State Secretary for Planning).  This 
planning organ might or might not introduce further amendments to the draft.  
Once satisfied with the contents of the draft, the Secretariat d’Etat would 
return the draft to the Minister of Industry and Energy who in turn would 
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submit it to the general manager of the enterprise.  The annual plan would 
constitute the main guide for the enterprise activity for a year.  Sometimes, 
some changes would be introduced in the plan when unpredictable conditions 
inside and outside the enterprise were raised.  If the needed changes were 
minor, this would be carried out at the enterprise level in the management 
board.  If the plan required major changes, this would not happen unless 
consulted with the Minister of Industry and Energy and the Secretariat d’Etat 
au Plan and the whole process of drafting, consulting and negotiating would 
start again to create a new version of the plan.    
 
Because the socialist managed enterprise was considered the foundation upon 
which to built the ideals of the socialist revolution and the major tool to 
implement the national economic and social plans, the Minister of Industry 
and Energy was careful to select managers who were loyal to the state 
ideological orientations.  The general manager of the enterprise was 
nominated by decree under the proposition of the Minister of Industry and 
Energy.  Often, he was selected from the army or the FLN.  And under the 
proposition of the general manager, the Minister also nominated the general 
manager‟s deputies, the managers of the divisions and managers of the 
production plants.  Though nominated by the Minister, the division and 
production plant managers, as understood from their private correspondances 
published by the SNSEMPAC (Fonds Documentaires de l’Entreprise 
SNSEMPAC, 1975-1978 and 1979), had no autonomy to take decisions even 
for the simple decisions such as for example from which supplier to get spare 
parts and the day of the week when the vehicles they used for personal and 
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for the transportation of the enterprise products should be washed.  They 
were required to implement all the directives issued by the general manager.  
The organisational structure of the socialist managed enterprise was highly 
centralised and the communication between managers and subordinates was 
also highly formalised.  A typical structure of a socialist managed enterprise 
would look like figure 4.1 below.        
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Figure 4.1.  The Organisational Structure of the SME between 1975 and 1977 
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What was also obvious from the legislation governing the management of the 
socialist enterprise was the fact that the Algerian legislators had kept silent on 
how many deputies should be nominated and on what criteria they should be 
selected and remunerated.  They also kept silent on the criteria by which the 
members of the management board of the enterprise should be selected and 
remunerated.  The board was, as previously mentioned, managed and 
presided by the general manager.  It was composed from 9 to 11 members 
and 2 of its members were selected by the Workers‟ General Assembly to 
represent the workers of the enterprise.  Under Ordinance no.75-23 dated 29 
April 1975 relative to the Statut-Type of the commercial socialist enterprise 
(Recueil des Textes Portant Géstion Socialiste des Entreprises, 1976), the 
management board was given the authority to elaborate itself the 
organisational structure of the enterprise, the policies for the recruitment and 
selection and reward and compensation of personnel and the policies for 
products marketing and distribution.  The elaboration of these policies would 
be carried out in consultation with the Workers‟ General Assembly, the 
Minister of Industry and Energy, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of 
Labour and Social Affairs.  It was common to see the majority of the 
members of the board drawn from inside the enterprise particularly from the 
planning, financial, commercial and production departments.  These 
managers were the main advisers to the general manager.  They were the 
ones upon whom the general manager heavily relied when drafting the 
enterprise annual plans and they were always the ones who they accompanied 
him when summoned by the Minister of Industry and Energy or the Minister 
of Finance to provide explanations on the performance of the enterprise or on 
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any other issues related to the activities of the enterprise.  A typical role 
played by these four major functional managers in a manufacturing 
enterprise, could be understood from the private correpondances compiled in 
the Fonds Documentaires de l’Entreprise published by the SNSEMPAC for 
the years 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979).  Their role could be briefly 
explained as follows:   
  
The Manager of the Planning Department.  The manager for planning was 
active in gathering information from other departments particularly 
production and commercial in order to design the broad lines of the annul 
plan and to keep a check over the progress of the implementation of the 
investment projects. He made sure that information from these departments 
flowed regularly to his department.  At the head office of each enterprise, a 
department for information and document control was created to facilitate the 
communication of information from the divisions and the production plants 
to the planning department.  Meetings between the manager of this 
department and the managers of the commercial and of the production 
departments located at the head office as well as the general manager of the 
enterprise were regular on a monthly basis to verify that the divisions and the 
production plants were in control of the production targets allocated to them 
by the head office.  Any discrepancies in the monthly reports from the 
provincial and production managers would force the manager for planning to 
ask for explaining from the manager of production at the head office and 
sometimes also from the production managers in the production plants 
themselves.     
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The Manager of the Production Department.  One of the main objectives of 
the socialist managed enterprise system was to increase production to satisfy 
the needs of the domestic market which was in constant growth with the fast 
rising population and therefore volume mattered a lot.   Each month, 
managers of the production plants were required to submit a full report to the 
production manager at the head office on how much raw material was used in 
production and how much stocks were left in the warehouses.  And each 
month, the production manager at the head office had to submit a report to 
the Minister of Industry and Energy on the progress of production in every 
production plant.  Following the massive investments which the government 
made in the manufacturing sector in the 1970s as a result of the rising price 
of oil, one of the outcomes of these investments was the expansion in the size 
of the socialist enterprise.  One enterprise could manage tens of production 
plants.  As an example, at SONACOME, some 44 production plants were in 
operation employing some 27,000 workers, at SN SEMPAC the number was 
estimated to reach some 93 plants employing 20,400 workers and at 
SONELGAZ the number was 48 production plants employing some 15,000.  
These production plants were often dispersed in different regions of the 
country.  Neither the production managers nor the provincial managers had 
autonomy to set their monthly production targets.  These targets had to be 
elaborated by the production manager at the head office located in the capital 
city Algiers and sent to the production managers on a monthly basis for 
execution.  The managers as well as the workers in the production plants 
made sure to achieve the objectives and production targets assigned to them 
by the head office because this would secure their bonuses.  In all socialist 
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enterprises, volume and productivity were the main criteria upon which the 
bonuses were calculated and the percentage of the bonus in relation to the 
basic salary of a worker differed from one enterprise to another depending on 
the activities in which the enterprise operated.  At the SN SEMPAC, for 
example, the bonus of a production worker, as documented in the Fonds 
Documentaire de l‟Entreprise for 1975-1978 and for 1979, was based on the 
performance of the plant in terms of productivity and volume produced each 
month.  The amount of bonus paid for productivity did not exceed 12 percent 
of the basic salary.  The main criteria upon which productivity was calculated 
were the rate of achievement of the monthly objectives assigned to the plant, 
the rate of reduction in production expenditures and the rate of reduction in 
expenditures on equipment and machinery maintenance.  As for the volume 
of outputs produced, the amount of bonus paid did not exceed 8 percent of 
the basic salary.  The bonus was calculated on how many kilogrammes 
produced by worker, the quality of the product, how much the worker 
followed the instructions on how to produce the product and how good 
his/her attendances at work were.  With these bonuses, the government tried 
to stimulate workers to increase the volume and quality of products to reduce 
the problem of shortage particularly of products of high consumption and to 
reduce the import bills.      
 
The Manager of the Financial Department.  Being a financial manager was a 
highly prestigious position in the socialist enterprise but at the same time it 
was a position were the chances of being fired was high if the enterprise 
mismanaged its accounts because of his negligence.  This manager made sure 
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that the reports on the expenditures and incomes made by all the units of the 
enterprise had to come to his office regularly otherwise he will be in trouble 
with the bank and the representatives of the Minister of Finance.  One of the 
fundamental objectives of the socialist enterprise as explained in Ordinance 
71-71, in the National Charter (1976) and in the constitution (1976) was to 
reduce financial wastage.  To achieve this objective, the government 
instituted tight control over the management of funds in the socialist 
managed enterprise and also tightened the access to different capital 
suppliers.  Following the law of finance of 1970, each socialist enterprise was 
required to enter into contract for five or even ten years with only one of the 
existing five banks - BNA, CPA, BEA, BDL and BADR (Benissad, 1994).  
As an example, all socialist enterprises operating in agricultural activities had 
to borrow from the BADR.  The logic behind this restriction was not only to 
make sure that both the enterprise and the bank worked towards the same 
objective which was that of fulfilling the development programmes included 
in the four years plans but also having a fixed amount of credits which the 
enterprise was allowed to borrow from its own bank each year, the enterprise 
would have no other choices but to improve its profitability.  In the law of 
finance of 1974, it was clear that only the unproductive activities such as 
those related to workers welfare services would be financed by the state 
treasury.  Productive activities had to be financed by the enterprise proper 
earnings and by bank credits which were repayable.  Based on the evaluation 
of the annual plan submitted each year by the enterprise, the Minister of 
Finance specified how much credits the bank was allowed to lend to the 
enterprise and to make sure that the credits were not wasted, the financial 
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manager was required to submit each month reports on the financial 
performance of the enterprise to the bank for evaluation.  Failure to do so 
could create many troubles in the enterprise-bank relationship which could be 
manifested by the bank freezing further loans to the enterprise.  Monthly 
evaluation of the financial performance of the socialist enterprise was also 
carried out by the representatives of the Minister of Finance.  At the head 
office of each enterprise, the Minister of Finance appointed the Commissaires 
aux Comptes (financial auditors).  The prerogatives of these Comminssaires 
were according to the law of finance of 1970 and the Decree no. 70-173 
dated 16 November 1970, to control all activities which had connection with 
the economic and financial performance of the enterprise and to make sure 
that the legislations governing the economic and financial operations of the 
enterprise were properly implemented and to make sure that the financial 
reports produced by the management board were not subject to 
manipulations.  Being located in the enterprise, the Comminssaires could call 
the financial manager at any moment to provide accounting documentation 
for evaluation.  Any discrepancies discovered in the accounts or exaggeration 
in expenditures even if these expenditures concerned the travelling expenses 
of the general manager would lead to suspicion and often this would call the 
intervention of the Inspecteur des Finances (financial inspector) for a 
thorough review of the accounts (see the report of the Ministère de l’Industrie 
Légère published in November 1978 criticising the strong intervention of the 
Minister of Finance through the Général Inspection of Finances).    Any fraud 
discovered in the accounts would cost the financial manager and also the 
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general manager heavy penalties such as paying fines and even being put in 
prison (Latrous, 1982; Belloula, 1999).   
  
The Manager of the Commercial Department.  This manager was in charge 
of all commercial and distribution activities of the enterprise.  Each month, 
he had to send a full report to the production plants on the quantities of 
products that they should produce and from which supplier they should 
purchase their inputs.  Because the socialist enterprise was allowed to use 
domestic and foreign suppliers, many socialist enterprises used foreign 
suppliers not only to import raw materials and technological equipments and 
machineries but also the products they produced themselves.  In the case of 
the SN SEMPAC, for example, because of the inability of the enterprise to 
satisfy the demands of the domestic market for flour and semolina, it was 
forced to import these products.  Though between 1974 and 1977, the 
commercial managers of the socialist enterprises, operating particularly in 
light industries such as food manufacturing, textiles and material for building 
construction, were active in designing marketing plans to face the pressure 
from the competition of imports and the private sector, this pressure was soon 
lifted when the law no. 78-02 dated 11 February 1978 was promulgated.  In 
its article 6, the socialist managed enterprise was given the monopoly over 
the external trade and therefore it was the only one allowed to import.  The 
main objective of the law was to protect the national production.  Only the 
inputs needed by the enterprise and the products not produced by the 
domestic producers were allowed to be imported.  In practice, the law had 
opened the door wide for financial wastage.  Some socialist enterprises 
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became less motivated to increase production and productivity and covered 
their poor performance by importing the products they were supposed to 
produce in their production plants.  Others imported the products already 
produced locally.  After one and a half year of its implementation, it became 
clear that the 78-02 law was not working and was strongly criticised by the 
FLN (FLN, March, 1980).               
 
It remains to say, however, that Ordinance 71-74 was not only a turning point 
in the relationship between the government and enterprise management but 
more significantly between workers and management.  The Algerian 
legislators clearly understood that without the participation of workers in the 
management of their enterprises, workers motivation to increase production 
and productivity which were one of the ideals of the socialist revolution 
would be hard to achieve.  Based on this rationality, workers had to be not 
only producers but also managers creating a new form of management-
workers relationship.          
 
4.5.2. Management-Workers Relationship under the Socialist Managed 
Enterprise System 
 
Under the socialist management system, the general manager found 
him/herself squeezed by the control of workers.  No decision would be taken 
by the general manager or other low level managers unless consulted with the 
workers‟ representatives.  In Ordinance 71-74, all the duties and 
responsibilities of workers and the mechanisms for their participation in 
management were defined.  A number of commissions were also put in place 
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to facilitate the implementation of workers participation such as  the 
Commission Nationale de la Géstion Socialiste de l’Entreprise (National 
Commission for the Management of the Socialist Enterprise),(CNSME), the 
Commission Nationale de l’Organisation (National Commission for 
Organisation), (CNO), and the Conseil de Coordination (Coordination 
Board), (CC).  Workers were required to elect their Workers‟ Assembly for 3 
years at the enterprise and also at the production plant levels.  It was 
compulsory that the members elected had to be members of the UGTA.  The 
workers had to participate in the management of the enterprise and of the 
plant through 5 specialised commissions - financial and economic 
commission, social affairs and cultural commission, personnel and 
occupational development commission, discipline commission and security 
and hygiene commission - and through 1 or 2 of their members represented in 
the management board of the enterprise and also the management board of 
the plant.  Through the 5 commissions, workers were allowed to participate 
in all aspects of the internal management of the enterprise and of the plant 
such as investment programmes, production targets, procurement, 
distribution, personnel rewards and compensation and financial expenditures.  
From the information provided by the 5 commissions, the Workers‟ 
Assembly had to elaborate an annual report indicating the state of affairs in 
the management of the enterprise and of the plant and had to make 
recommendations for improvement.               
             
The socialist management system found strong popularity among workers but 
its implementation was not easy as it was expected.   It was resisted by most 
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general managers of the sociétés nationales.  The first société nationale 
which implemented the system was the SNMETAL.  This société was used 
as a pilot experiment.  In October, 1972, 12 production plants employing 
more than 4,000 workers participated in the experiment (Akkache, cited in 
Branine, 1994).  In early 1973, a seminar was held discussing the SNMETAL 
experiment.  Though the experiment was not a total success, the system was 
introduced in most state enterprises in manufacturing and service sectors 
including banks and education establishments.  By 1974, the number of 
enterprises that adopted the system increased to 15.  Because Ordinance 71-
74 related to the Socialist Managed Enterprise did not provide detailed 
procedures and techniques on how to implement the system, the Ordinance 
was exposed to misinterpretations by enterprise managers and the trade union 
representatives.  This urged the government administration to enact in 1975 a 
set of labour regulations entitled „Textes d’Application de la GSE‟ or Texts 
for the Application of the Socialist Managed Enterprise.  These texts had 
given some clarity on how to implement the socialist management system in 
different industries by providing techniques that would facilitate the 
implementation.  Consequently, the number of enterprises and plants that 
adopted the system increased in one year alone, 1975, from 15 to 32.  In the 
following year, the number jumped to 50 enterprises and plants employing 
some 188,523 workers.  At the National Conference held in December 1975 
on the socialist managed enterprise, many enterprises reported increases in 
their production and workers profit sharing dividends.  At SONIPEC, for 
example, production increased by 50 percent and similar increase occurred at 
SN SEMPAC (Boutefnouchet, cited in Branine, 1994).  The improvement 
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was related to the tough discipline introduced by workers representatives in 
the work place by controlling absenteeism; by the workers willingness to 
participate in the management of their enterprises and their enthusiasm to 
work hard so that they could increase their shares in the profits; in addition to 
the support the general managers of these enterprises provided to workers 
representatives such as giving access to their representatives in the 5 
commissions to any information they required and working closely with them 
in the elaboration of investment projects, annual plans, personnel policies and 
workers‟ welfare services.  In the big socétés like SONACOME and 
SONATRACH, their general managers had strongly resisted the introduction 
of the socialist management system.  At SONACOME, the system was 
introduced in 1974 but workers participation had never been materialised.  Its 
manager opposed the idea that workers were capable of managing an 
enterprise as important as SONACOME.    For him, the majority of the 
members of the 5 commissions had neither the right educational backgrounds 
required in management nor the technical and the management skills to 
decide on investment projects and the future of the enterprise (Manager, 
Headquarters, UGTA, 2004).  The opposition of the manager to the system 
increased the determination of workers representatives to create instability in 
the enterprise and this by going on strikes.  Absenteeism and strikes became 
almost a common thing to see at SONACOME which had tremendously 
affected the production of the enterprise.  At SONATRACH, too, 
management opposition to workers participation in the management of the 
enterprise was even stronger.  The socialist system was projected to be 
introduced in this enterprise in 1977.  It was postponed to 1978 and finally to 
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1981.  Because the société was composed of a large number of production 
and distributions plants which were dispersed in different regions of the 
country, it was difficult to design a plan to implement the system effectively.  
And before the system was to be implemented at SONATRACH, the 
government launched its first reforms to restructure the public sector.   
 
4.6. The First Reforms of the Public Sector (1978-1986) 
  
Two reforms were of importance during this period.  These were represented 
by the government introducing in 1978 the Statut Général du Travailleur 
(General Status of the Worker), (SGT), which was a system that created a 
uniformity in the employment practices in all the commercial enterprises and 
the reconfiguration in 1982 of the public sector by breaking up the highly 
integrated state enterprises into enterprises specialised by activities to reduce 
the pressure on managers to manage their enterprises and to give the regional 
and local government authorities some responsibilities to control the 
economic activity in their areas. 
  
4.6.1. The Statut Général du Travailleur (SGT) 
 
The SGT was introduced by the promulgation of the Law no.78-12 dated 5 
August 1978.  The law came to make an end to the multiplicity of systems 
governing the employment policies in the different commercial industries 
which were until then using the employment practices inherited from the 
colonial period.  In the socialist managed enterprise, the employment policies 
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were negotiated between the management board of the enterprise headed by 
the general manager and the Commission for Personnel and Occupational 
Development and in the private sector they were negotiated between the 
firm‟s owner and the UGTA.   The system of negotiation created a 
differentiation in the distribution of income of workers not only between 
public and private firms but also between enterprises within the same sector.  
In the socialist enterprises, for example, workers in enterprises which had 
priorities in the government economic strategies for development had 
benefited from high salaries and generous bonuses and social welfare 
services and more opportunities for training and development. Workers 
belonging to SNMETAL, SONACOME, SNS, SONATRACH and 
SONELGAZ were the highest paid in the country.  In fact, these enterprises 
became the attraction of skilled and talented workers from other socialist 
enterprises and other sectors.  With the growing gap in income distribution 
between workers in different socialist enterprises and between the public and 
private sectors together with the rising prices of goods for consumption it was 
natural to see a rise in conflicts between managers and poorly paid workers.  
In the socialist sector alone, some 2,566 conflicts were recorded in different 
enterprises where some 1,082 were worker strikes (Koriche, 1994: 247).  
Fear from the escalation of social instability in the country, the government 
introduced the SGT to institute a system of uniformity in the employment 
policies.   
 
With the exception of the self-managed enterprise, the agricultural 
cooperatives of the Agrarian Revolution and the civil service which were 
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governed by specific work relation codes, all the state and private enterprises 
operating in commercial activities had to introduce the SGT.  The main 
objectives of the SGT as stated in the Law no.78-12 were to define the 
obligations of workers and managers and significantly to install a unique 
national policy over classification of work positions and worker 
remunerations based on the principle of „equal work, equal salary‟.  
Regardless to what industry the enterprise belonged, workers positions in 
state and private firms, their salaries and their bonuses were classified into 
groups as determined by legislations.  The work positions in all industries 
were divided into classes and sub-classes which were determined in a 
national classification method called, the Méthode Nationale Unique de 
Classification (Unique National Method for Classification), (MNUC), 
promulgated by the Decree no.82. 356 dated 20 November, 1982.  There 
were 5 classes and 13 sub-classes.  Each class and sub-class was allocated a 
number of points as illustrated in table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1.  Criteria determining the grade of a worker’s  position in the manufacturing 
and service commercial enterprise.  
          
 
Source:  Décret No. 82.356 du 20 Novembre 1982 
 
This classification of work tasks was followed by the classification of the 
basic salaries in the different manufacturing industries.  Table 4.2 illustrates 
the classification of the basic salary for three categories of workers. 
 
Criterion Number of  points 
Qualification 
 
1. Academic background 
2. Work experience 
 
Responsibility 
 
1. Tasks involving the use of tools, equipments etc. 
2. Tasks involving administrative paper work, 
3. Tasks involving direct supervision of workers in the 
production process, 
4. Tasks involving authority of command in the hierarchy 
 
Effort 
 
1. Tasks involving physical effort 
2. Tasks involving repetition in the production process 
creating  monotony, 
3. Tasks involving mental concentration   
 
Work Conditions 
 
1. Tasks involving the worker discomfort such as noise, 
heat and  health problems 
2. Tasks involving risks and accidents which the worker 
might be exposed to such as radiation, explosion etc. 
  
Constraints and particular requirements 
 
1. Tasks involving constraints other 
than those mentioned above, 
2. Tasks involving personal quality 
such as creativity, ability to 
motivate others and skills only few 
peoples have. 
 
485 points   (40.42 %) 
 
315 points    (26.25%) 
170 points    (14.17%) 
 
260 points    (21.66 %) 
 
 90 points      (07.50%) 
30 points       (02.50%) 
70 points       (05.83%) 
 70 points      (05.83%) 
 
 
174 points    (14.50 %) 
 
 50 points       (04.17%) 
 30 points       (02.50%) 
 94 points       (07.83%) 
 
161 points    (13.42 %) 
 
126 points     (10.50%) 
 
 
 35 points      (02.92%) 
 
 
120 points    (10.00 %) 
 
 60 points       (05.00%) 
 
 60 points       (05.00%) 
                                                                                            Total 1,200 points   (100.00%) 
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Table 4.2.  Salary scale in Algerian dinars (DA) for the different categories of workers 
in the manufacturing and service commercial enterprise. 
 
Unskilled and semi-
skilled  
Workers 
Workers with college and 
university background 
Workers with managerial 
positions 
Grade 1.  1,000 
Grade 2.  1,100 
Grade 3.  1,300 
Grade 4.  1,600 
Grade 1.  2,000 
Grade 2.  2,500 
Grade 3.  3,000 
Grade 4.  3,750 
Grade 1.  5,000-5,200 
Grade 2.  5,500-6,000 
Grade 3.  6,250-6,450 
Grade 4.  6,500-6,900 
Grade 5.  7,000-7,500 
Source:  Data analysis. 
 
From the first sight, the national classification of salaries gives the reader the 
impression that managers were the highest paid, but when looking at it 
carefully, a manual  worker could earn more than the general managers 
working in some industries like for example in education or even in 
manufacturing like textiles and food processing industries.  Though the 
MNUC gave high points to academic achievement and positions with 
authority, the monthly income of a manual worker or of an engineer working 
in hydrocarbon and heavy industries could earn much more than a university 
professor or a medical doctor because of the various bonuses and indemnities 
attached to some of their tasks such as: 
 
 Indemnity to work shifts which could range between 5 and 25 percent 
of the basic salary (Décret no. 81-14, 31 March 1981);  
 
 A bonus for individual performance which could reach to a maximum 
level of 10 percent of the basic salary; 
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 A bonus for collective performance which could range between 25 and 
30  percent of the basic salary if the target assigned to a task was achieved 
above 100 percent; 
 
 Indemnity attached to how much the task involved mental and physical 
nuisances like for example noise and heat (Décret no. 81-58, 28 March, 
1981); 
 
 A bonus attached to the maintenance of equipment and machineries; 
 
 A bonus called a bonus of Zone which was attached to the geographical 
location of the job and how much the job was important in the government 
development programmes (Décret no.82-183, 5 May, 1982).  If one takes 
SONATRACH, as an example, because most of its production plants and 
distribution outlets were located in the different towns of the south where 
the environmental conditions were harsh and unbearable, to encourage 
mobility of workers to these locations, the bonus of Zone of a worker 
could reach some 70 percent of his/her basic salary. 
 
Clearly, the SGT had benefited some categories of workers at the expense of 
others because at that time the strategies followed by the government was as 
mentioned before the industrialisation of the country and therefore workers in 
hydrocarbon and heavy industry were treated better.  What is also important 
to mention here is the fact that the SGT had taken away one of the main 
managerial task of a general manager that of designing a compensation and 
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reward system based on the nature of the tasks attached to the post, the 
financial circumstances of the enterprise  and the performance of the worker.  
For the white collar workers with ambition to work up the ladder to 
managerial positions, the SGT offered them little opportunity for promotion 
to these positions.  In the building and road construction industry (Ministère 
des Travaux Publics, 26 June, 1983) for example, the difference between the 
basic salary of one management position and another did not exceed 150 
dinars (equivalent with today‟s exchange rate of US$2).  The narrow gap in 
earnings between the different grades for professional and managerial 
positions also demoralised those seeking to gain more training and 
development since the development would not add much difference to their 
salaries.  When the country started to get into financial troubles in 1985 and 
1986 following the sharp decline in the government revenues from the oil 
export, the first step the government administration carried out was 
increasing the salaries of managers as table 4.3 shows.   
 
 
Tables 4.3.  The rise  in the salaries of managers  following the oil crisis of 1986. 
 
                                         
a. b. 
   
      Year        
Category 
1981-1985    
A 5,000-5,200 DA 
B 5,500-6,000 DA 
C 6,200-6,450 DA 
D 6,500-6,900 DA 
E 7,000-7,500 DA 
 
 
        Year 
Category 
1986-1989 
A 24,300-18,900 DA 
B 17,865-15,750 DA 
C 14,805-13,625 DA 
 
  
Source:  Data analysis. 
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Their salaries went up by more than three times their level only five years 
earlier.  The increase was an incentive introduced to stimulate managers to 
create the right environment in their enterprises to increase production and 
productivity to reduce the shock of the oil crisis.  It remains to say however 
that the revision brought to the salaries of managers was the first step for 
further changes which the employment system as a whole had to see after the 
abolishment of socialism in 1989. 
 
4.6.2. The Organisational Restructuring of the Public Sector of 1982 
 
The organisational restructuring of the public sector introduced in 1982 was 
evidence that the socialist managed enterprise as a system of management 
was not working.  In the fourth congress meeting of the FLN which took 
place in 1979, the FLN proceeded in the evaluation of the national economic 
and social strategies implemented during the whole period between 1967 and 
1978.  Though it was recognised that the various development programmes 
initiated since 1967 had contributed to improvement in the economy and the 
standard of living of the population, the economy still suffered from under-
utilisation of production capacities, low efficiency in economic growth, 
distortion between the different sectors of the economy and wastage of 
resources.  The rate of the domestic demand satisfied by the domestic 
production rather than increasing it decreased from 48 percent in 1967 to 24 
percent in 1977.  Authors who analysed this period (Andreff and Hayed, 
1978; Andreff, 1979; Osterkamp, 1982; Benissad, 1994) related the causes of 
the development failure in Algeria to: 
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 Bad choice of the development strategies and therefore the investment 
projects.  Since 1967, the government based its strategy for development on 
the „Industries Industrialisantes (Industrialising Industries)’, a model 
developed by De Bernis.  The model predicts that the concentration on the 
development of the heavy industry especially steel and iron would 
automatically generate industries that would produce machineries and 
equipments needed in agriculture and would also reduce the import of these 
machineries and equipments from the capitalist countries (Genne, 1979).  But 
it became clear that the implementation of this model did not fit with the 
economic and social conditions of Algeria.  The country suffered from an 
underdeveloped domestic market and an acute shortage of skilled labour 
force.  The implementation of the investment projects in the majority of the 
state enterprises relied heavily on foreign expertise from capitalist and 
communist countries which was very expensive to hire; 
 
 The excessive intervention of the government administration in the 
elaboration and execution of the investment projects of the state enterprises 
caused a long delay in the completion of most of the projects.  Some had to 
be carried out from one national plan to the next.   From the 400,000 million 
dinars allocated for the implementation of the first five years national plan 
(1980-84) (Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire, 1980), almost 
half of these funds had to be invested to finish projects which already started 
in the second four year national plan (1974-77); 
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 The high integration and diversification of the state enterprises turned 
these enterprises into conglomerates with divisions and production plants 
dispersed in different regions of the country a fact which made it hard for the 
Ministry of Industry and Energy, the central planning body and particularly 
the Ministry of Finance to exercise an effective control over their economic 
and financial management.  Because of the difficulties to control their 
financial expenditures, most state enterprises incurred heavy debts.  In 
manufacturing alone, the total debt of all enterprises combined was estimated 
to reach around 80 billion dinars (equivalent to some US$12 billion with 
today‟s exchange rate) or some 94 percent of the country‟s GDP. 
 
In the hope to tighten the control over the wastage of resources to avoid 
further debts and to increase the production and productivity of the state 
enterprises, the FLN Congress recommended the contraction in the size of 
these enterprises by breaking them down into smaller entities.  These entities 
became specialised by line of activities.  Some entities became in charge 
exclusively with production, some with distribution, some with research and 
development and some with importation.  As a result, SONATRACH, SNS, 
SNMETAL, for example, were broken down into 8, 14 and 4 enterprises 
respectively.  Table 4.4 below shows the dramatic expansion in the number 
of enterprises of the public sector following the organisational restructuring 
strategy implemented after 1982. 
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Table 4.4.   Reconfiguration of the public sector after 1982. 
 
Type of industry No. of enterprises 
before 1982 
No. of enterprises after 
1982 
Agriculture 05 15 
External trade 10 26 
Culture 01 03 
Petrochemicals 02 15 
Finance 05 08 
Building and Urbanism 06 85 
Hydraulics 07 20 
Light Industries 09 46 
Heavy Industries 05 47 
Information 01 01 
Telecommunications 01 02 
Health 01 05 
Tourism 06 21 
Transportation 07 20 
Road Works 03 12 
Planning and 
Environmental 
Management 
01 02 
                              Total 70 328 
Source:  MPAT, May 1983 
  
However, the reconfiguration of the public sector did not add any value to the 
performance of the national economic growth.  Rather, it had created more 
wastage of resources.  Because of the pronounced shortage of people in the 
labour market with management and technical skills and the housing shortage 
which made workers mobility very difficult, it was hard for enterprises 
especially those located in remote areas to fill in the vacant positions.  Often 
these positions were filled in by people who lacked even the technical 
knowledge about the activities in which their enterprises operated.  As the 
country entered a serious economic crisis following the sharp drop in the oil 
price in 1986, the government carried out a full revision of its role in the 
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economic activity and this by launching reforms to introduce the free market-
oriented principles.   
 
4.7.  Conclusion 
 
The strategies for economic and social developments followed by the regime 
of Boumedienne were too ambitious.  The participation of workers in the 
management of the enterprises created conflicts between workers and the 
enterprise senior managers which created a slow down in production and 
productivity following the rising number of industrial actions in many 
industries.  Production progress was also slow with the monopoly of the 
socialist enterprise over the external trade and the low incentives provided by 
the SGT system for competence and skill development of employees.    More 
significant was the heavy reliance of the Algerian economy on Western 
technology and raw materials.  These technology and materials were 
purchased in foreign currencies and therefore any fluctuation in the price of 
oil and gas would have significant consequences on the national economic 
growth in general and the manufacturing sector in particular.  
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 Chapter 5  
 
The Transition of Algeria to the Free Market System  
 
                                                      
5.1.  Introduction 
 
As already mentioned, the development programmes initiated in the 1960s 
were tightly linked with the revenues drawn from the export of 
hydrocarbons.  Any fluctuation in their prices would negatively or 
positively affect the national economic and social growth.  Therefore, the 
heavy drop in their prices in the mid 1980s affected every aspect of the 
Algerian society and this could be considered as a turning point in the 
history of Algeria since independence in terms of its political, economic 
and social orientations.  In this chapter, a brief discussion was first given 
on the economic and social situations in the late 1980s prior to the reforms 
initiated by the government to move to the free market system.  This was 
followed by a discussion of the reforms introduced in the socialist 
enterprise while still operating within the socialist system.  Then a detailed 
discussion was given on the free market reforms.  Four aspects of these 
reforms were discussed.  These were the democratisation of the political 
system, the reforms of the banking and the private sectors and the 
privatisation of the state enterprise.   
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5.2.      The Economic and Social Degration in the late 1980s 
     
Since independence, the export of hydrocarbons had been in steady increase 
reaching in 1980 some 98 percent of all exports.  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, massive investments were absorbed by this sector to 
develop it.  A large part of these investments were also financed by 
borrowings from the international financial markets.  In 1979, the country‟s 
borrowings reached around $US 18.5 billion or 6 times of its level in 1973.  
But the comfortable position of Algeria to borrow from international markets 
did not last long.  With the drop in the oil price in 1986 from $US26 to 
$US15 a barrel, the government revenues dropped from $US12.8 billion in 
1985 to $US7.8 billion in 1986 (Behidji, 1er Trimestre, 1997: 25) or a drop 
by some 40 percent (Sari, 2002: 17).  The contraction in the oil revenues and 
the difficulties to secure loans, particularly long and medium terms loans, 
from the international financial institutions pushed the government to tighten 
its control over imports and also over its financial assistance to the public 
sector.  As a consequence, state-owned enterprises became unable to buy the 
necessary inputs which resulted in massive reduction in their production 
(Abdoun, 4em Trimestre 1998 et 1er Trimestre, 1999).    The production of 
state-owned enterprises operating in manufacturing, for example, dropped in 
three years or between 1985 and 1987 by 20 percent.  For Chikhi (1990: 10) 
“This situation gives an image of a country incapable of producing”.  Since 
1986, the national economic growth started to deteriorate rapidly.  It dropped 
from 4.6 percent in 1985 to minus 1.9 percent in 1987 (Chikhi, 1994:  13).   
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The immediate results of this deterioration were a significant increase in the 
rate of inflation which went from 8.2 percent in 1984 to 46 percent in 1987, a 
massive drop in job creation from almost 2 million created between 1967 and 
1983 to 138,000 jobs in 1984 and to only 88,000 in 1987 (Chikki, 1994:15).  
Because of the massive drop in job creation and the closure of many 
production plants as well as the growing number of the new job seekers, the 
rate of unemployment increased to some 22 percent of the active population 
in 1987.   
 
The rising unemployment had serious repercussions on the standard of living 
of the population.  It was estimated that between 1984 and 1987 the 
purchasing power of the Algerian citizen for basic foods such as bread, milk, 
cooking oil and sugar dropped by 20 percent.  Because of these economic and 
social problems, it was inevitable to see an explosion in social tensions.  
Violence, workers‟ strikes and public demonstrations against the government 
in most cities intensified in 1987 and 1988.  To tackle these social tensions, 
the government undertook measures to revitalise the national economy first 
by the corporatisation of the state-owned enterprise and this by granting 
autonomy to its general manager to take strategic decisions, and second by 
introducing the free market economic system. 
 
5.3. The First Sign of the Government Disengagement from the 
Economic Activity   
      
The first sign of the government disengagement from the economic activity 
came in late 1987 when the Law no. 87-19 dated 8 December 1987 was 
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promulgated which granted the general managers in the state cooperatives in 
the agricultural sector the autonomy to take strategic decisions.  Few weeks 
later, the Law no. 88-01 dated 12 January 1988 was promulgated to grant 
autonomy in the commercial enterprises whether operating in manufacturing 
or service sectors (COREP, 1989).  The 88-01 law was designed to transform 
the state-owned enterprise into an Entreprise Publique Economique (Public 
Economic Enterprise), (EPE), ruled by private commercial rules. Those EPEs 
with an important position in the economic development of the country and 
operating at national level were assigned the ownership status of joint stock 
companies and those operating at local level were, however, assigned the 
ownership status of companies with limited responsibilities.  The two types 
of ownership differed in their control structures.  The stock companies were 
controlled by boards of directors whereas the limited companies by 
supervisory boards.  Because of the important place that the EPEs operating 
at national level had represented and still represent in the government 
policies and the national economic activity of the country and more 
importantly their importance in the privatisation strategy of the government, 
it was decided that it would be important to examine the type of 
management-government relationship that the Law 88-01 had instituted in 
these enterprises.  Having some insight on this relationship would 
demonstrate how much sincerity the government had in its claim to 
disengage itself from the management of the economic activity in the 
country.         
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5.3.1. The Autonomy of the EPE:  Autonomy Incomplete 
 
Under the Law 88-01, ownership and management were separated.  The 
management of the EPE was handed over to the general manager while the 
ownership of the EPE had to remain in the hands of the government.  The 
government ownership retained in the EPEs had to be managed by public 
holding companies called Fonds de Participation (Participation Founds).  
What the law had instituted was a management structure divided between two 
separate bodies.  One body exclusively in charge of the EPE‟s financial 
operations  represented by the Fonds and one in charge of the rest of its 
internal operations  represented by the board of directors and the general 
manager.  The mission and the corporate control structure of each of these 
two bodies tell us exactly what the government intended by the Law 88-01.     
 
5.3.1.1. The Government Presence through the Fonds de  Participation 
 
 
The Fonds were joint stock companies.  Their mission, as explained in the 
Rapports sur l’Autonomie des Entreprises published in 1987, was to:   
 
 Restructure the financial situation of the socialist enterprises before these 
enterprises would be transformed from socialist managed enterprises into 
EPEs; 
 
 Ensure the best management of the government capital in the EPEs to 
reduce financial wastage; 
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 Introduce investments in the EPEs on behalf of the government to make 
the EPEs efficient and profitable; 
 
This mission had to be carried out by: 
   
A.  The General Assemby of the Fonds.  All the Fonds were governed by one 
general assembly (Décret no. 88-119, 21 June, 1988).  This assembly was 
composed of 15 ministers (Décret no.88-120, 21 June, 1988). All its 
decisions had to be elaborated within the economic and social strategy of the 
government.  In its ordinary and extraordinary meetings, the assembly was 
allowed to decide on: 
 
 The dividends to be distributed and the profits to be retained in the EPEs; 
 
 The prerogatives of the members of the boards of directors of the EPEs; 
 
  The charter and business contracts of the EPEs; 
 
 Whether to accept or reject the annual reports submitted by the EPEs; 
 
 The nomination and compensation of directors of the EPEs and of the 
financial auditors. 
  
The influence of the head of the government, the governor of the Central 
Bank of Algeria and the treasury in its decisions was strong.   
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B.  The Board of Directors.  The board was composed from 5 to 9 members 
who were nominated by the government for a period of 5 years renewable 
(Loi no.88-03, 12 January, 1988).  They were in their majority members 
representing the different government departments and industries owned by 
the goverment.  The mission of the board was the execution of the resolutions 
of the general assembly and the instructions flowing from the state treasury 
and the Conseil National de Planification (the national planning body), 
(CNP).  To make sure that the EPEs did not deviate from the decisions taken 
by board of directors of the Fonds and its general assemby, the board of 
directors of the Fonds nominated the personnes who should sit in the general 
assemblies and the board of directors of the EPEs (Loi no. 88-03, 12 January, 
1988) 
  
Also, to avoid the monopoly of one Fond over the financial management of 
the EPE, the capital of each EPE was divided between three Fonds except for 
the banks where their capital was divided between four Fonds.  All the 781 
enterprises which were listed to be transformed into EPEs were divided 
between eight Fonds.  Each Fond included in its portfolio between 23 and 
163 enterprises operating in similar or related activities.  The number of 
enterprises in each Fond and the ownership stake of the Fonds in these 
enterprises are given in table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1.  The  EPEs in the portfolios of the eight Fonds de Participation by the end of 
1993. 
Fonds Number of 
EPEs 
Ownership stake of the 
Fonds 
Building 
Construction 
163 Majority Ownership in 95 
EPEs 
Services 133 Majority/Unique 
Ownership in 45 EPEs 
Food Industries 110 Majority Ownership in 38 
EPEs 
Electronics, 
Telecommunications, 
Informatics 
104 Majority Ownership in 27 
EPEs 
Chemicals, 
Petrochemicals, 
Pharmacy 
 94 Majority Ownership in 25 
EPEs 
Mining, 
Hydrocarbons, 
Hydraulics 
 30 Majority Ownership in all 
30 EPEs 
Equipments/Materials 
used in different 
Industries 
 23 Majority Ownership in all 
23 EPEs 
Miscellaneous  
Industries 
124 Majority Ownership in 35 
EPEs 
Source: Data analysis. 
 
What is worth mentioning here is that when the Fonds took over these 
enterprises, the majority of these enterprises suffered heavy debts and had 
records of poor performance.  The mission of the Fonds as mentioned before 
was to revitalise these enterprises and this by restructuring their financial 
situations to speed up their transfer into EPEs.  The state treasury spent some 
600 billion dinars in their financial restructuring between 1991 and 1995.  
This restructuring was expected to give confidence to the EPEs so they could 
produce more and increase their export to reduce the burden of their debts.  
They were required to be profitable like any private companies.  They were 
also allowed to set the prices of their products except for what was 
considered strategic products of first necessity like flour, milk, water, 
electricity.  More important, they were allowed to set the policies of their 
  
 134 
personnel, shed workers for economic reasons, choose their own suppliers 
and customers and borrow from international financial markets.  To 
concretise the autonomy of managers in strategic decision-makings, the law 
88-01 instituted in the EPE the control structure followed in the private stock 
company in the free market economic system.  But in practice, as seen next, 
the autonomy was incomplete and the disengagement of the government from 
the management of the EPE was artificial.   
   
5.3.1.2. The Extent of Autonomy Allocated to the General Manager 
 
The only way to understand how much autonomy the management of the 
EPE had is to look at its control structure.  The EPE was controlled by three 
bodies:  
 
A. The General Assembly.  When the government owned 100 percent of the 
shares of the EPE, its Fonds de Participation assumed the status of the 
general assembly of the EPE.  In other cases, the general assembly was 
composed of members representing a mixture of members from the Fonds 
and other public enterprises.  One important point to mention here is that the 
Law no.88-01 dated 12 January 1988 relative to the EPE kept silent on the 
prerogatives of the general assembly and how its members should be 
nominated. 
     
B. The Board of Directors.  The law also kept silent on the prerogatives of 
the board of directors and how its members should be selected.  However, the 
board was composed with a minimum of 7 directors and 12 directors to a 
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maximum.  Amongst these directors, 2 should be representatives of workers 
of the EPE.  The directors were nominated by the general assembly for a 
period of 6 years renewable.  A director was not allowed to participate in 
more than 3 EPEs and his/her remuneration was essentially based on what 
was called Jetons which was related to the attendance of a director at the 
meetings of the board and a bonus called Tantième.  In the early 1990s, the 
average amount of a jeton was 140 dinars per meeting.  And since most EPEs 
had between 4 and 6 meetings per year, the annual income of a director by 
attending the meetings in one EPE was on average between 560 and 840 
dinars.  As a director was allowed to participate in 3 EPEs to a maximum, 
his/her global income for being a director amounted to an average between 
1,680 and 2,520 dinars per year.  For the Tantième, however, most directors 
did not draw significant income.  The Tantième was a bonus based on the 
profitability of the EPE.  And the amount allocated to the Tantième was not 
allowed to be more than twice the annual global amount drawn from the 
Jetons.  Since the majority of the EPEs in the 1990s suffered form low 
productivity and negative profitability, the Jetons were the only source of 
earnings from being a director in a board of an EPE. 
 
C. The General Manager.  The Decree no. 88-101 dated 16 May 1988 clearly 
called for the resignation of the general manager in charge of the socialist 
enterprise once his/her enterprise was converted into an EPE.  But there was, 
however, no mention on how the general manager of the EPE should be 
selected and what should be his/her prerogatives in the EPE and how he/she 
should be remunerated.  These came only later with the promulgation of the 
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Code de Commerce (Commercial Code) published in 1993 which is still in 
application to the present time while writing this work.  The code gives great 
details on the obligations, responsibilities and composition of the general 
assembly and the board of directors.  What is more significant in the code is 
that it gives the general manager ample power to manage the EPE.  He/she is 
in charge of the Management Board of the EPE and also elected to be the 
President of the Board of Directors making him/her President General 
Manager (PGM).  The duties, compensation and sanctions of the PGM have 
to be negotiated between the PGM and the board of directors and concluded 
in the work contract of the PGM signed by the two parties.  In most EPEs, the 
PGM assumed the presidency of the board of directors of the parent 
enterprise and those of the divisions.  In some cases, the president of the 
board of directors of a division was selected from a functional department 
located at the parent head office.  At Saidal, for example, the president of the 
board of directors of the division Biotic was the manager of the Human 
Resources Department, that of the division Anti-Biotic the manager of the 
Financial Strategy Department and that of the division Pharmal the manager 
of the Audit and Analysis Department (Groupe Saidal, 2002).  The logic 
behind the concentration of power mainly in the hands of the PGM was to 
create coordination and synergy between the activities of the EPE. 
 
From the above mentioned control structure, it is clear that there was no 
actual autonomy granted to the general manager of the EPE as the law 88-01 
claimed.  The government kept its control power over the EPEs through its 
representatives in the general assemblies and the board of directors of the 
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EPEs.  Also, the Fonds de Participation failed to fulfil their main mission to 
make the EPEs efficient and profitable with the exception of those enterprises 
which operated in hydrocarbons which were doing well because of the huge 
investments made by the Fonds to modernise their equipments in order to 
increase production and attract foreign partners.   
 
The inability of the Fonds to improve the performance of most of their EPEs 
was caused by various factors.  First, the timing to fulfil this mission was not 
right.  The Fonds were created at a time when the political situation in the 
country was unstable leading to the continuous change of ministers and 
consequently the members of the Fonds.    Second, the law 88-01 forbad the 
liquidation of a poorly performing EPE.  If the liquidation of an EPE was a 
necessity, the assets and the shares of the EPE had to be transferred to 
another EPE or to a local authority.  The private sector was not allowed to 
purchase the assets or the shares of the liquidated EPE and therefore private 
investors were excluded from the participation in the capital of the EPE and 
in its management.  Third, the macroeconomic environment was very hostile.  
Among the environmental constraints was the steady depreciation in the 
value of the dinar.  Its value dropped from 4.9 per $US in 1987, 7.6 in 1989, 
8.9 in 1990, 18.5 in 1991 to 56.20 in 1996 (Abdoun, 4em Trimestre 1998 et 
1er Trimestre, 1999: 39).  This depreciation reduced the power of the EPEs 
to import the necessary raw materials and technology needed in their 
production processes.  Fourth, the Fonds were reluctant to invest because 
neither the CNP nor the Fonds had a clear strategy on how to allocate the 
scarce resources in the country.  Important too was the fact that the Fonds 
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controlled enterprises which operated in different activities and many of the 
members of the general assembly and the board of directors of the Fonds did 
not have the required technical knowledge of the activities of the EPEs in 
their porfolios.  Though the Fonds were supposed to exercise tight control 
over their EPEs by regularly analysing the financial and economic 
performance of the EPEs, in reality this rarely happened.  Often the Fonds 
received only the financial accounts of the EPEs which were in most cases 
manipulated by their managers.  Fifth, neither the Fonds nor the general 
managers of the EPEs were ready to face the new rule of the game in which 
the public enterprise found itself in.  Since the law of autonomy of the public 
enterprise was introduced in 1988, the government administration embarked 
in installing the legal and institutional framework to build up the free market 
economic system where the liberalisation of trade put the EPE face to face 
into competition with not only domestic private firms but significantly with 
big foreign firms, a competition which the EPE was not ready for.            
         
 5.4. Putting in Place the Institutions of the Free Market     
 System  
 
When the state-owned enterprise was granted management autonomy, the 
intention as it seems was not only to make the state enterprise efficient but 
also to prepare it for privatisation.  Though until 1994, there was no mention 
of the word privatisation in the speeches and debates of any government 
official, the prediction was that with Algeria‟s difficulties to secure loans 
from international financial institutions because of its growing debts, its 
inability to service its debt arrears and the steady decline in the production of 
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all the sectors of the economy, the country would eventually fall in the trap of 
the IMF and accept the IMF‟s conditions in return for loans where 
privatisation would constitute one of the main conditions.  What is evident is 
that between 1988 and 1993, the government were active putting in place the 
free market institutions and mechanisms to welcome privatisation by 
introducing a series of legal and institutional reforms such as: 
 
 The law of the private sector orientation (Loi no. 88-25,  12 July, 1988); 
  
 The law relative to the abolishment of the external trade monopoly (Loi 
no. 88-29, 19 July, 1988); 
 
 The law relative to the liberalisation of prices (Loi no. 89-12, 5 July, 989); 
 
 The authorisation of employers to create their own associations (1989) 
such as the CAP, CNPA, ACE, CGEOA and the UNEP; 
 
 The revision of the Labour Relations (1990).  This revision abolished the 
monopoly of the UGTA and introduced the trade union pluralism.  It also 
abolished the SGT which was replaced by the collective bargaining between 
the employers and workers representatives; 
      
 The creation of the stock market (1990); 
 
 The introduction of VAT (1992); 
 
 The revision of the Code of Commerce of 1975 (1993). 
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Perhaps the most striking reforms of all during this period which had a 
significant effect on the social and economic structure of the Algerian society 
were the break up with the socialist ideology followed since independence, 
the expansion of the private sector and particularly the authorisation of 
foreign companies to invest in the country especially in hydrocarbons, the 
reform of the banking sector and the privatisation of the state-owned 
enterprise. 
 
5.4.1. The Democratisation of the Political System 
 
The democratisation of the political system came after the public 
demonstration against the government in October 1988 which ended with the 
death of some five hundred people.  Straight after this event, the government 
introduced in 1989, the country‟s third constitution since independence - the 
first was in 1963 and the second in 1976.  The new constitution abolished 
socialism and introduced the multi-party political system.  As a consequence, 
several political parties even those which were banned were formed in 
September 1989.  To accelerate both the political and economic reforms, 
Mouloud Hamrouche, a pro-free market reformist, was selected by the end of 
1989 as the head of the government.   Hamrouche was welcomed by the 
international financial institutions.  He was seen as a man who could speed 
up the economic reforms and as a result some 973 billion dollars (Benderra, 
2002) worth of credits were allowed to Algeria between 1989 and 1991 to 
carry out his economic reforms.  But while the economic, legal and 
institutional reforms were going well, the multiparty system did not seem to 
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go in the right direction.  In the regional and provincial elections, the Islamic 
party, the FIS, won more than half the seats in the provincial elections or 853 
seats out of 1,541 and almost the majority of the seats in the regional 
elections or 32 out of 48. The presidential elections which were anticipated to 
take place in June 1991 did not take place and this led the FIS to call for a 
national strike which resulted in the intervention of the army and the 
replacement in June 1991 the government of Hamrouche with the pro-
centrally planned system Ahmed Ghozali (Entelis, 1992; Bouardel, 2003; 
Heristche, 2004).  In his speech in Parliament in June 1991, Ghozali 
(Services du Chef du Gouvernment, 1991) strongly criticised the economic 
reforms of his predecessors as too quick too soon.  He introduced an 
economic strategy for development with three objectives to achieve: 
 
   The compression of imports especially those not desperately needed in the 
production and consumption to reduce the government expenditures; 
 
   Expanding the capacities of oil and gas production and this via the 
creation of  partnership between SONATRACH  and the multinational 
companies; 
 
   Reducing inflation by freezing salaries in the public sector and increasing 
taxation. 
     
The strategy of austerity followed by Ghozali was a clear return to the 
government strong intervention in the national economy.  However, it neither 
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showed any sign of improvement in the economic growth nor was welcomed 
by the international financial institutions.  Under Ghozali and later under 
Belaid Abdesslam - Abdesslam was the former Minister of Industry who 
served under Boumedienne‟s government and he replaced Ghozali in 1992 
and followed similar lines of government intervention as Ghozali - long and 
medium credits from the IMF and other Western countries became difficult 
to secure.  With the drop in the oil price in 1992 and the high portion of 
hydrocarbon export revenues, estimated to 90 percent of total revenues, put 
to service Algeria‟s foreign debts (Guendouzi and Kabri, 4em Trimestre 1998 
et 1er Trimestre, 1999: 134), the country‟s economic and social situation 
entered into deeper troubles.  In fact during this year, or 1993, it was believed 
that the country‟s foreign reserves were enough to pay for no more than one 
month of imports.  This crisis was further exacerbated by the growing 
political insecurity which broke up as a result of the cancellation of the 
legislative elections, the dissolution of the parliament and the resignation of 
the President of the country, Chadli Ben Djadid in 1991.  The country was 
put under a state of emergency and the presidency of the country was taken 
over by a collegial structure called the Haut Comité d’Etat (State High 
Committee) Presided by Ali Kafi.  Under Mokdad Sifi who became the head 
of the government in 1994, the presidential elections were organised in 
November 1995 where Liamine Zeroual became the president of the country.  
Under Sifi and Zeroual the economic reforms initiated since 1988 accelerated 
but this time under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank through 
the two Programmes for Structural Adjustment (PSA) signed by the Algerian 
government in 1994 and 1995 where the expansion of the private sector, the 
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liberalisation of the banking sector and the privatisation of the state-owned 
enterprise were amongst the most important conditions of these programmes. 
 
5.4.2. The Expansion of the Private Sector 
 
Since the Tripoli Charter of 1961 (Amirouche and Chegham, 1985) until 
today, the Algerian government has always recognised the private sector as 
an integral part of the national development.  The Code of Investment of 
1963 provided a lot of facilities to encourage the participation of the private 
sector, which was predominantly foreign, in the economic activity such as 
low rates of taxation and facilities to bank credits.  But the private sector was 
reluctant to invest fear of future nationalisation.  In 1966, a new ordinance 
(Ordonnance no.66-284 dated 15 September, 1966) was enacted to explicitly 
specify the monopoly of the government over the sectors considered strategic 
such as hydrocarbons, mechanical engineering, iron and steel while the 
private sector should operate in the non strategic industries such as textiles, 
leather, food processing, plastic and construction (Hadjseyd, 1985). 
   
With the socialist approach to economic and social development initiated 
since 1971, both in the National Charter (1976) and the Constitution of 1976, 
the private sector was put under rigid control.  An investor willing to create a 
private firm should go through a chain of bureaucratic procedures which 
could take months, had to pay high taxation, faced difficulties to secure 
credits from the state banks and the size and the activities in which the firm 
should operate were increasingly restricted.  More significant, the Law 78-02 
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dated 11 February 1978 put an end to the freedom of the private firm to 
import the raw materials and equipments from foreign markets.  The socialist 
managed enterprise was the only commercial entity allowed to import input 
supplies needed in the economic production.  The private sector was as it 
seems banned from import fear of any alliance with international capital, to 
allow the government to have a full control in the transfer of capital to 
foreign markets and fundamentally to protect the domestic production from 
competition of imported goods.  By 1982, about 25 percent of private firms 
operating in manufacturing closed their doors because of the shortages in 
supply of raw materials and equipments (Bouzidi, 1985).   Only 12,000 
private firms remained in operation mainly in industries requiring less 
technology.  About half of these firms operated in construction industry. 
 
In the sixth session of the Central Committee of the single political party 
FLN which took place in 1982, the role of the domestic private sector in the 
national economy was reviewed.  Subsequently, a new law (Loi no.81-11 
dated 21 August 1982) was enacted lifting the rigidity of the previous 
legislations on private investment and giving the private firm a significant 
role to play in the national economic growth.  The objectives assigned to the 
private firm were (Hammam, 1985): 
  
 To satisfy the needs of the population in goods and services; 
 
 To create jobs; 
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 To extent the national production capacity; 
 
 To be not a competitor but a complement to the public sector. 
 
The impact of this legislation on the expansion of the private sector was 
limited.  Though some firms were created to operate in activities which 
needed technical skills such as mechanical engineering and electricity, the 
majority of newly created firms were oriented towards food processing, 
construction, textiles and all industries which carried less investment risks.   
The fact remains that the true expansion and diversification of the private 
sector came only since the 1990s with the promulgation of the law relative to 
the Money and Credit of 1990 (Loi no. 90-10, 14 April 1990) and the 
progressive lifting of government monopoly over the external trade.  In its 
article 183, the law no.90-10 allowed the participation of foreign investors in 
the economic activity of the country.  The distinction between foreign and 
domestic investors was abolished with the legislative decree (Décret no. 93-
12, 5 October 1993) relative to the promotion of investment of 1993.  The 
decree guaranteed the free investment in the country, the equality before the 
law of domestic and foreign investors, less administrative procedures to open 
a business, less taxation and the creation of the National Agency for 
Investment and Promotion or APSI to assist investors with the necessary 
information and make the process for creating a business quicker.  Further 
encouragement to invest in the country was promulgated with Ordinance 
no.01-03 dated 20 August 2001 relative to investment development.  
Investments made in activities perceived by the government as strategic and 
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which lead to a sustainable development could benefits from a number of 
advantages such as low custom duties, the exemption for ten years from the 
payment of a number of taxes and implicit and explicit government 
assistance.  To accelerate the activity of investment in the country by local 
and foreign investors, the government created an agency called Agence 
National de Developpement et Investissement (National Agency for 
Development and Investment), (ANDI) (Décret no. 01-282, 24 Septembre, 
2001), which replaced the APSI, to provide the right information to investors 
and make the administrative procedures to open a business in the country less 
problematic.   
 
The series of laws relative to investments enacted since 1990 had tried to lift 
the institutional constraints facing investment in the country to boost the 
confidence of both domestic and foreign investors that investment in Algeria 
was safe.  For foreign investors, they were allowed to transfer their profits 
outside the country and were guaranteed against the prospect of future 
property expropriation.  As a result, the size of the private sector and its 
contribution of the GDP had grown tremendously.  The number of firms 
increased from some 57,000 in 2001 to 150,000 in 2003 (Belmihoub, 2006).  
In the year 2004, the number almost doubled reaching some 225,449 firms 
and employing between 250,000 and 300,000 workers.  The contribution of 
these firms to the GDP was estimated to reach around 54 percent.  The 
majority of these firms were of small size.  About 90 percent employed 
between 1 and 9 workers.  Also, the majority operated in agriculture and food 
processing, construction, retailing, services and were concentrated in the big 
  
 147 
cities and urban areas (for more details on the development of the private 
sector in Algeria see the report of the CNES published in 2003).  
 
Despite all the measures that the government has so far introduced to 
promote private investment, the private domestic investor was until recently 
still constrained by a bundle of institutional problems.  According to the 
report of the CNES (2003) and the report of the World Bank (2003) the 
private firm in Algeria faced strong competition from imports and the 
informal sector, high taxation, banks high interest rates, difficulties to secure 
bank credits and tight regulations of entry.   For example, an entrepreneur 
wishing to open a business had to go through 49 procedures and wait around 
407 days and more, depending on how much connection the entrepreneur had 
with the admininstrative bureaucracy, before the business is finally 
registered.  Since 2005, however, the government has introduced some 
reforms to reduce the cumbersome registration process for opening an 
enterprise.  An entrepreneur has to go through 14 procedures, wait for 26 
days and pay around 9 percent of the capital of the enterprise (World Bank, 
2006)          
 
5.4.3. Reforms of the Banking System 
 
The development of the banking system went hand in hand with the 
development strategies followed by the government since independence.  
Apart from the Central Bank of Algeria which was created in December 
1962, all the commercial banks were created following the nationalisation of 
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the French banks in 1966 and 1968 as a result of these banks refusing to 
participate in the development programmes initiated by the government of 
Boumedienne.   
 
During socialism, the banking system was highly regulated.  The bank was 
no more than a simple administrative institution and therefore it lacked the 
spirit of competition, innovation and modernisation.  Though in all the 
financial laws promulgated since 1970, the banks were required to exercise 
tough control over the financial expenditures of the state-owned enterprises 
to reduce wastage (Benhalima, 2001), in practice, the control was loose.  The 
state-owned enterprise had no problem to get credits from its own bank.  
Under a simple presentation of a credit application, Bettahar argued (1995:  
17), “The tap for funds was turned on”.     
 
Until 1986, this type of bank-enterprise relationship was tolerated because of 
the abundance of the government revenues drawn from the high price of oil 
in the 1970s.  But with the changes taking place in the international monetary 
system since the early 1980s and the sharp drop in the oil price in 1986, the 
Algerian legislators introduced as mentioned earlier the law of autonomy of 
the state-owned enterprise in 1988 to reconstruct the government-public 
enterprise relationship.  In 1989, the banks were transformed into joint stock 
companies (Benachenhou, 1998).  Few months later, the Law no.90-10 dated 
14 April 1990 was introduced to separate the banking system from the 
control of the state treasury and the Minister of Finance.  The Central Bank 
of Algeria was transformed into the Bank of Algeria governed by a 
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management team  composed of a governor and a board of directors all 
nominated by the government.  The management team became the only 
authority allowed to introduce the conditions regulating the behaviour of 
banks and financial institutions operating in Algeria.  The law also introduced 
the permission to create private banks and financial institutions.  By 2004, the 
financial market in Algeria counted 21 commercial banks and 7 financial 
institutions (Liberté, 25 March, 2004).  Though 15 of the commercial banks 
were private, these were small in size.  Until 2002, the public banks still 
dominated around 95 percent of the financial resources in the country.  
Around 91 percent of long-term credits and some 84 percent of deposits were 
transacted in these banks.  The domination of public banks had been resented 
by the IMF and the World Bank and they recently called for their 
privatisation as the only mean to stimulate them to be active players in the 
economic activity (Jeune Independent, 7 October, 2006).  The government 
had taken some initiative to prepare them for privatisation by spending in 
2002 some 75 billion dinars for their recapitalisation.  Their managers had 
also introduced, through the assistance of foreign consultants, international 
standards in the various activities of these banks to improve their 
performance.  However, until 2006, there was no sign of the privatisation of 
any public bank.  In fact, despite their management autonomy, public banks 
including the Bank of Algeria were still exposed to strong intervention by the 
Minister of Finance and the Inspection Générale des Finances (General 
Inspection of Finances) (IGF) making the enterprise-bank relationship in 
favour of the public enterprises than the private firms especially the medium 
and small ones.  
  
 150 
5.4.4. Privatisation of the State-Owned Enterprise (1994 onwards) 
 
 
Between 1989 and 1991, under Mouloud Hamrouche, the head of the 
government at that time, the reforms to the free market economic system 
were working fast and this was with the blessing and the financial help 
provided by the international financial institutions which amounted during 
this period to some $US 1.120 billion..  As mentioned earlier, the positive 
attitude of the international financial community with Algeria changed when 
Ahmed Ghozali (1991-92) and Belaid Abdesslam (1992-93) took over the 
government office.  The austerity measures followed by these two heads of 
government to stabilise the economy did not yield fruit.  The national 
economic growth was working below its level in the late 1980s.  In 1994, the 
production of the EPEs operating in manufacturing with all industries 
combined dropped by 50 percent from its level in 1989.  Also, it became very 
difficult for the Algerian government to secure loans from international 
financial markets especially for long and medium term loans as Algeria 
became regarded as a risky borrower.  Its debts increased from $US 25.7 
billion in 1993 to $US 29.5 billion in 1994 and more than 90 percent of the 
government revenues drawn from hydrocarbons were used to service these 
debts (Harchaoui, 2006).  The immediate response to this alarming situation 
forced the government to enter into negotiations with the IMF for loans but 
this time with conditions attached to the loans.  Two Stand-By agreements 
were signed as a consequence.  The first Stand-By was signed in April 1994 
and the second in March 1995.  The two Stand-By allowed the extension of 
the period for the repayment of $US 16 billion worth of debts from 3 years as 
was agreed in 1990 to 16 years (Harchaoui, 2006).  The repayment of the 
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debts over a period of 16 years was supposed to lift the pressure from the 
Algerian government to service its debts and consequently the portion of 
export revenues used to service the debts dropped from 93 percent of the total 
revenues to 47 percent.  This reduction together with more credits coming 
from the international financial community and also the increase in the price 
of oil in 1995-1997 were all providing good conditions to implement the 
objectives included in the two Programmes for Structural Adjustment (PSA) 
(for more details on the objectives of the PSAs and their effects on society 
see CENEAP, no.17, 2000 and CNES, 2000).  The main objectives included 
in the two PSAs were: 
           
 The liberalisation of the external trade; 
 
 The liberalisation of price; 
 
 The convertibility of the dinar; 
 
 The ban of subsidies for all commodities including energy and food of 
first necessity to control state expenditures; 
 
 Freezing salaries; 
 
 The liberalisation of the banking system by creating private banks; 
 
 Privatisation of the public enterprise.  
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These objectives were sought to stabilise the macroeconomic environment by 
reducing inflation and the state budget deficits (IMF, 1995).  By the year 
2005, many of the objectives included in the PSAs seemed to have been 
achieved.  The macroeconomic environment seemed to have been stabilised 
such as: 
 
 From an average growth of 1.7 percent per years between 1980 and 1994, 
the GDP grew between 1999 and 2002 by 2.5 percent per year (World Bank, 
2003).  It grew further to 4 percent per year between 2003 and 2004 and to 5 
percent in 2005 (L’Economie de l’Algerie, 2005); 
 
 Unemployment dropped from 30 in 1994  to 13 percent in 2005; 
 
 Inflation dropped from 30 percent in 1994 to 3 percent in 2005 
(L’Economie de l’Algerie, 2005); 
 
 Foreign debts dropped from 40 percent of GDP in 1999 to 27 percent in 
2005 or from $US 28.3 billion in 1999 to $US 5 billion in 2005.  And foreign 
reserves reached in 2005 around  $US 70 billion; 
 
Though encouraging, the World Bank considered these results not enough to 
stabilised the economy and regarded the privatisation of  the state-owned 
enterprise was moving at a slower pace (for more details on the transition in 
Algeria and the impediments for this transition, see the report of the World 
Bank published in 2003).  Until 2003, large state-owned enterprises were still 
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waiting to be privatised.  One of the reasons for the slow move of its 
privatisation could be related without doubt to the fact that the government 
was still not ready to embark in such a programme which the experience of 
other socialist countries has proved to create many social problems and little 
short and medium economic benefits.  In addition, the political environment 
which dominated the whole period of the 1990s was very unstable and there 
was a strong opposition to privatisation by many influential factions in the 
government apparatus and society.  However, privatisation in Algeria until 
2005 went through three different phases.  Before discussing these phases, it 
considered best to understand first what objectives the Algerian legislators 
sought to achieve by privatisation.         
 
5.4.4.1. The Objectives of Privatisation   
 
In all government official publications relative to privatisation, the concept 
„Privatisation‟ was defined in a broader sense.  In the documents (1994, 
March 1995, October 1995) published by the Ministry of Industrial 
Restructuring and of the Participation, privatisation meant the transfer of the 
property and management of the public enterprise to the private sector, the 
installation of an institutional and judicial environment capable of developing 
the private sector and the definition of the role of the government in society.  
In similar lines, in Ordinance no.95-22 relative to the privatisation of the 
Entreprise Publique Economique and in Ordinance no. 95-25 relative to the 
Géstion des Capitaux Marchands de l’Etat (Management of the State Trading 
Capitals), privatisation could be understood in the first ordinance as the 
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transfer of all or part of the assets of the public enterprise and the transfer 
through contracts of the management of the public enterprise to private 
investors with the objective to improve the performance of the public 
enterprise.  In the second ordinance as well as in the Legislative Decree no. 
93-08 modifying and completing the Commercial Code of 1975, privatisation 
meant the participation of the private sector in the ownership of shares in the 
public enterprise.  The share ownership would allow the private investor to 
participate in the management and in investments in the public enterprise.  
Later in 2001, the Ordinance no. 01-04 relative à l’Organisation, à la 
Géstion et la Privatisation des Entreprises Publiques Economiques 
(Organisation, Management of the Economic Public Enterprises) gave more 
broader definition than any previous official publications.  In this ordinance, 
privatisation meant the major means which would be used to accelerate the 
transition to the free market economic system.  Generally speaking, all the 
definitions on privatisation which had been provided by the government 
administration since 1994 could be understood that in the eyes of the 
Algerian legislators, privatisation could be used to achieve three types of 
objectives which were different and not quite easy to achieve but 
interconnected; 
 
 Financial objective.  For a long time, the commercial state-owed 
enterprise had been a heavy burden on the government budget.  Huge 
financial assistance had been poured into this enterprise to make it efficient.  
In addition to the huge assistance made by the state treasury between 1982 
and 1990 which was estimated to fall around 2,000 billion dinars, the treasury 
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poured between 1991 and 1997 another 1,250 billion dinars for the same 
purpose (Harchaoui, 2006) where around 840 billion were absorbed by the 
state-owned enterprises operating in manufacturing.  With privatisation, the 
weight of the financial burden to bring rescues to the loss-making state-
owned enterprises was expected to be reduced.  And since only public 
enterprises operating in industries considered by the government to be of 
strategic importance would be exempt from privatisation, such as for 
example hydrocarbons, the state treasury was expected to be left with only a 
handful of public enterprises in its portfolio and consequently its rescue 
expenditures would reduce enormously.  In addition to the tight control over 
the state treasury rescue expenditures, the treasury wanted also to reduce its 
expenditures related to the costs involved in privatisation.  A large portion of 
the revenues drawn from the sale of a public enterprise was allowed to be 
retained by the privatised enterprise with the purpose to repay its outstanding 
debts and to pay for the costs of workers redundancies following the 
organisational restructuring (Mebroukine, 1999) which  the state-owned 
enterprise listed for privatisation was required to introduce. 
   
 Economic objective.  By transferring the ownership of the state-owned 
enterprise to the private sector, it was expected that the efficiency of the 
privatised enterprise would improve which consequently would improve the 
national economic growth and reduce the reliance on hydrocarbons as the 
major commodity for export and the only source for the government foreign 
revenues.  Privatisation was supposed to be a useful instrument to attract 
foreign investors who not only bring the technology and the capital but also 
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open foreign markets for the local production and stimulate competition in 
the domestic market.  Bouzidi (1999) explained the reasons why attracting 
foreign investors was important.  For him, the public enterprise would never 
be able to compete in a free market economic system because it did not have 
enough experience in competition, enough experience in export, still used 
outdated technology, still produced low quality products and suffered 
qualitatively and quantitatively in management competence.  This was one of 
the reasons why partnership with foreign companies had constituted one of 
the main methods used in privatisation of large state-owned enterprises. 
   
 Political objective.  Any strategy that deals with the economic and social 
aspects of society must have acceptance at least with the majority of the 
population.  In the case of privatisation, the acceptance of workers to sell 
their enterprises must be gained before the process of privatisation starts at 
all.  In all the laws relative to privatisation, the Algerian legislators made sure 
to include workers as active participants in the process of privatisation.  
Workers were encouraged to buy the assets and shares of their enterprises.  
The end result was to reduce workers opposition to privatisation, to show to 
the general public that privatisation was legitimate since it was accepted by 
workers and that the essence of privatisation was to increase popular 
ownership of the means of production.   To create the support of workers to 
privatisation and to motivate them to increase productivity, the decree no.01-
352 dated 10 November 2001 provided workers with a 15 percent discount of 
the price of the assets for sale.  Workers were also reserved a 10 percent 
ownership of the shares of any plant or enterprise sold to the private sector.  
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Important too was the emphasis on the protection of workers‟ jobs in the 
privatised enterprise.  A private investor acquiring the plant or the enterprise 
was required to avoid the reduction in the number of workers.  This was 
purposely designed.  The Algerian legislators wanted to avoid repeating the 
same mistake of the early 1990s where a massive reduction of workers was 
carried out by enterprise managers to reduce operation costs, a reduction 
which culminated in serious social tensions and political instability in the 
country.  They also wanted to avoid the demoralisation of workers which 
could emerge following privatisation and also avoid the antagonism of 
workers to the new owners of the privatised enterprise which could culminate 
in the workers creating acts of sabotage to destroy the privatised enterprise 
which would be detrimental not only to the privatised enterprise but the 
whole process of privatisation in the country.     
 
Trying to achieve both the economic and political objectives had proved 
difficult.  Most investors, especially foreigners, were not ready to accept the 
surplus of workers which most enterprises listed for privatisation suffered 
from.  Also, the whole institutional framework created to carry out the 
process of privatisation was rigid and lacked transparency which further 
discouraged the participation of investors and made the process of 
privatisation working at a lower pace as the next sub-section will reveal.     
  
5.4.4.2. The Phases of Privatisation and their Institutional Framework    
 
Any strategy of privatisation should put in place an institutional framework 
to facilitate the elaboration and implementation of privatisation.  The 
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building of the institutional framework for privatisation in Algeria was a long 
process as previously mentioned.  It started in 1994 with the promulgation of 
the Law of Finance of 1994 and continued until 2001 with the promulgation 
of Ordinance no.01-04 dated 20 August 2001.    The slow progress to sell the 
state-owned enterprises especially the larger ones was caused by the 
multiplicity of constraints in which the country found itself in such as the 
political unstability, the strong opposition of some political factions and 
influential groups in society which saw in privatisation the end of their 
control over the national economy, the strong opposition of workers and their 
representatives in Parliament who saw in privatisation the end of their jobs, 
and also the lack of expertise of the government administration to devise a 
strategy with  concise and coherent policies of when to privatise, what to 
privatise, how to privatise and to whom to privatise.  This combination of 
constraints made privatisation of the state-owned enterprise to be carried out 
in three phases:   
 
 A. Phase One of Privatisation (1994).  The first sign of privatisation came 
after the first Programme for Structuring Adjustment included in the first 
Stand-By signed in 1994 between the Algerian government and the IMF.  
The first time the term privatisation appeared in a government official 
document was in articles 24 and 25 of the law of Finance of 1994.  In these 
two articles, the state-owned enterprise was allowed to partially sell its assets 
to private investors, to open its capital to their participation and it was also 
allowed without changing its ownership status to transfer its management to 
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private firms.  The articles also specified that the transfer from public to 
private could be made by the following methods: 
   
 Public Offering of Shares; 
 
 Negotiated Agreement; 
 
 Competitive Bidding. 
 
The articles also explained that only 49 percent of the shares of the enterprise 
should be sold.  Also, during this phase, there was no mention of any sale for 
the benefits of workers or a mention of a specific government institution in 
charge in the elaboration and execution of privatisation.  In Decree no.94-45 
dated 28 November 1994 which came to explain how to implement article 24 
and 25, the elaboration and implementation had to be carried out at different 
levels of the government administration.  The general assembly of the EPE 
was given the authority to propose what assets to sell and at what price, but 
the proposals would take effect only after being accepted by the general 
assembly of the Fonds de Participation.  Once accepted, the proposals would 
be sent for evaluation to three government bodies.  These were: 
 
   The National Committee of Follow up which was composed of 6 ministers 
who belonged to the Ministry of Industry and Energy, Agriculture, Tourism, 
Commerce, Craftsmanship, and Restructuring and Participation; 
 
  
 160 
  Four Sectoral Committees which represented the Committee of Industry, 
Committee of Commerce, Committee of Agriculture and Committee of 
Tourism; 
 
  The Commission of Verification and Control.   
  
Often these different government bodies not only evaluated the proposals 
made by the general manager of the public enterprise but also interfered in 
what the enterprise should or should not privatise.  This confusion in 
responsibilities between the different government bodies together with the 
lack of a properly functioning stock market and the lack of a domestic capital 
willing to purchase the assets and shares of the public enterprise, resulted that 
by the end of 1994, not a single asset or share were privatised.  The process 
of privatisation was accelerated only during the second phase of privatisation 
when the government signed its second Stand-By in March 1995. 
 
 B. Phase Two of Privatisation (1995-2000).  This phase was characterised 
by the government making a clear approach to privatisation in terms of which 
industries were eligible to privatisation and how much to privatise.  In 
Odinance no.95-22 dated 26 August 1995, all sectors which were not 
considered strategic were listed for privatisation.   These were:   
 
 Building and road construction; 
 
 Hotels and tourism; 
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 Trade and distribution; 
 
 Textiles and food processing; 
 
 Transformation industries.  These included: mechanical engineering, 
electricity, electronics, woods and its derivatives, papers, chemicals, plastics, 
and leather and skins; 
  
 Goods and passengers transportation; 
 
 Insurances; 
 
 Ports and airlines services; 
 
 Small and medium enterprises operating at local level.   
 
The ordinance did not bring any changes in the methods that should be used 
in the privatisation of assets or shares.  The board of directors of the 
enterprise listed for privatisation could propose what to privatise, how to 
privatise and to whom to privatise.  The decision depended of course on the 
activities of the enterprise, on the financial health of the enterprise, on 
whether the enterprise operated at national or local level.  The novelty which 
the Ordinance 95-22 had brought was the permission of workers of the 
enterprise slated for privatisation to participate in the ownership of the shares 
of their enterprise.  They were eligible to acquire for free 10 percent of the 
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shares.  These shares had no voting rights and no rights to be represented in 
the board of directors of the privatised enterprise.  Also, the legislator had 
made a clear distinction through Ordinance no.95-25 dated 25 September 
1995 between enterprises to be totally privatised and those to be only 
partially privatised on the assumption that only enterprises which had no 
future potential and were outside any hope that their performance would 
improve should be totally privatised.  Those enterprises that had the potential 
for better performance in the future should be revitalised by restructuring 
their financial situation and their organisational structure and therefore their 
privatisation should be partial.  To make the process of privatisation working 
smoothly, two separate but interconnected institutions were created to carry 
out privatisation.  These were the Conseil National de Privatisation (National 
Board for Privatisation), (CNP), which was in charge of total privatisation 
and the Holdings Publiques (Public Holdings) in charge of partial 
privatisation.  
 
 The Conseil National de Privatisation (CNP).  In Ordinance 95-22, 
the Conseil was charged to work closely with a government body 
called the Institution and with the head of the government.  The 
organisation of the Conseil and the responsibilities and compensation 
of its members were detailed in the Executive Decree no.96-104 dated 
11 March 1996.  The Conseil was composed of 7 members and their 
duties were to valuate the assets and shares for sale, to determine their 
prices and to decide on the methods by which they should be sold.  
Each year, the Conseil was required to submit a report on all its 
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activities to the Institution (MIR, 1999).  The Ordinance 95-22 had 
kept silent on what were the prerogatives of the Institution.  Also, the 
transfer of ownership as stated in this ordinance carried rigid 
conditions which made privatisation less attractive to potential 
investors.  In its article 4, it was clearly stated that the CNP would be 
willing to privatise an enterprise only if the new owner would 
introduce the restructuring and the modernisation of the means of 
production in the enterprise.  The new owner was also forbidden to 
change the activity of the enterprise for a minimum period of 5 years.  
The Algerian legislators feared, as it seems, to see privatisation 
turning into a mean for a quick profit by the new owner.  To make 
sure that the activity of the privatised enterprise was protected, the 
legislators instituted the participation of the government in the 
privatised enterprise through its ownership of the “golden share” for a 
maximum period of 5 years.  In the Executive Decree no.96-133 
dated 13 April 1996, it was stated that “Any decision taken by the 
board of directors/supervisory board or the general assembly of the 
privatised enterprise which goes against the rights attached to the 
golden share, the members representing the golden shares of the 
government in the enterprise should oppose the decision …the 
Institution in charge of privatisation should be informed”.  The golden 
shares allowed the government to nominate 1 or 2 of its 
representatives in the board of directors or the supervisory board of 
the privatised enterprises.  Though they had only a consultative power 
in these boards, they were the watchdogs of the government.  Any 
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decision that would lead to unjustified liquidation of the enterprise or 
workers redundancies was considered in the eyes of the government 
as against the national interest.   
 
The rigid terms and conditions attached to the purchase of the assets or shares 
were a little bit relaxed when the Ordinance no.97-12 dated 19 March 1997 
was promulgated.  In this ordinance, investors who were willing to modernise 
the means of production of the enterprise, avoid job cuts and maintain the 
activities of the enterprise were guaranteed to benefit from a maximum of 25 
percent reduction in the price of sale of the assets or shares.  They were also 
guaranteed that the payment should not all be in cash and in full.  Investors 
were allowed to pay at least 20 percent of the selling price in cash while the 
rest had to be paid with an annual fixed interest rate of 6 percent over a 
maximum period of 15 years (MIR, 1999). These benefits were welcomed by 
investors and in 1998 following the Executive Decree no.98-195 dated 7 June 
1998 the first batch of public enterprises to be privatised was announced to 
the public.  The batch included 385 production plants belonging to 89 public 
enterprises.  The decree did not specify which enterprise should be totally or 
partially privatised.  The decision was from the prerogatives of the Public 
Holdings in consultation with the CNP. 
 
 The Public Holdings. These Holdings were created by Ordinance 95-
25 dated 25 September 1995 to replace the Fonds de Participation.  
They were charged to carry out partial privatisation and also to act as 
the only intermediate between the public enterprise and the head of 
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the government.  There were 17 Holdings, 12 operated at national 
level and 5 at regional level.  The portfolio of the 17 Holdings 
included some 1,732 enterprises operating at national and local levels.  
Unlike the Fonds, the government entrusted to the Holdings the 
ownership of all the properties the government owned in the EPEs 
whether its ownership was wholly, majority or minority.  The 
Holdings were joint stock companies governed by a two-tier 
corporate governance structure.  Though legally autonomous to take 
their own decisions, in practice they were under the control of the 
Conseil National des Participations de l’Etat (National Baord for 
State Participations), (CNPE).  The CNPE was composed of 11 
ministers and presided by the head of the government and assisted by 
a small technical secretariat.  The main task of the CNPE was to 
define the strategic policies and the organisation of the public sector 
and also define the orientations of the Public Holdings and the 
mechanism for their coordination.   
 
The main mission of the Public Holdings was to restructure the EPEs to make 
them ready for privatisation.  Their life span was limited.  Once the 
privatisation programmes were implemented, the Holdings should be 
abolished.  One thing for sure, the Public Holdings had spent billions of 
dinars to help the public enterprises listed for privatisation to carry out their 
financial and organisational restructuring to make them attractive to 
investors.  But at the same time, the restructuring had created massive 
enterprise closures and workers redundancies.   Some 320,000 workers were 
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laid off between 1996 and 1998 following the liquidation of some 1,011 
enterprises.  About 935 of these enterprises operated at local levels (MIR, 
1999: 40).  The majority of the liquidation took place in enterprises with no 
prospect of future performance improvement and were sold through a 
negotiated agreement between the CNPE and the purchasers and only few 
through competitive bidding.  What is certain was the fact that the presence 
of two separate institutions to privatise the public enterprise had created a lot 
of conflicts and confusion in the responsibilities of the Public Holdings and 
the CNP.  Very often, the general manager of the public enterprise was 
confused about what to privatise in his/her enterprise.  Under the influence of 
the CNP, he/she might propose to privatise a production plant wholly and 
under the influence of the Public Holding he/she might propose to privatise 
only part of it.   This confusion slowed down the progress of privatisation and 
it was only since 2001 that the progress gained high speed.   
   
C.  Phase Three of Privatisation (2001- to the present).  In this phase, 
privatisation became entirely the responsibility of the head of the 
government.  This was, as it seems, to prove to investors, particularly 
foreigners, the strong commitment of the government to privatisation and to 
ensure them that all the necessary assistance would be provided to them and 
that their investments would be fully protected by law.  Under the proposition 
of H. Temmar who was Minister of the Participation and the Coordination of 
the Reforms (MPCR), Ordinance no.01-04 dated 20 August 2001 was 
promulgated.  For Temmar, privatisation should proceed fast and without any 
prior enterprise restructuring as was previously required under the Public 
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Holdings.  To show the full commitment to privatisation and to accelerate the 
process, five government bodies were created to elaborate and implement the 
privatisation programmes.  Three of these bodies were purely political and 
two technical as shown in figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1.   Privatisation process after 2001 
 
 
 1. Keys:  Communcation  [                    ] ,   Consultation     [                    ] 
2.  Source:  Data analysis 
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The political bodies were represented by: 
   
 The Conseil des Ministres (Board of Ministers), (CM).  The Conseil  
was a body which elaborated the strategy and the programmes of 
privatisation and it was presided by the head of the government; 
 
 The Conseil des Participation de l’Etat (Board of State Participation), 
(CPE).  The Conseil was composed of 11 ministers and presided by 
the head of the government.  It met at least every three months to 
monitor the progress of privatisation.  The tasks of the CPE were to 
define the government strategy in the public sector and the 
programmes of privatisation and to evaluate and approve the reports 
from the different bodies in charge of the implementation of 
privatisation (Ordonnance no.01-04, 2001).  When the government 
was the only owner or had a majority ownership in the public 
enterprise, the CPE assigned its representatives in the general 
assemblies of the public enterprises.  Through its representatives, the 
CPE had direct intervention in the proposals for what to privatise and 
how to privatise.  Its intervention was also carried out through its 
direct link with the Societes de Gestion des Participations de l’Etat 
(Management Companies for State Participations), (SGPs).  The 
SGPs regularly submit reports to the CPE for evaluation on the 
valuation of the enterprises ready for privatisation, the assets and 
shares proposed for sale and the price set for the sale; 
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 Ministère de la Participation et de la Promotion des’ Investissements 
(Minister of Participation and Investment Promotion), (MPPI).  The 
MPPI was directly linked with the head of the government, the CM 
and the CPE.  Its mission was to propose the strategy for the public 
sector, the enterprises to be privatised and all the mechanisms to be 
used in privatisation as well as the strategy for the promotion of 
investment.  It was also responsible for the implementation of 
privatisation and investment by evaluating the reports submitted by 
the different organs in charge of privatisation and investment (Décret 
Executive no.03-49, 2003).  The evaluation was often done with the 
help of experts recruited from the local market and from overseas.  
Once the evaluation and analysis were done, the MPPI sent a full 
report to the CPE and the CM for approval or amendment. 
 
As for the technical bodies, these were represented by: 
 
 Sociétés de Géstion des Participations de l’Etat (SGPs).  The SGPs 
were accountable to the CPE and therefore the head of the 
government.  They were joint stock companies.  The SGP was 
controlled by a management board and a general assembly.  The 
board was composed of three members who were nominated by the 
general assembly.  The general assembly controlled all the SGPs and 
was fully composed of ministers.  The SGPs were created to replace 
the Public Holdings.  But unlike the Holdings, the SGPs did not have 
any property rights in the public enterprises.  In 2002, there were 32 
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SGPs in existence where 4 operated at regional level and 3 at local 
level.  Their mission was to manage on behalf of the government the 
properties the government owned wholly or partly in the public 
enterprises.  Their task was to (CEGRO, 2003; CEBELEQ, 2004): 
 
  Restructure the public enterprises in their portfolios to improve 
their performance; 
 
  Propose what to privatise in these enterprises; 
 
  Valuate the economic and financial health of these enterprises with 
the help of experts often from overseas; 
 
  Work closely with the general managers of these enterprises to 
look for potential partners and negotiate the business deals with 
these partners; 
 
  Act as the General Assemblies in these enterprises. 
 
 Commission de Contrôle des Opérations de Privatisation (Control 
Commission of Operations of Privatisation), (CCOP).  This body was 
under the authority of the head of the government.  Its mission was to 
make sure that the whole process of privatisation was carried out in 
all transparency.   
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What Ordinance no.01-04 had brought was that it had abolished all previous 
legislations on privatisation.  It did not make any distinction between one 
industry and another.  All public enterprises, whether operating in strategic or 
non strategic industries, were listed for privatisation.  It remains to say, 
however, that significant progress has been made since then in privatisation.  
Though enterprises operating in hydrocarbons and banking have remained 
until the time of writing this work still wholly state-owned, a mounting 
pressure from the IMF and the World Bank has recently been put on the 
Algerian government to proceed in the privatisation of enterprises in these 
industries and whether they will be privatised, only time will tell.           
  
5.4.4.3. The Outcomes from Privatisation 
 
Privatisation has its impact not only in reducing the size of the public sector 
but also in changing the behaviour of all social groups in society. And 
therefore, the outcomes drawn from privatisation should be looked at from 
two major dimensions:  physical dimension to reflect the size of the public 
sector transferred to private ownership and the societal dimension to 
understand what impact privatisation had on those social groups which 
benefited a great deal from the centrally planned economic system and on the 
cultural structure of society.        
 
A. The Physical Dimension.  Though more than ten years since privatisation 
was first introduced in Algeria, privatisation still continued until the time of 
writing this work to form one of the major economic issue debated in the 
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parliament.  Between 1994 and 2003, the progress to privatise had been very 
slow but it started to speed up since 2004 though the IMF and the World 
Bank still found it not fast enough.  In the second phase of privatisation, 
however, privatisation affected only medium and small public enterprises 
where the majority of them operated at local level.  Out of a total of 1,324 
enterprises operating at local level in 1994, by 1999, the five regional Public 
Holdings had managed to sell more than half or 935 enterprises.  More than 
half of these or 486 were liquidated and bought by workers and managers 
through negotiations with the CNPE.  The employee buy-outs created around 
1,152 new enterprises creating as a result some 20,021 jobs.  Almost a third 
of these newly created enterprises, or 156, operated in light industries like 
textiles, leather and building construction materials (MIR, 1999).   
 
In most reports produced by the Public Holdings, the most favoured method 
of privatisation of small enterprises and production plants was employee buy-
outs.  This preference was based on the belief that by liquidating the 
enterprise and creating instead an enterprise owned and managed by the 
managers or workers, the new owners would be more motivated to increase 
the efficiency of the enterprise.  In most cases, the liquidation of an enterprise 
was proposed by the general manager and workers in consultation with the 
Public Holdings (Holding Public Regional Centre, 1999).  To encourage 
employee buy-outs, the government provided preferential deals to employees 
such as a 15 percent discount in the price of the asset for sale and the 
provision of loans to be repaid over a period of 20 years.  Clearly, the 
government did not gain any financial revenues from the sale, rather it spent 
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some 54 billion dinars to cover for the costs involved in the operations of 
liquidation and transfer of ownership, but it had gained the support of the 
UGTA.  But employee buy-outs did not go as workers and managers 
expected.  They were unable to secure credits from the banks so they could 
invest them in the modernisation of their enterprises to make them profitable.  
Without profitability, employees were unable not only to keep their newly 
created enterprises running and keep their jobs but also they found 
themselves unable to repay the loans the state treasury provided to them to 
purchase the assets.  In addition, employees faced many property rights 
problems such as the difficulty to register their newly created enterprises with 
the Chamber of Commerce because the legal system to protect this type of 
enterprises was still not fully formed.    The property rights system was also 
still not fully formed to protect investment transactions used in auction and 
bidding.  When the list of 240 enterprises was published in the Executive 
Decree no. 98-195 dated 7 June 1998, the government administration hoped 
to see domestic and particularly foreign investors to participate actively in the 
process of privatisation.  A first batch of 89 public enterprises was launched 
for privatisation between 1998 and 1999.  But as table 5.2 shows, only 60 
enterprises were sold and the participation of foreign investors was very 
small. 
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Table 5.2.   The first batch of enterprises privatised and the origin of their new owners 
which was carried out by the CNP in 1998 
 
 
Source:  Data analysis. 
 
 
The participation of foreign investors started to increase only after 2001 
when the political and macroeconomic conditions started to stabilise and 
more importantly when the government offered a lot of advantages to invest 
in Algeria such as exemption to pay taxes for ten years on equipments 
imported and used in the production, freedom to dispatch profits out of the 
country, protection against expropriation and the intervention of the 
government to settle any conflicts that might arise with their business 
partners and the full guarantee of their property rights.  Investors of Algerian 
origin living overseas or residents in the country were also offered the 
advantage to pay only 30 percent of the purchase price in cash while the rest 
had to be paid over a period of five years.  With the stabilisation of the 
macroeconomic environment and the various advantages provided to 
investors, the MPPI hoped that the 1,200 enterprises which it published in 
2002 should be quickly privatised.  Some 146 were large enterprises, 650 
were medium and the rest were small.  The large enterprises operated in iron 
and steel, electronics and mechanical engineering.  All the large enterprises 
were privatised by the MPPI whereas the medium and small enterprises were 
Number of enterprises Number and origin of the new 
owners 
Domestic Foreign 
Water and drink production 
units 
16 23 5 
Brick production units 23 31 0 
Hotels 21 35 1 
                                                 Total             60 89 6 
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privatised by the SGPs (El Watan, 23 May, 2005).  By 2007, the number of 
enterprises privatised was 417 where 192 were totally privatised, 44 had 
opened their capital to private participation and only 69 were sold to 
employees.  Until the time of writing this work, the name of the enterprises 
sold and the origins of the new owners had not been disclosed either by the 
MPPI or by any other government departments.  However, table 5.3 attempts 
to offer some information on the name of enterprises privatised since 1998, 
their method of privatisation and the origins of their owners. 
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Table 5.3.   Enterprises  privatised between 1998-2006 
Privatised 
enterprises 
Type of industry  Portion of 
the capital 
sold 
Method used in 
privatisation 
Objective sought 
from privatisation 
El-Aurassi Hotel Tourism 20% Stock market Funds 
Eriad Sétif Wheat processing  20% Stock market Funds 
Sider El-Hadjar Steel and Iron 70% Participation of a 
block investor the 
Indian ISPAT   
Technology and 
management know-
how 
ENAD Detergents 100% Participation of 
a block investor, 
the German 
Heinkel  
Technology and 
management know-
how 
Division Tiaret of 
the SNVI 
Mechanical 
engineering 
65% Participation of a 
block investor, 
the French BTK  
Technology and 
management know –
how 
Saidal Pharmaceuticals 20% Stock market Funds 
 
15% 
Participation of a 
block investor, an 
Algero-Kuweity 
firm,  El Faki  
Funds 
EMB Metalic packaging 15% Participation of a 
block investor, 
the German SNM 
Otto Wolf 
Technology and 
management know-
how 
ENGI Petrochemicals 60% Participation of a 
block investor, 
the German 
Messer  
 
 
 
Technology and 
management know-
how 40% 
 
 
 
Participation of a 
block investor, 
the German Linde 
Relizane division 
of Eriad Tiaret 
Group 
Wheat Processing 100% Total ownership 
by the Algerian 
company  
Benabdellah 
Funds 
Mostaganem 
division of Eriad 
Tiaret Group 
Wheat processing  100% Total ownership 
by the Algerian 
company 
Chourkhaled 
Funds 
Cherchell 
division of Eriad 
Alger Group 
Biscuit 
manufacturing  
90% Participation of a 
block investor, 
ülker Turkey 
Flash Algerie 
Funds 
Médéa division of 
Eriad Tiaret 
Group 
Wheat processing  100% Employee Buy-
Out by El Akouas 
Company 
Funds 
Magnia division 
of Sidi Bel Abbas 
Group 
Starch 
manufacturing  
100% Total ownership 
by the Algerian  
Mitidji Group 
Funds 
Sig division of 
Sidi Bel Abbas 
Group 
Wheat processing  100% Total ownership 
by the Algerian 
Mitidji Group 
Funds 
Mahdia division 
of Eriad Tiaret 
Group 
 
Wheat processing  100% Total ownership 
by the Algerian 
Majid company 
Funds 
Aissa Idir 
division of Eriad 
Alger Group 
Wheat processing  100% Total ownership 
by the Algerian la 
Belle Group 
Funds 
Source:  Data analysis. 
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The table clearly shows the limited number of enterprises using public 
offering of shares as their method of privatisation.  This limitation stemmed 
from the fact that most public enterprises listed for privatisation suffered from 
poor performance and also the institutional framework needed to make the 
stock market work efficiently was still missing in the country.  One point 
worth mentioning here is the fact that during the third phase of privatisation, 
not a lot of jobs were lost as a consequence of privatisation.  Around 12,000 
jobs were saved and some 7,000 were created.  But still, privatisation did not 
accelerate as hoped for in 2001.   Until 2008, almost two-thirds of enterprises, 
which were listed for privatisation in 2002, were still unable to attract 
investors and only between 32 and 57 billion dinars (El Watan, 15 January, 
2006) were generated from the privatisation sales.  Looking closely to the free 
market environment in Algeria, there were still many constraints standing as 
obstacles to privatisation and amongst them were those social groups which 
opposed privatisation and looked at it as a blow to their future survival.      
 
B. The Societal Dimension. One must admit that since 1990 a transition to 
the free market economic system has been in progress in Algeria.  This 
progress was clear in the various changes that had taken place in the various 
aspects of the economic environment such as the installation of a number of 
the free market institutions and mechanisms, the expansion of the private 
sector through the participation of both domestic and foreign investors, and in 
the reduction in the size of the public sector.  What is also interesting to say 
here is that the transition to the free market system and particularly 
privatisation has created a hard shock to the life of comfort enjoyed by many 
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social actors in the Algerian society.  The effect of the shock has manifested 
itself in the exposure of the government administration to the rising pressure 
of the anti-reformists to preserve the status quo particularly the protection of 
the public enterprise from privatisation and the mistrust of the majority of the 
population in the credibility of the government following the rising social 
problems created by the closure of many public enterprises and the 
disengagement of the government from the provision of many social welfare 
services. 
 
 The Rising Pressure of the Opponents of Privatisation.  Within the 
government apparatus, there existed divergence of views of what to privatise, 
to whom to privatise and especially whether or not to privatise.  The 
opponents of privatisation were influential groups in the government 
administration and the national economic activity.  These were retired army 
officers, ministers and public enterprise managers and many members 
presently working in the government apparatus, the army and public 
enterprise managers who still believed in the importance of the public sector 
in the economic activity though they admitted that the public enterprise 
should be opened to modernisation in its equipments and management to 
improve its performance (Interview with a retired PGM, Headquarters, 
UGTA, 2004).  These groups saw the effects of privatisation from the 
national and self-interest perspectives.  For them, privatisation meant an 
instrument that the pro-reformists inside and outside the country could use to 
reduce the power of the government and significantly to take away the 
sovereignty of the country (interview with the manager of Conflicts and 
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Social Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 2004).  They feared that by selling the 
public enterprise to outside owners, and particularly to foreign investors, this 
would stop their control over the resources of the public enterprise and also 
diminish their power over the government apparatus since the private sector 
through time would grow powerful and would have influence in the political 
and economic orientations of the country.  They also argued that by selling 
the public enterprise this would mean a massive reduction in the government 
revenues which for decades the state treasury enjoyed and this would never 
be compensated by the taxes that the private sector is required to pay since 
the fiscal system in Algeria was still inadequate and was costing the treasury 
billion of dinars as a result of the tax evasion practised by the private sector.  
More important, for the opponents of privatisation, after ten years since 
privatisation started, the domestic private sector had remained reluctant to 
invest in risky projects that add value to the national economic growth 
despite all the encouragement that the government had provided for this 
sector.  Consequently, they had been active putting pressure on the 
government not to privatise the large public enterprises that they considered 
as the spinal cord to the life of the Algerian economy such as those operating 
in hydrocarbon and banking.  They warned that if this would happen, it 
would be a major disaster on the whole structure of the Algerian society 
which would inevitably lead to a civil war like that experienced in the 1990s 
or worse (Interview with the manager of Conflicts and Social Affairs, 
Headquarters, UGTA, 2004). 
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 The Rising of Social Misery in the Country.   Any country that reaches 
between 10 and 15 percent of unemployment, this rate is considered very bad 
for the country (CNES, 2005).  But considering the rate of unemployment in 
Algeria which increased from 23 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 1998, one 
would straight forward conclude that the situation in Algeria was not only 
bad but was a real disaster.  Between 1994 and 2000, more than 500,000 
workers were laid off or some 8 percent of the active population (CNES, 
2005: 5) where some 58.5 percent were between 30 and 35 years old and 88 
percent of them were married and with children to raise.  These lay offs 
together with the rising number of first time job seekers had created not only 
a pool of young unemployed, which was estimated in 1999 to reach around 
2.2 million, but also a pool of young poor.  Poverty had been estimated to 
have touched some 23 percent of the population or around 6.4 million people 
where 70 percent lived in small towns and the rural areas (CNES, 2002).  
Though the government had provided schemes of assistance to reduce the 
problem of unemployment; especially among the youth with low academic 
achievements and no professional experience such as the Programmes 
d’Emploi des Jeunes (Youth Employment Programmes), (PEJ) which 
provided temporary jobs in public enterprises operating at local levels 
especially in industries such as building, forestry, farming and hydraulics, 
and the Dispositif d’Insertion Professionelle des Jeunes (Scheme for 
Professional Insertion of Youth), (DIPJ) which encouraged youngster to 
create micro-enterprises individually or collectively; the fact remained that 
only a limited number of youngsters benefited from the schemes.  The reason 
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was simply because the government lacked the institutional instruments to 
implement the schemes and significantly lacked enough funds.     
 
The shortage in financial resources meant that the government was unable 
not only to manage unemployment but also forced to make huge cuts in its 
expenditures in social services such as education, housing and health care 
which made the lives of the majority of the population worse.  The huge cuts 
led to a dramatic deterioration in the management of these services and 
consequently the private sector increased its participation in the provision of 
these services.  There was an explosion in the number of private medical 
clinics, private housing companies and private schools.  These private social 
services were expensive and therefore only those who could afford used 
them.  The majority of the population had to use the services still controlled 
by the public sector which were of low quality.  The public hospitals, for 
example, suffered from obsolete equipments, continuous interruption in 
medicines and were staffed with inadequate skills because the majority of 
professionals with high competence had left to work in their own medical 
care clinics or went overseas particularly to the developed countries like 
France, Canada and the USA to look for better life.  The same can be said 
with those competent professionals in education and also in most other 
industries in the country.   
 
The disengagement of the government from the economic activity as dictated 
by the two Programmes for Structuring Adjustments meant primarily that the 
government had to leave the free market mechanism dictating the prices of 
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goods and services.  Though the salaries of workers in most industries were 
raised only slightly since the transition, the prices for all goods and services 
including for goods such as milk and bread were raised sharply and this made 
the majority of the population in front of serious difficulties to make end 
meets.  According to a survey carried out by the CENEAP (2000) of a sample 
of 2,000 peoples, about 56 percent of people in the sample had either reduced 
or given up since 1993 consuming food such as meat and fruits and two-third 
of them had to borrow from family, friends and the banks when it concerned 
buying medicines or using the health care facilities.  With the spread of 
poverty among a large segment of the population, the country had seen an 
increase in what is commonly known as the diseases of the poor such as 
cholera, diphtheria, tuberculosis, typhoid, stress and depression and also an 
increase in the dissolution of moral values.  As a measure to replace the free 
medical care services which were in practice since 1974, the government has 
introduced since 1992, the social assurance system.  In 2000, around 87.4 
percent of the population or some 30 million were covered by the system.  
But the problem remained that many felt that the prices of medicines were 
beyond their financial means and they had to wait weeks before they would 
get the refunds from the social assurance agency, the CNAS.  The CNAS was 
allowed to make 100 percent refunds only for medicines which were 
considered of high therapeutic importance and which were very expensive 
because they were imported from the developed countries.  The cheap 
medicines which were predominantly produced by local pharmaceutical 
enterprises were refunded only 80 percent.  In addition to this health measure, 
the government has also created special funds to assist financially the rising 
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numbers of associations which dealt with the rising number of youngsters 
taking drugs and alcohol, the rising number of abandoned children and old 
aged men and women and the large number of orphans which were the result 
of terrorism.  In fact the rising poverty in Algeria had given an explosion in 
the number of crimes and in the number of dysfunctional families as a result 
of the rising number of divorce especially among young couples ( for more 
detail on the rising social problems in transition in Algeria, see CNES, 2002 ).      
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
Clearly, after nearly two decades since the free market system was introduced 
to Algeria, the public sector remained the dominant producer for the national 
economy with the hydrocarbons still the major source of the government 
foreign revenues.  The early years of the transition to the free market had, 
indeed, created serious economic and social problems.  Though the 
macroeconomic environment started to show signs of stabilisation since the 
early 2000‟s, the national economic growth remained low still with heavy 
reliance on imports.  The privatisation of medium and particularly of large 
state enterprises was also progessing very slow and their restructuring still 
remained a major issue in both the management and government debates.  The 
kind of restructuring taking place in these enterprises was until the time 
before carrying out this research study unknown.  In this study, attempts had 
been made to highlight the kind of restructuring behaviour and its 
determinants in the Algerian enterprise through the experience of three large 
state enterprises slated for privatisation operating in different manufacturing 
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industries.  The next chapter will discuss the methodology used to investigate 
these three enterprises.          
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Chapter 6         
 
                                  Research Methodology  
 
   
6.1.        Introduction  
  
The question raised in chapter three required a focus on the restructuring 
actions undertaken by the state enterprises slated for privatistion in Algeria as 
they were challenged with the dilemma of survival and transformation in the 
transition to the free market economic system and also on the forces leading 
or impeding their restructuring.  This chapter discussed the methodology 
followed in data collection and analysis to answer the question.  A brief 
discussion on the approach to research methodology in social sciences was 
given first.  This was followed by a detailed discussion on why the topic was 
chosen, what research strategy, methods and techniques were used in the 
collection and analysis of data, what problems were encountered during the 
data collection, and finally the historical backgrounds of each enterprise 
chosen for this research. 
 
                    
6.2.   Approach to Research Methodology in Social Sciences 
 
Methodology, according to Silverman (2000: 79) could be defined as “How 
one will go about studying any phenomenon”.  In social science research, two 
types of research strategies have predominated:  the quantitative strategy and 
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the qualitative strategy.  The divide between the two strategies was based on 
epistemological and ontological considerations. These considerations looked 
to the social world from different perspectives and therefore researchers, as 
discussed below, used different methods in their data collection and analysis. 
 
6.2.1. The  Quantitative Research Strategy 
 
This strategy was based on an epistemological tradition called „Posivitism‟.  
Neuman (2006: 81) broadly defined „Posivitism‟ as “The approach of the 
natural science”.  Positivism – there are a variety of positivist schools such as 
logical empiricism, the accepted or conventional view, postpositivism, 
naturalism, the covering law model, and behaviourism - arose from the 
nineteeth century school of thought by the Frenchman Auguste Comte (1798-
1857) who founded sociology.  In his major work entitled „The Course of 
Positive Philosophy‟, Comte outlined the principles of posivitism which are 
still used until today.  His principles were later modified by the British 
philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) in his work entitled „A System of 
Logic‟ and by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) in his 
work „Rules of the Sociological Method‟.  Durkheim‟s Rules have become 
the main textbook for positivist social researchers (Neuman, 2006:  81). 
 
For Neuman (2006: 86), the positivist philosophy carried the following 
assumptions:  
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1. The ultimate purpose of research is to discover and document universal 
causal laws of human behaviour; 
 
2. Social reality is not random.  It is patterned and has order.  Science let 
human discover this order and the laws of nature; 
 
3. Basic patterns of social reality are stable and knowledge of them is 
additive.  The regularity in social reality does not change over time and 
laws discovered today will hold in the future; 
 
4. People respond to external forces that are as real as physical forces on 
objects.  According to Durkheim “Social phenomena are things and ought 
to be structured as things”; 
 
5.  It looked at how external force, pressures, and structures that operate on 
individuals, groups, organisations or societies produce outcomes it 
downplayed on individual subjective or internal reasons and any sense of 
free choice or volition.  This is to say that powerful social pressures and 
situations that operate on people to shape most if not all of their actions; 
 
6. Positivism tried to learn about how the social world work to enable 
people to exercise control over it and make accurate predictions about it; 
 
7. It sees science as a special, distinct part of society that is free of personal, 
political or religious values.  It involved applying strict rational thinking 
  
 189 
and systematic observation in a manner that transcends personal 
prejudices, values and bias”.  
 
Generally speaking, the proponents of positivism looked at the social world 
from the natural science perspectives.  Accordingly to Keat and Urry (cited in 
Neuman, 2006: 82) “There is only one logic of science, to which any 
intellectual activity aspiring to the title of „science‟ must conform”.  Based on 
this logic, the positivist researchers used the measurement of people and 
institutions as the only way to produce an acceptable knowledge. They were 
preoccupied, Bryman (2000: 8) argued “To deduce from what is known about 
a particular domain and of theoretical considerations in relation to that 
domain a hypothesis (or hypotheses) that must be subjected to scrutiny”.  
This scrutiny could be carried out by any of the five methods such as a social 
survey, experiment, official statistics, structured observation, and content 
analysis, and the findings of the research were evaluated, according to 
Bryman (2004: 28), on three criteria:  
 
a. Reliability.  To see whether the measures designed for the concepts 
were consistent; 
 
b. Replication.  To see whether the procedures that constitute the measures 
used in data analysis could be replicated; 
 
c. Validity.  To see whether the constructs used to measure the concepts 
were consistent (measurement validity); whether one variable caused 
  
 190 
the variation of another variable (internal validity); whether the findings 
of the research could be generalised beyond the specific research 
context (external validity); and whether the social settings from which 
the date was collected had been contaminated by the interference of the 
research scientist (ecological validity).   
 
However, the dependence on purely quantitative methods and neglecting the 
social and cultural construction of the variables had put researchers using 
quantitative research strategy to criticism.       
 
6.2.2. The Qualitative Research Strategy 
 
Researchers using quantitative research strategy had been criticised for their 
dependence on purely quantitative methods.  This dependence, Silverman 
(2000: 6) argued, “May neglect the social and cultural construction of the 
variables which the quantitative research seeks to correlate”.  Critics to 
quantitative research strategy came from a philosophical tradition called 
Interpretism‟.   Interpretism - there are a variety of interpretive social schools  
such as hermeneutics, constructionism, ethnomethodology, cognitive, 
idealist, phenomenological, subjectivist, and qualitative sociology – can be 
traced to the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) and the German 
philosopher Wilhem Dilthey (1833-1911).  Weber felt that (cited in Neuman, 
2006: 87) “We must learn the personal reasons or motives that shape a 
person‟s internal feelings and guide decisions to act in particular ways”.  On 
similar lines of thought, Wilthey argued that there were two different types of 
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science.  The one based on abstract explanation and the one based on an 
empathetic understanding or Verstehen of the everyday lived experience of 
people in specific historical settings.  Neuman (2006) summarised the goal 
sought by the interpretive philosophy as to: 
 
1. Develop an understanding of social life and to discover how people 
construct meaning in natural settings; 
 
2. The human social life was intentionally created out of the purposeful 
actions of interacting social beings.  Therefore, the social world was 
largely what people perceived it to be; 
 
3. People were engaged in an ongoing process of creating systems of 
meaning through social interaction.  Then they use such meanings to 
interpret their social world and make sense of their lives; 
 
4. Evidence about social actions cannot be isolated from the context in 
which it occurs or the meanings assigned to it by the social actors 
involved. 
 
Based on these philosophical views, the interpretists, according to Bryman 
(2004: 13), “Share the view that people and institutions are fundamentally 
different from the natural sciences and they assume that the social scientist 
should interpret the actions of people and their social world from their point 
of view”.  Accordingly, researchers using interpretive principles were often 
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called qualitative researchers.  They collect and analyse data by using words 
rather than numbers.  They would use one and often several methods to 
understand the social world.  These were: ethnography/participant 
observation, qualitative interviewing, focus group, language-based approach 
such as conversation analysis and discourse analysis, and the analysis of texts 
and documents.   
 
The main preoccuptation of qualitative researchers was to generate a theory 
out of the collection and analysis of data, though this was not always the 
case.  “There are examples”, Bryman (2004: 20) argued, “of studies in which 
qualitative research has been employed to test rather than to generate 
theories”.  In addition, though the findings of a qualitative research were 
evaluated on their validity and reliability, these two criteria were quite 
different from those used in quantitative research.  Lincoln and Guba (cited 
in Bryman, 2004: 273) proposed that “The assessment of a qualitative study 
should be based on trustworthiness and authenticity.  Trustworthiness was 
based on five criteria:  credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability.  Authenticity was also based on five criteria.  These were:  
fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic 
authenticitiy, and tactical authenticity.  In general, qualitative research was: 
 
-Concerned with words; 
-Inductive where theory was generated from data; 
-Interpretive; 
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-Had an ontological position described as constructivism which assumed that 
social properties were the outcomes of the interaction of individuals, not 
seperated from this interaction. 
 
However, qualitative research strategy was criticised for being subjective, 
difficult to replicate, very difficult to generalise and lacked transparency.  But 
though qualitative and quantitative were two distinct research strategies in 
terms of the role of theory and their epistemological and ontological 
positions, the distinction, according to Bryman (2004: 21), “Is not hard-and-
fast one...Studies that have the broad characteristics of one research strategy 
may have a characteristic of the other...Many writers argue that the two can 
be combined within an overall research project”.  The combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods into the research methodology of a 
single study is what was called triangulation.  Methodological triangulation, 
according to Creswell (cited in Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1994: 18), “Could be 
carried out in one of the four forms: 
 
-The researcher first conducts a qualitative phase of study and then a 
quantitative phase; 
 
-The researcher conducts the qualitative and quantitative phase at the same 
time; 
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-The researcher conducts the study using both the quantitative and the 
qualitative approaches about equally to understand the phenomenon under 
study; 
 
-The researcher conducts the study within a single dominant [paradigm] with 
a small component of the overall study drawn from an alternative design”.   
 
In conclusion, using one research strategy or combining the two depends on 
the nature of the topic and particularly on the question(s) that the researcher 
seeks to answer.        
 
6.3. The Research Methodology Followed in this Study 
 
6.3.1. The Reason for Choosing the Topic 
 
Being interested in the economic developments of Algeria, it was clear from 
the many reports published by the Algerian national newspapers that the 
association with the European Union in 2002 and the prospect of Algeria 
being a member of the World Trade Organisation should urge the Algerian 
state and privatised enterprises to restructure effectively in order to be able to 
compete.  This stimulated my interest to carry out a research study on 
enterprise restructuring in Algeria.  At this time, my interest focused to find 
an answer to the question of:  How much the internal management of the 
giant oil state company SONATRACH had deviated from the socialist 
management style and became competition-oriented?  The research was 
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supposed to compare SONATRACH management style with a multinational 
firm such as BP or Shell.  Since SONATRACH was still wholly owned by 
the government, a literature review on the organisational behaviour of the 
public enterprise in the market and planned economies was made during 
2002 and 2003.  Review of strategic management and organisational 
behaviour literature in private firms was also made.  The dimensions to 
measure the organisational behaviour of SONATRACH were borrowed from 
the work of Stalker and Burns (1961), Lorsch and Lawrence (1967) and, in 
particular, from Khandwalla (1977).   In the summer of 2003, a visit was 
made to the head office of SONATRACH in Algiers to ask managers in the 
different departments to participate in the research but unfortunately they all 
declined.  As a result, changes were made in the research track.  This time the 
focus was made on the manufacturing enterprises slated for partial and total 
privatisation.  The government considered that privatisation was too slow and 
the law of privatisation of 2001 was supposed to speed up privatisation and 
therefore enterprises had to restructure to get rid of unproductive assets, to 
concentrate on assets with competitive potentials, to introduce modern 
technologies and market-oriented management procedures.  The research 
started with the search for any published work on enterprise restructuring of 
the privatised enterprise in Algerian and Western information sources and 
fortunately none existed which consequently made my enthusiasm stronger to 
carry out the research.  The literature on enterprise restructuring and its 
determinants in a transition context was reviewed in 2004.  Research on this 
topic had focused almost exclusively on the ex-communist countries.  
Enterprise restructuring in other countries which had moved to the free 
  
 196 
market system at almost the time as the ex-communist countries had been 
neglected by researchers.  This neglect had, indeed, increased my 
determination to carry out the research on enterprise restructuring in the state 
enterprises slated for privatisation in Algeria.  In the summer of 2004, my 
research data collection and analysis started.                        
 
6.3.2. The Research Strategy Followed 
 
Algeria is a country different from the ex-communist countries in terms of its 
cultural values and social structure and in terms of its political and economic 
developments in pre and post transition.  Therefore, one would expect that 
these characteristics would have impact on the restructuring behaviour of the 
state enterprises slated for privatisation and the determinants of this 
behaviour.  The research started with a broad question, as already mentioned 
in chapter three, which was:  What kind of enterprise restructuring and its 
determinants one would expect in the Algerian state enterprises slated for 
privatisation, given the facts that Algeria is a country different from the ex-
communist countries in terms of its cultural and social structures and in its 
political and economic developments in pre and post transition?  To answer 
this question, a combination of qualitative and quantitative research approach 
was used.  Since the restructuring actions were constructed by the individuals 
in direct and indirect links with these enterprises, the interpretation of these 
actions by these individuals was very important and therefore a qualitative 
research strategy was a suitable strategy to use.  Also, since the purpose of 
the research was to test whether the Algerian cases investigated in this 
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research would exhibit enterprise restructuring and its determinants similar or 
different from those experienced in the ex-communist countries, the research 
was inductive.  In addition, as the replacement of top managers in the 
enterprises slated for privatisation would form an important part in their 
restructuring actions, a survey was used to explore the extent of changes 
taking place in the charactetistics of these managers.  The research also used 
primary materials such as state, private company and media reports.  
Generally speaking, though the research was qualitative, inductive and 
interpretative in its nature, it was complemented by quantitative methods in 
order to answer the research question.          
  
6.3.3. The Research Design Chosen 
 
This is a case study.  Yin (2003: 13) defined a case study as “An empirical 
enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident”.  A case study could be an individual, a group, an 
organisation, a social or political phenomenon.  Researchers using case 
studies could use a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to explore, 
describe or explain phenomena and situations.  The choice, Yin (2003: 6) 
explained, between case study, survey, experiment, archival analysis and 
histories should be based on the types of research questions.  According to 
him, if the research questions were of the type „What‟ questions and the goal 
of the researcher was to develop pertinent hypotheses and propostions for 
further inquiry, the researcher should make a decision to conduct an 
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exploratory study using any of the three methods:  a survey, an experiment or 
a case study.  If on the other hand the goal of the researcher from the „What‟ 
questions was to idenfity the outcomes a survey or an archival analysis would 
be more suitable as research methods than a case study.  Survey and archival 
analysis would be also suitable in research guided by „Who‟ and „Where‟ 
questions especially when the goal of the researcher was to describe the 
incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon or when it was to be predicted 
about certain outcomes.  A case study design was often used when the 
research was guided by „Why‟ and „How‟ questions because such questions 
dealt with operational links needing to be traced over time rather than mere 
frequencies or incidence.    
 
This research was guided by a „What‟ question in which the goal was not 
only to develop an understanding on the restructuring behaviour of the 
enterprises slated for privatisation and the determinants of this behaviour but 
also to put forward some propositions for future investigation on the topic.   
Therefore, a case study design was the most suitable.  This design would 
allow an intensive examination of these enterprises through the participation 
of their managers, close observation of their settings, and examination of 
their internal documents.   
 
However, at the begining of the research investigation the intention was to 
explore enterprise restructuring and its determinants in three enterprises 
slated for privatisation operating in the same industry to see whether there 
was any pattern in their restructuring behaviour.  The investigation started by 
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consulting the directory of all enterprises slated for privatisation published by 
the ministry of industry.  It was decided to choose three enterprises from any 
of the three industries:  The iron and steel, the clothing, or the wheat 
processing and manufacturing.   These industries had enterprises operating 
and serving the customers in three main regions of the country:  central, 
eastern and western.  It was planned to select one enterprise from each 
region.  The historical development and performance backgrounds of the 
three industries were reviewed.  Before starting the investigation, however, a 
visit was made to some of the researchers specialised in economic and 
organisational development in Algeria located at the Centre National 
d’Etudes et d’Analyses pour le Plan (The National Centre of Studies and 
Analyses for Planning), (CENEAP), and at the Centre de Research en 
Economie Appliqueé pour le Developpement  (The Research Centre in 
Applied Economy for the Development), (CREAD), to get some tips from 
them on how to get an easy access to these enterprises.  Some of the 
researchers at the CENEAP advised that the timing was not right to do 
research in these enterprises since many of them were preparing themselves 
for privatisation and it would be hard to get their participation in the research.  
Despite this disappointing advice, a visit was made to the ministry of 
industry.  The security at the main gate was very tight.  A visitor had to 
explain the reason for the visit and to name the person the visitor wished to 
see.  Despite the purpose of my research was explained to the security it was 
not possible to see any manager of any sponsoring department of the three 
industries selected for the research.  Instead, the security oriented me to the 
documentation centre.  My visit was welcomed by the manageress of the 
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centre but still no access was made to any manager of any sponsoring 
departments.  In fact, the manageress advised that researchers should arrange 
themselves the appointments to see the managers of the privatised enterprises 
they wanted to investigate.  The manageress was very helpful by providing 
me with some documents and allowed me to use freely the library in the 
centre.  Most of the documents in the library were out of date with the 
exception of the government official journal (Journal Official de la 
République Algerienne), which publishes the government laws and the 
government appointments of senior managers in the public sector, and 
documents on the transition policies published by the ministry of industry.  
Some of the documents collected from the documentation centre were used in 
this research to cover the political and economic backgrounds of Algeria in 
pre and post transition.  After a month going back and forward to the ministry 
of industry, not a single contact was made with any manager in the 
sponsoring departments.  One morning, however, a bit of luck appeared.  A 
neighbour of mine, not seen for years, was on her way to enter the building of 
the ministry of industry and it was her who opened the door for my research 
to progress.  She worked as the main secretary in the office of the manager in 
the sponsoring department for food industry to whom she explained the 
purpose of my research.  The manager was happy to help and introduced me 
as one of his relatives to the managers of the sponsoring departments of steel 
and iron and clothing industries.  Despite the letters of recommendations 
given to me by the managers, only the enterprise VETCO in the clothing 
industry and Eriad Alger in wheat processing and manufacturing industry 
agreed to participate.  With these disappointing results, the choice of 
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enterprises that should participate in my research had to change again.  This 
time, it was decided to select three enterprises operating in different 
industries but with different financial performances.  The many reports of the 
national newspaper EL Watan indicated that Saidal was growing fast in terms 
of its financial performance and its shares of the domestic market.  Eriad 
Alger was losing markets and in heavy debts and the SNVI was growing at a 
slow pace.  Again, the manager of food industry had to introduce me to the 
managers of the sponsoring departments of pharmaceuticals industry and 
mechanic and metallic industry.  Though Eriad Alger was investigated during 
the summer of 2004 and of 2005, the participation of Saidal was very hard to 
get despite the letter of recommendation given to me by the manager in the 
sponsoring department of pharmaceuticals. Its participation was possible only 
when the senior manager in the department of conflicts and social affairs at 
the headquarters of the UGTA, who was very participative in my research, 
intervened by giving me a letter to hand over to the secretary in the head 
office of Saidal located in the town called Dar El-Beida.  The participation of 
Saidal was in the summer of 2004.  As for the SNVI, despite the letter of 
recommendation from the manager of the sponsoring department of mechanic 
and metallic, my several visits to the enterprise head office located in the 
town of Rouiba, during the summer of 2004, did not yield any result.  The 
secretary in the office always apologised that her boss was either in meetings 
or outside the enterprise.  It was only in the summer of 2005, and after many 
visits, while waiting in the reception room, the manager of the technical 
department and the manager of the human resources department came from a 
meeting room and there my meeting was made with these two managers and 
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the purpose of my research was explained to them.  Fortunately, they 
accepted to participate in my research and had facilitated my access to other 
managers in the enterprise.     
 
6.3.4. The  Collection and Analysis of Data 
 
The research had a clear focus.  It investigated enterprise restructuring and its 
determinants for the period 1990 to 2005.  It used a combination of methods 
used to collect data.  These were:  interviews, a survey, and primary 
documents.   
 
6.3.4.1. Interviews.  
 
 This method was chosen because the interest was to obtain the point of 
views of the interviewees and also it was flexible in a sense that the 
interviewers, Bryman (2004: 320) argued, “Can depart significantly from any 
schedule or guide that is being used.  They can ask new questions that follow 
up interviewees‟ replies and can vary the order and even the wording of 
questions”.  This meant that it allowed me to ask questions of introducing, 
follow-up, probing, specifying and interpreting natures.  The broad question 
that guided the research was broken down into seven categories.  Each 
category contained a number of questions.    The questions were developed 
from the case studies of  Estrin et al., (1995) and Brada and Singh (1999), 
from the works of Hendley (1998), Laszlo and Whitley (2000), Linz et 
al.,(2001), Clark et al., (1998), Carlin et al., (1995), the cross-country survey 
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of the EBRD (2000), the survey of Carlin et al., (2001), the survey of Muent 
et al., (2000), and from the question guide that was previously developed to 
study SONATRACH.  The questions were asked in the form of semi-
structured interviews to allow the cross-case comparability.  Interviewees 
were asked to give a brief history of the enterprise, the ownership structure of 
the enterprise, the nature of industry in which the enterprise operated,, the 
extent of competition, the product market strategy, the organisational 
structure, and employment policies.  The questions included in these 
categories are found in Appendix A.   
 
Purposive sampling was used to select the individuals to be interviewed.  
These individuals were selected on the basis of their direct involvement with 
the restructurig actions taking place in their enterprises.  These were the chief 
executives, the general secretaries, managers of divisions and of functional 
departments.  Managers in the functional departments were selected from the 
departments which had direct involvement in the corporate strategic decision 
makings at the head office and division levels.  These were the planning, 
marketing, finance, research and development, production, and human 
resources.  Thirty nine managers were interviewed through semi-structured 
interviews.    Eriad Alger was the first enterprise to be investigated.  
Transcription was made after each interview.  Since most of the managers 
were very participative, this allowed me to go back at any time and ask them 
for more explanations on issues that were not explained during the 
interviews.  As a result, the semi-structured question guide was reconstructed 
and used later with Saidal and the SNVI.   
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To cross-check the data collected from the three enterprises, other sources 
were also used.  These were in the form of state, private company and media 
reports and also individuals that had some links with these enterprises.  
Therefore, managers of the sponsoring departments of the three enterprises 
located at the ministry of industry, managers at the UGTA, managers at the 
state consultancy organisation, CNAT, and workers from the three enterprises 
were selected to be interviewed.  Interviews were carried out with two 
managers in the sponsoring departments, two managers at the CNAT, three 
managers at the headquarters of the UGTA,  six workers where three were 
from Eriad Alger, one from Saidal and two from the SNVI.  These workers 
were met at the department of conflicts and social affairs at the headquarters 
of the UGTA.  In this office, interviews were also carried out with one retired 
President General Manager from the enterprise called Giplait and a manager 
who was sacked from the public holding called CABELEQ.  The interviews 
with these participants were unstructured interviews.  The interviews were 
tailored to develop an understanding of the positive and negative effects of 
the transition on the state and privatised enterprises in the country, with 
reference to the three enterprises investigated in this research, and many 
issues related to their internal management.  Managers were asked on issues 
such as the extent of control of the government in the management of the 
state and privatised enterprises; how managers in the enterprises and 
government adminstration were recruited, evaluated and compensated; the 
level of education of senior managers in the enterprises and the kind of 
training they took since privatisation; the  kind of problems that existed 
between enterprise senior managers and the government representatives in 
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the enterprises; the kind of changes that took place in the recruitment and 
compensation of workers and their participation in the decision makings of 
their enterprises; the kind of relationships that existed between the 
management of the three enterprises of the study and the UGTA; the 
categories of workers affected by the sale of assets and the types of worker 
welfare services that were abandoned and those that still remained; the kind 
of problems that existed in the institutional environment; their positions 
towards privatisation; the importance of the public sector in the government 
policies; the role of the public holdings in restructuring; the kind of 
investments made in the privatised enterprises with reference to the 
enterprises under investigation; and the kind of policies that the govenment 
should put in place to make the state and privatised enterprises more 
competitive.         
 
In total, fifty four semi-structured and unstructured interviews were carried 
out in this research study.  As mentioned before, each interview was 
transcribed right away (see a sample of a transcribed unstructured interview 
in Appendix B) and read several times to generate new issues not covered by 
researchers on enterprise restructuring in the ex-communist countries.  The 
transcription also allowed me to make a liste of documents that should be 
used to cross-check the information given in the interviews and also 
information needed in the data analysis.    Many visits were made as a 
consequence to collect more data from some already interviewed managers at 
Eriad Alger, particularly the general secretary at the head office, managers in 
the UGTA and the CNAT and the manager in the sponsoring department for 
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food industry.  Unfortunately, not a single manager that was previously 
interviewed at Saidal and the SNVI was ready to be interviewed again.  The 
new issues raised by the interviewees that had impact on restructuring were 
counted and tabulated as shown in table 6.1   below. 
 
Table 6.1. Frequency of new issues affecting restructuring raised by interviewees. 
 
 
 
 
                                 Source:  Data Analysis 
 
Most interviews were tape recorded but some interviewees refused to be 
interviewed through tape recorder and preferred instead notes taking.  Also, 
some interviewees who were tape recorded required to remain anonymous.  
The taped interviews lasted between half an hour and two hours.  As for the 
unstructured interviews, some of these interviews lasted for many hours.  At 
the headquarters of the UGTA, for example, the interviews took sometimes 
the whole working day as a result of interviews being interrupted by phone 
New issues raised Number of of interviewees   
(n=54) 
-Impact of civil war on production and  
productivity. 
 
-Impact of civil war on technical drain. 
 
-Rejection of Western investors holding large stakes in 
the privatised enterprises. 
 
-Suspicion about the Programmes for Structural  
Adjustments imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on  
Algeria and  suspicion about firms from Western Europe to  
Invest in Algerian economy and Algerian enterprises 
 
-Partnership without share ownership with foreign  
investors welcomed 
  
-Recruitment, promotion and reward of managers  
and workers based on family, freinds and regional ties. 
 
-Avoiding laying off workers based on  
religious brotherhood and customs  grounds.  
  
  9 
 
 
21 
16 
 
12 
 
 
 
42 
 
14 
 
18 
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calls or by people who came to solve their conflicts at the UGTA.   In fact, 
the manager of the department of conflicts and social affairs allowed me to sit 
in his office and observe the different matters and problems his department 
dealt with.  This gave me the opportunity to meet workers and enterprise 
trade union representatives of different enterprises including the enterprises 
included in my investigation and discuss with them some of the issues related 
to my research.  All the interviews with the directors at the ministry of 
industry, managers of the CNAT and managers of Eriad Alger, Saidal and 
SNVI were carried out in French language.  But with the managers of the 
UGTA and other interviewees met at the UGTA, most of the interviews were 
in Algerian language, a language which is a combination of French, Arabic 
and sometimes Berber words.  All the interviews in French and Algerian 
languages were back translated into English.   
  
6.3.4.2.  The Survey.   
 
In contrast to all previous research on management replacement in the 
transition countries, management replacement in this study was investigated 
by looking at the characteristics of the top management teams of the three 
enterprises.  The link between top management characteristics and 
organisational outcomes – strategic choices and performance (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984) and between top management characteristics and corporate 
strategy change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1991) were well documented in 
strategic management literature.  Measuring this concept in this study would 
capture whether the three enterprises had introduced new blood of managers 
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with market-oriented skills.  According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), older 
managers and managers who had functional track in production and process 
engineering would be less inclined to take risky investment and be 
competitive, would prefer the status quo and would be concerned with their 
career and financial security.   Measuring this concept would also test the 
claims made by authors like Ivancevich et al., (1992), Avraham (1993), 
Luthans et al., (1993), Pribova and Savitt (1995), Shipley et al., (1995) and 
Savitt (2001) that managers from the socialist period would find it difficult to 
follow a competitive strategy as they were less equipped with skills required 
in a competitive market.      
 
Since there was no published data available on the characteristics of the top 
management teams in the three enterprises and since numerical data would be 
required to measure the concept, a survey was used.  The measures used to 
gauge the top management characteristics were adopted from the propositions 
advanced by Hambrick and Mason (1984).  The authors proposed to measure 
five dimensions.  These were: 
   
1. Age.  It was assumed that younger managers would lead the corporate to 
growth and risky investments.  By contracts, older managers would be less 
able to grasp new technologies, would have greater psychological 
commitment to their enterprise and their status quo and were more concerned 
with their career and financial security. 
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2. Formal education.  Education was assumed to reflect the person‟s 
knowledge and skills.  For example, a person educated in engineering would 
have a cognitive base different from someone educated in history or law.  
This cognitive base would affect the strategic orientations of the managers.    
 
3. Functional track.  Experience developed in some functional areas would 
exert some influence on strategic choices.  The authors proposed that 
managers coming from marketing, research and development, sales and 
production would emphasis corporate growth and the search for new 
oppurtunities whereas those coming from production, process engineering 
and accounting would emphasis strategies at improving the efficiency of the 
transformation process.   
 
4. Career experience.  It was suggested that the chief executives officers 
brought from outside the corporation would make changes to the structure, 
procedures and people more than those promoted within the corporation 
because they would be less committed to the status quo and would have the 
desir to create loyal „lieutenants‟.  It was also suggested that executives who 
spent their entire career in one organisation would have a relatively limited 
perspectives to face intensive competition or a radical technological shift.  
Their in-depth industry familiarity would serve best a market with stability.   
 
5. Socio-economic backgrounds.  It was suggested that gender, social status 
and religious and regional belonging would affect the strategic orientations of 
top managers.  It was assumed that managers from disadvantaged 
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backgrounds would pursue aggressive strategies in their markets in order to 
achieve recognition and esteem.   
 
A self-completion questionnaire was constructed to measure the five 
dimensions.  The questionnaire was piloted at Eriad Alger.  It was distributed 
to seven low ranked managers at the production plant called Aissa Idir. Some 
managers required that they would fill in the questionnaire in my presence to 
explain to them anything they found it difficult to understand.  It was very 
clear that the questions which measured their social status and their regional 
belonging made them uncomfortable.  Some managers asked “I do not see 
any sense to know whether I come from rich or poor family and from which 
region I come from” and some did not even attempt to answer these 
questions.  These two questions were dropped from the questionnaire.  The 
respondents were also confused to answer the question which asked to show 
the number of years spent in different functional departments.  The 
categories, showing the range years, overlapped such as 0-1, 1-2, 2-3 and so 
forth.  This question was reconstructed using a four years interval for each 
category.  The final version of the questionnaire looked like the one in 
Appendix C.     It included fourteen questions.  The age variable was grouped 
into categories with ten years interval to make it easy during the analysis.  
The formal education was gauged by question 3 and 4; the career experience 
by question 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12; the functional track by question 11 and 13.  
As it was expected that the management teams should have undergone some 
training and development in competitive-oriented skills, question 14 was 
included.     
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The questionnaire was distributed to the respondents at Eriad Alger, Saidal 
and the SNVI using non-random sampling, using quota sampling.  The 
respondents were selected based on their direct influence in the strategic 
decisions of their enterprises.  These were all the president general managers, 
the general secretaries, the division managers and the senior managers in the 
marketing, research and development or equivalent, finance, human 
resources management, production, and planning departments.  From reading 
the organisational diagrammes of Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI, one 
hundred and eleven managers were supposed to fill in the questionnaires.  
Only seventy nine were filled in and returned or 71 percent.  The 
questionnaire data was analysed using a univariate analysis.  Since it was a 
comparative case study, one variable was analysed at a time.  A frequency 
tables were used providing the number of managers and the percentages 
belonging to each variable in question.          
 
6.3.4.3.  Primary Documents  
 
Primary documents in the form of quantitative data to evaluate the 
restructuring actions of the three enterprises were used.  These were financial 
and operational performance data such as the annual sale revenues, added 
value, net profit after taxe, cah flow, and total and partial productivity.  The 
data on the sale revenues and the partial productivity were available for all 
the three enterprises.  As for the rest of the data, it was available only from 
Eriad Alger and Saidal but not from the SNVI.   
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Primary documents also included  published records of the three enterprises 
such as annual reports, board of directors reports, functional department 
reports, internal regulation manuals, collective bargaining manuals, private 
correspondances between the President Geneneal Managers and managers in 
divisions and functional departments, private correspondances between 
managers of the different functional departments; selection and recruitment 
reports of PGMs; private correspondences between the UGTA and the heads 
of the government, private correspondences between trade union 
representatives, workers and the public holdings.  
 
6.3.4.4.  Secondary published materials.   
 
These included from official documents to media reports to standard books 
and articles publications written in French, Arabic and English.  These 
documents provided the basis for a great deal of political, economic and 
social developments in Algeria in pre and post transition and also of the 
restructuring taking place in transition countries which served as a 
background of restructuring and its determinants in transition economies.       
 
6.3.5. Problems Encountered during the Research 
 
 This research did not go without problems.  The first problem was, as 
mentioned above, the difficulty to get access to the enterprises to be 
investigated.  At the beginning of the research, the intention was to gather 
information from all parties involved in the decision making process in each 
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enterprise selected in the research.  This meant that the research should have 
involved the manager of pharmaceutical department, the manager of the food 
industries and the manager of mechanic and metallic industries located at the 
ministry of industry, the general manager of the public holding of Eriad 
Alger called CEGRO and the PGM of each enterprise and all managers of the 
divisions and the functional departments. Though two interviews were 
carried out with the manager of the food industry and of the mechanic and 
metallic industry, and most managers at different levels of each enterprise 
under investigation, unfortunately, the general manager of CEGRO was 
reluctant to participate in the research.  When first met in his office, he 
agreed to participate in the research, but when he was asked to make an 
appointment so an interview would be carried out with him, he declined.  
After many phone calls to his office, his secretary apologised and gave the 
excuse either her boss was not there, or in a meeting.  After weeks of trying, 
his secretary finally told me that her boss was not ready to participate.  And 
when asked whether it would be possible to use their documentation resource 
department to collect some published data, the answer of the secretary was 
negative too.  Even at Saidal and the SNVI, the secretaries at their head 
offices were not at ease when asked to use their documentation resource 
departments.  By contrast, Eriad Alger provided me with some of their 
internal documents.  But to get hold of some of Saidal‟s and the SNVI‟s 
internal documents, their workers who were interviewed at the UGTA were 
asked for help.  One worker of Saidal provided me with the internal 
regulation document of the enterprise.  However, the managers at the UGTA 
provided me with the majority of the documents used in pre and post 
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transition of Algeria and the internal documents of the enterprises 
investigated in this study.  They provided me not only with the internal 
documents such as the internal regulation manuals of the SNVI and Saidal, 
their collective bargaining manuals, some of their annual reports but also 
some annual reports of CEGRO and other public holdings and even some 
private correspondences between the UGTA and managers of the enterprises 
involved in the research and managers from other public enterprises and 
correspondances between the UGTA and the heads of the government.    
Documents on the public holdings and on the SGPs were also provided by 
the manager who was sacked from the public holding CABELELQ.     These 
documents together with the documents of the different internal regulations 
of the UGTA and the UGTA‟s different stages of development since 
independence reinforced my understanding of the internal functioning of the 
UGTA and its participation in the transition period and also the internal 
functioning of the three enterprises of this study and most public and 
privatised enterprises in the country.    
    
6.4. The Historical Background of the Three Enterprises 
   
Before moving to the next chapters, it is best to give a brief introduction on 
the general characteristics of each enterprise included in the research and the 
nature of the industry in which each enterprise operated. 
  
 
 
  
 215 
6.4.1.  Saidal 
 
Saidal was the major pharmaceuticals producer in Algeria.  The 
pharmaceuticals industry in which Saidal operated is Research and 
Development intensive and therefore very costly.  In most countries, this 
industry is highly regulated in terms of price, raw materials and finished 
products conditioning, marketing techniques and approval procedures.  In 
this industry, there are two types of pharmaceuticals manufacturers in 
existence and which compete with each other:  The manufacturers which 
develop the products in their own Research and Development laboratories 
and manufacturers which produce generics - that is to say products based on 
the expired patents of major drugs.  Because the pharmaceuticals industry is 
very competitive and both manufacturers have always customers for their 
products, they often make high profits.   
 
With the continuous growing population in Algeria which was growing in 
recent years at a rate of 3.5 percent per year, both original and generic 
products had no constraints to find customers.  Saidal was a generic 
manufacturer, created in 1985.  Before Saidal came into being, the 
Pharmacie Centrale d’Alger (Central Pharmacy of Algiers), (PCA), was the 
only state-owned producer for pharmaceuticals.  The PCA was created in 
1963 from the nationalisation of the French company Biotic which was 
created in 1952.  The PCA was among the first enterprises in the country to 
be transformed into a socialist enterprise following the Law 71-74 relative to 
the Socialist Management of the Enterprise (SME).  Until 1982, the PCA had 
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the monopoly over production, distribution and import of medicines of 
human consumption.  It was composed of three production plants:  El 
Harrach, Biotic and Pharmal.  Following the organisational restructuring of 
the public enterprise in 1982, the PCA was reorganised into the Entreprise 
Nationale des Produits Pharmaceutiques (National Enterprise for 
Pharmaceutical Products), (ENPP).  The ENPP was given the monopoly in 
production.  The distribution and imports were attributed to three regional 
enterprises called the Pharms- ENAPHARM, ENCOPHARM, and 
ENOPHARM to serve the central, eastern and western regions of the country 
respectively- (Jora, March, 1982). In 1985, the ENPP was transformed into 
Saidal.  Since 1985, economic growth through capacity expansion and 
product diversification through partnership was one of the long-term 
objectives of Saidal.  In 1988, it acquired the production plant of Anti-Biotics 
of the state enterprise, Société Nationale des Industries Chimiques (National 
Company of Chemical Industries), (SNIC), located at Médèa and in 1992, it 
went into partnership with a 40 percent ownership in a mixed company called 
Fabre with the French laboratory Pierre Fabre and the Danish company 
NovoNordisk.  This mixed company was supposed to be built at Tizi-Oozou 
in the area of Oued Aissa and produce 70 different medicines including 
Insulin.  Unfortunately, this partnership never materialised and in 2002, the 
mixed company was dissolved.  In 2005, the products of Saidal were 
produced in its three divisions.  These were the division Biotic which was 
composed of the factory of El- Harrach, the factory of Gué de Constantine 
and the factory of Cherchell; The division Pharmal which was composed of 
the factory of Dar El Beida, the factory of Annaba and the factory of 
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Constantine; And the division Anti-Biotical of Médèa.  These products were 
distributed through four distribution networks.  These were the distribution 
centre of Médèa, the commercial unit of Batna, the commercial unit west and 
the commercial unit centre     
 
Though Saidal competed in 2002 with some 85 pharmaceuticals import 
companies and 5 domestic producers - LADPHARMA, LAM, BIOPHAR, 
LPA and IMA -, it produced some 80 percent of the domestic production in 
pharmaceuticals.  Its production was diversified in related products.  In 2003, 
it produced 150 products. About 40 percent of the sale revenues were created 
by 40 products.  The main products were anti-Biotics, anti-Diebetics, anti-
Rhumatics and anti-Hypertensives.  Between 1995 and 2003, the sale 
turnovers of Saidal increased from 2.4 billion dinars to 5.2 billion or an 
average growth of 13 percent per year.  Of the 5.2 billion dinars recorded in 
2003, about 1.2 billion were produced in partnership with some 
multinationals.  Partnership had also contributed in the increase of Saidal 
export.  Export included finished and raw material products.  In 2003, export 
produced some 31 million dinars for a volume of 0.9 million units.  Export 
was mainly to African and Arab countries in addition to Germany, Italy and 
France.  In its long-term development strategy, Saidal put as its main 
objective to increase its share of the domestic market from 42 percent in 2005 
to 50 percent by the year 2011 and to increase its export, where 10 percent of 
its annual sale turnovers should come from export.  Since 2002, the long-term 
strategy (2002-2011) of Saidal had concentrated on improving quality in 
products and management to increase its shares in domestic and foreign 
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markets.  Consequently, the number of its labour force was in steady 
increase.  Between 2001 and 2004, it increased by an average of 4 percent.  
Most of the recruitment had focused on skills in finance, marketing and 
research and development.  Labour productivity as a measure of efficiency 
had steadily increased from 26,500 units per worker in 2000 to 33,000 units 
in 2001 and to 34,000 in 2002.                 
 
6.4.2.  The   SNVI 
 
The heavy vehicles industry in which the SNVI operated is a highly 
concentrated industry with few companies dominating the industry.  It is also 
an industry where customer demands focus on quality, reliability and 
competitive price.  However, since independence in 1962, the domestic 
market for heavy vehicles in Algeria   was monopolised by the state 
enterprise SONACOME and later by the SNVI.  SONACOME was created in 
1967 from the nationalisation of the French vehicles producer Berliet.  It was 
composed of 10 production plants.  The first truck produced by SONACOME 
came out of its production plants in 1973.  In 1981, SONACOME was 
restructured following the Decree no. 81-342 dated 12 December 1981.  The 
SNVI was created from this restructuring.  The SNVI produced trucks, buses, 
trailers and coaches.  The transition to the free market economic system 
initiated in 1990 did not affect the monopolistic position of the SNVI.  The 
vehicles of the SNVI were produced in a 300,000 square meters industrial 
zone located in a small town called Rouiba which was situated some 30 Km 
away from the capital city Algiers. The zone was composed of five divisions:  
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One commercial division, one division for logistics and services and three 
production divisions where one was for welding, one for industrial vehicles 
and one for body works.  The SNVI had also a sixth division which was for 
body works manufacturing located in the city called Tiaret in the west region 
of Algeria.       
 
The market for vehicles, with all types combined - that is light and heavy 
vehicles - in Algeria was growing fast with an average rate of 20 percent with 
the growing population which was estimated to reach in 2005 around 32 
million peoples.  It was also growing with the new development strategy to 
build the country infrastructure which the state had launched since 2001.  The 
market was considered to be the second in Africa after South Africa.  In 
2004, some 3.01 million vehicles were in circulation in Algeria.  About 2 
million were cars, 57,000 buses and coaches and 54,000 trucks.  In 2005, the 
SNVI satisfied the domestic demand for heavy vehicles by producing 
between 4,000 and 5,000 vehicles per year.  It captured some 40 percent of 
the market.  The rest was satisfied by imports.  The main competitors of the 
SNVI were Renault, Man and Iveco.  Though the number of its workers was 
in steady decrease from 13,520 workers in 1987 to 8,000 in 2004, its sale 
revenues were in steady increase.  Between 1997 and 2003, its revenues 
increased from 1.5 billion dinars to 14.7 billion dinars.  Part of the increase 
was due to the number of vehicles sold but not so much on efficiency.  
Though the productivity was in steady increase compared to the 1990s, until 
2004, it did not achieve its level of the 1970s and 1980s.  In recent years, the 
SNVI had followed a strategy to attract partnership with multinational 
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companies to improve its product mix and also the open new markets for its 
products.  Until 2004, the products of the SNVI had penetrated some African 
and Arab markets but the sale revenues drawn from this penetration was very 
marginal.  The President General Manager of the SNVI envisaged that the 
enterprise shares in these markets would increase with its partnership with 
the multinationals.  In 2005, a partnership was materialised by the 
participation of the French company BTK in 65 percent of the capital of the 
production division at Tiaret and the prospect for the SNVI to have another 
partnership, this time with its number one competitor Renault Truck, was at 
the time of writing this work, at the stage of negotiations. 
 
                       6.4.3.  Eriad Alger 
 
Eriad Alger was created from the organisational restructuring of the société 
nationale SNSEMPAC following the Decree no. 82-377 dated 27 November 
1982.  The decree reorganised the SNSEMPAC into five large regional 
enterprises – Eriad Alger, Eriad Tiaret, Eriad Bel Abbas, Eriad Setif and 
Eriad Constantine - Eriad Alger was created to subsidise the central region of 
the country with flour, semolina and other wheat derivative products like 
pasta, biscuits/chocolate, yeast, and animal feeding.   
 
Since independence, the strategy of the Algerian state was to follow a self-
sufficiency strategy in agricultural food products to reduce import.  
SNSEMPAC was created in 1965 from the nationalisation of a number of 
French mills.  It was composed of 59 production plants spread in different 
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regions of the country.  As the population was growing faster from 13 million 
in 1969 to 18 million in 1979, the consumption of flour and semolina 
increased from 30 kg per head a year in 1965 to 80 kg per head in 1979.  This 
increase in consumption automatically pushed the SNSEMPAC to increase 
the volume of its production.  By 1979, 93 production plants were in 
operations where 63 of them produced flour, 13 produced semolina and the 
rest produced pasta, biscuits/chocolate, yeast and animal feedings.  Its 
average production for flour and semolina increased from 1,500,000 kg per 
day in 1965 to 4,500,000 kg in 1980.  Though there were private firms 
competing with the products of SNSEMPAC, these were small firms.  
SNSEMPAC had the monopoly, particularly after 1971 following the 
introduction of the socialist managed enterprise, over production and 
distribution.  In 1979, its products were distributed through 576 distribution 
outlets located in different regions of the country.  By 1980, the SNSEMPAC 
was still unable to fully satisfy the demands of the domestic market for its 
products.  The technology it used in its operations was mostly inherited from 
the colonial period and therefore obsolete.  For example, the mills of Hamma 
Bouziane located in the city of Constantine dated back to 1860.  The 
enterprise was overburdened with debts accumulated as a result of the many 
public enterprises failing to pay for their purchases and the social costs 
introduced by the socialist managed enterprise system.  However, the 
workers and their families benefited from free medical care and cheap food 
stuff.  In 1979, SNSEMPAC had 27 medical centres with 40 general 
practitioners and 14 dentists instituted in different production plants.  It had 
also 55 cooperatives, 18 canteens and 15 workers lounges.  Like the rest of 
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the sociétés nationales during the centrally planned economic system, 
workers training and development was an important objective in the strategy 
of the SNSEMPAC.  Workers benefited from intensive training and 
development in the SNSEMPAC training centre called Ecole Algerienne de 
Meunerie (National School of Milling) located in the city of Blida and also in 
other public centres such as INPED, IIFC and ITEEM in addition to training 
in overseas schools.   
 
When Eriad Alger was created in 1982, it inherited many of the debts of the 
SNSEMPC and the obsolete technology it used.  With the transition into the 
free market economic system in 1990 and the growing number of private 
firms in the industry of wheat processing and its derivatives, Eriad Alger was 
unable to compete.  In fact, Eriad Alger was constrained by the state which 
imposed on Eriad to abandon many of its activities such as biscuits, 
chocolate, yeast, pasta and animal feeding - whose prices were determined by 
the market and could have benefited Eriad Alger -, and to concentrate on the 
production of flour.  The production of flour increased between 1991 and 
1998 from 300 million kg a year to 350 million or a sale turnover from 40 
million dinars to 45 million dinars.  Though since its creation in 1982, Eriad 
Alger remained stable in terms of the number of workers which was around 
6,000 workers, after the organisational restructuring taking place in 1998, the 
number was reduced by almost 40 percent or from 6,701 in 1996 to 2,535 in 
2000.  Since 1999, the efficiency of Eriad Alger had remarkably improved 
from 250 kg a day per worker in 1986 to 790 kg in 1999, but this did not add 
any value to its competition.  Eriad Alger had been unable to protect its share 
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in the domestic market.  The high quality of the products of its competitors, 
the state imposition that Eriad Alger should use the state-owned enterprise 
OAIC as its only supplier for wheat, the difficulties to secure loans from the 
banks and the growing debts of the enterprise together with the unfair 
competition from the private and the informal sector, all contributed to the 
drastic decline of Eriad Alger where in 2005, its products almost completely 
disappeared from the market.                             
 
6.5. Conclusion  
 
Enterprise restructuring is the introduction of changes in the operations of the 
enterprise.  They are developed and implemented by individuals who have 
direct links with these operations.  The perceptions and point of views of 
these individuals about these changes were important in this research for 
developing an understanding of when, what, where and how the changes took 
place.  A qualitative research strategy was suitable for this purpose.  The 
research used a multiple case study in order to carry out an intensive 
examination of the cases with the hope to generate new issues not covered by 
the literature of enterprise restructuring in the ex-communist countries and to 
establish the similarities and differences in restructuring behaviour between 
the cases.  A combination of methods was used.  These were qualitative 
interviewing, a survey and primary documents.   
 
Though these methods allowed some understanding of enterprise 
restructuring and its determinants in the Algerian context and had generated 
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some new insights such as the impact of civil war, lack of technical skills and 
adequate market information, the legacy of colonialism and cultural values 
on the enterprise in transtion and its environment, this understanding was 
limited for various reasons.   
 
First, the research should have included other privatised and private firms 
with good financial records operating in the same industries as those 
investigated in the study.  Eriad Setif, which was listed in the stock exchange 
since 1999 and was praised by the national newspapers for its good financial 
performance, and domestic private firms such as LaBelle and Sim with good 
performance records, would have been good cases to compare with Eriad 
Alger.  The same could be said with Saidal.  The inclusion of some of the 
best performing domestic private firms in pharmaceuticals in the study would 
have also given some insights on how these firms faced competition and the 
environmental constraints.   Significantly, the inclusion of privatised and 
private firms would have enriched our understanding not only on their 
restructuring actions and financial and operational performance but would 
have, particularly, increased our understanding on the impact of the socio-
cultural structure of Algeria and its political and economic developments 
backgrounds on the management behaviour of the Algerian enterprise.       
 
Second, the evidence presentated in this research had ecological validity but 
could not provide internal validity and replicabiltity.  The non-random 
method used in sampling had reduced the external validity of the findings.  
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Therefore, the findings drawn from Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI could 
not be representative of all enterprises operating in their industries.         
 
Third, the reliability of the measures employed to tap on the concept 
„characteristics of top management team‟ have to be tested again in other 
research to evaluate their consistency.  Also, since the questionnaire 
employed closed-questions, this had restricted the answer of the respondents.  
More data on top management characteristics should have been collected 
using other methods such as qualitative interviewing and company private 
documents on managers‟ ages, their academic achievement, their trainings 
and their work experience.  Also significant to mention, there was no 
evidence that the questionnaires distributed at the Eriad Alger, Saidal and the 
SNVI were filled in by managers who were selected to be part of the 
investigation.  In fact some questionnaires were filled in by managers from 
audit, quality control, sales and legal departments.  And nobody could be sure 
that the managers who filled in the questionnaires were telling the truth in 
their answers.   
 
More research on enterprise restructuring and its determinants must be 
carried out on a larger sample.  The sample should include a combination of 
state, privatised and de novo enterprises in Algeria.  The research should also 
be carried out on enterprises in other developing countries which also moved 
from the planned economic system to the free market system and also in 
countries which share cultural values similar to those found in Algeria.         
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Chapter 7 
 
Enterprise Restructuring at Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI 
 
  
7.1. Introduction 
 
There is a general agreement amongst researchers who studied the transition 
economies in the ex-communist countries that the ultimate success of 
transition depends strongly on the amount of modifications that the 
enterprises introduced in their day-to-day operations.  It was seen in chapters 
two and three that not all enterprises in these countries responded to the 
emerging free market environment with the same degree.  The response was 
influenced by the nature of industries in which the enterprises operated, the 
speed in the expansion of the private sector in the country, the extent of the 
hard budget constraints imposed on the enterprises, the type of owners in 
charge of the enterprises and the degree of development of many other 
mechanisms needed in the free market system such as bankruptcy, property 
rights, taxation and many others.  All these factors had, with different 
degrees, influenced top management decisions in enterprise restructuring at 
Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI.  In this chapter, the privatisation approach 
followed by these enterprises and the impact of this approach on their control 
structure was examined first.  This was followed by analysing the 
characteristics of their top management teams.  A detailed analysis of their 
restructuring actions was given in section 7.4.  To evaluate the restructuring 
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actions of the three enterprises, section 7.5 analysed the impact of these 
actions in terms of their financial and operational performances.   
 
7.2. Their Ownership and Control Structure 
 
Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI were slated for privatisation since 1995. 
Between 1995 and 2000, they were all listed to be partially privatised.  This 
meant that they had to be put under the control of the Public Holdings.  Eriad 
Alger was controlled by the Public Holding Agro-Alimentaire de Base et 
Divers (Basic and Diverse Agro-Feeding), Saidal by Chimie-Pharmacie-
Engrais (Chemical-Pharmacy-Fertelisers) and the SNVI by HOMELEC.  
Though these Holdings were joint stock companies, they were not 
entrepreneurial companies.  Their main purpose was to transfer the state-
owned enterprises that they owned on behalf of the government to private 
investors.  Before selling them to the private sector, these enterprises should 
pass by two stages.  First, they should bet transformed into joint stock 
companies governed by commercial private rules.  Saidal and Eriad Alger 
were already transformed into joint companies.  The former was transformed 
in 1989 and the latter in 1990.  As for the SNVI, this was transformed in 
1995.  Second, they should renegotiate their outstanding debts with their 
banks.  This was done through a scheme called the Dispositif Banque-
Entreprise (Bank-Enterprise Scheme).    Eriad Alger and the SNVI settled 
their debts problems by having some of their debts written off and some to be 
repaid over a long period of time.  Third, the enterprises should carry out the 
restructuring of their activities as a measure to reduce their operating costs by 
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getting rid of unproductive activities and concentrating only on activities with 
future potential.  Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI embarked in their 
organisational restructuring in 1998.  The SNVI was more aggressive than 
Saidal and Eriad Alger in its organisational restructuring approach.  Unused 
garages, buildings and parking for vehicles as well as the canteens, 
cooperatives and cleaning services were all sold to private investors or 
returned to local municipalities and thousands of workers were laid off, even 
those with high technical skills.  At Saidal, only workers with no skills such 
as cleaners and porters were laid off.  But despite the massive cuts in workers 
and unproductive assets, efficiency at the SNVI remained still low and its 
survival in the market was still hard to secure.   
 
Though the SNVI, Eriad Alger and Saidal were all allowed to raise funds, 
desperately needed for the modernisation of their equipments and procedures, 
by opening their capital to private investors, only Saidal did so because it was 
the only one economically and financially healthy.  In 1998, Saidal launched 
its first long-term action plan (1998-2005) to modernise its equipments and 
machineries and improve the quality of its products and worker skills.  To 
raise the capital needed to implement the plan, the PGM of Saidal proposed 
to the board of directors of the enterprise to open 20 percent of the enterprise 
capital to private investment.  It took a lot of explaining before the PGM of 
Saidal convinced the CNPE and the Public Holding that the capital should be 
sold as shares in the stock market.    Before the shares were issued, an 
international consultancy company, the PGA which was a French division of 
the consultancy company Arthur Anderson, was hired.  The company 
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collected and analysed the financial and economic conditions of the 
enterprise.  On the 22 June 1998, the general assembly of Saidal approved in 
its extraordinary meeting, as it was clearly stated in its resolution no. 4, to 
issue two million shares which should be sold in the stock exchange in 1999 
for a fixed price of 800 dinars a share.  The plan of the assembly was to 
create two block holders of shares represented by financial and non-financial 
institutions.  The ownership structure of Saidal was planned to look like this 
(Holding Publc Chimie-Pharmacie Groupe Saidal, 1999):   
 
 Financial institutions should own 30 percent of shares; 
 
 Non-financial institutions should own 30 percent of shares; 
 
 And private individuals should own 35 percent of shares; 
 
 Workers of Saidal should own 5 percent of the shares.   
 
This ownership structure did not go as planned.  The PGM of Saidal, Ali 
Aoun, was against any strong participation by a block investor whether 
public or private in the ownership of his enterprise.  He preferred, instead, to 
see the 20 percent capital owned by thousands of individuals.  And for this to 
happen, he had to convince the general public that share ownership was a 
safe investment.    At the beginning, a large portion of the general public was 
reluctant to participate in share ownership because it was something new to 
them and significantly because they were scared of losing their money.  To 
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convince the general public that their investment would be safe and 
rewarding, the PGM of Saidal mobilised a campaign to explain the benefits 
of investing in shares.  In the words of a manager in the Biotic division:   
 
We were very enthusiastic about this campaign.  Together 
with Ali Aoun [the PGM], we toured in our caravan every city 
in the country to encourage people to buy the shares…You 
know, it was the first experience of its kind in the country.  
People did not have the money and they were frightened to 
lose what they had got. With this campaign, we wanted to 
attract the maximum number of people…  We were very 
happy with the result.  The offer was oversubscribed.  This 
boosted our confidence that our programme for the long-term 
development of Saidal would be implemented.  We were sure 
that our enterprise would survive in the long-term (Manager, 
Biotic Division, Saidal, 2004)        
 
The campaign yielded positive results.  One million and 900,000 shares were 
bought by individuals and the rest by private firms.  In the absence of 
properly functioning enforcement institutions to protect minority 
shareholders, the power of Ali Aoun dominated the decisions of the board of 
directors of the enterprise.  His domination did not lead Saidal to less 
restructuring and poor financial performance as some observers would have 
expected but rather it made Saidal one of the most prosperous domestic 
enterprises in the country.  In fact, Ali Aoun has proved to the government 
administration and to the general public as well that hard work and taking 
risk could turn a loss making enterprise at the door step of liquidation into a 
profit one.   
 
When Ali Aoun was nominated in 1995 as the PGM of Saidal, the main 
objective for his nomination was to liquidate the enterprise.  But rather than 
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liquidating it, he turned the enterprise around.  The first thing he did was to 
reorganise the operations of the enterprise and motivate workers to work 
hard.  As a result, production and turnover increased.  With its good 
performance record, Saidal, as seen later, was able to attract private 
investments by entering into partnerships with a considerable number of big 
foreign companies.  And in 2004, Saidal sold 15 percent of its capital to a 
strategic investor, the company Faki.  The sale was made in order to bring 
fresh capital which was needed for Saidal‟s second long-term development 
plan (2002-2011).  The main objective of the plan was to make Saidal the 
number one domestic producer for pharmaceuticals and expand its share in 
foreign markets.   
 
Though the government still remained a majority share owner in both Saidal 
and the SNVI, this did not, as it seems, shake the dominant power of their 
PGMs in the decision-making process.  In fact, the enactment of Ordinance 
no.01-04 relative to privatisation had given them more power than they 
wished for.  Under Ordinance no. 01-04, both Saidal and the SNVI still 
remained eligible for partial privatisation and therefore they were exempted 
from being part of the portfolio of any public holding represented by the 
SGP, and this meant that both enterprises were less closely supervised by the 
government administration.  Only enterprises eligible for total privatisation 
had to be put under the control of the SGPs to speed up their privatisation.  
Eriad Alger was unfortunately one of them.  It was put under the control of 
the SGP, CEGRO.  CEGRO was the intermediate between the CPE, the 
MPPI and the PGM of Eriad Alger.  Its mission was to manage the activities 
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of Eriad Alger, to control its financial expenditures, to elaborate its policies 
in the repartition of dividends, to invest in projects for the development of its 
production capacities and marketing and to look for potential investors as 
buyers or partners. To keep a close control over Eriad Alger, CEGRO had to 
mandate its representatives to sit in the general assembly of the enterprise, 
had to nominate the directors of the enterprise‟s board and had to select the 
enterprise Commissaires aux Comptes (Financial Auditors).  In practice, the 
programmes for restructuring and development of Eriad Alger and the plans 
for its privatisation were elaborated jointly between CEGRO and the PGM of 
Eriad Alger. Because CEGRO controlled a portfolio of tens of EPEs and had 
a limited number of staff, this made it hard for CEGRO to elaborate for each 
EPE its programmes for restructuring and privatisation plans.  Often, the 
EPEs proposed and elaborated the programmes and the plans and CEGRO 
had only to approve them.  For example, at Eriad Alger, the decisions to sell 
the flour production plant of Aissa Idir and the biscuit production division of 
Cherchell and many other unproductive assets were the initiatives of its 
PGM, Mr Mazidi and not of CEGRO.            
 
One point to remember is that when the state-owned enterprise was 100 
percent owned by the government and was slated for total privatisation as 
was the case with Eriad Alger, interference by the CPE and particularly the 
MPPI in the strategic decisions of the enterprise was strong.  Any investment 
project proposed by the PGM had to be evaluated by the MPPI and the CPE 
and these two government bodies could accept or reject the proposal 
depending on how much the proposal fitted the strategies set by the 
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government for privatisation.  This was not the case with Saidal and the 
SNVI.  Since the MPPI and the CPE regarded them as enterprises with 
potential, their PGMs were given almost unlimited power to take the 
decisions that would allow the revitalisation of these enterprises and make 
them more competitive.   
 
From the interviews, it was clearly understood that the PGM of the SNVI and 
Saidal had strong influence in the decisions of the board of directors and the 
enterprise general assembly.  At Saidal, the 20 percent of shares owned by 
the general public did not seem to have any effect to reduce the dominance of 
its PGM over the resolutions of the board of directors.  By law, the 
shareholders, through their representatives in the board of directors, have the 
right to attend the meetings of the board; to decide on the strategic decisions 
of the enterprise; to nominate, sanction and remunerate the PGM; to decide 
on the amount of dividends to be distributed; and on the capital of the 
enterprise (Code de Sociétés, livre 5 du Code de Commerce, 1993).   In 
practice, as revealed in the case of Saidal, the influence of the two directors 
representing the shareholders and the two directors representing the workers 
in the decisions of the board of directors had almost no effects whatsoever.  
One should not forget that the power of the PGM in the joint stock company 
in Algeria stems from the Commercial Code itself.  The code does not clearly 
specify what responsibilities the board of directors has towards the 
shareholders.  More important, the code gives total power to the board of 
directors to take short, medium and long-tems decisions.  And since the PGM 
is the chairman of the board and the directors meet only occasionally, this 
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automatically makes the PGM the top decision maker in the enterprise.  
Though the code specifies that any resolution in the board meeting should be 
taken by majority votes, whether at Saidal, the SNVI or Eriad Alger, the 
members of the board of directors agreed with whatever decisions the PGM 
made.  The loyalty of the directors to the PGM seems to play a key role in 
decision-makings not only in the three enterprises of this research but in most 
state and partially privatised enterprises in Algeria.     
 
Through its representatives in the general assemblies of Saidal, the SNVI and 
Eriad Alger, the government (the government was represented at Saidal and 
the SNVI by members from the MPPI and at Eriad Alger by members from 
the MPPI and CEGRO) was supposed to be in charge of the selection process 
of the directors of the boards in these enterprises.  But it was a common 
practice in these three enterprises, and without doubt in all state-owned 
enterprises slated for privatisation in the country, that the majority of the 
directors had relational links with the PGMs.  How this happened?  The 
Commercial Code allows the PGM to propose a list of people for 
consideration by the general assembly of his enterprise but the code does not 
specify upon what criteria the candidate should be nominated, this was left 
for the discretion of the members of the assembly.  In most cases, as it was 
understood from the managers at the UGTA, the directors were nominated 
without prior scrutiny or investigation on their professional competence, 
integrity and specialisation in the activities of the enterprises.  And it became 
almost a rule in almost all state-owned and partially privatised enterprises in 
the country to see that the majority of directors were individuals with whom 
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the PGMs had developed, through the years, friendly and close relationships.  
The directors often belonged to public commercial enterprises, to government 
banks and to the different departments in the government administration.  
Table 7.1   below gives some insights on the type of members that composed 
the board of directors of Saidal in 2000. 
 
Table 7.1.   Type of members that composed the board of directors at Saidal in 2000 
 
Full name Duties at Saidal  Duties outside 
 Saidal 
Representation  
outside Saidal 
Ali Aoun PGM  ENEPAC 
Haddadj Hamid Director Previous PGM of  Saidal  
Chabi Ali Director PGM of ENEMB BADR 
Bouabcha 
Salah Eddine 
Director Assistant in Petrochemical 
Development 
 
Chihab 
Mohamed 
Director Manager of NAFTAL 
Network  
ENAED 
Moustafaoui 
Benamara 
Director Manager of Security  
NAFTAL division of 
SONATRACH 
 
Boulala Ahmed Director General Manager of Simedal 
Pharmaceutical products 
 
Bey Mustapha Manager of Social 
Services at the 
division Biotic of 
Saidal 
  
Nabi Slimane In Charge of 
Principal Study at the 
Anti-Biotical 
Division 
  
  Source:  Holding Public Chimie-Pharmacies Groupe Saidal, 1999 
 
Resentment in the way the directors were selected was expressed not only by 
the interviewed workers and managers at the UGTA but also by some 
managers at Eriad Alger.  For the general secretary of Eriad Alger “Legally, 
the Conseil d’Administration (Board of Directors) is the most important body 
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in the enterprise.  Its members should be composed of persons with 
competence, who have the right specialisation and motivation to bring 
something new to the enterprise, not playing the role of how much they will 
take advantage of the policies of the PGM‟ (General Secretary, Head Office, 
Eriad Alger, 2004). Both the directors and the PGMs saw each other as an 
important channel through which to strengthen old relationships and create 
new ones through new contacts with individuals from other enterprises and 
government institutions.   
 
Clearly, changing the state-owned enterprise from a socialist enterprise into a 
joint stock company did not break the long established tradition of nepotism 
which predominated the socialist era in the recruitment of people at the 
highest level of the hierarchy in the enterprise.  In fact, the transition to the 
free market economic system had reinforced the relational network not only 
in the nomination of the members of the board of directors but also in the 
recruitment of the enterprises PGMs.  In the three enterprises of this study as 
well as in almost all enterprises in the public sector, the PGMs were selected 
for their loyalty to influential factions in the government apparatus.  In the 
words of a retired manager interviewed at the UGTA‟s headquarters (2005) 
“Since independence, managers in Algerian state enterprises have always 
been selected to concretise in their work place the state political, economic 
and social policies”.  The manager of the Conflicts and Social Affairs at the 
UGTA (2005) added “Managers were selected from two institutions:  from 
the army, from the Armée Nationale Populaire (Popular National Army), 
(ANP), and from the unique political party, from the Front de Liberation 
  
 237 
Nationale.  Today, they are still selected from the army and the FLN and also 
from other influential factions in the state...  Every minister will select the 
PGMs he can trust and he can rely on to implement his decisions.  You do not 
have to see far, our enterprises are full of Anaam Sidi (yes master)”.   
 
However, one has to mention here that though the Commercial Code states 
that the PGM should be elected by the board of directors, it seems that the 
government wanted to show to the World Bank, after the signature of the first 
Stand-By in 1994, its determination to fight nepotism and corruption inside 
the state enterprise.  This determination was clearly seen when the 
government introduced a clear procedure on how to select and recruit PGMs 
and General Managers (DGs).  The Human Relation Psychologist at the 
CNAT explained that  “The intention of the state, the way I understand it, 
was to reduce nepotism in the selection process of senior managers of the 
EPEs which has become endemic in the whole public sector” (Human 
Relation Psychologist, CNAT, 2005).  The government tried to break up the 
long-established relational networks that dominated the selection and 
recruitment process of senior managers by giving the opportunity for a new 
blood of managers especially from the private sector to manage the state 
enterprises with the hope to accelerate the organisational and financial 
restructuring of the enterprises slated for privatisation to speed up their 
privatisation and to turn those not yet listed for privatisation more 
competitive to make them more attractive to domestic and foreign investors.  
Following the Instruction of 29 January 1995 of the head of the government, 
Mokdad Sifi, the Public Holdings were required to advertise the vacant 
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positions in the national press.  Once this was done, the board of directors of 
the enterprise concerned, through an Ad-Hoc committee of experts, in which 
no member of the board should be present, would select the candidates.  The 
selection was based, in addition to the academic achievement and 
professional experience of the candidate, on how well the candidate answered 
the interview questions which were predominantly about creativity and taking 
risks in business and the relationship with others in the enterprise.  The 
selected candidates should be interviewed and evaluated by a second 
committee called the Comité d’Interview (Interview Committee).  At the 
CNAT (Mission Conduite par les Services Specialisés du CNAT, November, 
1995), the Comité d’Interview was composed of one expert in Human 
Resources Management, one expert in Human Relation Psychology, one 
expert in the domain of activity of the enterprise seeking to fill the vacant 
vacancy, one representative of the Public Holding, one representative of the 
ministry of the industrial sector to which the enterprise belonged and if the 
vacant position was in an enterprise operating at local level, a representative 
of the head of the local government should also be included.  The committee 
was required to assess the candidate‟s academic achievement and 
professional experience, and also evaluated his/her knowledge and attitudes 
on areas such as: 
 
 His/her  ability to communicate with others; 
 
 His/her ability to motivate others; 
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 His/her ability to be creative and innovative; 
 
 His/her ability to negotiate and resolve conflicts; 
 
 His/her ability to take risks. 
 
Once the evaluation of candidates was done by the Comité d’Interview, the 
Comité submitted the candidate‟s evaluation report to the board of directors 
in the case of the EPE and to the sponsoring minister and the head of the 
local government in the case of a national enterprise not yet transformed into 
an EPE and an enterprise operating at a local level respectively.  In the case 
of an EPE, the board and very often the Public Holding would decide who 
should be chosen for the vacant position.  Once the selection was done, an 
employment contract had to be prepared which would be negotiated between 
the board and the candidate selected.  Before the signature of the contract by 
the two parties, the contents of the contract had to be reviewed by the Public 
Holding for any amendments.  The length of the contract had to be not less 
than three years and not more than six years (Chef du Gouvernement, 29 
January, 1995).  In this study, the PGMs of Saidal, the SNVI and Eriad Alger 
had been in their position as PGMs since 1995, 1998 and 2000 respectively.  
Their work contract had consistently been renewed since then.   
 
The selection procedure of senior managers in the state enterprises introduced 
since 1995 had created some transparency in the selection and recruitment 
process but the procedure did not last long.  It was abandoned after 2001 
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when Ahmed Ouyahia came as the Head of the Government.  The retired 
manager interviewed at UGTA‟s headquarters (2005) explained that: 
 
Ouyahia has brought us a system where regionalism and 
tribalism in the selection of managers, and I mean any 
manager, is based on the region he comes from.  I am sure you 
have seen it yourself when you went to these enterprises.  You 
noticed that sometimes almost the whole chain of managers 
come from his region, you know which region I mean.     
 
This abusive behaviour in the selection of senior managers could be expected 
because the Commercial Code has kept, like in the case of the nomination of 
members of the board of directors, silent on the criteria by which the PGM 
should be selected and there is no independent organisation in the country 
attributed with power to verify how the selection and recruitment process is 
done in the enterprises.  And from the interviews with the managers at the 
UGTA, it was clearly understood that despite the emphasis in the official 
publications by the various departments in the government administration 
that state enterprises whether slated or not slated for privatisation should seek 
hard to recruit people with managerial competence outside the public sector, 
almost all senior managers of state and partially privatised enterprises in the 
country were managers and workers who served during the socialist period.  
The findings drawn from the self-completion questionnaire, examined in the 
next section, distributed among the management teams of Eriad Alger, Saidal 
and the SNVI provided support to what the managers at the UGTA said on 
this issue.        
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7.3. The Characteristics of their Management Teams 
 
The analysis of the data collected from the survey indicated that there was 
almost no distinction between the three enterprises in terms of the 
characteristics of their top management teams.  The great majority of their 
senior managers were middle aged individuals.  For the Human Relation 
Psychologist: 
 
The age of a PGM and a DG seems to matter a great deal to 
the SGP and to the Conseil d’Administration…It seems that 
there is a tendency to choose persons who fall in the age group 
between 40 and 50…If you ask me why, I really do not know.  
Perhaps because this age group is perceived as the right age 
where a candidate is mature enough, has accumulated enough 
work experience, etc. (Human Relation Psychologist, CNAT, 
2005).   
 
Looking at table 7.2 below, not only the PGMs fall in this age group but also 
the majority of division and functional managers.  More than 50 percent were 
aged between 46 and 55.  Very significant was the predominance of men in 
managerial position.  Out of the 79 managers who participated in the survey, 
only 7 managers were female.  
 
Table 7.2.  The age groupe of managers at Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI 
 
 
Source:  Data analysis. 
        Age 
 
Enterprise 
Less than 46         46-55  More than 55  Total managers 
 in each enterprise 
Eriad Alger 10  (29%) 20 (58%) 4 (13%) 34 100% 
Saidal  6 (25%) 13 (54%) 5 (21%) 24 100% 
SNVI  7 (33%) 12 (57%) 2 (10%) 21 100% 
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The survey also revealed that the majority of managers were high academic 
achievers.  Table 7.3 below, clearly reveals the high percentage of the 
managers in all the three enterprises with academic achievements from 
universities and technical institutes and some with postgraduate degrees such 
as master and Phd.  The PGM of Saidal, for example, carried a Phd degree in 
chemistry.  Also, 70 percent, as shown in table 7.4, graduated from 
engineering studies and only 18 percent from administrative studies      
 
 
Table 7.3.    Number of managers with different academic achievements 
  
                        Education  
                        background 
                                                     
 
Enterprises 
  University 
   Level 
Technical      
college level 
Secondary  
School level 
Eriad Alger 11 (32   %) 15 (44   %) 8 (24   %) 
Saidal  18 (75   %)   2 (08   %) 4 (01   %) 
 SNVI 11 (52.4%)   7 (33.3%) 3 (14.3%) 
Source:  Data analysis. 
 
Table 7.4.  Academic discipline of managers at Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI 
 
 
                                      Source:  Data analysis. 
 
                          Enterprise 
Academic  
Discipline 
  Eriad Alger    Saidal SNVI 
Engineering studies 18 72% 12 66.7% 13 72.2% 
Administrative studies 05 20% 02 11.1% 04 22.2% 
Economic studies 02 08% 04 22.2% 01 05.6% 
                                     Total      25 100%  18 100% 18 100% 
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The high level of academic achievements of managers was not confined to 
these three enterprises only but it was common in most state enterprises as 
explained by one trade union manager when he said that “This is the fruit of 
the heavy investments in education and training carried out by the state 
during the 1970s” (Assistant Manager, Department of Conflicts and Social 
Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 2005).  The technical manager at the SNVI 
also added that “During the 1970s, the state tried to create a strong base of 
professionals in manufacturing to concretise its policy of „l‘industrie 
industrialisantes’ (in other words, creating a national heavy industry 
base)…We sent many of our young workers to continue their studies in 
communist and Western countries… the results were good, good indeed” 
(Technical Manager, Technical Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005). 
   
The majority of managers at Saidal, Eriad Alger and the SNVI worked in 
their enterprises for more than 10 years.    At Saidal, the 24 managers who 
participated in the survey had been with the enterprise between 12 and 19 
years.  At Eriad Alger, though there was between 1995 and 2001 about 18 
different PGMs, to my surprise, only few division and functional managers 
had been replaced.  Of the 34 managers who participated in the survey, 33 
worked with the enterprise between 10 and 23 years.  As for the SNVI, in 
recent years, the enterprise recruited 11 out of the 21 managers from outside 
the enterprise.  No managers in the three enterprises had work experience in 
the govenment administration or the private sector.  At Eriad Alger, the 
newly recruited manager worked in one public enterprise.  At the SNVI, 
seven worked in one public enterprise and four in two public enterprises.  
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Compared to Eriad Alger and Saidal, the SNVI had the highest number of 
newly recruited managers.  This was expected as a result of the fact that the 
SNVI had carried out, following the sharp decline in its outputs because of 
the liberalisation of trade in the early 1990s and the organisational 
restructuring of 1998, massive reduction in the number of its workers 
including managers with high calibre. The Human resources manager 
explained that:   
 
The biggest mistake we made in the 1990s is that we did not 
make any distinction in the reduction of our workers…People 
who had been with us for years, who had outstanding 
professional skills had been laid off.  The consequence of this 
irrational policy is that we have been forced to recruit new 
managers and professional workers from outside to replace the 
ones we lost (Human Resources Manager, Head Office, SNVI, 
2005). 
 
Whether recruited from outside or promoted internally, there seems to be a 
common policy followed at the SNVI as well as at Eriad Alger and Saidal 
that managers should have strong work experience in areas such as product 
inspection and control, procurement and particularly  production.  At Eriad 
Alger, five managers spent between 12 and 16 years in production and two 
between 2 and 6 years.  At Saidal, nine spent between 7 and 11 and seven 
between 2 and 6.  At the SNVI, fourteen spent between 7 and 11 and two 
between 2 and 6 years.  Also, the majority of managers surveyed were 
promoted from the department of production as table 7.5 below shows. 
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Table 7.5.  The number of managers promoted from the different functional  
departments 
 
                     Enterprise                             
 
Department 
    SNVI Eriad Alger 
 
    Saidal 
Production 15 
 
(71%) 25 (73%) 17 (69%) 
Finance/Accounting  5 
 
(25%)  6 (18%)  5 (21%) 
Commercial  1 
 
(04%)    2 (10%) 
Procurement    3 (09%)   
Human Resources       
                         Total 21 100% 34 100% 24 100% 
Source:  Data analysis. 
  
The prospect to be promoted to managerial positions from production was 
confirmed by the Human Relation Psychologist at the CNAT (2005) when 
she said that: 
 
The majority of candidates I interviewed came particularly 
from engineering…Most of them spent considerable years in 
the production department…They have impressive knowledge 
in their field of specialisation…I also noticed that there is a 
tendency which is now growing among public enterprises to 
select managers with financial accounting background and 
experience to be able to manage the financial constraints faced 
by most enterprises.   
 
Three reasons can be given for why the promotion to managerial positions 
came predominantly from the department of production.  First, through the 
years, production managers accumulated the right skill to deal with the 
shortage of inputs which was endemic in the socialist enterprise.  This type of 
skill was still needed during the transition to the free market where many 
enterprises, especially those in the public sector and with financial debts, saw 
occasional interruptions in the supply of the raw materials they needed for 
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their production plants.  Second, many managers in many state and partially 
privatised enterprises still regarded increasing the volume of outputs as the 
best strategy to face competition and therefore managers with a long 
experience in production would be the right people to implement this 
strategy.  Third, managers with functional experience in production were 
regarded as the people who were more sensitive to technological 
development and they were expected to bring a great contribution to 
technological innovation or modification in the processes and products of 
their enterprises.   
 
In addition, the survey revealed that all managers in the three enterprises 
were given training in their respective tasks but only 82 percent at eriad 
Alger, 88 percent at saidal and 81 percent at the SNVI were given training in 
quality management with the prospect to produce products recognised by 
international standards.        
 
Clearly, the great majority of managers in the three enterprises were groomed 
within their enterprises and this leads to argue that it would be unlikely that 
they would easily allow their enterprises to be sold to private investors.  
Almost all managers interviewed at Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI were 
determined to protect their enterprises from total privatisation.  The PGM of 
Saidal expressed clearly in a press conference that he would have wished to 
see his enterprise still 100 percent state owned and wished to see the state to 
stay present in an industrial sector like the one in which his enterprise 
operated.  He had regretted to have issued 20 percent of the capital of his 
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enterprise (Politique, 19 March, 2006).    One should not be surprised to see 
this antagonistic position of managers to privatisation.   These managers were 
deeply attached to their enterprises and the majority were indoctrinated with 
the ideology of the publicness of the industrial sector.  They would try hard to 
protect their enterprises from new and young recruits with liberal ideas who 
might challenge their decisions and might take their jobs and consequently 
sell their enterprises.  To protect their enterprises from the newly emerging 
liberal ideas and protect their positions, the PGMs of Eriad Alger, Saidal and 
the SNVI, and the same could be said with the PGMs of other public 
enterprises in the country, surrounded themselves by managers whom they 
could trust.  Trustworthy individuals were promoted internally or recruited 
from other public enterprises with which the PDGs had close relationship.  
The various evaluation reports of candidates for the position of PGM, 
produced by the Comité d’Interview at the CNAT, revealed the strong belief 
of the candidates that a PGM should build up around him/her a management 
team whom he/she could trust.  The trust according to these managers could 
provide a harmonious environment within the enterprise.  They perceived 
trust and loyalty as useful instruments that would bring stability in the 
enterprise because there would be few conflicts between the PGM and his/her 
subordinates over the many management decisions.         
 
More important, at Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI, managers were proud 
to be high academic achievers and skilled in the core activity of their 
enterprises and therefore many of them in the division and functional 
departments complained that they were not paid enough when compared with 
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their counterparts in the private sector.  However, since the law of autonomy 
of 1988, the government had tried to make the senior management positions, 
particularly the PGM/GM position, in the state enterprise attractive to 
talented managers by raising their monthly salaries.  The remuneration of a 
PGM, for example, was composed of two parts: 
   
 A fixed part.  This was composed of the basic salary and all the 
accompanying allowances such as a company car often chauffeur driven, 
mobile phone, and travel expenses.  Since the liberalisation of the economy 
in 1990, the basic salary of a PGM was calculated based on the Salaire 
National Minimum Guaranti (SNMG) - the Guaranteed Minimum National 
Salary.  In the two years when the research study was carrried out, the SNMG 
was 10,000 dinars (with today‟s exchange rate equivalent to about US$ 130).  
In most state enterprises, the basic salary of a PGM was 8 to 10 times the 
SNMG and in some enterprises like, for example, at the Entreprise Nationale 
de Geophysique (National Enterprie of Geophysics), it was 20 times (Open 
letter from the trade union representatives of the enterprise ENAGEO to the 
PGM of ENAGEO, 3, July, 1995) 
  
 Bonuses.  There were two types of bonuses.  Bonuses paid every three 
months for achieving the performance objectives of the enterprises and an 
annual bonus decided by the ordinary general assembly in its annual meeting.  
This bonus was required not to be more than 60 per cent of the basic salary.     
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On average, the monthly salaries of managers at Saidal, Eriad Alger and the 
SNVI, with the exception of the position of PGM, ranged between 40,000 
and 50,000 dinars. As it was impossible to get access to information on the 
salaries of their PGMs, and based on the information gathered on salaries 
from other state enterprises, one would speculate that the average salary of 
their PGMs would fall between 100,000 and 120,000 dinars.  The salary of a 
PGM was negotiated between the PGM and the board of directors and it was 
subject to review.   The review was based on how much the enterprise had 
achieved the quantitative and qualitative objectives set in the Performance 
Contract signed between the enterprise and the government.     
 
All PGMs of state enterprises were subject to the system of Performance 
Contract.  This system came as a result of the Circulaire no. 03 of 22 January 
1994 which required every state enterprise to elaborate a Plan de 
Redressement (a restructuring plan).  The plan was an assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the enterprise.  In most cases, it was elaborated 
by the PGM with the assistance of an international consultancy company.  
The plan was negotiated between all parties involved in the state enterprise 
(here the PGM, the Public Holdings, the bank and the UGTA).  Once the plan 
was accepted by the different parties, a Performance Contract was formulated 
between the Public Holding and the enterprise (Holding Public Regional 
Centre, 1999).  The contract set the objectives to be achieved by the 
enterprise for a period of 3 years.   
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The essence of the Performance Contract was as it seems the intention of the 
government to motivate the PGMs to increase the productivity and financial 
performance of state enterprises.  The contract included the objectives to be 
achieved in the various operations of the enterprise.  It also included the types 
of support and assistance the government should provide to make the 
achievement of the objectives possible.  The contract included quantitative 
and qualitative objectives.  The quantitative objectives covered: 
 
 Profitability; 
 Productivity; 
 Rate of capacity utilisation 
 
And the qualitative objectives covered: 
 
 Partnership with foreign investors; 
 Divisionalisation of activities; 
 Shares issuing; 
 Redundancy; 
 Putting in place information management systems; 
 Management of stocks 
 
From consulting the various performance contracts in the three enterprises of 
this study, the contracts tended to give high importance to profitability and 
productivity.  A typical Performance Contract attributed to the quantitative 
and qualitative objectives the weights shown in table 7.6 below. 
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Table 7.6.   Objectives and their weights included in a Performance Contract 
 
                         Objectives        Weights 
 Profitability 
 Whole productivity 
 Rate of capacity utilisation 
 Resources re-employment 
 Installation of accounting analysis 
 Management Information System 
40% 
30% 
10% 
 08% 
 06% 
 06% 
                                                                   Total          100% 
Source: Data analysis. 
 
The implementation of the contract was evaluated by the Holdings.  In the 
case of Eriad Alger, for example, it was evaluated by CEGRO.  The 
evaluation took place every 6 months and sometimes every month when the 
performance of the enterprise showed sign of a very poor score.  Achieving 
between 90 and 100 percent was considered an excellent performance, 
between 70 and 80 percent a good performance and less than 60 percent an 
unsatisfactory performance.  When an enterprise achieved an excellent 
performance, some functional and production plant managers could be 
promoted and the salaries and bonuses of the whole top management team 
would often increase as a consequence.  In the case of achieving less than 60 
percent, the management team and members of the board of directors could 
be dismissed.  Before the dismissal occurred, an investigation by the bank 
and the government representatives such as the CPE and the Inspection 
Général des Finances would be carried out to see the causes.  When poor 
performance of the enterprise was attributed to environmental factors that 
were beyond the control of the PGM, the government was required to provide 
compensations for any losses incurred from the unforeseen constraints.   
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Though the government sought by the system of the Plan de Redressement 
and the Contrat de Performance to be close to the problems of the state 
enterprise and as already mentioned to motivate senior managers to increase 
their efforts to improve the performance of their enterprises, the system did 
not bring any improvement in most state and partially privatised enterprises.  
For one manager at the UGTA, „The Plan de Redressement and the Contrat 
de Performance are a waste of time.  They are a failure like the rest of all the 
policies initiated by the government since the liberalisation of our economy‟ 
(Manager, Department of Conflicts and Social Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 
2005).  The same informant added that the system was good in its substance 
but it had never been applied as it should be.  Despite many state enterprises 
were operating at deficit, the government did not seem to bother a lot to 
sanction senior managers.  In fact, their salaries were in steady increase and 
this because every time there was an increase in the SNMG, their salaries had 
automatically increased.  In a frustrated tone he said:    
 
The liberalisation has made the PGMs richer and the workers 
poorer…I cannot understand, and nobody can make me 
understand how an enterprise which is working at losses can 
increase the salaries of its PGM and his management team.  In 
fact, the SNMG has been practically created not to benefit 
anybody else but the management class.  Every time the 
SNMG increases, automatically the salaries of the management 
will have to increase.  The rise in salary should be connected to 
performance achievement not to the SNMG.  It is against this 
policy of resource wastage that us the UGTA we stand against.  
We want a state with a clear economic and social policy.  A 
policy which is fair not to serve only a tiny minority of the 
population (Manager of Conflicts and Social Affairs, 
Headquarters, UGTA, 2004). 
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At both the SNVI and Eriad Alger, their PGMs were exposed to strong 
criticism by their workers including their division managers.  At the SNVI, 
they wanted to understand why the salaries of their PGM had been for a long 
time in steady increase by an average of almost 10 percent each year while 
the same PGM refused any negotiations to increase the salaries of the 
workers.  And it was this unfairness and insensitivity of the PGM to the 
demands of the workers which led to the 6 days strike in November 2003 at 
the production plants of the SNVI at Rouiba.  As for Eriad Alger, the anger 
of workers broke out in 2005 as a response for the non-payment of salaries of 
most division workers while the PGM and his entourage (managers and 
workers who were close to the PGM) were still getting their salaries.  Things 
went worse for the PGM of Eriad Alger when workers demonstrated against 
him at the head office of the enterprise and at the headquarters of the SGP 
CEGRO not only demanding the payment of salary arrears of most workers 
but also refusing his announcement of massive workers downsizing in the 5 
divisions of the enterprise where some divisions were planned to lose some 
80 percent of their work force. 
   
7.4. Their Restructuring Actions 
 
Until 1990, Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI were surrounded by a stable 
market which meant an absence of competition in the case of Saidal and the 
SNVI and a negligible one in the case of Eriad Alger.  But the liberalisation 
of trade, the devaluation of the dinar, the budget constraint imposed by the 
state treasury and the state banks on the public sector, the explosion of small 
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and medium private firms and the growing size of the informal sector, all 
these conditions subjected the three enterprises to a real challenge.  Like most 
state enterprises in the country, however, the early years of transition were a 
real shock to Saidal, Eriad Alger and the SNVI.  Their outputs declined 
sharply as a result of the sharp shortage of cash to buy the raw materials 
required in the production process and also their inability to sell their 
products because of the strong competition from imports.  At Saidal, the size 
of its sales in terms of units sold dropped from 73 million units in 1991 to 50 
million in 1992 creating a sharp drop in its net profit from 704 million dinars 
to 377 million dinars (Boulahrik Mohand, 1995).  The same can be said with 
Eriad Alger.  Though at Eriad Alger for the period 1991 to 1995, the sales of 
flour and semolina increased because of the government policy to import 
enough wheat in order to avoid shortages in the supply of bread in the 
country which might lead to serious social unrest, the production of its other 
products like yeast, biscuits and chocolate dropped sharply.  The production 
of yeast for the period 1991-1994 decreased from 18,270 tonnes per year to 
17,400 and for biscuits/chocolate the decline was from 137,024 tonnes  to 
12,0 75 tonnes (Bilans de Synthèses, 1990, 1992 1993 1994).  As for the drop 
in sales of the products of the SNVI in the early years of the transition, the 
data was, unfortunately, not available.  However, from the series of 
interviews carried out with many of its managers, it was clearly understood 
that the enterprise suffered heavy losses.  A manager in the carrosseries 
division explained that: 
 
Before [that is before the transition], we were producing.  We 
had annual plans and we made profits.  Every thing was fine.. 
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But with the policy of enterprise autonomy and the transition 
to the free market economic system, the state had left us.  We 
had to finance most of our production from our own means 
(Manager, Carrosseries Division, Rouiba, SNVI, 2005).  
 
 
The liberalisation of trade in the early 1990s was only one side of the 
problem faced by the three enterprises.  In 1995, these enterprises were listed 
to be partially privatised which meant that their top management had to 
design a plan, often in consultation with the Public Holdings, to restructure 
their enterprises to revitalise them and make them able to absorb the 
challenge of competition.  This was a tough task for top management given 
their lack of expertise to deal with competition and the poor performance of 
the free market institutional environment which had just emerged.  After ten 
years since these enterprises were listed for privatisation and fifteen years 
since they were exposed to competition, this study was able to draw the 
conclusion that Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI had followed different 
approaches to enterprise restructuring.  Their restructuring behaviour was 
discussed and analysed through two broad dimensions:  their top 
management perception of the market and the changes they introduced in 
their internal operations.  Three areas in their internal operations were 
discussed and analysed.  These were: their product market strategies, their 
organisational structures and their employment practices.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 256 
7.4.1. The   SNVI 
 
7.4.1.1.  Its Top Managemen Perception of the Market 
 
There is no a prescription available which guides top managers on how to 
diagnose the market in which their enterprises operate.  Their decisions to 
cope with the changes taking place in the market are as good as their 
perceptions of that market.  At the SNVI, their top managers considered that 
their enterprise had passed by tough time especially in the early years of 
transition.  According to a manager in the carrosseries division: 
 
The sudden withdrawal of the state from the economic activity 
made both our suppliers and customers in serious financial 
troubles.  Our supplier of steel at El-Hadjar could not produce 
enough steel because of the lack of money.  Also, public 
enterprises which were our customers did not have the money 
to buy from us…It was a very difficult time for us.   
 
He added: 
 
Being public, we had to come to the rescue of other public 
enterprises.  We had accumulated huge debts as a result.  In 
fact, until now, many of these enterprises have not paid us.  
Some of them have already been closed down. Now, we are 
negotiating with the state to write off these debts from our 
accounting books (Manager, Carrosseries Division, Rouiba, 
SNVI, 2005). 
 
 
But with the stabilisation in the macroeconomic conditions in recent years, 
many SNVIs top managers became more relaxed when they talked about 
competition in their market.  Though to survive in a competitive market 
especially when your competitors were multinationals an enterprise had to 
seek hard to create new products with new markets or new markets with its 
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existing products, but for the top managers of the SNVI, their market was 
given and not created.  With a pride in the tone of his voice, the commercial 
manager explained that:   
 
The activities in which our enterprise operates require heavy 
investments and a technical experience accumulated through 
years of practice which our enterprise has.  This makes the 
entry of a domestic competitor very difficult…Us! we do not 
have a domestic competitor.  We have the monopoly in the 
creation and making of vehicles.  True, we have some 
competitors.  But these are Algerians in partnership with 
foreign firms who import vehicles.  I mean they are authorised 
agents.  They are not a threat to us… It is true, at the 
beginning [the early 1990s], a lot of our customers left us to 
buy vehicles from these agents, but when they saw the product 
- it is generally Asian product - they have regretted to have left 
SONACOME. Because they realised that our product has 
quality and robustness.  Many have come back to us 
(Commercial Manager, Commercial Division, Head Office, 
SNVI, 2005). 
 
 
Many customers have come back to the SNVI because of some institutional 
developments that have taken place since the late 1990s.  Senior managers of 
the SNVI together with the trade union put pressure on the government to 
regulate import of vehicles.  In 1997, the government only allowed the entry 
into the country of vehicles less than 3 years old.  In 2005 more restrictions 
were imposed on vehicle imports where only new vehicles were allowed to 
be imported.  These restrictions on imports together with the reduction of 
taxation from 15 percent, to 5 percent and recently in 2005 to 0 percent on 
imported raw materials and equipments entering in the production process of 
vehicles at the SNVI, had provided the SNVI a quasi-monopoly in the market 
for trucks, buses and auto cars in the country.   
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The threat of competition had also been of minor concern to top managers of 
the SNVI because of the recent government decision in 2004 to exclude the 
SNVI from total privatisation.  The enterprise was considered strategic in the 
economic development plans of the government.   The SNVI was strategic in 
terms of being:  First, the major supplier of vehicles for the Ministry of 
National Defence and for the local governments.  It produced heavy trucks 
for the army, buses for school student transportation and trucks for rubbish 
collection for local governments.  It also produced vehicles for 
SONATRACH and SONELGAZ.  Second, with the increase of production of 
the enterprise from 20 percent in 1998 to 40 percent in 1999, and its export to 
some African countries like Gabon, Congo, Niger, the Senegal and also to 
some Arab countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and 
Mauritania, the government seemed to have come to realise that, if 
encouraged explicitly and implicitly, the SNVI could be a potential national 
producer for heavy vehicles.  The encouragement would increase its market 
share and consequently it would help reducing the government expenditures 
on import of vehicles.  Since the production of vehicles depended on other 
industries like steel, plastics, rubber, leather, glass to name but few, this 
would help the revival of enterprises in these industries which had been 
declining in recent years and would create consequently more jobs.  
Encouragement would also boost the confidence of the SNVI to export more 
which would be a good source for bringing the needed foreign currency.  
Third, the government had launched since 2002 very ambitious programmes 
for the development of the country infrastructures.  These programmes 
included the building of one million houses to be finished by the year 2009, 
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the development of agricultural and water industries and a massive project 
for building roads and motorways.   
 
With these ambitious development programmes, the SNVI was expected to 
play a key role in supplying the domestic market with the needed heavy 
vehicles.  It was estimated that in the year 2008 alone, the minimum needs of 
the markets for trucks would fall between 15,000 and 17,000 and for buses 
between 3,000 and 3,500 (Libérté, 3 April, 2007).   As a consequence, 
explicit support had been provided by the government to boost the 
confidence of the SNVI such as:     
 
 The writing off of some of the SNVI‟s outstanding debts estimated to 
some 62 billion dinars (the equivalent with today‟s exchange rate of some 
$US 4.5 million) (Libérté, 5 April, 2007).  When asked in a press conference 
for why the government did not do the same for other state enterprises in 
financial troubles like the SNVI, the Minister of Industry responded that “The 
financial debts of the SNVI are not the result of bad management of the 
SNVI but they are the result of the exogenous factors of the 1990s” (El 
Watan, 1 February 2005)  On the same point, a manager of the SNVI added 
that “The senior managers of the SNVI are still putting pressure on the 
Ministry of Industry to write off all its past debts to give the enterprise a 
clean start” (Manager, Carrosseries Division, Rouiba, SNVI, 2005); 
 
 Bringing back to light the project for building the first Algerian car „Fatia’  
which was initiated in 1989 in partnership with the Italian car manufacturer 
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Fiat and then abandoned because of the country political instability in the 
1990s; 
 
 Transferring to the work shops of the SNVI more than 3,000 vehicles 
produced by the SNVI and used by the local governments, which were left 
for years laying without repairs, to repair them and introduce some 
modifications to them.   
 
All these institutional, financial and economic support which have been 
provided by the governmente demonstrate how much the government was 
reluctant to disengage from the control of the SNVI.  This reluctance was 
also clearly demonstrated when the Minister of Internal Affairs said that:      
 
The  importance of the contract [the orders made by the 
Ministry for 1,300 mini cars for school transportation and 
3,000 vehicles for reparation and renovation] between the 
SNVI and local governments is not only to provide the local 
communities with means of transportation but also the 
development of the SNVI which has proved that when it has 
orders for its products it can function in a good and efficient 
manner…This is [that is the SNVI] one of the best example 
which shows that the public enterprise can be present whatever 
the environment (EL-Moudjahid, 12 September, 2005) 
 
 
The implicit and explicit support provided by the government to the SNVI 
had revived the enterprise at least in the short term.  It had also given to its 
top managers a reassurance that if things stayed as they were, that is 
government‟ support, they do not have to worry a lot about the future 
survival of their enterprise even in a free market economic system.  The top 
managers of the SNVI were quite convinced that the change should be 
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introduced in the enterprise slowly and not in leaps.  For the technical 
manager:   
 
We are now in the free market system. Yes.  This is good.  But 
we have to go slow.  We have to react to events as they come.  
We have to react in a manner which brings us results.  We 
have to be careful.  We should not change for the sake of 
change.  We should change only when the change brings 
positive results to the SNVI and more importantly to our 
community (Technical Manager, Technical Department, Head 
Office, SNVI, 2005).   
 
 
7.4.1.2. Restructuring of its Internal Operations 
 
Since 1986, the easy life of the SNVI started to decline.  The budget 
constraint imposed by the state treasury and banks upon the public sector put 
the SNVI in deep financial troubles.  By the end of 1997, the enterprise was 
burdened by some 47 billion dinars of debts.  The cash trap in which the 
enterprise found itself in made the SNVI delaying paying its suppliers and its 
creditors.  Many creditors started to take legal actions against the SNVI to get 
back their money.  The top managers of the SNVI intensified their 
negotiations with the state treasury asking the state to bail out their enterprise 
or at least provide some guarantees to the state banks to facilitate their 
acquisition of bank loans.  Through the Dispositif Entreprise-Banque 
scheme, the financial situation of the SNVI was restructured and in 1998 a 
new PGM, Chahboub who had been with the enterprise since 1973 and knew 
a great deal about the operations and problems of the enterprise, was 
appointed.  He designed, in consultation with the Public Holding 
  
 262 
HOMELEC, an action plan.  The plan introduced changes in the following 
areas: 
   
A.  Its Product Market.   The plan introduced flexibility in the choice of 
suppliers and customers.  However, the commitment to suppliers changed 
with the changes in the environment.  At the beginning of the transition, the 
enterprise opted for spontaneous transactions with its suppliers inside and 
outside the country because the demands for its products were low.  Under 
these circumstances, the enterprise found itself in no obligation to commit 
itself for its future conduct with its suppliers.  But as imports for vehicles 
became more controlled in recent years, the enterprise changed its strategy.  
It opted to establish a stable range of suppliers with whom it hoped to 
maintain long-term commitment and long-term relations and perhaps joint 
venture as was the case with ZF, its German supplier of gear boxes and 
Renault, its French supplier for engines.  Until 2005, the SNVI imported its 
equipments entering into the assembling of its vehicles from 22 suppliers 
where 9 were from France, 5 from Germany, 5 from Algeria and the 
remaining 3 from the UK, Ireland and Austria.  A manager at the industrial 
verhicles division explained that “We hoped all our suppliers were Algerians 
and not foreigners because this will cost us less. This is why when the supply 
we need is provided by an Algerian supplier, we go to this supplier…We 
prefer to go to Algerians because we know them, we know their procedures 
and they are cheap‟ (Manager, Industrial Vehicles Division, Rouiba, 2005).    
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Similarly, the SNVI had also opted for long-term commitment with its 
customers.  Though 50 percent of its customers were from the public sector, 
the SNVI engaged with all its customers, whether public or private, to create 
close relationship with them by understanding their needs and bringing the 
changes they hoped to see in a heavy vehicle.  On this point, a manager at the 
commercial division explained that: 
 
Things are not like before [the socialist period].  Before, it was 
us, through the directives of the Ministry of Heavy industry, 
who decide what vehicles to produce.  The customer had to 
take it or leave it.  Now things have changed.   With Algeria 
opening its borders [trade liberalisation] too many models are 
in the market...The client is very choosy.  We try our best to 
satisfy what he wants.   We want our clients to stay loyal to 
us…We have introduced many modifications in our vehicles 
such as in their looks, in their comfort, in their strength.  To 
give an example, we have introduced modification in the 100 
V8 bus which is now called Médina.  The modifications were 
introduced in its gear boxes, its engine and many others.  The 
Médina was a success when we put it for exhibition.  Our 
tractor TC 260 (4x2) has also attracted the attention of many 
public and private companies (Manager, Commercial Division, 
SNVI, 2005).   
  
  
Producing a product which meets international standards had also been in 
recent years one of the major objectives set for the long-term business 
strategy of the SNVI.  This urged the enterprise to introduce modern 
procedures and equipments in the production process.  In 2005, it introduced 
the ISO 9001 version 2000 to create quality management at all levels of the 
enterprise.  Because of competition from imports, the SNVI dominated in 
2005 only 40 percent of the domestic market (El-Watan, March, 2006), and 
its top management hoped to see the SNVI‟s products dominating the 
domestic market by at least 50 to 60 percent and to increase its exports to 
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more countries in the African and Arab regions.  Together with many top 
managers of public and domestic private enterprises, the SNVI top 
management has recently launched a campaign to encourage customers to 
buy the local product by using the slogan „Made in Bladi [that is made in my 
country]‟.      
 
The PGM of the SNVI knew that increasing the share in the domestic market 
and export would be hard to achieve unless the enterprise associated itself 
with potential partners.  In its department for partnership, a team of experts 
was created to actively look for domestic and foreign partners.  The technical 
manager explained that “Our enterprise is highly integrated.  We want to 
build up partnership not only with foreign firms but also with the local small 
and medium enterprises.  We want to transfer the activities which are not 
profitable to local enterprises.  We want to concentrate only on a limited 
number of production lines to reduced costs and to concentrate on what we 
know best.  These local enterprises will be our local sub-contractors and our 
close partners.  Us! at the SNVI, we look for the result, the profit comes only 
later.  We want to create jobs, to revive our local communities and also to 
reduce our expenditures on imports” (Technical Manager, Technical 
Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005).  In 2006, some 2,204 of the SNVI‟s 
inputs which were produced in-house were produced by some 300 local sub-
contractors (El Watan, 2 February,  2006) and its PGM had been active to 
convince the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Finance to  provide 
facilities both financial and institutional that would encourage the creation of 
small and medium enterprises in the country (Le SoirAlgerie, 2 
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February.2006) to boost the mechanical engineering industry and other linked 
industries and to reduce the government expenditures on spare parts imports 
which were growing every year.  In the year 2005 alone, the import for spare 
parts was estimated to reach some US$25.4 million, and some of the spare 
parts could easily be produced by local producers.     
 
To boost the growth of the SNVI, its PGM saw in partnership with foreign 
companies as the only way.  For him, partnership would allow the enterprise 
to acquire technology, capital and open new markets and significantly to 
reduce the pressure of multinational competition in the domestic market.  A 
manager in the commercial division explained that: 
 
Competition in our industry is strong.  And to survive, 
companies are merging to get bigger and stronger.  In a 
company like ours with a production capacity between 4,000 
and 5,000 vehicles per year and an annual turnover of 20 to 22 
billion Dinars is like a drop in a sea.  In our industry, a 
company which produces less than 100,000 trucks and 2,000 
buses is condemned to disappear from the market.  Us! if we 
do not go into partnership, our future is not sure especially 
when Algeria becomes part of the World Trade Organisation.  
We want to bring our competitors as our partners.  Now, we 
are in negotiations with two of our main competitor Renault 
Truck and BTK (Manager, Commercial Department, SNVI, 
2005). 
   
 
With the help of a consultant companies Boose Allen Hamilton and Ernest 
Young, the SNVI was diagnosed for its strengths and weaknesses. The 
intention was to open part of the capital of the enterprise for the participation 
of a block investor.  The PGM was confident that the enterprise would have 
no problem to attract partners for various reasons.  The market for heavy 
vehicles in Algeria was growing as a result of the government ambitious 
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projects to develop the country‟s infrastructures.  The country was also cheap 
in terms of energy and labour supplies and close to markets in Africa and the 
Arab countries.  In addition to the advantages the government provided to 
foreign investors.  But until 2005, only two partnerships were materialised.  
One with the German ZF and one with the French BTK.  Foreign investors 
were not ready to invest in the SNVI because the enterprise was 50 percent 
integrated.  The SNVI was diversified in many products such as different 
types of trucks, buses and trailers.  Often foreign companies interested to 
invest in the SNVI were specialised companies.  For example, Renault 
Trucks was specialised only in producing trucks, BTK was specialised in 
vehicle body works.  The specialisation of the division of Tiaret in body 
works was one of the reasons why BTK was more interested to invest in this 
division.  For a manager in the commercial division “No foreign company 
will be interested in invest in state within a state” (Manager, Commercial 
Department, SNVI, 2005).  The SNVI was still burdened with surplus 
workers and more important of all was the strict conditions the enterprise put 
on partnership.  The interested investor was required to bring the technology, 
the capital and also open new markets for the products of the SNVI.   A 
manager in the industrial vehicles division explained that: 
 
We have allowed the German producer ZF to produce gear 
boxes in our premises at Rouiba where the SNVI holds 20 
percent of the capital of his firm because ZF has a world 
reputation in making gear boxes and other equipment for 
trucks and buses.  We have machines which make gear boxes 
but they are old.  Once we bring new machines and we get 
certified for international quality standards, we will ask him 
[ZF] to use our machines, our steel and our expertise.   
 
He added: 
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Here at the SNVI, we do not allow a foreign investor to come 
and work.  I mean, we do not accept a foreigner unless he 
brings something concrete.  He should not come to take over 
the enterprise.  The workers here have a strong say in the 
decisions concerning the future of their enterprise.  They will 
never accept a foreigner that will use them solely to work.  
Workers through their representatives in the Comité de 
Participation can block the whole technical services if the 
management of the enterprise goes against their interests or the 
interests of the enterprise (Manager, Industrial Vehicles 
Division, Rouiba, SNVI, 2005). 
 
Though both French companies, BTK and Renault Truck, were interested in 
investing in the SNVI, only BTK, after long negotiations with the PGM of 
the SNVI, had accepted the conditions of the enterprise.  In return for buying 
65 percent of the shares in the division located in Tiaret in the west region, 
BTK accepted to protect the existing 900 jobs in the division, to create 
another 250 jobs and export some of the SNVI products to foreign markets.  
It was forecast that, by this partnership, the division would be able to increase 
its production from 2,000 vehicles per year to 5,500 (El Watan, 13 
Decembre, 2006) and to introduce some modifications in the design of the 
existing vehicles to make them more compatible with the hot weather 
conditions in the regions located in the south of the country.  As for Renault 
Truck, the negotiations between this company and the SNVI were still going 
on at the time of writing this work.  One of the major points in these 
negotiations was for Renault Truck to use the premises of the SNVI located 
at Rouiba to assemble trucks in return for Renault Truck to allow the SNVI 
products to be marketed in European markets and also to promise not to 
challenge the leadership of the SNVI in the Algerian market. This promise 
was also one of the conditions imposed by the SNVI on BTK.                       
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B.  Its Organisational Structure.  Kono (1980: 284) defines the 
organisational structure of a firm as “The way the firm groups its jobs and 
defines the line of authority to integrate the jobs”.     During the socialist 
period, however, the SNVI, and the same can be said with the rest of state 
enterprises operating in the manufacturing sector, was over burdened by 
activities which had no relationship with its core production and service 
operations.  The auxiliary activities, according to the human resource 
manager “Were intended to create the wealth of the nation” (HR Manager, 
HR Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005).  These were activities which 
were supposed to make the life of the worker at the work place easy and 
comfortable and fundamentally to stimulate the worker to increase 
production and productivity.  The activities included personnel 
transportation, canteens, housing, cooperatives to name but few.  Under the 
instructions of the CNPE, all public enterprises listed for partial privatisation 
were required to externalise these auxiliary activities to concentrate only on 
their core activities.  The SNVI quickly embarked in the process of 
externalisation since 1998.  The workers were given the priority to buy these 
activities as collectives to create new micro-enterprises that would operate as 
sub-contractors to the SNVI.  And to make the financial and operational 
restructuring of the core activities feasible, the core activities were 
divisionalised by product.  Figure 7.1 below shows the transformation that 
had occurred in the organisational structure of the SNVI since privatisation.  
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Figure 7.1.  Organisational Structure of the SNVI in Pre and Post Privatisation 
Organisationa Structure in 1987 
 
 
 
Manufacturing 
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                               Tasks                                            Tasks                                              Tasks 
                       
         -Central Methodes                -Purchases                   -Vehicule Studies   
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  -Iron Works 
  -Smelting-Works 
  -Truck Assembling 
  -Bus Assembling 
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Source:  Moussa, 1987 
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Organisational Structure in 2005 
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With the abolishment of socialism, the FLN unit and the 
Workers‟Assemblies were also abolished from the structure of the SNVI.  
New functional departments were created such as the department that dealt 
with the security of the enterprise from terrorist attacks and vandalism, the 
department that elaborated plans for partnership and industrial restructuring 
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and the department for internal auditing.  The department of manufacturing 
was reorganised into four divisions.  The intention of this divisionalisation 
was to reduce wastage of resources and this could be achieved by allowing 
the division manager to have the power to make decisions on matters which 
concern the division.  Legally, the division was given the status of a joint 
stock company with the financial and operational power in the hands of its 
board of directors.  In practice, the whole power was still concentrated in the 
hands of the PGM of the enterprise.  But since the division of Tiaret had 
become a majority controlled by the French company BTK, the board of 
directors had assumed ample control over the decisions of the division.  
 
What was interesting in the changes taking place in the organisational 
structure of the SNVI was the promotion of marketing and after sale.  The 
marketing and after sale staff were installed within the commercial division 
at the head office at Rouiba and in the ten branches of the commercial 
division spread in different regions of the country.  Because marketing was 
new to the SNVI, the staff in this department was still not fully experienced 
with techniques on how to diagnose their competitors.  This was 
understandable.  During the socialist period, marketing as understood in the 
private firm in the developed economies did not exist.  At the SNVI, for 
example, the commercialisation of its products was carried out by the 
department of distribution and maintenance.  This structure was justified 
under this system.  The commercial manager explained that: 
 
Between 1970 and 1990, our enterprise was exclusively a 
producer, because the system in place demanded that.  We had 
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to produce and let the sale of our products decided by a 
government body.  This body decided to whom our products 
should be sold.  What I mean is that the relationship client-
producer and producer-market did not exist.  It was only since 
the late 1990s that the concept marketing started to penetrate in 
our enterprise (Commercial Manager, Commercial 
Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005).     
 
 
With no directives from the sponsoring ministry to whom to sell, the staff in 
the marketing department was left to look for customers on their own.  
Though 50 percent of customers were state enterprises and institutions, the 
staff had developed a strategy to increase the number of private customers in 
the domestic market and to increase export to African and Arab countries.  
They carried out surveys to understand how the Algerian customer saw the 
products of the SNVI and what improvements they wanted to see in these 
products.  Also promotion of the image and products of the SNVI had been 
done through the distribution of posters in different companies and to the 
general public in addition to organising exhibitions for the products of the 
SNVI in the country and in some African and Arab countries.  A manager in 
the commercial division explained that “We have been able to fill our order 
book until the year 2009.  We are trying to grow.  But I can say we are not 
growing fast.  We are still a small enterprise with no more than 5,000 
vehicles per year.  At the moment, we are not trying to compete head to head 
with Chinese or American products.  We are trying to gain back some of the 
shares of our market that we lost in the 1990s.   I can say that we have 
through the 35 years of the existence of our enterprise, we have gained 
enough experience in our industry and what we need now is some 
modifications in our products to meet international standards” (Manager, 
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Commercial Department,  SNVI, 2005).  On this point, another manager 
added:   
 
Our market and our financial position do not allow us to make 
major innovations in our products.  It is not easy to move from 
one system to another.  You really need a period to adapt.  To 
create new products, you have to transform the whole 
production machineries, equipments, buildings and skills.  I 
wanted to say, you need huge investments.  And investments 
as you know need a lot of money.  In terms of money, we are 
not self sufficient.  In fact, we had to borrow money to carry 
out the small investments we had in recent years.  Even the 
banks, they have not been very helpful like before.  We are at 
an edge of break up with them.  They always ask us where is 
your added values.  The banks today are happy to provide 
credits to enterprises with high positive added values 
(Manager, Industriel Vehicles Division, Head Office, SNVI, 
2005). 
   
 
C. Its Employment Policies.   Until 1990, the employment practices at the 
SNVI were governed by the SGT.  The application of the SGT had proved to 
be rigid and incompatible with the transition to the free market economic 
system.  The human resources manager complained that:   
 
The system did not work since it was first implemented in this 
enterprise.  I can give you an example.  All functional 
managers were paid the same salary.  Because the worker‟s 
effort to produce a task was highly considered in the 
classification of salaries, a worker working as a black smith 
was classified better than a worker working as an electro-
mechanics.  Also, because jobs were classified, the prospect 
for a promotion was almost non existent.  There was little 
enthusiasm among people especially those with professional 
and managerial skills to put themselves forward in 
programmes for training and development since these 
programmes would not contribute to their job promotion.  
Now, things are different.  People can be promoted or 
demoted.  Their salaries can be increased or decreased.  The 
environment has changed a lot.  Today, there is a tough 
competition in the market over professional and managerial 
skills.  Companies that offer high salaries, high bonuses, 
housing, and training are taking the best people in the labour 
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market (HR Manager, HR Department, Head Office, SNVI, 
2005).        
 
In 1990, the government introduced the Law no.90-11 dated 21 April 1990 
which abolished the SGT and replace it with a more flexible form of 
relationship between management and workers.  Workers at all level of the 
enterprise even those with managerial positions became subject to work 
contracts.  The work contract can be permanent, part-time or temporary 
depending on the nature of the activity the worker is supposed to accomplish.  
What was more interesting in the development taking place in the 
management-workers relationship since 1990 was the right of management to 
downsize the number of workers in the enterprise. According to the Law 94-
09 dated 26 May 1994 (Code de Travail, 1997), which is in application to the 
present time, managers are allowed to downsize the number of their workers 
in a large number if the economic and financial situation of the enterprise 
justifies it.  The law also clearly points out that the downsizing should not 
take place unless discussed and approved by the worker representatives in the 
Comité de Participation (Participation Committee) and the trade union.  It is 
specified in Clause 7 and 8 of this law that managers should only take such a 
drastic decision after one or all the measures which have been mentioned in 
these two Clauses have been implemented, such as reducing the amount paid 
for bonuses, freezing salaries and promotion, retraining workers affected by 
the downsizing decision or their placement in other enterprises in the same 
sector, transforming full time workers into part-timers, the non renewal of 
workers‟ contracts with limited period, and put workers who approached the 
age of retirement for an early retirement.  To encourage managers to avoid 
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massive downsizing, the government promises to provide financial support 
for the enterprise that engages in projects that create activities to re-employ 
the workers that may be affected by downsizing.  The enterprise is also 
promised to be exempted from paying a number of taxes and to pay low 
dividends to the state treasury (see the experience of many public enterprises 
on downsizing published by the MIRP, March 1995). Since the introduction 
of this law, the SNVI, compared to Eriad Alger and Saidal, was aggressive in 
the reduction of the number of its work force.  The number of its workers 
dropped from 19,000 in 1987 to 15,000 in 1995 or 21 percent.  The number 
reduced further, as table 7.6 below shows, with the implementation of its plan 
for organisational and financial restructuring introduced in 1998.   
 
Table 7.7.   The changes in the number of workers in the three enterprises  
 
during the period (1997-2002) 
 
                 Year 
Enterprise 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SNVI 13,520 10,300 9,209 9,165 8,761 8,119 
Eriad Agler   5,678   5,455 5,195 4,888 4,644 2,788 
Saidal  ____   ____ 2,800 3,207 3,412 3,563 
Source:  Data analysis. 
 
The action plan of the SNVI to reduce its work force did not seem to be a 
plan well thought through.  The plan did not prevent skilled workers from 
being laid off including some with long experience in managerial positions.  
The workers were laid off through the départ volontaire (voluntary 
departure) and particularly through the retraite anticipéé (anticipated 
retirement).  According to the Décret Legislatif no. 94-10 dated 26 May, 
1994 relative to the anticipated retirement, only male workers who are over 
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50 years old and female workers who are over 45 years old should be covered 
by the anticipated retirement scheme.  The amount of payment provided for 
this category of workers depends on the number of years that the worker 
spent in his/her actual enterprise and other enterprises and also the years left 
before his/her legal age of retirement.  When only less than five years are left 
for the worker before he/she legally retires, this worker is entitled for a total 
payment of thirteen months salary.  When only five or more years are left, 
he/she is entitled for sixteen months salary.  And when only eight or more 
years are left, he/she is entitled for nineteen months salary.  At the SNVI, 
however, any worker who reached 50 years old or above and who had 20 
years of work experience in the enterprise had to be selected for the retraite 
anticipéé.  The human resources manager explained that “The retraite 
anticipéé did not distinguish between workers skills.  Whether the worker 
was good or bad, whether skilled or unskilled, they were all listed for lay 
offs.  It was very painful.  The people we lost were generally people with 
academic degrees with long experience of know-how.  These people have left 
us and today we have difficulties to replace them.  Now we are suffering 
from a big shortage of people with professional and technical skills” (HR 
Manager, HR Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005).  The technical 
manager added: 
 
When a worker spends twenty years in his jobs, this is the time 
when the enterprise starts to benefit fully from him because he 
has accumulated enough experience and professionalism in his 
skills.  He can do his job with his eyes closed.  We should have 
kept these people.  Now, what we are doing, we are bringing 
young people.  We train them how to do the work.  It takes 
three to four years to train them.  But this training is not 
enough.  We should have at least kept our old professionals to 
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transfer their long experience to the younger workers.  This is 
how I look at things (Technical Manager, Technical 
Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005).     
 
 
Because of the changing conditions in the market, the SNVI, like the rest of 
other enterprises in the country, had introduced the concept of Human 
Resources Management.  A Human Resources department was installed at 
the head office in Rouiba and another one at the body works division of 
Tiaret to replace the personnel and development departments.  At the 
division, the human resources manager had little autonomy to take decisions 
concerning the personnel of the division.  He had always to consult with the 
human resources manager at head office.  And though the name of the 
departments had changed,   many of the practices of the SGT were still 
applied by the human resources departments.  Like under the SGT, the salary 
of a worker was still determined based on five criteria:  The academic 
qualification, the type of responsibility attached to the task, the mental and 
physical effort used in the task, the conditions in which the task had to be 
carried out and other constraints surrounding the task.  Workers also enjoyed 
medical health services because the Law no. 88-07 dated 26 January 1988 
relative to hygiene, security and medical care was still in application until 
today.  Each enterprise whether private or state is required to provide medical 
care services to its workers free of chages.  The enterprise was also required 
to provide social services including housing (Décret no. 82-179 dated 15 
May 1982 relative to the National Fund for Social Services is still in 
application until today) to its workers to reduce the problem of workers 
mobility.   As it was understood from the interviews, workers at the SNVI did 
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not benefit from housing benefits for a long time   On this point, it is 
interesting to say that workers became more worried to keep their jobs than 
to ask for social benefits.   
 
The job opportunities at the SNVI were few but the demands for them were 
tremendous.  The human resources manager explained that “The human 
resources manager finds it tough to choose the right candidate.  I can show 
you now [taking a box from the cabinet], in this box I have received almost 
five thousand applications for one vacancy.  All the applicants have high 
university degrees and long experience.  They almost all fit the job 
description and it is difficult to make a decision” (HR Manager, HR 
Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005).  Because of this huge competition 
over few jobs available, the selection of candidates was, according to one 
worker of the SNVI “Very often based on who you know and not on what 
you know and the majority of the recruited candidates were offered 
permanent jobs”.  There was a widespread belief amongst many of the 
managers interviewed that offering permanent contracts to workers would 
increase the commitment of these workers to the enterprise and would 
increase production and productivity.  In 2005, the total number of workers at 
the SNVI was estimated to fall around 8,200 workers and around 7,300 or 80 
percent were permanent workers and only 800 were temporary.  Even when 
some of the production units became temporarily idle for shortage of 
customer orders, workers were not laid off but transferred to other production 
units or their working hours were reduced.  The top management of the SNVI 
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had been careful not to repeat the mistake of the 1990s to resort to workers 
downsizing when an economic or financial problem arised.    
 
To improve production and productivity the top management introduced a 
compensation system based on the nature of activities of the worker and 
his/her performance.  After long discussions with the Comite de 
Participations and the UGTA‟s representatives, higher salaries were 
allocated to highly skilled workers in production and also to workers in the 
financial, marketing, technical and managerial positions.  Bonuses were also 
paid for collective and individual performance.  Still, the salaries at the SNVI 
were less than those paid in many large state-owned enterprises like 
SONATRACH and in the private firms.   
 
7.4.2.    Eriad Alger  
 
7.4.2.1. Its Top Management Perception of the Market 
 
Like the SNVI, Eriad Alger was also provided with some institutional and 
economic supports by the government such as restrictions on imports for 
pasta, flour and semolina as well as setting a higher price for flour which had 
allowed Eriad to make some profits.  Between 1994 and 1999, Eriad Alger 
sale revenues increased from 7,060 million dinars to 18,306.5 million dinars 
(Bilans de Synthèses, 1994 and 1999).  But the good performance of the late 
1990s was temporary.  Since 2000, Eriad Alger started to enter into serious 
financial problems for various reasons.  It was surrounded by many domestic 
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competitors.  The entry and exit barriers in the industry in which Eriad Alger 
operated were very low.  In 2004, more than 300 mills were operating in the 
country.  These were public and private enterprises.  As the government tried 
to encourage the expansion of the private sector and also tried to keep the 
market for bread stable, facilities such as financial credits were provided to 
investors wishing to open medium or small enterprises in milling.  The 
market had become saturated with flour by two and a half times what the 
market demanded.  Because of flour surplus in the market, competitors had to 
diversify to survive.  According to the procurement manager “Some of our 
private competitors have been unable to sell their flour in the market and 
have to diversify their products in order to survive.  The group Sim, for 
example, which is one of the strongest private competitors in the market, in 
addition to producing large quantities of flour and semolina, it was able with 
its strategy of diversification to capture between 12 and 18 percent of the 
market for pasta and couscous (Procurement Manager, Head Office, Eriad 
Alger, 2005).  The markets for couscous, pasta, biscuits,, chocolate and yeast 
were profitable because their prices were fixed by the market and though 
Eriad Alger had the capacities and the experience to produce these products, 
it did not, however,, take advantage of these resources.  In the words, of the 
marketing manager “Though Eriad Alger was losing its shares of the market 
for all its products, no new products were introduced, not even modifications 
in the existing products‟ (Marketing Manager, Alger Division, Eriad Alger, 
2004).  The same point was shared by the procurement manager when he said 
that: 
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The same products which were produced during the socialist 
period continued to be produced in the transition.  Recently, 
things have changed.  Activities for producing pasta and 
couscous have been abandoned.  Biscuits and chocolate of 
Cherchell have been sold.  Our core activity now is milling 
tender wheat to produce flour (Procurement Manager, Head 
Office, Eriad Alger, 2005).     
 
 
The concentration on producing flour was not a strategic choice initiated by 
top managers of Eriad Alger.  Rather, the choice was imposed upon the 
enterprise by the government.  All managers felt that their enterprise was a 
hostage of the government bureaucracy.  Though Eriad Alger had been 
transformed into a joint stock company since 1990, the government still 
looked at the enterprise as if it was still socialist.  Its PGM was still subject to 
directives emanating from the MPPI, the CPE and the Ministry of Industry.  
For the general secretary:   
 
Very often, our role is simply of a mail box…They [the 
various ministers] do not consult us in order to participate in 
decisions which are related to investments at Eriad Alger, or 
on decisions regarding partnership or privatisation…In the 
reality of things, we are actually the ones who they should be 
involved (General Secretary, Head Office, Eriad Alger, 2004). 
 
 
 
Though the PGM, in consultation with the board of directors, was allowed to 
make decisions concerning the replacement of equipment and machineries or 
concerning the personnel practices like recruitment and promotion, decisions 
concerning introduction or modification of a production line, partnership or 
privatisation, these had to emanate in the first place from the government.  
The tight control of the government over these major decisions was one of 
the major causes of the conflicts between the government and the PGMs of 
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Eriad Alger and this had very often led the government to replace them.  As 
previously mentioned, the PGM of Eriad Alger had been replaced eighteen 
times in a very short period, 1995-2000.  This continuous replacement 
demoralised senior managers at all levels of the enterprise to take initiatives 
to set clear objectives for medium and long-term development of the 
enterprise.  Their demoralisation was clear in the absence of any action plan 
to restructure or privatise.   Though the enterprise was listed for privatisation 
since 1995, until 2000, the enterprise did not put in place special units or 
committees for selecting the activities for partial privatisation, or for quality 
improvement or for personnel development.  Also, though the enterprise was 
continuously incurring losses in the shares of its markets for flour, semolina 
and other products, its top management did not take any initiative to 
understand the strengths and the weaknesses of Eriad Alger‟s competitors at 
least of those competing in flour, which became Eriad‟s core product.  On 
this point, the marketing manager explained that: 
 
True, we have a list of our competitors at national level.  But 
we do not have information on the strengths and weaknesses of 
these competitors…We do not have what we call „economic 
spying‟.  We do not have a department or a unit which takes 
charge exclusively of diagnosing what made our competitors 
strong, what are their strategies and all that (Marketing 
Manager, Marketing and Commercial Department, Head 
Office, Eriad Alger, 2004). 
 
 
To speed up the process of privatisation, a new PGM, Mr. Mazidi, was 
nominated in late 2000.  Under his leadership, action plans were developed to 
restructure the financial and organisational position of the enterprise.  This 
PGM had also attempted in many occasions to put pressure on the 
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government to bring some changes in the regulations controlling the industry 
in which its enterprise operated.  In the resolutions taken in the year 2002 at 
the annual meeting of the general assembly of the enterprise and at the 
various meetings of the board of directors of the parent enterprise  (Eriad 
Alger, 2002), top management called the government  to: 
 
 Lift the restriction imposed on Eriad Alger to be exclusively supplied for 
its raw material -wheat- by the state-owned supplier, the OAIC.  It called for 
the right of Eriad Alger to freely choose the suppliers they considered 
adequate in terms of quality and price; 
 
 Lift the control on the price of flour and let the market  decide its price; 
 
 Put control over the unfair competition practiced by many private firms 
with whom Eriad Alger competed.     
 
Unfair competition by the private sector had been mentioined not only by 
managers of Eriad Alger but all managers interviewed whether at the SNVI, 
Saidal or the UGTA.  They all regarded competition from the private sector 
and particularly from the informal sector very damaging to the survival of the 
state and privatised state enterprises and the whole national economy.  In  the 
market for flour, for example, because the price of flour was regulated by the 
government for both public and private enterprises (Ministère de Commerce, 
October, 2006), to increase their turnovers, many private competitors resorted 
to illegal practices such as selling without receipts to avoid taxation or 
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bribing government quality controllers to use cheap and  low quality wheat   
It was estimated that about 50 percent of turnovers of some private firms in 
Algeria was due to these types of illegal practices.  Though the legislation on 
competition had existed since 1995 with the introduction of Ordinance no.95-
06 dated 25 January, 1995 and amended in 2003 by Ordinance no.73- 43 
dated 1 July, 2003, the Conseil de Concurrence (Competition Board) had 
been until the time of writing this piece of work unable to control 
competition especially of the informal sector (CCNM, June, 2004) whose 
contribution to the GDP was estimated in 2003 to reach some 30 percent and 
may be more (CCNM, June, 2004: 4).   
 
The tight control of the government over the management of Eriad Alger and 
the weakness of the government to regulate the industry of wheat processing 
and its derivatives had cost Eriad Alger a high price.  In only 3 years, or 
between 2002 and 2005, the shares of its market for flour dropped from 80 to 
3 percent.  Finding itself with almost no market shares and in serious 
financial difficulties, Eriad Alger had given up its activity as producer of 
flour.  From 2005, its main activity was to process wheat for its strong private 
competitor Blanky. “We are now a service enterprise”, the procurement 
manager explained.  He added “What we do now is that private firms bring 
us their wheat and we mill it for them and they pay us.  We are doing this 
type of service because we do not have the money to buy our own wheat.  
We cannot borrow money from the bank because we are already with heavy 
debts” (Procurement Manager, Procurement Department, Head Office, Eriad 
Alger, 2005).  In 2005, Eriad Alger was in so serious financial troubles to a 
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point where it was not capable to pay its workers including division and plant 
managers and some staff at the head office.  For the secretary of the 
enterprise general secretary “We have not been paid for four months.  My 
father had to give me money to pay for my transport.  You see, I am working 
for free.  And if things will stay as they are now, I am going to look for work 
in the private sector” (Secretary, Head Office, Eriad Alger, 2005).  Unable to 
secure financial help from the government and loans from the bank, the PGM 
decided to sell the 54,700 square meters of land attached to the enterprise 
division located in Corso in order to pay for the arrear salaries. 
  
7.4.2.2. Restructuring of its Internal Operations 
 
A.  Its Product Market. There are always opportunities in the market that can 
help the survival of an enterprise.  The opportunities which were available to 
Eriad Alger were to increase the production and quality of some of its 
products like biscuits, chocolate and yeast which were in great demand.  
These products could have compensated for the low turnover yielded by the 
sale of flour and semolina and would have increased the number of its 
customers which were in steady decrease.  In all the annual action plans of 
Eriad Alger produced between 2000 and 2004, modifying the existing 
products of the enterprise or introducing new ones seemed to be one of the 
major priorities of the enterprise top management.  But the CPE and the 
MPPI were persistent that Eriad Alger should concentrate on producing flour 
and semolina and other products like pasta, couscous, biscuits, chocolate and 
fresh yeast should be sold to the private sector. Since these activities were 
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slated to be sold, top management was unwilling to make investments to 
improve the production and quality of these products.   In 1999, its division 
for fresh yeast production located at Oued Smar was closed as well as 3 out 
of the 4 production plants for biscuits/chocolate division located at Cherchell.  
For the marketing manager:  
 
The reason why Oued Smar division was closed was because 
we did not have the treacle which is the raw material to 
produce yeast.  The treacle is the material which allows the 
yeast to ferment.  We could have easily substituted treacle with 
dates. And as you know, we have plenty of dates in the 
country.  With this substitute, we could have avoided the 
closure of the division and also we could have produced yeast 
cheaply saving thousands of foreign currency. What I am 
telling you now is what we had already suggested to the state 
authorities but they did not listen to us.  So, we had to close the 
division and transfer its workers to other production plants 
(Marketing Manager, Head Office, Eriad Alger, 2004).  
 
 
In addition, Eriad Alger started to lose its market place for flour and semolina 
because its competitors were winning its traditional customers through 
quality.  For flour, for example, the number of its customers in the form of 
retailers dropped between 1994 and 1998 from 44 percent to 13 percent and 
the wholesellers represented only 30 percent of its total customers.  For many 
managers interviewed, it was difficult to bring bach these customers because 
the flour of Eriad was poor in quality.   The mills of Eriad Alger were in their 
majority equipped with obsolete technology and the wheat used in the 
production of flour did not meet the international standards in terms of 
quality.  More significant, because Eriad Alger was not allowed to diversify 
its suppliers for wheat, this made it accept any quality of wheat supplied by 
its main and only one supplier, the OAIC.  Without any exception, all the 
managers interviewed criticised the government imposition to use one 
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supplier.  For the production manager “The prices of the OAIC are more 
expensive than other suppliers and the quality is not very high…Sometimes 
our production plants stop running because the deliveries from the OAIC 
came late.  This is one of our major problems” (Production Manager, Corso 
Division, 2004).  Many of the managers could not figure out the logic behind 
the government imposition to buy from one supplier.  For the marketing 
manager “Even if Eriad Alger wants to compete with its products for pasta 
and biscuits, it will be impossible to compete because we have to use the 
flour and semolina we produce ourselves which is not of the quality required 
for this type of products [pasta, couscous, biscuits]…In this business, you 
have to be flexible in the choice of the suppliers of your raw materials.   Our 
competitors are free to buy their wheat from anywhere they want, from 
overseas or from domestic suppliers.  Us! Unfortunately, we cannot because 
the state forbids us to do so” (Marketing Manager, Corso Division, Eriad 
Alger, 2004).   
 
In 2000, a plan to improve the quality of flour was elaborated.  Ten 
production plants were listed to introduce new technology and procedures in 
order to improve the quality of their flour.  These were Aissat Idir, Complexe 
Blida, FPA Blida, Smailia, Semoulerie Corso, FPA Corso, Tadmait Baglia, 
Aiso-Bessam and Bouira.  This project for quality improvement was first 
implemented at Aissa Idir.  It was wholly financed by Eriad Alger and cost 
the enterprise around 3,086,074.5 dinars.  This production plant obtained its 
quality certificate ISO 9001 version 2000 in 2003.  The improvement in the 
quality of flour of this plant improved Eriad Alger‟s image among the baker 
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in particular.  In 2003, around 99 percent of its customers were individual 
private bakers and fear of losing this potential customer, Eriad Alger engaged 
in a long-term commitment with this type of customer.  Through its 
marketing unit called Cellule d’Ecoûte du Client (Customer Listening Cell), 
discussions with this customer took place on regular basis to specify any 
problems with the specifications of flour and corrective actions were taken 
quickly.    More important, hoping to keep its customers, Eriad Alger had 
embarked, since 1998, in a strategy that allowed its customers to buy by 
credit not by cash as before.  With this purchase facility, its account 
receivables steadily increased.  In one year alone, its account receivables 
increased from 280 million dinars in 1998 to 1,651 million dinars in 1999 and 
to prevent losing these customers to the private sector, Eriad Alger had also 
allowed them to pay their credits at any time they saw it suitable.                
 
Desperate to increase its share of the market, all the action plans elaborated 
by the enterprise called for partnership with private investors.  Partnership 
was regarded as an instrument that would improve the financial, 
technological and management position of the enterprise.  The general 
secretary explained that his enterprise could have saved its market place if the 
CPE had allowed the enterprise to enter into partnership with some potential 
investors.  The French firm LeSaffre was interested to enter into a joint 
venture with Eriad Alger to produce and market fresh and dried yeast in 
conformity with ISO 9002 in the division Oued Smar.  Interested too in 
having partnership with Eriad Alger was the two Algerian firms ENPC and 
Complexe Jute Bejaia.  Their business plan was to improve the packaging 
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activities of Eriad Alger. Negotiations for a business deal with Lesaffre, for 
example, were going on with Eriad Alger for two years but they had never 
been materialised.  The general secretary explained that: 
  
When there is a business opportunity, the matter should be 
dealt with promptly.  The interested investors will not wait 
until you take permission from the state bureaucracy.  These 
people are not used to this type of bureaucratic procedure.  We 
signed a protocol with LeSaffre.  We submitted our report 
about our meeting and negotiations with LeSaffre to the CPE 
and the MPPI.  More than two years have lapsed and we are 
still waiting for an answer.  This investor will ask himself who 
is my interlocutor.  Is it the PGM, is it the SGP or is it the 
Ministry of Participations?   Finally, we lost this opportunity of 
partnership (General Secretary, Head Office, Eriad Alger, 
2005).   
 
 
The PGM of Eriad Alger further explained that “Eriad has viable capacities, 
has a personnel who is ready to learn new techniques and improve their 
expertise but we cannot do anything because every time we wanted to move a 
step forward people from above moved us two steps backward.  We need to 
be free when it comes to designing the strategy of our enterprise the way we 
want to see it in the future” (PGM, Head Office, Eriad Alger, 2004).              
 
B.  Its Organisational Structure.  Under the instructions of the CNPE, Eriad 
Alger was requird to externalise its auxiliary activities, to divisionalise its 
core activities and to instal a marketing department.  By this organisational 
restructuring, it was hoped to create better control of resources, better 
integration between the different operations and significantly to make the 
enterprise profitable in order to make it attractive to investors for partnership 
or for total privatisation.  The enterprise embarked in organisational 
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restructuring in 1998 by restructuring the head office and divisionalising its 
core activities.  By the end of 2001, the structure of Eriad Alger looked like 
figure 7.2, below. 
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Figure 7.2.   Organisational structure of Eriad Alger in 2001 
Head Office Organisational Structure 
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Division Organisational Structure 
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Source::  Eriad Alger, 2000 
 
Its core activities were divisionalised into seven divisions.  These were:  
Beni-Mezghenna, Tell, Corso, Tizi Ouzou Mills, Hamza Mills, Oued Smar 
and Cherchell.  And in 2002, the enterprise started to sell its unproductive 
assets where the majority had to be sold to Eriad‟s workers.  The sale covered 
124 distribution outlets and transportation vehicles which benefited 534 
workers.  Table 7.8 and 7.9 below show the number of assets sold and the 
number of workers who benefited from the sale.   
      
 
 
 
  President General Manager 
Financial and 
Accounting 
Department  
 Planning and 
Organisation 
Department  
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Table 7.8.  Number of disttibution and transport vehicles sold  and the  
number of workers who benefited from the sale 
 
       Plants No.of warehouses No. of  sale points Total workers 
Alger 16 _   94 
Tizi Ouzou 06 04   40 
Blida 03 01   71 
Corso 07 01   56 
Bouira 02 05   40 
Tipaza 03 01   44 
Total 37 12 345 
 Source:  Eriad Alger, March 2002 
 
 
Table 7.9.   Weight of vehicles for sale and the number of beneficiaries 
Plants 3 
tonnes 
7 
tonnes  
8  
tonnes  
10 
tonnes 
12 
tonnes 
20 
tonnes 
Total No. of 
workers 
Alger  
Tizi- 
Ouzou 
Blida 
Corso 
Bouira 
Tipaza 
06 
10 
05               
04 
01 
04 
- 
- 
02 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
- 
- 
04 
01 
- 
11 
- 
- 
01 
- 
- 
02 
- 
- 
09 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
03 
- 
- 
31 
10 
07 
21 
02 
04 
139 
  10 
  07 
  27 
  02 
  04 
Total 30 02 17 12 11 3 75 189 
Source:  Eriad Alger, March 2002 
 
 
 
Workers were also allowed to buy Eriad‟s five lounges, seven canteens, two 
cooperatives, four mills, one pasta production plant and one biscuit plant in 
addition to houses owned by Eriad Alger.  The beneficiaries were required to 
transform the production and service assets into micro-enterprises where 
some of them had to act as Eriad‟s sub-contractors.  One important point to 
mention is the fact that all the production plants sold to workers were in a 
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very desperate condition.  Their maintenance was very costly because they 
were equipped with obsolete technology and their technology went back to 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  For example, the production 
plant Amirouche dated back to 1895, Beni Mered to 1884, F.P.A. Alger to 
1901 and les Frères Ameur to 1914.  These  mills, the production manager 
explained  “Often stop running for a month or more until we get the spare 
parts and the majority of the spare parts do no exist in the market anymore” 
(Production Manager, Alger Division, Eriad Alger, 2004)..  What is 
interesting to say is that the spin off of unproductive activities was until 2005 
still not fully complet.  Many divisions remained still overburdened with 
unproductive assets which many division managers had called for their sale.   
 
Though the essence of divisionalisation as explained by the PGM of Eriad 
Alger was to give complete autonomy to division managers to decide on all 
operations and financial expenditures in their divisions, in practice, all the   
decisions concerning the divisions had to emanate from the head office.  The 
bureaucratic style of management which was practised during the socialist 
period was still strongly practised at Eriad Alger.  In the two documents 
entitled „L’entreprise Mère Eriad Alger’ and ‘La Charte des Responsabilités 
et des Niveaux Relationels Intra-Groupe Industriel Eriad-Centre’ of July 
1998, it was clearly stated that the head office was the only office which had 
the right to elaborate decisions concerning the production, marketing, 
development, procurement, distribution and personnel for all the divisions.  
The tight control created, without exception, a clear resentment amongst the 
division managers interviewed.  For the division manager of Corso:  
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It is always the GSE…in terms of organisation.  We do not 
have the feeling that there is autonomy in decisions.  
Judicially, we are autonomous entities.  But in practice, there is 
none.  Even at the functional level, they [the CPE and the 
MPPI] have reproduced the old organisational system [the 
socialist system] (Division Manager, Corso Division, Eriad 
Alger, 2004). 
 
Another manager added: 
 
Very often, the budgets allocated to divisions are recalculated 
at the head office because of the failure to have the right 
information.  This always leads to modifications and 
readjustments in the production plans at the production plants 
(Manager, Corso Division, Eriad Alger, 2005) 
 
 
To make sure that both the division and production managers did not deviate 
from the production plans allocated to them by the head office, these 
managers were required to submit daily to this office the stages of the 
production and the stocks almost in the same way as things were done during 
the socialist period.  When asked the reason for this tight control over the 
divisions, especially production, the answer of the general secretary was 
simply “To make sure the resources are not wasted, otherwise we have to do 
a lot of explaining to our owner [the government]” (General Secretary, Head 
Office, Eriad Alger, 2005).   
 
The tight control over division and production managers as well as functional 
managers had clearly demoralised these managers from taking initiatives to 
make changes to improve the operations of their divisions or departments.  
They were also demoralised for another reason.  Because of the continuous 
replacement of their PGM, these managers had become accustomed to see 
that every time a PGM was appointed, the enterprise would see new changes 
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introduced in its policies and internal regulation and it would be a waste of 
time to propose or design an action plan to introduce changes.  According to 
the assistant manager at the UGTA “Every time there is a new PGM, there is 
a change in the way the enterprise does its daily business.  He will say [the 
PGM] to his staff throw, throw, throw.  He wants to prove that he is better 
than his predecessors” (Assitant Manager, Department of Conflicts and 
Social Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 2004). The negative impact of the 
continuous replacement of the PGM on the internal development of the 
enterprise was clear in the continuous postponement of some investment 
projects launched by Eriad Alger.  One of the projects to mention here was 
the project for water treatment at the division of Oued Smar.  This project 
was launched in the late 1990s and was postponed many times.  It was put for 
execution and was finally finished only a few months before this research 
study started.     
 
Important too, one would expect that because Eriad Alger was perpetually 
losing its shares in the domestic market, it would have at least given some 
autonomy to the marketing staff in order to mobilise them to take active 
action and study the market and design ways to promote Eriad‟s products. In 
the document entilted „Organisation de l’entreprise Mère, Eriad Alger’ of 
June 2000, it was clearly stated that the main tasks of the department of 
marketing was to:   
 
 Study every opportunity to create new markets with new products; 
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 Promote the image of the enterprise and its products; 
 
 Look for opportunities for exports; 
 
 Make sure that the divisions implement the marketing strategy elaborated 
by the head office. 
 
In practice none of these tasks were carried out.  The manager of marketing 
at the head office insisted that since the function of marketing was introduced 
in the enterprise, there had never been one single research of the market 
whether by the marketing department at the head office or the marketing 
departments in the divisions.  The only thing the enterprise had created 
recently was, he explained “A Cellule d’Ecoûte du Client.  The staff of this 
Cellule, located here in the department of marketing in this head office, gets 
in touch with bakers.  They usually discuss with them whether they are happy 
with the flour we sold them.  Often, the bakers are happy with the flour 
produced by the production plant Aissa Idir because this plant has introduced 
quality standards in its production operations and has recently been certified 
for quality.  Apart from this, we have not done much in marketing” 
(Marketing Manager, Marketing and Commercial Department, Head Office, 
Eriad Alger, 2005).  Three reasons might explain this inactivy of the 
marketing department.  First, there was the lack of marketing skills amongst 
the staff of this department.  Second, there was the lack of money to finance 
the marketing activity. For the procurement manager “We do not have money 
to promote Eriad products.  If you look in the TV, you always find the biscuit 
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of Blancky, the couscous of Sim and the pasta of laBelle.  You never see our 
products.  Our competitors invest a lot in promotion.  Us, we do not.  If we 
are not even able to buy the raw materials, how can we think to spend on 
promoting our products.  It is not possible, is it (Procurement Manager, 
Procurement Department, Head Office, Eriad Alger, 2005).  Third, Eriad 
Alger did not have a department for research and development that work 
closely with the department of marketing to innovate new products.  Eriad 
Alger had a department called   La Direction de Développement et de 
Réalisation (Development and Achievement Department) which was created 
when the SNSEMPAC was in existence.  The actual functions of this 
department were: 
 
  To carry out studies on what technology the enterprise should introduce 
in the production plants; 
 
  To provide technical advice to top management; 
 
  To control the implementation of the projects. 
  
Clearly, this is a technical department and its responsibility was to elaborate 
projects to introduce new equipment and machineries to increase the level of 
production in particular.  The department was responsible for introducing the 
development projects in the production plants Aissa Idir, Ain Bessam, 
Tadmait and Smailia.        
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 C.  Its Employment Policies.  Despite the steady loss of its market shares, the 
top management of Eriad Alger did not downsize the workers surplus in his 
enterprise to reduce the costs.   Between 1987 and 1995, the number of its 
work force dropped from 6,728 to 6,642 or by only 86 workers which was 
very negligible.  Even when the enterprise was put for organisational 
restructuring in 1998, the number stayed almost stable.  It was only in 2002 
when, as table 7.7 above shows, almost half of the work force was reduced as 
part of the action plan to prepare the divisions and production plants for sale.  
Like in the case of the SNVI, the majority of redundancies were carried out 
through the départ volontaire and retraite anticipée.  With the départ 
volontaire, the manager entered into negotiations with the worker.  The 
negotiations as explained by the human resources manager “Was to convince 
the worker to leave the company in return for payments…Handsome amount 
of payments were given in this scheme” (Human Resource Manager, Alger 
Division, Eriad Alger, 2004).  Out of a total of expenditures on retirement of 
176 million dinars for the year 2002, 51 million was spent on départ 
volontaire (Eriad Alger, September, 2003).  The most affected by the 
redundancy were people in the department of Security, as there was less need 
for them since terrorism had almost stopped, and also people in the 
production plants especially among semi and unskilled workers as modern 
equipments were introduced in some mills.  Skilled workers were hardly 
touched.  In the words of the human resources manager “Our company made 
sure to keep our professional and skilled workers because our company 
depended on them for its survival.  We wanted to keep these people because 
it is not easy to find them in the market.  The private sector is stealing the 
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best people.  They pay them more than us” (Human Resources Manager, 
Alger Division, Eriad Alger, 2004).   
 
To create flexibility in its employment practices, Human Resources 
departments were installed at the head office and division levels.  But the fact 
remains that HR decisions and policies were centralised at the head office.  
The HR manager at the head office elaborated in consultation with other 
functional managers in the head office the short, medium and long-term HR 
strategies for the whole enterprise.  No new recruitment and training and 
development of workers were allowed to be carried out at division and 
production plants levels unless discussed with the HR manager at the head 
office and authorised by this manager.   
 
While the label of the department dealing with employment practices 
changed from Personnel and Human Relations to Human Resources, the 
procedures and techniques for job classification and workers recruitment, 
selection and remuneration remained still influenced by the SGT.  The 
salary of a worker was calculated on the academic achievement required for 
the job, the type of responsibility attached to the job, the effort to do the job, 
and the constraints surrounding the job.   
 
In addition, the influence of the SGT at Eriad Alger was also found in the 
classification of work positions in the enterprise.  Workers were divided into 
20 grades:  unskilled workers were graded between 1 and 9, semi-skilled 
between 10 and 13 and professional and managers between 14 and 20.  This 
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meant that all division managers were paid the same basic salary, all 
production plants managers were paid the same and so forth and all the 
managers had permanent contracts.  In fact, in the year 2000, out of a total 
number of 4,888 workers in the whole enterprise, more than two-third, or 
3,634 workers, were permanents.   The human resources manager did not 
see the necessity to give determined contracts to workers.  He explained that 
“These people have been with us for years and we did not see the necessity 
to change them from permanent to temporary contracts like many other 
enterprises have done.  See what happened to these enterprises.  Once you 
give a worker a limited contract, he will leave.  As I said before, we do not 
want to lose our workers especially the skilled ones” (Human Resources 
Manager, Alger Division, Eriad Alger, 2004).  To keep workers in the 
enterprise and increase their productivty, the PGM decided to buy a plot of 
land of 5 hectares in the area of Boumerdès to build flats for production and 
some division managers.  What was surprising was also the fact that rather 
than reinvesting the profits that the enterprise made in 1999, these profits 
were invested by increasing the salaries of employees in the head office and 
some division managers.  Between 1999 and 2000, the average salary of an 
employee at the head office increased from 39,112 dinars to 65,348 dinars.  
And though the division of Oued Smar for yeast production and the division 
of Cherchell for biscuits/chocolate production were almost at a halt, the 
average salary of their employees increased from 26,799 dinars to 28,079 
dinars.   
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Important, too, to mention was the fact that the enterprise was still providing 
almost the same indeminities provided during the socialist period.  On the 
top of his/her basic salary and the bonuses paid for individual and collective 
performance, a worker could receive additional incomes through various 
indemnities.  The enterprise provided twenty indemnities.  These were:   
 
 The Till indemnity.  This was paid to workers who had direct contact with 
money such as workers who dealt with buying and selling.  The amount of 
indemnity paid to the worker depended on the amount of money he/she dealt 
with.  When the worker dealt with an amount above 500,000 dinars, for 
example, he/she received 250 dinars each month; 
 
 The Professional Experience indemnity.  This was calculed on the number 
of years the worker worked in the enterprise and outside the enterprise.  For 
certain categories of workers, this indeminity represented around 50 percent 
of their basic salaries; 
 
 The Posted Work indeminity.  This was paid to workers who shared the 
work in groups.  There were two systems.  The 2x8 discontinued posted work 
system.  Under this system, one team worked in the morning and the second 
work in the afternoon for five days a week.  The members of these two teams 
were paid 10 percent of their basic salaries.  The second system was the 3x8 
continued posted work.  The workers worked twenty four hours a day and 
seven days a week divided into three groups.  One group worked in the 
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morning, the second in the afternoon and the third at night.  The workers 
were paid 25 percent of their basic salaries; 
 
 The Nuissance indeminity.  This was calculated on how much the task of a 
worker involved heat, efforts and danger and was paid monthly.  The amount 
paid at Eriad Alger was between 414 dinars and 78 dinars; 
 
 Work Shift indeminity; 
 
 Obligation indemnity.  This was paid for workers who were asked to do 
the same work outside their normal work place; 
 
 Training and development indeminity.  This depended on the length of 
training the worker was supposed to do.  When the training was to last more 
than a month, some workers received around 20 percent of their basic 
salaries; 
 
   Basket indemnity.  When the worker did not have a canteen in his/her 
work place, the enterprise paid for his food.  At Eriad Alger, the worker was 
entitled to 35 dinars per day; 
 
 Transportation indemnity.  When the worker used the public 
transportation and paid him/herself for the expenses, he/she was entitled for 
compensation.  The amount of compensation depended on the travelling 
distance.  At Eriad Alger, the worker was paid 300 dinars for a distance 
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between 2 and 10 kilometres, 450 dinars for 11 and 30 kilometres and 500 
dinars for more than 5 kilometres.  And when the worker used his/her own 
vehicles, he/she received 1,500 dinars if he/she worked in management 
position and below this position, he/she received 900 dinars; 
 
 Displacement indemnity.  This was for workers who were required to be 
displaced as part of their jobs.  When the displacement was less than a 
month, the amount was 400 dinars per day for those occupying managerial 
positions and 300 dinars per day for those below these positions.  When the 
displacement was between one and six months, the amount was 350 dinars 
per day and 250 dinars for the two categories respectively; 
 
 Annual Holiday indemnity; 
 
 Replacement indemnity.  This is given when a worker is placed 
temporarily in a job not his/her.  For example, when a manager of human 
resources replaces a general manager in his/her absence; 
 
 The Unique Salary indemnity.  This was given to a worker whose spouse 
did not work.  It was 100 dinars for a worker without children and 200 
dinars with children; 
 
 The Family Allowance indemnity.  This was paid to workers with 
children.  The worker was paid 60 dinars for each child; 
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 The Annual Merit indemnity.  This was paid for workers who were 
regarded by senior managers as workers who deserved some recognition for 
their good work.  The amount was between 1,000 dinars and 5,000 dinars; 
 
 Innovation and Research indemnity.  This indemnity varied between 
5,000 and 10,000 dinars; 
 
 The Moudjahidin (a person who participated in the war for independence 
1954-1962) indemnity.  The amount of this indemnity varied with the 
number of years that the worker spent fighting in the war; 
 
 The Loyalty indemnity.  This was paid to workers who showed loyalty to 
the enterprise; 
 
 The Responsibility indemnity.  This was paid to workers who had other 
workers under their responsibility such as managers, foremen and 
supervisors. 
 
   The School Expenditures indemnity.  This was paid to help workers 
with their expenditure for their children schooling.      
 
Many division managers regarded that the distribution of salaries and 
bonuses at Eriad Alger were not distributed fairly.  One worker working at 
the production plant of Aissa Idir explained that “People got the bonuses not 
because they were good in their jobs or they have done anything good to the 
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enterprise but because they are the close friends of the big boss.  Most 
people you see in high positions in this enterprise have been put in these 
positions „bil Piston’ (through nepotism)” (Worker, Headquarters, UGTA, 
2004)          
 
In fact, in the majority of cases, neither the recruitment nor the promotion at 
Eriad Alger had been done fair and square as this was repeatedly mentioned 
by the interviewees at the UGTA.  One must understand that the procedures 
on how to select candidates and their promotion existed in the internal 
manual of the enterprise but in practice none of these procedures were 
applied.  When a vacancy was advertised in the national press, an applicant 
had to provide a bundle of certificates (this is a procedures followed in all 
state and privatised enterprises in the country) to prove his/her suitability to 
the post advertised.  The applicant had also to sit an aptitude test and 
interview but these were only formalities.  The applicant was chosen based 
on who he/she knew in the enterprise or in the government administration.  
The more the applicant had ties with someone at the highest level of the 
enterprise or the government administration, the better the chances he/she 
had to get the job.  To my surprise, the marketing manager and the general 
secretary at Eriad Alger admitted that the phenomenon of relative and friend 
ties was widely practised in their enterprise.  For the general secretary:  
 
The piston (nepotism) has invaded every department.  When 
one looks to this practice from the top, you have to say that 
even managers are selected by clientelism and alliances.  It is 
not the professional capacity which is the criteria for the 
selection of a manager.  And the same can be said about the 
selection at the lower levels of the enterprise.  
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He added: 
 
Under the socialist system, we had a control system and it 
functioned well.  For any candidate who had been refused a 
job, this candidate had the right to complain.  We had a 
committee which looked at this type of complaints.  This 
committee analysed the arguments advanced by the candidate 
and if he had the right, he would be selected for the job.  These 
committees do not exist anymore.  Sometimes people we do 
not really need are sent to us from the Ministry or from the 
SGP and we have to accept them and nobody can do anything 
against it  (General Secretary, Head Office, Eriad Alger, 2005).         
 
 
With this unethical practice of piston, Eriad Alger, as well as many 
enterprises in the country, had lost the opportunities to bring skilled and 
competent workers who could have brought a significant improvement in the 
enterprise performance.   
  
Like in selection for the job, there were written procedures for the promotion 
of workers.  The main criteria which the evaluation of workers was based 
upon were very basic.  The worker was evaluated on whether he/she was 
capable to do the job as instructed, able to work in a team and the quantity 
and quality of the job produced.  In reality, some workers had never been 
evaluated but got promoted under the discretion of their superiors.  The 
piston was, as one manager at the UGTA explained „Strongly used when 
promotion involved managerial positions‟ (Manager, Department of Conflicts 
and Social Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 2004).  The general secretary of 
Eriad Alger also explained that: 
 
The administrative personnel [managers and their secretaries at 
the head office] are well paid because of their promotion which 
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is done regularly almost every year.  These promotions are not 
based on the professional aptitudes of the personnel or the 
improvement of their competences.  The promotion is done 
based on who you know not on whether he has performed 
better.  That is why the administrative personnel are the 
highest paid in the enterprise (General Secretary, Head Office, 
Eriad Alger, 2005).            
 
Piston was also used when the programmes for training and development 
were concerned especially when training would lead to promotion and also 
when the training would take place in foreign countries. In 2000, some 450 
employees, particularly at management level, benefited from training at Eriad 
Alger.  The training concerned the acquisition of skills of quality control part 
of the project to implement the Quality Management System 9001, 2000 in 
the production plant of Aissa Idir.  Taking into consideration the technical 
and management skills which Eriad Alger desperately needed in a 
competitive market, the efforts made on training and development could be 
considered negligible.   
 
7.4.3. Saidal 
 
7.4.3.1. Its Top Management Perception of the Market 
 
Though Saidal was also confronted with government control and unfair 
competition from imported medicines, thanks to its PGM, Saidal took since 
1995 every opportunity to confront the pressure and survive. However, like 
the SNVI and Eriad Alger and the rest of the state-owned enterprises in the 
country, the sudden liberalisation of trade in 1991 created an explosion of 
imports for pharmaceutical products.  Unable to compete with this import, 
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Saidal was listed for closure in 1994.  After a period of internal struggle, the 
PGM of Saidal was removed and replaced in 1995 by a man who had become 
a known figure in the Algerian business sphere, Dr. Ali Aoun.  This man had 
shown that when you play your cards right, both privatisation and the 
transition could be advantageous to the growth and development of the state-
owned enterprise.  For the manager of the Department of Conflicts and Social 
Affairs at the UGTA “Ali Aoun is a model which should inspire every 
Algerian manager. He is successful because he is a nationalist and a man who 
likes his country‟ (Department Manager, Department of Conflicts and Social 
Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 2004). 
 
Ali Aoun initiated a new era in the history of Saidal.  From the beginning, he 
believed that the decline in the performance of Saidal was related more to the 
lack of vision of his predecessors on how to take advantage of the existing 
capabilities and use them in an efficient way.  According to one manager: 
 
Our PGM knew that our company did not lack competent 
personnel or production facilities.  It needed to use these 
resources wisely.  We diagnosed the strengths and weaknesses 
of our enterprise and we found that the urgent need was to 
motivate people and to use our capacities to a maximum to 
prevent the enterprise from closure.  When our PGM took 
power, the workers of Saidal were not paid for six months. We 
made some changes in the way things were done here [at 
Saidal].  Our objective at that time was to pay these workers 
and increase production.   From working only 7 hours a day, 
we added two shifts, to make our production plants working 
around the clock (Manager, Head Office, Saidal, 2004). 
 
 
Without spending one single dinar on equipments and machineries and 
without any financial help from the government, the short term strategy of 
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Saidal yielded positive results.  It yielded results at a time when most state-
owned enterprises found it hard to survive and at a time when the market for 
pharmaceuticals was saturated as a result of the explosion of imported 
medicines.  During the year 1995, the import for pharmaceuticals was 
estimated to reach some US$ 555 million (Algerie, 21 December, 1999) the 
highest since 1991.  Saidal recorded a net profit of 90 million dinars and paid 
its 120 million Dinars overdraft.  Since that year, Saidal had never looked 
back.  It had gone from strength to strength.  It had recorded remarkable 
production outputs and profits in the coming years.  To give an example, 
between 1996 and 1997 alone, its production rose by 23 percent and its profit 
rose from 230 million dinars to 400 million dinars (the equivalent of some 
US$ 5 million). 
 
With these remarkable production and financial achievements, senior 
managers of Saidal grew confident in their abilities to make Saidal the 
number one enterprise for pharmaceuticals production in the country.  Based 
on this long-term vision, The PGM and his management team elaborated in 
1997 Saidal‟s first long-term development plan (1998-2005) for investments 
to diversity in related products and introduce quality concepts and techniques 
in their management, products and services.  The investments were worth 1.4 
billion dinars (or approximately US$ 19.6 million).  The ambitious 
investments came at the time when the government was putting tight control 
over its expenditures as a result of the Programme for Structural Adjustment 
signed with the IMF.  But for senior managers of Saidal the problem was 
already resolved.  The cash needed for the investments was going to be raised 
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by issuing twenty persent of the enterprise capital for public ownership. The 
development plan had been executed as scheduled.   
 
Important in this first development plan was the emphasis of Saidal to 
increase its partnership with multinational pharmaceutical firms.  Ali Aoun 
strongly believed that the only way to survive in a competitive market was 
not to compete with your enemy but to be partner with them, and this what he 
did.  Since 1996, the number of partnership between Saidal and foreign firms 
had been in steady increase and thanks to this partnership Saidal had become 
the number one domestic producer for pharmaceuticals and had been able to 
open distribution networks in many developing countries and even in some 
developed ones.   
 
7.4.3.2.   Restructuring of its Internal Operations      
 
A.  Its Product Market.   Because Ali Aoun had a clear vision of how Saidal 
would be in ten to twenty years time, he and his management team were 
active looking for every opportunity in the market.  The marketing 
manageress explained that “Through our Cellule Veille and our embassies in 
foreign countries, when an opportunity arises we jump for it” (Marketing 
Manageress, Marketing Department, Head Office, Saidal, 2004). The first 
step that Ali Aoun made when he was nominated the PGM of Saidal in 1995 
was to carry out a diagnosis of the internal operations of the enterprise.    By 
diagnosing the strengths and weaknesses of the enterprise, the PGM realised 
that the enterprise was not producing what the market really needed.  
  
 312 
Consequently, the enterprise followed what a division manager called „A 
strategy of nettoyage‟ (Division Manager, Biotic Division, Saidal, 2004).  
Products which were not demanded a lot by the market were taken from the 
enterprise production lines.  During the early years of transition, the 
consumption of anti-Biotics to treat stress increased among the population as 
a result of the rising terrorism, unemployment and poverty.  Saidal took this 
opportunity and specialised in producing anti-Biotics.  With this strategy of 
specialisation in anti-Biotics, this meant a large cut in the number of Saidal‟s 
suppliers for raw material.  More important, rather than buying the raw 
materials entering in the production of  anti-Biotics from international 
markets, top management decided to produce them, with the help of an 
Italian company All Chim Tech, in the enterprise own facilities in its anti-
Biotical division at Médéa.  In the words of the marketing manageress: 
 
We did not want to depend on international markets for this 
raw material.  It cost a lot to buy them from these markets. 
You must understand that one of the reasons for the decline of 
the enterprise in the early 1990s was because most of its 
production lines stopped to operate because there was no 
foreign currency to buy the raw materials.  We did not want 
the same to happen to us.  If there is any devaluation in the 
Dinar or an increase in the price of this raw material in the 
international markets, this will not hit us hard (Marketing 
Manageress, Marketing Department, Head Office, Saidal, 
2004).         
 
 
In fact, what had happened with Saidal‟s strategy of vertical integration was 
the ability of Saidal to earn foreign currency by exporting the raw materials 
to many countries.  Between 2002 and 2003, the sale revenues from export of 
raw material went from 17 million dinars to 75 millions dinars.   About 44 
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million dinars out of the 75 million dinars came from the Italian market and 
the rest from Sudan, Yemen, Senegal and Niger.        
  
Selling cheap and providing the medicines the most demanded by the 
Algerian customer was one of the major objectives of the long-term strategy 
of Saidal.  According to the marketing manager “Profit is not our main 
concern.  Our main concern is to make our customer happy.  To make him 
find the medicine he wants when he goes at any time to the chemist” 
(Marketing Manager, Pharmal Division, Saidal, 2004).  To achieve this 
objective, Saidal had to reshape the domestic environment for 
pharmaceuticals and this by convincing customers to switch from specialities 
to generics.  One manager explained that: 
 
Specialities are very expensive.  The average Algerian cannot 
afford them.  When a GP prescribes these medicines, very 
often the patient ask him if he can prescribe something 
cheaper…As you know, most people are poor in our country.  
They cannot afford expensive medicines (Manager, Pharmal 
Division, Saidal, 2004)                    
 
 
Another manager added:  
 
 
Generics are 40 to 50 per cent cheaper than specialities and the 
effects are the same.  I am sure that you agree with me that in 
our country we have a culture that says cheap medicines are 
not effective…We are trying hard to convince both patients 
and chemists that generics are safer and effective (Manager, 
Division Biotic, Saidal, 2004). 
 
 
Motivated by this objective, the top management mobilised through various 
means such as press conferences and conferences at the hospitals and medical 
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institutes, a campaign to convince both the customers and the government 
officials that generics were safe and less costly to produce.  More important, 
the argument of the PGM was that changing into generics would reduce the 
government‟ bills for medicine imports which was increasing from year to 
year.  On average, about US$ 770 million were spent each year on imports 
where 80 percent of these imports were specialities.  In fact, most of the 
imported medicines were already produced by local producers.  In many 
occasions, Ali Aoun criticised the government for failing to regulate the 
pharmaceutical market.  For him, imports should be done wisely.  It should 
include the medicines which were mostly needed and which were not 
produced locally.  Patients who suffered from diabetes, cancer and asthma 
very often could not find these medicines in the hospitals and in the chemists 
because some of the import agents stop purposely supplying the market with 
these medicines in order to increase their prices when supplied again.  “It is 
immoral to make profit at the expense of the health of people.  The state 
should do something about it.  This is why we are pushing for the generics.  
We have also decided recently to import the medicines which we do not 
produce and which are needed by the market.  We want to make an end to 
this regular shortage of supplies of the most important medicines” (Marketing 
manageress, Marketing Department, Head Office, Saidal, 2004)      
  
Compared to the SNVI and Eriad Alger, Saidal was ahead of them to find 
business partners.  Its growing sales and its financial health and more 
importantly the importance of the Algerian market for pharmaceuticals which 
was the third in Africa after Egypt and South Africa (Les Débats, 26 April- 2 
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May, 2006) had attracted many foreign investors since 1997.  However, its 
strategy of partnership took two forms: 
  
 Alliance through Façonnage.  This alliance allowed foreign investors to 
produce their own products in the production plants of Saidal using 
Saidal‟s equipments and Saidal‟s personnel.  This type of alliance was 
used with the multinationals like Pfizer and Eli Lilly (USA), Aventis 
(German/France), Novo Nordisk (Denmark), Dar Addawa and Ram 
Pharm (Jordan); 
 
 Industrial Alliance:  This alliance was a joint venture with multinational 
laboratories to create, together with Saidal, factories to produce the 
multinationals products.  Joint ventures were concluded with the GPE 
(Groupement Pharmaceutique Europeen), Pfizer (USA), SANOFI 
Aventis (France), Spimaco (Saudi Arabia), JPM (Jordan), Asdima (Arab 
League), BEULA (South Africa), PharmaCuba (Cuba) and Dar-Addawa 
(Jordan).   Around US$ 140 million were spent by Saidal in these 
alliances with foreign firms.  In addition to foreign firms, Saidal had also 
entered into alliances with domestic private firms such as LAD Pharma, 
Solupharm, Adcima-Spimaco-Jpm-Digromed.  The participation of 
Saidal in the capital of the various joint ventures in the year 2003 is given 
in table 7.9, below.   
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Table 7.10.  The various joint ventures and the percentage of Saidal’s 
 
 Participation in their capital in 2003 
 
 
Name of 
Joint 
Venture  
Total number of 
shares 
Number of shares detained 
by Saidal 
Part of Saidal 
in the capital 
in % 
Adcima 6,000 23   0.38 % 
Nover  112,500 5,000   4.44 % 
Aldaph 25,000 2,500 10.00 % 
Somedial 5,708 1,410 24.70 % 
Pfizer 
Pharms 
Algerie 
5,430 543 10.02 % 
PSM 9,120 2,736 30.00 % 
APS 42,620 12,786 30.00 % 
Joras 20,000 6,000 30.00 % 
Taphco 6,560 2,296 35.00 % 
Algerie 
Clearing 
65,000 5,000 07.69 % 
 Soruce:  Rapport de Géstion 2003 
 
With the strategy of façonnage and joint ventures, Saidal increased the 
number of its product in 1999 to 185 and its share of the domestic market 
increased from 10 percent in 1995 to 45 percent in 2004.  With Algeria 
signing the association with the European Union in April 2002 and the 
prospect of Algeria‟s adhesion to the World Trade Organisation, Saidal set 
for itself a long-term objective of capturing by the year 2011, 50 percent of 
the domestic market and increasing its exports to African and Arab countries 
and some countries in the developed world where 10 percent of its total 
annual turnovers should come from these exports.  Guided by this long-term 
objective, Saidal increased its spending on personnel training and 
development, on project to introduce modern technologies and procedures 
and techniques for quality products and management such as ISO 9001 and 
9002 version 1994 and ISO 9001 version 2000.   
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However, in recent years, Saidal had grown uneasy with its partnership with 
some multinationals.  For its PGM „We want a partnership where the benefit 
is mutual‟ (El Moudjahid, 4 February, 2004).  When Saidal engaged in the 
early 1990s in its joint venture with the Danish firm NovoNordisk and the 
French firm Pierre Fabre to produce Insulin, Saidal hoped a transfer of 
technology and know-how and significantly the constant availability of 
insulin in the Algerian market.  However, these two multinationals had 
preferred importing the products they produced in their countries of origin to 
the Algerian market and had kept for 15 years providing excuses to the 
Ministry of Health for why they could not invest in production.  In 2002, 
Saidal broke the partnership and went solo, and without any financial help 
from the state, it produced Insulin in its production plants located in the 
Eastern region of the country, Constantine.  Recently, the PGM of Saidal had 
also been active in convincing the state authorities and domestic private firms 
that the only way to face the competition from the multinationals in the 
domestic market was to get bigger.  He wanted to see more partnership 
between the public enterprise and the domestic private firm.   
    
B.  Its Organisational Structure.  Like the SNVI and Eriad Alger, Saidal 
carried out its organisational restructuring in 1998.  New departments were 
created, as shown in figure 7.3, below, as a result of its strategy for the 
introduction of new products and the expansion of its distribution networks. 
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Figure 7.3.  Organisational Structure of Saidal in pre and post Organisational Restructuring of 
1998 
     
 
 Organisational Structure in 1996 
 
          President General Manager 
 
     Assistant General Manager 
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Programme and Operational 
Control Department 
 Transit Unit 
 
Source:  Public Holding Chimie-Pharmacie, 1999 
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Organisational Structure in 2006 
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But unlike the SNVI and particularly Eriad Alger, the division managers as 
well as the functional managers had enjoyed autonomy in taking decisions 
regarding their own area of operations.  This had been possible since the 
introduction in 2002 a system called the „Balanced Scorecard‟.  This system 
is a measurement system.  It is a system which gives top managers as 
explained by Kaplan and Norton (1992) a fast but comprehensive view of the 
business.  It provides according to these two authors answers to four basic 
questions: 
 
 How do customers see us? 
 What must we excel at? 
 Can we continue to improve and create value? 
 How do we look to shareholders? 
 
The implementation of the Balanced Scorecard meant for Saidal, the Human 
Resources manager explained “That each manager has to elaborate his own 
action plan based on the problems he knows and to try to find solutions to 
these problems.  His action plan should fit within the overall strategy of the 
enterprise. This type of system of planning is new to us.  We have already 
started to implement it at different managerial levels.  Things are already 
looking good” (HR Manager, HR Department, Head Office, Saidal, 2004).  
With this system in place, the top management team was able to have a clear 
view of how the enterprise was doing.  The team could pin point which units 
of operation were doing well and those which were doing badly and this 
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would help managers to take quick corrective actions before the problems 
would spread to other units of production.      
 
Because quality and diversification in related products had constituted the 
main objectives of the long-term strategy of Saidal, the managers of the 
marketing and research and development departments were given ample 
autonomy to take decision regarding the operations in their departments and 
they were important members in the Conseil Scientifique (Scientific Board), 
which was composed of twenty members mostly medical consultants, and the 
Comite Strategique (Strategic Committee) which was responsible for the 
elaboration of medium and long-terms strategies of the Saidal.  However, to 
understand the demands of Saidal‟s market, a unit called Cellule de Veille 
(Watch unit) was installed in the department of marketing.  Its mission as 
explained by the Marketing manageress was “To diagnose the strengths and 
weaknesses of our competitors…To understand what is going on in the 
domestic market.  The diagnosis will allow us to decide in which segments of 
the market we have to be aggressive and those in which we have to be 
defensive” (Marketing Manageress, Head Office, Saidal, 2004).  Through its 
close communication with other staff in the department of marketing 
particularly the staff in the Medical Information and Promotion units, the 
Cellule was able to promote the image of Saidal in the pharmaceutical market 
inside and outside the country.  The promotion was carried out through 
different means.  Through its two published magazines Saidal News and 
Saidal Santé, through posters and prospectuses and through scientific 
exhibitions.  In 2003 alone, more than 53 exhibitions were carried out in the 
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country by the marketing staff and because  the top management team of 
Saidal was determined to turn Saidal the leading producer of generics in the 
country, a large campaign was mobilised by this staff since 2002 to explain to 
the  wholesalers, GPs, chemists and dentists the benefits they could draw 
from generics in terms of their cheap price and significantly in terms of their 
comparable effects with any parallel specialities.            
 
With the purpose of making the generics the main products of Saidal, its old 
research and development department which was created in the early 1980s 
under the name of the Unité de Recherche en Médicaments et Téchniques 
Pharmaceutiques (Research Unit in Medicines and Pharmaceuticals 
Techniques), (URMTP), was transformed in 1999 into the Centre de 
Recherche et de Developpement (Centre for Research and Development), 
(CRD).  Because Saidal was healthy financially, it had no problem to secure 
credits from its bank the CPA to modernise the CRD.  In 2002, some 168 
million dinars were spent to purchase new equipments and machineries 
needed in the centre and in the development of its manpower.  In the same 
year, the centre employed 180 workers or 5 percent of the total work force 
where 80 percent of its employees were university graduates.  About 56 
percent graduated from the various disciplines of pharmacology.  What is 
important to mention here is that the tasks of the employees of the CRD were 
not focused exclusively on applied research in the laboratories.  Rather, the 
mission of the CRD was to develop medicines particularly in generics and 
also to provide technical assistance to the various production plants.  In 2006, 
the centre was able to bring innovation in three procedures entering in the 
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production of some of Saidal‟s products and the creation of a new product to 
treat dehydration.  These innovations were possible thanks to the regular 
communication between the CRD, marketing and the professional people in 
the domain of pharmaceuticals and medicine within the Conseil Scientifique 
and the Comité Stratégique.  . 
 
Though there existed regular communication between the CRD and other 
major departments, the functional managers at Saidal whether at the CRD, at 
the marketing or at the production departments complained that this 
communication was still a long way from effective.  Functional departments 
depended on each other for their performance and therefore the information 
from one department to another should be adequate, sufficient and submitted 
at the right time.  According to the Marketing manageress “People still do not 
understand the importance of information.  Sometimes the information we 
need from the production and the purchase departments came to us very late 
and this can temporarily block our programme of action.  This is what is 
going on at the present in our enterprise” (Marketing Manageress, Marketing 
Department, Head Office, Saidal, 2004).  The Production manager added “If 
your programme of action is set to produce in 15 days and you come to 
realise that the procurement department let you know at the last moment that 
the raw material is not going to come only after one month, naturally, your 
programme is affected.  Sometimes we have to change our programmes of 
production because the raw materials we have received did not have the 
specifications we wanted.  These are serious constraints that we face here” 
(Production Manager, Biotic Division, Saidal, 2004).              
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In addition to their complaints with communication, many managers 
interviewed rejected the formalisation used in the control of subordinates in 
their enterprise.  The control practices of the socialist era were still practised 
and subordinates were subjected to tight rules and procedures. For example, 
each worker had to follow to the letter the instructions enumerated in his/her 
„Fiche de Poste’. The Fiche defined the worker‟s tasks and duties and how to 
produce the tasks.  For the production manager “The tasks of the worker are 
clearly defined and the worker should follow them to the letter otherwise he 
will be sanctioned” (Production Manager, Pharmal Division, Saidal, 2004).  
The marketing manageress added “The policy of Saidal is to create quality 
products.  We have to define who does what.  Every body should follow what 
is written in the Fiche de Post. He has to follow every instruction given to 
him because in our business precision in measurement and quantities are very 
important.  We have informed our production workers to do it right the first 
time to avoid reworking and wastage” (Markeing Manageress, Marketing 
Department, Head Office, Saidal, 2004).  Based on this tight control policy, a 
worker was evaluated for his/her performance based on how much he/she had 
achieved what was required from him/her in the Fiche de Poste.   
 
Discipline by formal rules and procedures meant that rotation of workers 
between jobs was impossible.  It also meant that any problem a worker might 
encounter when doing his/her tasks was referred straight to his/her superior.  
The position of a person in the organisational hierarchy seemed to be very 
important.  Workers were not ready to take any responsibility for fear of 
getting fired or demoted.  The production manager explained that “For any 
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little problem, the worker has to take the problem to his boss.  Sometimes the 
problem even goes to the division manager or even to the PGM.  They have 
[the workers] this idea that managers know best.” (Production Manager, 
Pharmal Division, Saidal, 2004). The tight control had also somehow 
discouraged some skilled workers to suggest ideas that might have helped 
improving better the way they carry out their tasks.      
 
C.  Its Employment Policies.  Unlike the SNVI and Eriad Alger, Saidal had 
since 1995, enjoyed, as shown in table 7.7, above, an increase in its work 
force.  Some 1,000 were recruited between 1999 and 2004.    The recruitment 
covered people with specialised and management skills.  The shortage of 
skills like marketing, financial and administrative management and even 
technical skills which entered in the production process was a serious 
problem not only for Saidal but for all enterprises in the country because they 
were few in the labour market and this made competition over them very 
intensive.  At Saidal, for example, based on its strategy of diversification in 
related products meant that the acquisitions of skills in industrial pharmacy 
was paramount.  For the human resources manager:  
 
The biggest problem that Saidal faces is in the industrial 
pharmacy.  You have to know that the Algerian university does 
not train and develop in this domain anymore.  The university 
now creates pharmacists but not industrial pharmacists.  This 
means that we are forced to obtain these skills either by 
recruiting from outside or developing them inside.  We prefer 
to develop them inside because it will cost us a lot if we want 
to recruit from outside.  Also, when you train and develop 
internally, you are giving your workers the prospect for 
promotion for more rewarding positions.  This will create more 
commitment to the enterprise and dedication to do better.  We 
want our professional to stay with us.  The private sector is, 
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between brackets stealing our skilled workers because they pay 
them almost 6 to 10 times more than us (HR Manager, HR 
Department, Head Office, Saidal, 2004).   
 
Similar comments were given by the marketing manageress: 
 
We have a lot of information which comes to us but how to 
take advantage of this information is a problem.  We do not 
have experts in statistics, experts in market research etc.  We 
have tried to solve this problem by training internally.  
Recruiting from outside is generally very expensive.  
Generally, these recruits do not stay with us because they are 
paid better by the private sector…The problem in the public 
sector is that we have a lot of good things, a lot of good ideas, 
the problem is that we cannot pay the competence we want.  
So, we have opted to create this competence internally 
(Marketing Manageress, Marketing Department, Head Office, 
Saidal, 2004). 
 
Between 2001 and 2003, the recruitment of people with management skills 
increased by 9 percent and for specialised skills by 3 percent.  Because Saidal 
was guided by its policy of retaining the best skilled people, the 600 
managers who existed in 1995 were repositioned in tasks which suited them 
best with their specialised skills.  As far as the work contracts were 
concerned, in 2001, out of a total number of workers of 3,412, around 73 
percent or 2,500 had permanent contracts and the rest were temporary 
contracts.  Often the unskilled workers were offered temporary contracts.  It 
is worth mentioning that the steady increase in the number of workers while 
most public enterprises in the country were downsizing came as a result of 
the enterprise strategy for growth and development initiated since 1997 
through the extension of its production capacities, its research laboratories 
and its sales force.  Avoiding to a maximum worker lay offs, this gave Saidal 
a good image in the labour market and had created a good management-
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workers and management-trade union relationship.  For the manager of the 
department of Conflicts and Social Affairs at the UGTA “The UGTA has no 
problems with Saidal…The enterprise has protected jobs and created new 
ones.  The salaries of the workers have been in steady increase.  This what 
every Algerian enterprise should do” (Manager, Department of Conflicts and 
Social Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 2005). The manager of the human 
resources of Saidal added on this point: 
 
We have always paid our workers.  We have never missed 
paying our workers since 1995.  Every year, we distribute 
among our workers bonuses for profit making of the enterprise.  
It is not much but we never deny them what they deserve.  It is 
true that some of the trade union representatives have still in 
their heads the ideas and policies of the socialist period which 
sometimes create some problems in our discussions with them 
but these problems had never been serious or created any 
disturbances in our relationship with the trade union.  …In 
fact, sometimes we, including the PGM, have to consult them 
in matters which sometimes have nothing to do with them.  We 
have always been careful not to spoil our relationship with our 
social partner [the UGTA] (HR Manager, HR Department, 
Head Office, Saidal, 2004).   
   
Compared to the SNVI and Eriad Alger, workers at Saidal were better off 
than their counterparts in these two enterprises.  In fact, what was understood 
from the interviews with many managers at Saidal, Saidal paid higher basic 
salaries to its workers than any other public enterprise in the country, with the 
exception of SONATRACH and SONELGAZ.  Production and productivity 
were highly emphasised in the action plans of Saidal and therefore 
performance of a production worker was evaluated on these two criteria.  At 
the managerial levels, managers were also evaluated based on the objectives 
assigned to them in their performance contracts.  Though the procedures in 
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the recruitment and selection of workers were similar to those followed at the 
SNVI and Eriad Alger, there was however, no mention by any interviewees 
at the UGTA that the piston was exercised either in the selection, promotion 
or remuneration of workers at Saidal.  One worker of Saidal mentioned that 
“Here [at the enterprise] things are tough.  If you do not do your job right, 
you are immediately sacked.  They do not tolerate mistakes.  People are too 
scared to lose their jobs.  We have to work hard to keep our jobs”.  Even 
when managers failed to achieve the objectives assigned to them, they were 
sacked.  On this point, when the PGM, Ali Aoun, was asked in a press 
conference why a number of highly professional workers of Saidal were 
fired, his answer was simply “They did not do their job as they were 
supposed to do it” (El-Watan, 15 March, 2005).   
 
With its strategy for quality certification launched since 1999, intensive 
efforts were made in training and development encompassing workers at 
almost every level of the enterprise.  In 2001, out of a total number of 
workers of 3,400, 1,379 received training and development courses, 80 
percent of them were employees who worked in management and 
professional tasks.  The training covered four main areas: 
 Management (strategic and operational).  This had touched managers and 
specialised employees; 
 
 Quality assurance; 
 
 Postgraduate courses in industrial pharmacy; 
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 Specialities in the domain of R&D in pharmaceuticals 
 
Other training and development programmes were also introduced in skills 
such as financial accounting, stock control and financial management.  In 
2003, the enterprise introduced procedures for the evaluation of the training 
and development programmes initiated since 1999 and also the evaluation of 
the bodies which provided training and development courses inside and 
outside the enterprise.                               
 
Clearly, Saidal, Eriad Alger and the SNVI had followed different approaches 
to enterprise restructuring.  In order to be able to evaluate the effectiveness of 
these approaches, one had to look at the changes that took place in their 
financial performance and their efficiency.   
 
7.5. Impact of Restructuring on their Performance 
 
Because Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI were officially required, like the 
rest of state-owned enterprises eligible for privatisation, to embark in 
restructuring in 1998, the analysis of the impact of their restructuring 
behaviour on their financial and efficiency performance covered a five years 
period extending from 1999 to 2003.  One straight forward way to understand 
their financial performance was to look at the changes that took place in their 
annual sale turnovers.  These changes are displayed in table 7.11 below.   
 
 
  
 330 
Table 7.11.  Annual sale turovers (in million dinars) of Eriad Alger, Saidal 
 and the SNVI  for the period 1999-2003. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Data analysis. 
 
The table clearly shows that though the year 1999 was a good financial year 
for Eriad Alger, this did not last.  Its sales started to decline since 2000.  It 
declined in 2000 by 15 percent and in the following year by 11 percent.  In 
fact, in 2002, its sale turnover was 56 percent lower than its level in 1999.  By 
contrast, the sale turnovers of Saidal – with the exception of the year 2000 
where the sale turnovers dopped by 10 percent – had increased in 2002 by 31 
percent its level in 1999.  The same can be said with the SNVI.   The 
turnovers dropped in 2000 by 8 percent from the previous year and soon 
picked up and increased on average 8 percent each year between 2001 and 
2003.        
 
One has to point out that though the sale turnover is an indicator of the 
financial performance of an enterprise, it does not, however, show the 
enterprise solvency.  The enterprise solvency can be understood by looking at 
the enterprise added value, net profit after taxe and fundamentally at its cash 
                   Enterprise                            
Year                           
Eriad Alger      Saidal      SNVI 
1999 18,337 4,667 10,664 
2000 15,546 4,202   9,874 
2001 13,843 5,264 12,557 
2002 8,103 5,820 13,632 
2003 ____ 6,129 14,736 
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flow.  The data on these indicators was available from Eriad Alger and Saidal 
but not from the SNVI and this was the reason why table 7.12 below included 
only these two enterprises.               
 
Table 7.12.   Added values, net profits after taxe and Cash flows (in million  dinars)  at 
Eriad Alger and Saidal for the period 1999-2003 
 
      Enterprise   financial              
                   indicators 
Year 
Added value Net profits after taxe     Cash flows 
 
Eriad  
Alger 
Saidal Eriad  
Alger 
Saidal Eriad  
Alger 
Saidal 
1999 4,503 2,472  1,109 722 1,706 1,072 
2000  2,301  271 _____    624 
2001 1,689 2,815       46 380 _____    796 
2002 1,287 2,837 (-)133 264 _____    590 
2003 _____ 3,339 _____ 482 _____    833 
Source:  Data analysis. 
 
The table clearly shows that 1999 was a very good financial year for both 
Eriad Alger and Saidal.  Their added values (calculated as (the income from 
the products sold and services provided and the value of the products 
stocked) less (the costs of raw materials and equipments and services entering 
in the production process), their net profits and their cash fllows were 
positive.  Some managers at Eriad Alger related this year good financial 
position of their enterprise not so much to its performance but rather to some 
government subsidies to pay for workers redundancies.  The table clearly 
shows, however, that in 2002, Eriad Alger incurred heavy losses.  And by 
2005, the enterprise was unable to buy wheat to produce its main products.  
By contrast, Saidal, with the exception of the year 2000 where its net profits 
dropped from the previous year by 38 percent and its cash flow by 58 
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percent, it was solvent for the whole period 1999-2003 and it is still healthy 
financially until this time of writing this work.     
  
To have a clear picture of whether the restructuring actions introduced at 
Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI, had contributed to their efficiency 
improvement, it was decided to measure their productivity.  Two measures 
were used:  Total Productivity (calculated as Total Output divided by Total 
Expenditures on labour, raw materials, equipments and services entering in 
the production process) and Partial Productivity (calculated as Total Output 
divided by the Total Number of Workers).  The first measure was used for 
Eriad Alger and Saidal but not the SNVI because of the lack of data from this 
enterprise.  The second measure was used for all the three enterprises.  The 
results from the two measures are displayed in tables 7.13 and 7.14 below. 
 
 Table 7.13.  Total productivity (TP) of Eriad Alger and Saidal for the period 1999-2003. 
 
     Enterprise T P 
Year                                                          
Eriad Alger 
TP=Kg/Cost in dinar 
Saidal 
TP=Unit/Cost in dinar 
1999 0.7 0.3 
2000 ___ 0.3 
2001 0.5 0.3 
2002 0.7 0.3 
2003 ___ 0.3 
Source:  Data analysis. 
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Table 7.14.  Productivity per head of employee (PHE) at Eriad Alger, Saidal 
 and the SNVI for the period 1999-2003.    
 
                 Year       1999      2000      2001      2002   2003 
Enterprise                     PHE      
 
 
Saidal 
 
Quantity 
of    
units per 
year 
   110,313,000   97,287,000 112,509,000 121,111,000 12,4371,000 
No. of 
workers 
              2,800            3,377            3,412            3,563            3,762 
PHE             39,000          28,000          33,000          33,000          33,000 
 
SNVI 
No. of 
vehicles 
per year 
             _____           _____           _____            2,464            3,754 
No. of 
workers 
              9,209            9,165            8,761            8,119            8,147 
PHE              _____          _____           _____              0.33              0.33 
 
Eriad 
Alger 
 
Quantity 
of Kg 
per year 
 
1,917,848,200 627,061,800 662,410,700 435,933,300         ______ 
No. of 
workers 
              5,195            4,888            4,644           2,788         ______ 
PHE           369,172        128,285         142,638        156,361         ______ 
Source: Data analysis. 
 
Table 7.13 indicates that efficiency had been stable at Saidal but slightly 
varied at Eriad Alger.  For every dinar spent, 0.3 units were produced each 
year by the production plants of Saidal.  In the case of Eriad Alger, for each 
dinar spent in the production process, between 0.5 and 0.7 kilogrammes were 
produced.  The same can be said with efficiency in terms of productivity per 
head of employee.   At Saidal, each employee produced round 33,000 units 
each year.  At Eriad Alger, productivity was high in 1999.  Each employee 
produced on average around 370,000 kg of products.  But in the following 
year, it dropped by 35 percent.  And very surprising, it improved in the 
following two years despite the poor financial performance of the enterprise 
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during these years.  At the SNVI, despite its good financial performance, its 
productivity was poor even when compared with the socialist period.  In 
1976, around 4,037 vehicles were produced in a year by a total number of 
workers of 5,443 or one vehicle per worker.  This trend stayed the same all 
along the seventies and the early 1980s.  In 1986, for example, the enterprise 
produced around 7,350 vehicles by a total number of workers of 10,080 or 
one vehicle per worker.  But since the late 1980s and the whole period of the 
1990s and the early 2000s, efficiency became very poor because of the hard 
budget constraints and the stagnation of the market.  In 2002, for example, 
the average productivity was one vehicle per three workers but as the 
economic activity in the country started to grow slowly, productivity started 
to show some signs of improvement.  In 2004, the number of vehicles 
produced increased from 2,464 in 2002 to 4,000 with a total number of 
workers of 8,200 or one vehicle per two workers.  The enterprise was still 
unable to reach the efficiency level of the 1970s.  Many managers 
interviewed recognised that productivity at the SNVI was still low and it 
should be improved if the enterprise wanted to survive the competition from 
imports.     
  
7.6. Conclusion 
 
It is quite clear that Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI had approached 
restructuring with different strategies which consequently made an impact 
on their financial and efficiency performance.  Saidal was more successful 
than the SNVI and Eriad Alger in terms of its financial position and market 
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shares in the domestic market.  This was possible through its diversification 
in its products and innovation.  The SNVI was incremental in its 
restructuring and only few modifications were introduced in its products.  In 
fact, it was able to survive competition because of the government explicit 
and implicit subsidies.  As for Eriad Alger, despite its good performance 
recorded in 1999, this did not last.  Eriad Alger was constrained not only by 
the hard budget constraints but significantly by the government strong 
interference in its daily operations and particularly the government 
determination to sell the profitable activites and leave Eriad Alger in 
activities where both the prices of their products and the suppliers of their 
raw materials were government controlled.  At this point, one is intrigued to 
understand the underlying factors in the environment that determined the 
restructuring behaviour of the three enterprises.  The next chapter will try to 
shed some light on these factors.                  
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Chapter 8 
 
Determinants of Enterprise Restructuring at Eriad Alger, 
Saidal and the SNVI     
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
Firms are affected by and can affect the environment in which they operate.  
Effective management is the one that has the capacity to understand, analyse 
and manage the various factors in the environment be it political, economic 
or socio-cultural.  This chapter attempted to shed some lights on factors that 
had affected, whether positively or negatively, enterprise restructuring at 
Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI.  Six factors were discerned in this study.  
These were:   
     
8.2. The Trend in the Market 
 
In any enterprise, random factors play a key role in its restructuring 
behaviour such as the level of its debts at the beginning of restructuring, the 
location of the enterprise and the trend in the industry in which the enterprise 
operates.  The findings in this study clearly indicate that the trend in the 
industry was one of the most significant incentives that encouraged or slowed 
down enterprise restructuring.  During the early years of the transition, like 
the rest of most manufacturing industries in the country, Eriad Alger, Saidal 
and the SNVI suffered a sharp decline in their outputs.  For example, in 1995, 
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the chemical and pharmaceuticals industry declined by 18 percent, the food 
industry by 12 percent and the mechanical industry by 29 percent.  With the 
birth rate of the population growing at a rate of 3.5 percent per year and a 
steady deterioration of the health of the majority of the population, the 
pharmaceuticals industry started to grow fast.  In 1997, the outputs of this 
industry increased by 9.2 percent whereas the outputs of the food and 
mechanical industries dropped by 3 percent and 70 percent respectively 
(CNES, 1997).   The report of the CNES (2003: 59) estimated that between 
1990 and 1999, the Algerian market for pharmaceutical increased by 51.7 
percent or an average increase of 4.7 per year,  a growth which was faster 
than most manufacturing industries in the country including the  food and 
mechanical industries.  This study reveals, however, that though the trend in 
the industry in which an enterprise operates can be a determinant factor in 
enterprise restructuring this cannot work on its own without other 
complementary but essential institutional mechanisms.               
    
8.3. Management Autonomy, Partnership with Foreign Firms and 
Government Intervention Matter in Enterprise Restructuring 
 
There was a strong belief amongst all the managers interviewed in this 
research that autonomy in decision makings and partnership with foreign 
firms were more important than selling wholly or majority of their enterprises 
to private investors.  They did not see privatisation as the answer to any 
production or productivity problems faced by any enterprise in the country.  
For them, the transformation of their enterprises into joint stock companies 
was an incentive strong enough to allow them to show their managerial skills 
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and to bring the changes needed in their enterprises.   The PGM of Saidal, for 
example, was nominated in 1999 as one of the best PGM in the country and 
in 2004 his enterprise was nominated as the most successful domestic 
manufacturing enterprise in the country in terms of profits, quality products 
and selling at competitive prices (Saidal News, 2004).       
  
The managers also emphasised that the only way for top management 
autonomy to work well was to keep the government away from the day-to-
day operations of their enterprises and particularly from their strategic 
decisions.  Though Saidal at the time of writing this work had privatised 35 
percent of its capital, its PGM expressed clearly in many national press 
conferences that he regretted havivg sold, in 1998, 20 percent of Saidal‟s 
capital and if it was up to him, he would prefer to see the government stay 
100 percent ownership of Saidal but under condition that it would not 
interfere in the internal affairs of the enterprise.  The case of Saidal and the 
SNVI reveals that corporatisation of the state-owned enterprise under state 
ownership can benefit top managers in two different ways.  Managers can 
show their managerial skills to improve the performance of their enterprises 
and they can secure their survival and the survival of their enterprises by 
using their political skills.     
 
The case of Saidal shows that the only way to maximise the autonomy of the 
PGM is to minimise the government interference in the internal affairs of the 
enterprise.  This will happen only when the enterprise is profitable and 
solvent and this will make the enterprise in less need for financial support 
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from the government as clearly explained by one manager when he said 
proudly that: 
 
Saidal is successful not because of the support of the treasury.  
It was able to survive even during its hardest times and this 
survival was possible without asking from the state one single 
dinar.  In fact, the good performance of the Saidal has been a 
source for state revenues.  Every year, Saidal had since 1995 
paid between 400 and 500 million dinars on profits taxes 
(Manager, Head Office, Saidal, 2004). 
    
 
The financial autonomy of Saidal increased the power of its PGM to take 
strategic decisions and this had often led to conflicts with the Ministry of 
Health.  For example, when the PGM decided to produce the BirdFlu and 
Insulin without any foreign partner, the Ministry refused to give any explicit 
or implicit back up to his decisions.  In fact, the Ministry refused to make 
purchase orders of Insulin for the state hospitals and preferred to import the 
product from overseas despite the price was much higher than that offered by 
Saidal.   
 
The PGM of Saidal grew confident in facing the challenges created by the 
Ministry of Health not only as a result of the enterprise financial autonomy 
but also because he had the full back up of the trade union.  He was aware, 
since he was nominated as the PGM of Saidal in 1995, that in order to be able 
to fulfil his vision to rescue the enterprise from liquiation and turning it a 
number one domestic producer for pharmaceuticals, he had to create the right 
social conditions in the enterprise.  He was able to convince the 
representatives of the UGTA and the members of the Comité de 
Participation, who were against any form of privatisation, that the 
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partnership of Saidal with foreign investors would never lead to workers lay 
offs but rather it would protect jobs and create new ones.  By allowing the 
foreign investors to produce in Saidal‟s own production plants and with 
Saidal‟s personnel, Saidal had achieved two important objectives.  First, it 
was able to upgrade its existing products and produce new products with 
quality recognised by international standards and this allowed Saidal to 
increase its shares in the domestic market and to increase its exports.  Two, it 
was able to absorb any unused capacities available in the enterprise and this 
had allowed Saidal to avoid the closure of unproductive plants and therefore 
avoided massive lay offs.  Three, being a profitable enterprise, at a time when 
most state enterprises in the country were recording losses, this made the 
salaries of Saidal workers higher than their counterparts in most state 
enterprise and this had created a good management-trade union relationship 
and had made Saidal very attractive to talented workers.  In fact, the 
profitability of Saidal and its good reputation in the country had, as this was 
clearly shown by all the interviewees, increased the commitment of its 
managers and workers and made them proud of their enterprise, a 
commitment and a pride necessary for any enterprise seeking to improve its 
production and productivity.    
 
At the SNVI and Eriad Alger, however, the relationship between 
management and the trade union was poor.  At the SNVI, the relationship 
was poor since 1970s and became worse in the 1990s.  The massive lay offs 
during the 1990s made the worker representatives suspicious of any proposed 
restructuring plan made by the the management and often the suspicion had 
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led to worker strikes. The human resources manager clearly explained this 
point when he said that:   
  
The SNVI cannot take any action unless managers have to 
consult our workers especially when the action has to do with 
job cuts.  The whole enterprise will stop if we do things behind 
their backs.  To give you an example, Hundai is interested to 
work with us but they are not ready to accept to work with 
8,000 workers, they want only 1,000.  We are now also talking 
with Renault Trucks and their problems is also the surplus of 
workers in the enterprise‟ (HR Manager, HR Department, 
Head Office, SNVI, 2005).   
 
 
A trade union representative at the SNVI also added: 
 
Workers have learned a hard lesson from the restructuring of 
the 1990s.  As representatives of the workers, the UGTA is for 
restructuring but not for that which cuts jobs but rather which 
protects jobs and create new ones.  The people with authority 
in the enterprise [the top management team] are not allowed to 
put any restructuring plan unless the plan is thoroughly 
discussed with the workers representatives of the UGTA and 
the Comité de Participation.  Anything done without us is 
illegal.  If this happens, we will shut down all production 
operations and we can also take the matter to the court. 
(Representative of the UGTA at the SNVI, UGTA’s 
Headquarters, 2005).     
 
The strong position of the trade union in the SNVI was one of the reasons 
which made many foreign firms seeking partnership with the SNVI reluctant.  
In fact, it took a lot of convincing from the part of the PGM of the SNVI and 
the CPE before the workers representatives accepted the fact that the 
company BTK would be a majority owner in the division of Tiaret.  They 
accepted this fact only when BTK promised to protect the existing 900 jobs, 
create new jobs and to invest in physical and human capital.     The same can 
be said with Eriad Alger.  Worker representatives at Eriad Alger were 
  
 342 
strongly opposed to any privatisation or partnership which would lead to job 
slashing.  When the production plant Aissa Idir of Mezghana division, for 
example, was sold to an Algerian company laBelle, the transaction was 
carried out in a complete secrecy without the knowledge of worker 
representatives.  The workers had rejected the sale and carried out acts of 
sabotage in the privatised plant by refusing to work for six months and by 
making threats to any worker willing to work or cooperating with the 
instructions of the new owner. 
 
In addition, foreign firms who were interested to invest in the SNVI and 
Eriad Alger were also reluctant to do so because of the strong intervention of 
the government in their internal affairs.  The SNVI was suffering from heavy 
debts for a long time and this made it constantly subject to ask for financial 
helps from the government as this was clearly explained by its technical 
manager when he said that: 
 
Yes, definitely.  The state helps us financially.  It follows us 
and when we are in any financial risk, it comes to our rescue.  
You see, we have diversified production lines and this is the 
choice of the state.  The state wants to protect this industry 
because it sees in it as an industry which can revitalise other 
industries to keep some regional economic equilibrium.  And if 
we fall short of achieving the objectives of the state, the state 
will come to the rescue (Technical Manager, Technical 
Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005) 
 
 
 
My understanding from the interviews with many managers is that when it 
comes to strategic decisions, the PGM of the SNVI had the hand tied.  When 
decisions concerned big investment projects like for example which foreign 
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firm should have partnership with the SNVI, the human resource manager 
explained that “We cannot bring a partner from a country with whom our 
government has bad relations, even if this firm is the best.  Politics plays a 
major part in this type of decisions.  It is not possible to do things behind the 
government back” (HR Manager, HR Department, Head Office, SNVI, 
2005).     On this point, it is worth mentioning that recently the government 
has explicitly shown its willingness to financially support the state enterprises 
which were considered of high importance in its economic development 
policies.  This decision came after the programme of the public sector 
restructuring which the government launched in 2008.  Accordingly, the 
public sector was divided into three categories.  The first category was the 
Sociétés de Partenariat et de Developpement (Partnership and Development 
Companies), (SPP), which replaced the SGPs but inherited the same mission 
as the SGPs.  The second category was composed of thirteen Sociétés 
Economiques de Developpement (Economic Development Companies), 
(SED).  Each SED is a mega-company composed of a number of medium and 
small public enterprises in similar and related activities.  The SNVI was 
converted into a mega-company including in its portfolio all public 
enterprises operating in mechanical engineering activities and those with 
close link to these activities.  Some observers believed that the SNVI would 
perhaps take back the entities which were spinned off from SONACOME in 
the organisational reforms of 1982.  The same can be said with Saidal.  With 
the new government restructuring reforms of the public sector, Saidal 
included in its portfolio all the state enterprises operating in pharmaceuticals.  
The third category was the Sociétés de Promotion Industrielle (Promotional 
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Industrial Companies), (SPI), which were public enterprises newly created 
such as shipbuilding and Informatics.  The SED and the SPI were considered 
the main economic actors which would boost the development of the 
manufacturing sector in the country (El Watan, 22 November, 2007; 16 
March and 6 June 2008) and as a result the government promised to provide 
implicit and explicit support to these enterprises.  Under the instructions of 
the government, the Bank of Algeria introduced a programme for financial 
restructuring of 146 public enterprises by subsidising them with fresh cash 
and writing off and extending the repayment of their debts to help them to 
restructure and be competitive.  Whether the financial assistance provided by 
the government is going to help these state enterprises to introduce effective 
restructuring and be profitable as the government has expected, only time 
will tell.      
 
One should not forget that managers of the state-owned enterprises had 
welcomed these reforms of the public sector.  These reforms would bring 
more rescue opportunities to their enterprises but also would secure their 
survival.  Being a top manager in a state enterprise, especially in an enterprise 
of strategic importance in the national economy, this position will often allow 
the manager to influence the policies of the government.  When the manager 
knows how to play his/her cards right, this will allow him/her to take up an 
important political position in the government administrations as was the case 
for example with Ahmed Ghozali who was the PGM of SONATRACH and 
later he became the head of the government.   
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In addition, a top managerial position in a state enterprise provides job 
security and social prestige to the incumbent manager.  Though the salary for 
managerial positions in the private sector is often higher than in the state 
sector, the top managers of Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI had no 
intention to see themselves managers in private firms.  The reason can 
perhaps be explained by the fact that under private ownership, their 
management behaviour will be strongly monitored and this will be a decisive 
factor for their dismissal from their jobs if the performance of their 
enterprises is not satisfactory.  Also, in a country where the manufacturing 
sector is still predominantly government owned, and the state enterprises are 
still the largest in the country, being a PGM of a state enterprise is a 
prestigious status in society.  Until 2005, the state enterprises covered some 
80 percent of the manufacturing sector in the country.  In terms of capacities 
and worker sizes, they were larger than the private firms.  In terms of worker 
size, for example, the largest private firm did not employ more than 700 
workers.  Psychologically, the PGMs of the state enterprises especially those 
which operated at national levels saw themselves as the Elites and they had 
no intention to see their Elitism disturbed by any means especially the 
prospect for future privatisation.  There were a lot of cases published in the 
national press where the PGMs of some public enterprises mobilised their 
managers at lower levels as well as their workers to back up the UGTA‟s 
denunciation of the government policy to privatise the state enterprise.  While 
writing this work, the government had in fact announced to make an end to 
privatisation of the state-owned enterprise.  It had also announced to carry out 
  
 346 
an investigation for all the privatisations which had been carried out since 
1994 to see whether they had been done within the law.      
 
8.4. Corruption as an Obstacle to Restructuring and Fair 
Competition 
 
 
Without any exception, all the interviewees in this study had emphasised that 
the macroeconomic environment in Algeria had improved especially since 
the year 2000.  And when the managers of Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI 
were asked whether their enterprises faced any problems with the provision 
of the utilities services such as water, electricity, telecommunications and 
road transportation, they all confirmed that these services had improved 
tremendously when compared with their status during the 1990s.  On this 
point, the manager of the production plant Aissa Idir explained that “During 
the political instability of the country, nothing worked.  The mills stopped 
working for weeks because there was no water to wash the wheat.  Water was 
in short supply even for our own use.  We had to install our own water tanks 
to store water.  Now, every thing is fine” (Production Manager, Aissa Idir 
plant, Mezghana division, Eriad Alger, 2005).  The human resources manager 
of the SNVI also added that “The civil war had destroyed many of the 
development achievements of the 1970s.  The terrorists had attacked people, 
buildings, water pipes, transmission installations, roads.  During this time, 
our enterprise suffered from electricity interruption and water shortage.  But 
we managed” (HR Manager, HR Department, Head Office, SNVI, 2005).   
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Though the political and economic situations had improved in recent years, 
all the managers of the three enterprises emphasised that the environment in 
which they competed was still not properly equipped with mechanisms and 
institutions to protect competitors.  Unfair competition was mentioned as the 
most damaging to their enterprises performance.  Their competitors 
especially those competing by imports exercised what they described as 
„Concurrence déloyale’ (or illegal competition) by bribing officials in the 
different government institutions.  Because of this unfair competition, the 
growth of most state enterprises had been slow creating a slow national 
economic growth.  According to the World Bank (World Bank, 2000), when 
corruption is widely spread in a country, it can reduce the growth of a country 
from 0.5 to 1 percent each year.  In a survey carried out on bribery in 
Algerian enterprises, about 75 percent of senior managers surveyed admitted 
giving bribery to officials in the various state institutions (Tribune, 29, 
September, 2004) and bribery had contributed to some 50 percent of the 
turnovers of enterprises practicing this illegal act (Liberté, 20 March, 2007).   
 
Corruption is a very serious problem in Algeria.  It is found in all institutions 
whether political, economic, legal or social.  In the words of one manager at 
the UGTA “Corruption in Algeria is a national sport” (Department of 
Conflicts and Social Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 2005) and there is a 
saying spread among many citizens in the country that “If you have missed to 
make a fortune in the early years of independence, today is the right time to 
make a fortune”.  Although Algeria had ratified in April 2004 the Convention 
of the United Nations to fight corruption, the Transparency International (TI) 
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had recently classified the government institutions in Algeria as the most 
corrupted in the world.  The country was allocated the score of 2.6 in 2003, 
2.7 in 2004, 2.8 in 2005, and 3.1 in 2006 (AACC, 2007).  A score below 3 out 
of 10 indicates a high level of corruption in government institutions.  From 
these four scores, it was clear that the country was surrounded by a serious 
social problem if not tackled soon would lead the country to ruin.     
 
Many interviewees in this study particularly at Saidal and at Eriad Alger 
emphasised that their enterprises could have done much better if they had less 
administrative obstacles created by some corrupted officials in the 
government administration.  One manager at Saidal explained that “In their 
speeches, ministers put strong emphasis that the state is doing its best to help 
the domestic firms to increase national production and reduce imports.  In 
practice, imports are in the increase from year to year.  I can give you an 
example.  In the year 2003 alone, the state has spent some US$700 million on 
import of medicines.  Many of these medicines are already produced by our 
plants.  I can also tell you another thing.  In the law of import, a company is 
allowed to import only for a period of two years and then it should invest in 
production.  What happens, these companies import for two years and then 
they dissolve themselves and then they appear again under different names to 
import again” (Manager, Pharmal Division, Saidal, 2004).   
 
Another manager added:   
 
They say [the government officials] they are doing their best to 
reduce imports and want to increase the production of 
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domestic enterprises, but when we sent them our projects of 
investments, sometimes they answer us after 4 or 6 months 
which in reality they should give us their response in 72 hours.  
And sometimes, they never give us an answer.  Some people in 
the state want to block our efforts to destroy the company 
(Manager, Biotic Division, Saidal, 2004).   
 
 
The unwillingness of the government administration to support Saidal in 
some of its projects for development was clearly demonstrated when the 
PGM of Saidal decided to produce Insulin and BirdFlue in Saidal‟s 
production plants at Constantine in the east of Algeria.  For the BirdFlue, for 
example, the Minister of Health did not show any ambition to buy the 
medicine but rather, as the PGM of Saidal explained in a press conference, 
“They [the Minister of Health] want to import, so, leave them to import.  
Some people appear to be interested in import though they have the 
opportunity to have the medicine produced locally and less expensive…If 
they do not take it, there will be thousand others who will…I will find a 
market to export the product or to sell it to the local chemists.  There are rich 
people who can buy it but it will be pity‟ (Politique, 19 March, 2006).  The 
reluctance of some government officials to give their full back ups to some 
projects of development of some state and privatised enterprises in the 
country was, as understood from the interview with a manager at the UGTA, 
“An act of sabotage of local production.  Some people in the government get 
really upset when our public enterprises are doing well and they will do their 
best to destroy the ambitions and the dreams of these enterprises” (Manager, 
Department of Conflicts and Social Affairs, Headquarters, UGTA, 2005).  
Some interviewees believed that the attacks on some production plants in the 
country especially those of large state and privatised enterprises that were 
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doing well were not an act of terrorism as it was often reported in the national 
press but an act of some people who want to see them destroyed.  In fact even 
the PGM of Saidal, as it was understood from some interviewees, was him 
personally targeted by these attacks.  This clearly explains why both Saidal 
and also the SNVI and many other large state and privatised enterprises in the 
country have used armed security recruited from the Securité Nationale 
(National Security) to protect themselves and their enterprises.   
 
More explanations for the underlying forces at play to create obstacles to 
some large state and privatised enterprises prosperity were given by a former 
manager of the SGP CABELEQ interviewed at the UGTA‟s headquarters in 
2005.  In his words:    
 
Many officials in the state administration are themselves 
involved in imports and they do not want the domestic 
production to prosper because they will lose a lot...Some of 
them have established their own companies to compete with 
the public enterprises.  I can give you an example.  Why Eriad 
Alger is not doing well.  Because one member of the 
government wants to see Eriad Alger out of the way so his big 
mills which are located not very far from Algiers will dominate 
the market of the central region.  Ministers always talk about 
privatising the EPEs to make them efficient.  Most enterprises 
which have been sold have been turned into parking places or 
closed down…I can also say that when a member of the 
government chooses a partner for a local company, he 
definitely chooses a foreign company particularly French 
because this partner has already amarlu foumu (filled his 
mouth)[which means has given him a big bribe].   
 
 
With the partnership of Algeria with the European Union, and the prospect of 
becoming a member in the World Trade Organisation, the Algerian markets 
had become an open market with strong competition from the multinationals.  
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This had created some fear amongst many PGMs in both state and private 
domestic that the the long-term survival of their enterprises was under a 
serious threat.  Consequently, they called the government authorities to 
allowed state and private domestic enterprises to merge together to create 
mega domestic companies to face the threat.  Both the PGMs of Saidal and 
the SNVI had put forward projects for partnership with some domestic 
private firms but the government administration had showed its reluctance to 
give its consent to these projects.  The discontentment with this attitude of the 
government administration was clear when one manager at the SNVI 
explained that: 
   
When the private domestic firm CEVITAL approached us to 
enter into partnership with us, we were happy.  We submitted 
our project to the state but the state has blocked it.  Until now, 
we do not have a concrete reason for the refusal.  It seems that 
some decision makers in the state administration are happy 
with us to have a foreign partner than to have a domestic one...  
By going into partnership with domestic firms, we are not only 
creating more jobs but we are bringing more revenues to the 
state.  The foreign partner does not pay any taxes and he is 
allowed to take all his profit outside the country which is very 
harmful to the growth of the national economy...If we want to 
grow we need to reinvest the profits we make.  The foreign 
partner is usually not ready to do that…If these decision 
makers think that the foreign partners will bring the know-
how, they have to think again.  Nowadays, it is easy to buy the 
technology.  Foreign partners are interested only in making 
profits not in transferring technology.  I do not understand why 
they brought us the German ZF in our enterprise.  He did not 
bring any technology to the enterprise.  All his machines and 
equipments he uses in his production process are imported 
from Germany (Manager, Head Office, SNVI, 2005).   
 
 
In recent years, attacks in the press and by the AACC [this is an Algerian 
anti-corruption agency] against corruptive behaviour of many officials in the 
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government administration has been growing.  Though the government had 
enacted in April 2006 a law to fight corruption and as a consequence a state 
agency was created to implement this law, the AACC regarded this law as no 
more than ink on paper.  Neither the court nor the government administration 
had shown any enthusiasm to seriously tackle the problem of corruption in 
the country such as: 
 
 The Khalifa scandal.  This was the biggest financial scandal ever seen in 
the country.  Until 2007, the matter was still hanging in the court without any 
final verdict.  There was also no verdict on the trials of those criminals who 
embezzled some 231 billion dinars; 
 
 Implement Clause 7 of the law of anti-corruption which was rejected by 
the Algerian Parliament.  The Clause 7 requires that all individuals selected 
for high positions in the government institutions should declare the sources of 
their wealth two months before taking up their positions; 
 
 Fire some custom officers who were known for their lack of integrity and 
to install the right equipments used for detecting fraud.  Many the equipments 
used in airports and ports were obsolete and the ones which were modern 
needed repairs.  In 2003, for example, out of the 184 scanners, only 40 
functioned properly (Liberté, 1 August, 2004) 
; 
 Exercise tight control over the business contracts offered to foreign 
companies. Many contracts were offered not because the companies had good 
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reputations in their markets but because their owners paid high bribes to 
some influential officials in the government administration.   
 
The AACC feared that corruption would spread more in the government 
administration and institutions with the new projects launched by the 
government for the construction of infrastructures. In the words of the 
chairman of the AACC “The 55 billion dollars allocated to the projects are 
going to be the new prey for the heads of corruption” (AACC, 2007). 
                    
8.5. The Shortage of Technical Skilled Workers can Slow down 
Enterprise Restructuring  
 
Though the literature on restructuring in transition countries mentioned that 
senior managers in the ex-communist countries lacked skills in marketing, 
financial analysis and competitive management techniques, technically 
skilled labour force did not seem to be a problem in these countries.  Without 
doubt, the technical skill shortage has not been mentioned in the literature on 
restructuring as a constraint because the ex-communist countries were 
advanced in manufacturing and many countries like East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia were before their adhesion to the communist bloc after the 
Second World War in the same level of industrial development as the UK and 
France.  Also the circumstances in which the transition took place in the ex-
communist countries were totally different from those in Algeria.   
 
In Algeria, the transition to the free market economic system and particularly 
privatisation took place in the middle of a bloody political instability, a 
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situation which pushed many of the professionally skilled people to flee the 
country.  Many interviewees regarded the political instability of the 1990s as 
one of the causes of their product decline.  A manager at the SNVI explained 
that “Workers did not turn up to their jobs fear from being ambushed on the 
roads and killed.  We could not secure our inputs supplies and the distribution 
of our products because our lorry drivers refused to do so because it was not 
safe.  Our production plants stopped functioning for weeks because of this 
situation.  But I thank God now, these black years have gone and I hope for 
ever” (Manager, Industrial Vehicles Division, SNVI, 2005).   
 
Though these dark years have gone, the labour market remained still in sharp 
shortage of technical skills and the skills needed in competition.  For the 
human resources manager at the SNVI  
 
In the past, we had people who had high technical skills.  These 
were trained overseas or by the Algerian university.  Now, it is 
hard to find these people in the labour market, because now the 
Algerian university does not produce these types of people 
anymore.  Do not forget, we are now in more pressure than 
before.  We need people who know how to diagnose the 
strengths and weaknesses of our enterprise to be able to design 
a more realistic strategy of restructuring of the SNVI.  We 
always seek the help of international consultant companies to 
do it for us.  These consultants are very expensive to hire.  Now 
the Minister of Higher Education has now called for the 
necessity to introduce in our universities the teaching of 
modules in competitive management.  There are also some 
private schools which are now offering education in 
management and quality control.  I know it will take time to be 
like in the developed countries but at least our state is making 
some moves (HR Manager, HR Department, Head Office, 
SNVI, 2005).   
 
 
Similar comments were also given by the human resources manager at Eriad 
Alger when he said that: 
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In the Algerian labour market, there is a lot of shortage of 
technical expertise because this expertise has emigrated 
overseas…In the past, the education system performed better 
than nowadays.  Today, graduates from universities and 
technical institutes have less knowledge and skills than those 
we had in the past...  Some of them do not even know how to 
write a right sentence.  The new professionals do not have the 
same abilities as before and we have to train them for one to 
two or three years before they become well knowledgeable 
with their work (HR Manager, HR Department, Corso, 
Division, Eriad Alger, 2004).  
 
 
On the same point, the human resources manager of Saidal added:   
 
It takes us between 2 to 3 years to train and to develop 
Industrial Pharmacists before they can be fully integrated in 
the enterprise because the Algerian university does not produce 
these skills anymore.  This is why, we have put the pressure on 
the state to review the curriculum used in the university to 
make it more responsive to the need of our industry.  We have 
already taken the step to have close relationship with the 
university...This is a first step and I am sure this relationship 
will develop further and will bring the expectations we are 
looking for in terms of the skills we need...People are 
expecting too much too soon.  It will take time to develop all 
the skills our enterprise needs especially in the areas of 
marketing, finance and management (HR Manager, HR 
Department, Head Office, Saidal, 2004).   
 
The seriousness of the problem for the shortage of technical and management 
skills in the country was raised and thoroughly analysed in a report produced 
by the CNES in 2002 (cited in the national newspaper the Liberté, July, 
2004).  According to this report, the terrorism of the 1990s had targeted all 
professional categories in the country from journalists and artists to medical 
practitioners, university teachers and graduates and scientists.  The report 
pointed out to the seriousness of the problem by giving an example.  Between 
1992 and 1996 alone, some 3,000 professionals in the field of information 
technology alone had fled the country.  According to AMEDAF (Association 
de Médecins Algeriens de France (Association of Algerian GPs in France)) 
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out of a total of 10,000 foreign medical practitioners in France, 7,000 were 
Algerians (Libérté, July, 2004).  Many of the professionals who fled the 
country went to the industrialised countries and many have even created their 
own businesses there.  In recent years, senior managers of business 
enterprises in Algeria both in the state and private sectors had called the 
government to provide the right incentives to induce and bring back this 
important Algerian human capital to Algeria to benefit from their experiences 
and skills. 
  
8.6. Managers Complained about the Shortage of Adequate Market 
Information  
 
Senior managers from state, privatised and private enterprises, including the 
three enterprises of this study, have been active in recent years to put pressure 
on the government to reform the state institutions for information analysis 
and dissemination.  The scarcity and inadequacy of information on the 
market activities and the opportunities for investments in Algeria created 
obstacles for top managers of Saidal, Eriad Alger and the SNVI to have a 
clear picture of the whole environment in which they operated to allow them 
to elaborate an effective action plan for restructuring.  The manager of the 
planning department at Eriad Alger complained that: 
 
Until now, we do not have information which is needed in our 
forecasting process.  And I do not think this is only our 
problem but the problem of all Algerian enterprises.  They [the 
government] want us to be part of the free market economic 
system but we do not have information on this market.  The 
indices of this market still remain perceived from the 
macroeconomic indicators.  What I want to say, the 
information of the market should include more than these 
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indicators.  It should include information of psychological 
aspects, of the consumer behaviour etc…I mean knowing the 
situation in terms of the purchasing power of consumers, their 
options, their preferences.  This kind of information is still 
lacking in Algeria (Manager of Planning, Planning 
Department, Head Office, Eriad Alger, 2004). 
 
 
The marketing manageress of Saidal added:   
 
All the information about the market we have to do it 
ourselves.  If we rely on the ONS or the CNS, either the data 
they provide carries discrepancies or is out-of-date.  Doing this 
sort of things ourselves is time consuming and expensive 
(Marketing manageress, Department of Marketing, Head 
Office, Saidal, 2004).    
 
 
In its report of 2004, the CNES addressed the problem of information 
shortages and analysed in details the sources of the problem.  The report 
related the problem to the lack of coordination between all the actors in the 
economic and social activities.  There was a lack of coordination between the 
different departments and agencies in the government administration at 
central and local levels making the flow of information between them very 
difficult creating as a consequence distortion in the policies of these 
departments and agencies.  This state of affairs had been, according to the 
report, a consequence from the implementation of the Programme for 
Structural Adjustment dictated by the IMF on the Algerian government.  The 
programme created a hierarchical chain in decision makings in the 
government administration and an overlap of roles and responsibilities 
between the different decision making bodies.     
 
Also, the government  institutions for collecting and analysing the economic 
and social activities in the country such as the ONS (National Office of 
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Statistics) and the CNS (National Centre of Statistics) suffered from many 
problems such as the high turnover of their personnel, especially those with 
high skills, to search for better opportunities in the domestic private sector or 
overseas; the difficulties to collect data from private and state commercial 
and service enterprises and institutions.  The report pointed out that there was 
strong unwillingness especially from the part of the private firms to disclose 
information about their activities and their performances with the intention to 
avoid paying the taxes.  It also pointed out that private, state and privatised 
enterprises and institutions still used the old procedures used during the 
socialist period for evaluating their financial and human capital making the 
information generated by these procedures of low quality and insufficient to 
deal with the requirement of the free market economic system.  The report 
proposed that radical reforms should be introduced in the management of the 
ONS and the CNS and significantly in the management of all government 
institutions. 
 
8.7. Impact of Cultural Values and the Legacy of Colonialism on 
Restructuring 
 
The cultural values of a society are the customs, the language and the 
religious beliefs of that society.  They determine the way the citizens of that 
society look to life and determine how the citizens interact with each other 
and with people outside their society and their cultural values.  In Algeria, the 
cultural values of the citizens stem predominantly from Arab and Islamic 
customs and beliefs and also from the legacy of French colonislism in 
Algeria.   Showing high respect to your parents, to other members of your 
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family and to all peoples you interact with stem from Islam and are the 
foundations in the relationships between individuals.  In fact, not looking 
after your parents, when they reach an old age, is regarded not only unhuman 
but very sinful.  In the work place, older workers are respected by younger 
workers even if these younger workers are managers.  One manager at the 
SNVI deplored the fact that his enterprise targetted older workers to make 
them redundants.  For him, “It is unhuman to go to a man the age of my 
father and tell him we do not need your service anymore.  The poor man, 
nobody is going to offer him a job at fifty nine or sixty four years old.” 
(Manager, Commercial Division, SNVI, 2005).  At Eriad Alger, there was a 
sense of pride that the enterprise did not rush in laying off older workers like 
what many state enterprises did in the 1990s.  In all the divisions, except 
Corso, more than 20 percent of their work force were over 50 years old 
(Bilan d’Activité, Exercice 2000, Fonction Ressources Humaines, 2001).  The 
human resources manager explained that: 
 
If the production line stops running because there is no orders, 
we transfer workers to other production lines and bring them 
back when things get better...Often older workers that their 
skills become obsolete are given easy tasks like for example 
placing him a security guard, distributing mail to different 
departments or making coffee to the staff.  What I mean to say, 
easy jobs, why fire him, it is not right (HR Manager, Beni 
Mezghana division, Alger, Eriad Alger, 2005)                    
 
Many human resources managers at Eriad Alger and managers and workers 
interviewed at the UGTA‟s headquarters expressed their deep disappointment 
with the way the government handled the restructuring of the manufacturing 
sector in the 1990s.  One manager said “They were throwing workers in the 
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streets to solve the problems but what they have created is a total misery”.  A 
worker added “Privatisation is a capitalist thing...They [the West] brought us 
what I see as the heartless capitalism...Profits come before anything else”.  
Another worker explained “In our enterprise, consultants were hired from 
Europe to tell us what to do...They made things worse”.  The manager in the 
department of conflicts and social affairs at the UGTA regarded the main 
objective behind selling the public sector was “The complete destruction of 
the public enterprise”.  Many interviewees showed a clear sign not only of 
rejecting privatisation but a  resentment to foreign investors to own shares in 
the state enterprise especially investors from the West and particularly 
France.  A manager at Beni Mezghana division explained that: 
  
Some Algerian journalists are bombarding us with critics.  
They say we are not privatising quickly...You know that some 
of these journalists are bought by some French investors.  
Guess who is trying to buy our enterprise, the former colonial 
owner of our enterprise.  He wants to come back and take over 
the enterprise.  Well, I hope it will never happen while I am 
still alive (Manager, Beni Mezghana Division, Alger, Eriad 
Alger, 2004). 
 
 
The resentment of the former colonial power in Algeria is felt even 
among the young managers who did not live the colonial time.  Many 
interviewees clearly expressed their suspicions about the whole story 
of transition and privatisation and regarded what happened in Algeria 
since 1988 was a tool to put the country in the hand of the former 
colonial powers.  Paradoxically, the French language is until today still 
used even among those who do not want to see any French investment 
in the country.  The French language is widely used by individuals 
particularly by those occupying high positions in most manufacturing 
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and service enterprises and institutions.  It is used as a mean of 
communication but this does not mean that these individuals carry 
French cultural values.  The French language is regarded as a mean of 
technology and science transfer but the Islamic and Arab values are 
still representing the identity of the Algerian citizen, his/her belonging 
and his/her way of life.  The manager of conflicts and social affairs at 
the UGTA‟s headquarters (2005) expressed with proud that “Our 
religion dictates on us to have democracy...Islam is the religion of 
collectivity.  Every sciency, every way of life is in our  Quran”.   
 
8.8.  Conclusion 
 
Enterprise restructuring at Eriad Alger, Saidal and the SNVI was 
controlled by random and non-random factors.  The growing market 
for pharmaceuticals was an important incentive that encouraged 
restructuring at Saidal.  There was, also, a clear indication that the 
majority of managers of the three enterprises opposed privatisation and 
considered that the corporatisation of their enterprises was a significant 
incentive enough to encourage them to bring the changes needed in 
their enteprises to face competition.  Though the corporatisation of the 
state enterprise was a significant incentive in restructuring at Saidal, it 
was not so at the SNVI and Eriad Alger because of the government 
intervention in their internal affairs.          
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The government intervention was not the only constraint facing 
enterprise restructuring.  Corruption, the shortage of technical skilled 
workers, the shortage of adequate market information and significantly 
the political instability in the country had affected negatively 
enterprise restructuring in the three enterprises.  This chapter also 
revealed that the cultural values and the legacy of colonialism played 
an important determinant of enterprise restructuring.  The family, 
regional and friend ties and the sense of brotherhood between 
individuals were clearly exhibited in the recruitment and promotion of 
managers and workers and in avoiding the lay off of older workers.  
The legacy of colonialism was too clearly exhibited in the strong 
opposition of managers and workers to privatisation and resentment of 
foreign investors owing shares in the state enterprise and their 
suspicion that the whole transition to the free market was a new way to 
bring back the former colonial powers to Algeria.    
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion     
 
              
To date, the experience of enterprise restructuring and its determinents was 
drawn from the ex-communist countries in Europe.  The bulk of the research 
on this topic has, however, compared Central and Eastern countries with 
Russia and the NIS in terms of the methods used to privatise the state 
enterprise, the extent of hard budget constraints imposed on state and 
privatised enterprises, the extent of replacement of managers from the 
socialist period with market-oriented managers, and the extent of competition 
in the product market.  The conclusion drawn from this literature is that 
Central and Eastern countries adjusted faster to the free market system than 
Russia and the NIS and their state and privatised enterprises restructured 
effectively.   
     
This study explored enterprise restructuring and its determinants in three 
large state enterprises slated for privatisation operating in different industries 
in Algeria.  These were Saidal, the SNVI and Eriad Alger.  They operated in 
pharmaceuticals industry, heavy vehicles industry and wheat processing and 
manufacruring industry respectively.  Clearly, Saidal was more effective in 
its restructuring actions than the SNVI and Eriad Alger.  The case of Saidal 
also provides a finding that is not fully consistent with some of the studies 
reviewed in the literature on enterprise restructuring in the ex-communist 
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countries.  It does not support, for example, the suggestions made by Aghion, 
Blanchard and Burgess (1994) and Roland and Sekkat (2000) that managers 
would engage in restructuring because they wanted to show their managerial 
abilities and this with the prospect to remain in their positions once their 
enterprises were sold to private owners or to have better chances to be hired 
by private firms.  There was no clear evidence that the PGM of Saidal was 
concerned with his career since he was himself against privatisation and 
regretted having sold 20 percent shares of his enterprise in 1999.  There was, 
also, no clear evidence that the PGM of Saidal was encouraged to introduce 
restructuring in his enterprise because he had potential stakes in his enterprise 
which Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess (1994) suggested would be a potential 
incentive for managers to engage in restructuring.  Perhaps the only evidence 
drawn from the case of Saidal which clearly agreed with Aghion, Blanchard 
and Burgess is that related to their suggestion that hard budget constraints 
could be a significant incentive that would encourage restructuring.  The 
PGM of Saidal had explicitly stated in many national press conferences that 
his enterprise had never obtained financial help from the government and the 
investments made in his enterprise were financed by the revenues drawn 
from the sale of shares and predominantly from retained profits.  In this 
respect, one can confidently say partnership of Saidal with foreign companies 
played a large part in the growth of Saidal in terms of its product 
diversification, size expansion, increase in its domestic and foreign market 
shares, and its profitability.  This confirms the findings of Djankov and Pohl 
(1997) which indicated that Slovakian firms which went into partnership with 
companies from the West, particularly German and Austrian, restructured 
  
 365 
effectively and were profitable.  The case of Saidal also disagrees with the 
conclusion made by Claessens and Djankov (1999: 1123) that “Enterprise 
restructuring in transition economies requires new human capital which can 
best occur through management changes.  Countries with insufficient entry of 
new managers (either expatriates or newly trained managers) may have 
difficulties in achieving high corporate growth”.  In spite of the fact that the 
PGM of Saidal was groomed within the socialist economic system, his 
appointment in 1995 as the head of the enterprise had turned the enterprise 
around from a loss-making enterprise to a profit making enterprise, making 
Saidal an attraction to private foreign investors.  In addition, unlike the 
prediction made by authors like Ivancevich et al., (1992), Avraham (1993), 
Luthans et al., (1993) Pribova and Savitt (1995), Shipley et al., (1995) and 
Savitt (2001) that managers from the socialist system would find it hard to 
cope with competition, the case of Saidal clearly indicates the opposite.  Its 
PGM was able to quickly adjust the enterprise to the free market system and 
was as effective in his management as his counterpart in the private sector.  
In fact, the findings drawn from the survey on the top management 
characteristics do not support the propositions made by Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) that older executives and executives with functional track in 
production and process engineering would be less likely to engage in risky 
investment and be competitive and would be more committed to the status 
quo and be more concerned with their career and financial security.  If one 
were to speculate as to why the PGM of Saidal was successful in carrying out 
effective restructuring, several possible explanations can be given.  One 
explanation may lie in some intrinsic attributes of the PGM.  These could be 
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his personality, his leadership style or management ability.  Another 
explanation may be the PGM‟s ability to have greater negotiating room with 
the government administration permitting him to have ample discretion in the 
decision making process and be creative.  One or several of these 
explanations may be appealing but the present study cannot provide any test 
of these hypotheses.               
 
The study permits, however, to draw the conclusion that when enterprise 
restructuring is concerned, controllable and uncontrollable factors in the 
environment played an important role in determining the restructuring 
behaviour of Saidal, the SNVI and Eriad Alger which can be explained as 
follows: 
 
1.  The Controllable Factors. 
1.1.  The Corporatisation of the State Enterprise   
 
The corporatisation of the state enterprise seemed to be an institutional 
instrument that encouraged restructuring by allowing senior managers to 
show their managerial skills and abilities.  But it seemed that senior managers 
were allowed to do so only when there was little government interference in 
the internal affairs of their enterprises.  Financial autonomy was an effective 
tool that minimised the government interference in the affairs of Saidal.  
Though both the SNVI and Eriad Alger were corporatised in 1995 and 1990 
respectively, their senior managers had their hands tied to take strategic 
decisions in their enterprises not only because they were in heavy debts and 
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therefore desperate for government financial rescues but significantly the 
government looked at them from two different strategic positions in its 
economic and political agenda.  The government regarded the SNVI as the 
jewel of the Algerian manufacturing industries and its protection from total 
privatisation was vital.  Selling it to private investors meant giving the power 
to these investors to have influence not only in the most strategic industry in 
the country but also their influence in the government future economic and 
eventually political policies.    Therefore, the government provided various 
subsidies to the SNVI to revitalise it and protect it from competition.  These 
subsidies were in the form of debts forgiveness, tightening the entrance of 
new firms in heavy vehicles manufacturing industry and imposing that the 
SNVI should be the main supplier of government owned manufacturing and 
service enterprises.  Unlike the SNVI, Eriad Alger operated in an industry 
which did not generate new industries and this made it less important in the 
government economic and political strategies and therefore its total 
privatisation was the government main option.  Clearly, the corporatisation of 
the state enterprise can be an incentive that will encourage senior managers to 
introduce effective restructuring but only when the enterprise is less 
dependent on the government financial support and is not listed as strategic 
enterprise in the government political and economic policies.           
 
1.2.  The State of the Institutional Environment 
 
In agreement with Stern and Hicks (1996) and Nellis (2002), the privatisation 
of the state enteprise and its restructuring in a context of transition should be 
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supported by institutions and mechanisms that function properly.  In Algeria, 
privatisation of the state enterprise and its restructuring were very slow 
because these institutions and mechanisms lacked the necessary funding and 
technical expertise.  Algeria provides almost a unique experience of 
privatisation never experienced in the transition countries of Europe.  Though 
it was influenced by the Polish experience in terms of liquidating small 
enterprises and selling them to their managers and workers because this type 
of privatisation did not need a lot of funding and technical expertise, when it 
comes to privatise large state enterprises the government was very careful not 
to sell the assets of these enterprises to private investors and preferred instead 
partnership between these enterprises and foreign multinationals.  Partnership 
took the form of joint ventures and sub-contracting.  The case of Saidal 
shows that partnership benefited both partners.  The foreign partner benefited 
from the cheap labour and cheap price of energy and infrastructure, the 
proximity of Algeria to African and Arab countries, the freedom to dispatch 
their profits outside the country, and the provision of various tax concessions.  
Saidal, on the other hand, benefited from technology and management know-
how transfer, opportunity to open new markets outside Algeria and avoiding 
closing down production plants that lost markets by diversifying production 
lines and consequently avoiding massive worker redundancies.          
 
The study provides support to the report made by the World Bank (2000) that 
corruption is a serious obstacle not only in slowing down effective enterprise 
restructuring but also the growth of the national economy.  Corruption in 
Algeria has led to political instabililty, creating confusing laws and poor 
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functioning of the legal institutions to protect the rights of individuals and 
companies.  Foreign investors wishing to invest in Algeria should take into 
consideration this social phenemenon.  Also, policy makers in the Algerian 
government should understand that the economic and social reforms should 
not be confined to enacting a bundle of laws and the installation of 
government institutions to implement these laws.  These are important but 
not sufficient.  The main ingredient of the reforms should be the creation of 
competent individuals to implement these laws and manage these institutions.  
The competence of these individuals should be measured not only in terms of 
their technical skills but fundamentally in terms of their ability to be less 
tempted to corruption and be committed to their missions.  This type of 
individuals will be created only through a radical reform of the education and 
training systems in Algeria.  In support of Nellis (1999), privatisation of the 
state enterprise in Algeria should be halted until the free market institutions 
and mechanisms start to function properly.   
          
2.  Uncontrollable Factors 
2.1.  The Trend in the Market  
 
The findings drawn from this study support the conclusion made by Pohl, 
Anderson, Claessens and Djankov (1997) that the trend in the market would 
affect the restructuring behaviour of the enterprise.  The market in which 
Saidal operated was growing fast in Algeria providing opportunities for the 
enterprise to attract foreign investors.  In fact, the case of Saidal provides 
evidence that the trend in the market has more power than anything else in 
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the business environment to attract foreign investments.  Despite the political 
instability of the country and the inedequacy of the free market institutions, 
multinational firms were willing to take the risk and invest in Saidal.  This 
argument can be further back up with evidence from the SNVI.  The SNVI 
was able to have two partnerships, with ZF and BTK, only when its market 
started to grow following the massive project for infrastructure building 
launched by the government since the early 2000.  Even at Eriad Alger, some 
foreign investors were interested since 1999 to go into partnership with Eriad 
in activities with growing markets such as biscuits, chocolate and yeast.  But 
these partrnerships never materialised because the government insisted that 
these activities should be totally sold to private investors.  Though the 
location of the enterprise, its level of debts at the beginning of the transition 
matter in restructuring, the trend of the market in which the enterprise 
operates matters most.  
       
2.2.  The Cultural Values 
 
This study provides a determinant which has hardly been touched by 
researchers on transition economies which is the influence of the cultural 
values on enterprise restructuring.  By the cultural values, it is meant here not 
only the effect of religion on the habits and relationship between individuals 
but equally significant the effect of French colonialism on the way the 
Algerian citizen thinks about anything coming from France in particular and 
from the West in general.  The brotherhood that is the foundation of Islamic 
belief is tightly rooted in the relationship between individuals not only in the 
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family but also in the work place.  Any investor coming from outside this 
culture should understand this relationship.  The family and friend ties and 
regional belonging play an important role in the recruitment and promotion in 
the work place.  It is considered, for example, a shameful thing to do if a 
person refuses to do a favour to a family member or a friend and often the 
refusal leads to communication and tie break up with this person.  It seems 
that the family, regional and friend ties become reinforced when the country 
is going through harsh economic problems and the job opportunities in the 
labour market are scarce.  In addition, respect for the elderly is deeply rooted 
in the relationship between Algerian people.  It was clear from the interviews 
that there was a sense of guilt among many senior managers at the SNVI to 
have proceeded in the 1990s in the laying off of old workers.  In fact, it is 
common to see in many Algerian enterprises whether in manufacturing or 
service sectors, old men, who are not apt to carry out tiring and noisy tasks, 
are given jobs as security workers at the enterprise gate or making coffee or 
distributing mails to the enterprise staff.     
  
What is also significant in Algerian culture is that though the technology and 
know-how from the West are welcomed, the findings from the study clearly 
show the presence of resentment of managers and workers to see Western 
investors to own shares or assets in their enterprises.  The irony is that it is a 
common thing to see in Algeria that a person with a position of responsibility 
in manufacturing or service sectors to use French language as a mean of 
communication because it is still regarded as a mean of technology and 
science transfer from the developed economies.  But any policies or 
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recommendations emanating from Western institutions that affect, in one way 
or another, Algeria‟s economic and political institutions are still regarded 
with suspicion.       
 
However, the findings drawn from this study have their limitation.  They 
were drawn from the experience of only three enterprises.  Though the 
findings have ecological validity, they could not provide internal validity and 
replicability.  The non-random sampling used in the selection of participants 
reduced the external validity of the findings and therefore the experience of 
enterprise restructuring and its determinants of Eriad Alger, Saidal and the 
SNVI should not be regarded as representative of other enterprises operating 
in their industries.  To test the robustness of the findings drawn from these 
three enterprises, these enterprises should be reinvestigated.  Also, future 
research on enterprise restructuring in Algeria should be carried out on a 
larger sample including enterprises with different ownerships - state, 
privatised and de novo -  and the measures used in the questionnaire to tap on 
the concept of „top management characteristics‟ should be tested again to 
evaluate their consistency.  Though the questionnaire is a good instrument to 
use to measure this concept it has its limitation.  It uses close-questions which 
consequently restricts the answer of the respondents.  Other methods such as 
interviews and private company documents should also be used to collect 
data on this concept.  In addition, to develop more understanding of 
enterprise restructuring and its determinants in a transition context, research 
should concentrate on enterprises operating in developing countries which 
moved to the free market system.  The research should not focus solely on 
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describing effective and ineffective enterprise restructuring but should 
significantly try to find answers to the following five questions: 
 
1. How partnership with multinational firms affects enterprise restructuring 
in these countries and why multinational firms are attracted to these 
countries despite the multiple problems these countries have in many 
aspects of their environment whether political, economic or social; 
 
2. Since technical skills are very important assets of an enterprise, how the 
shortage in these skills affects enterprise restructuring in these countries 
and how enterprises that restructured effectively managed to overcome 
this shortage; 
 
3. Enterprises cannot operate without adequate information about their 
customers, their suppliers, competitors and the state of the institutional 
environment in which they operate.  The research should try to 
undersantand how the shortage and the inadequacy of market information 
affect enterprise restructuring and how enterprises that restructured 
effectively managed to overcome this problem; 
 
4.  The cultural values play a significant role in influencing and very often 
in shaping every aspect of a society.  The research should try to 
understand how these values affect enterprise restructuring and affect the 
institutions that interact with the business enterprise; 
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5. Why the ex-colonised populations still regard the former colonial powers 
with suspicions and how this suspicion affect enterprise restructuring and 
the functioning of the market institutions.  
 
In conclusion, despite the limitation in the research methodology used in this 
study, this study has made some contribution to our understanding of 
enterprise restructuring and its determinants in a context of transition.  It 
clearly shows that the experience of the ex-communist countries on this 
matter cannot be considered universal. True, there are some common factors 
that affect enterprise restrucruring regardless in which industry the enterprise 
operates and in which geographical location the enterprise is found.  For 
example, the trend in the market has a significant impact on enterprise 
restructuring.  An enterprise operating in an industry with no markets will 
incur losses whether this enterprise operates in the USA or in Jakarta.  Other 
factors which will have similar effect on enterprise restructuring, regardless 
in which geographical location the enterprise is found and in which industry 
it operates, are the state of the technical skills and the market information in 
the country.  Without doubt, the most important of all environmental factors 
affecting enterprise restructuring is the political situation in the country.  The 
study shows that the main ingredient for any transition to the free market is 
the political stability of the country.  The political instability of Algeria since 
1989 has created a fertile ground for corruption, brain and technical drains, a 
transition to the free market with a very slow progress and severe economic 
and social problems.  Therefore, policy makers should make sure to create 
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the political stability in the country before engaging in any radical economic 
and social reforms.       
 
 
                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 376 
Bibliography 
A 
 
 
Abdoun Rabah (1999) „Un Bilan du Programme de Stabilisation Economique 
en Algerie (1994-1998)‟,  Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 46/47, 4eme Trimestre 
1998 et 1er Trimestre 1999. 
 
Abedou Abderrahmane (1999) „Les Effets du PAS sur le devenir du Secteur 
Public dans les Régions Défavorisées‟, Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 46/47, 
4eme Trimestre 1998 et 1er Trimestre 1999. 
   
Act Notarié (no date) „Entreprises des Industries Alimentaires Céréalières et 
Dérives d’Alger : Eriad Alger, Société par Actions’. 
 
Adli Zouher (2002) „Réformes Economiques et les Entreprises Publiques 
AgroAlimentaires: Le Cas de l’Eriad d’Alger (1983-2000)’. 
 
Aghion Philippe, Blanchard Olivier and Burgess Robin (1994), „The 
Behaviour of State Firms in Eastern Europe Pre-Privatisation‟, European 
Economic Review, (38). 
 
Alchian A. (1965) „Some Economics of Property Rights‟, Politico, 30(4).   
 
Alfandari Gilles and Mark E. Schaffer (1996) „Arrears in the Russian 
Enterprise Sector‟, in: Simon Commander, Qimiao Fan, Mark E. Schaffer 
(ed.) (1996)  Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia, EDI 
Development Studies, the World Bank. 
 
Alfandari Gilles, Qimiao Fan, Lev Freinkman (1996) „Government Financial 
Transfers to Industrial Enterprises and Restructuring‟, in Simon Commander, 
Quimiao Fan, Mark E. Schaffer (ed.) (1996) Enterprise Restructuring and 
Economic Policy in Russia, EDI Development Studies, the World Bank.   
  
Amirouche Abdelhamid and Chelgham Mohamed Kamel (1985) „Le Secteur 
Privé dans la Doctrine Economique Nationale‟, CENEAP, no. 2, Juin.   
 
Andreff Wladimir and Hayab Abderrahman (1979) „Les Priorités 
Industrielles de la Planification Algerienne Sont-elles Vraiment 
« Industrialisantes » ?, Revue Tiers Monde, t. XX, no. 76. 
 
Annexe -1- (2002) „Allocation de Monsieur le Chef du Gouvernement devant 
les Membres des Directoirs des Sociétés de Géstion des Participations’, 
Alger, le 29 Décembre.   
 
Arhab Baya (1999) „Les Effets Sociaux du PAS dans le Cas de l‟Algerie‟, 
Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 46/47, 4eme Trimestre 1998 et 1er   Trimestre 
1999. 
  
 377 
Avraham Shama (1993) „Management under Fire :  The Transformation of 
Managers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe‟, Academy of Management 
Executive, vol. 7 (1).   
 
Barberis Nicholas, Boycko Maxim, Shleifer Andrei and Stukanova Natalia 
(1996) ‟How Does Privatization Work?  Evidence from the Russian Shops‟, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 104 (4).   
  
Bartley Douglas L. and Minor Michael S. (1994) „Why Would a Company 
Want to Enter a Joint Venture in the Former Soviet Union or Eastern 
Europe?‟, Journal of Product & Brand Management,  vol. 33 (22). 
 
Behidji Kamel (1997) „Autonomie, Rationalié et Management des 
Entreprises Publiques:  l‟Epreuve de la Realité Economique‟, Les Cahiers du 
CREAD, no. 39, 1 er Trimestre. 
 
Belattaf Mattouk  (1997)‟ Modalités et Difficultés de Mise en Euvre de la 
Privatisation des Entreprises Publiques Economiques en Algerie,‟ Les 
Cahiers du CREAD,  no. 39, 1er  Trimestre.   
 
Belka M, Estrin S., Schaffer M. E., Singh I.J. (1995) „Enterprise Adjustment 
in Poland :  Evidence from a Survey of 200 Private, Privatised and State-
Owned Firms’, Centre for Economic Performance, London School for 
Economic and Political Science, April.   
   
Belmihoub M.C.(2006) „Le Comportement de l‟Entrepreneur privé face aux 
Contraintes Institutionelles :  Approche a partir de Donneés d‟Enquête et de 
Panels sur la PME priveé en Algerie‟, Colloque International :  « Création 
d’Entreprises et Territoires », Tamarraset 3-4 Décembre. 
   
Benabdallah Youcef (1999) „Ajustement Structurel et Nouveau Statut de la 
Rente Pétrolière en Algerie‟, Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 46/47, 4ème 
Trimestre 1998 et 1er  Trimestre 1999. 
 
Benderra Omar (2002) ‘L‟Economie Algerienne 1986-1998‟, La 
Méditerranée des Réseaux, Octobre. 
 
Benhalima Ammour (2001) „Le Système Bancaire Algerien :  Textes et 
Réalité’, Dahlab. 
 
Benissad Hocine (1994) ‘Algerie :Réstructurations et Réformes Economiques 
(1979-1993)’,  Office des Publications Universitaires.   
 
Berle A. A. and Means G. C. (1932) ‘The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property’, the Macmillan Company.   
 
Berliner Joseph S. (1957) ‘Factory and Manager in the USSR’, Harward UP. 
 
Blaczczyski Barbara (1999) „Moving Ahead:  Privatization in Poland‟, 
Economic Reform Today, no. 2.   
  
 378 
Blanchard O., Aghion P. (1996), „ Ex-State Firms in the Transition : On 
Insider Privatisation‟,  European Economic Review, (40). 
 
Blasi Joseph, Panina Darya and Grachova Katerina (1994) „Ownership, 
Governance and Restructuring‟, in:  Liebermann W. and Nellis John (ed.) 
(1994) Russia:  Creating Private Enterprises and Efficient Markets, the 
World Bank.   
 
Boardman Anthory E. and Vining Aidan R. (1989) „Ownership and 
Performance in Competitive Environments:  A Comparaison of the 
Performance of Private, Mixed and State-Owned Enterprises‟, The Journal of 
Law and Economics, vol XXII (1), April.   
 
Bouardel Yousef (2003), „Political Parties and the Transition from 
Authoritarianism :  the Case of Algeria‟, J. of Modern African Studies, 41, 1.   
 
Boukella Mourad, Brabez Fatima (1999) „Effets de l‟Ajustement Structurel 
sur les Industries Agro-Alimentaires de Base‟, Les Cahiers du CREAD,  no. 
46/47,  4ème Trimestre 1998 et 1er  Trimestre 1999. 
 
Bouzidi Abdelmadjid (1985) „L‟Industrie Publique en Algerie: Quelques 
Observations‟, CENEAP, no. 2, Juin.   
 
Bouzidi Abdelmadjid (1985) „Pour une Approche Economique du Sécteur 
Privé en Algerie‟, CENEAP, no. 2, Juin. 
 
Boyko M, Schleifer A. and Vishny R. W. (1996) „A Theory of Privatisation‟, 
The Economic Journal, March 
 
Brada Josef C and Singh Inderjit (1999) „Corporate Governance in Central 
Eastern Europe:  Case Studies of Firms in Transition’, M. E. Sharpe.   
 
Branine Mohamed (1994) „The Rise and Demise of Participative 
Management in Algeria’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, SAGE. 
 
Bryman Alan (2004) ‘Social Research Methods’, Oxford University Press.   
 
Bureau d‟Etudes de Recherche et d‟Engeneering Generales : BEREG EPE-
SPA. (1995) „Pourvoi du Poste de Directeur General’ CNAT.   
 
Bureau d‟Etudes de Recherche et d‟Engeneering Generales : Entreprise 
Genie Civil et Batiment (1996) „ Pourvoi du Poste de Directeur General’, 
CNAT. 
 
Burns Tom and Stalker G. M. (1961), „The Management of Innovation‟, 
Tavistock.   
 
CABELEQ (2003) „Organisation et Management de la SGP CABELEQ’.   
 
  
 379 
Cameron Causey Margaret (1984) „Public Enterprise in Algeria:  Law as a 
Bridge between Ideology and Reality‟, Public Administration and 
Development, no. 4. 
   
Carlin Wendy (1994) „Privatization and Deindustrialization in East 
Germany‟, in:  Estrin S. (ed.) (1994) Privatization in Central and Eastern 
Europe,  Longman.     
 
Carlin Wendy and Aghion Philippe (1996) „Restructuring Outcomes and the 
Evolution of Ownership Patterns in Central and Eastern Europe,‟   Economics 
of Transition, vol 4(2),  
 
Carlin Wendy and Landesmann Michael (1997) „From Theory into Practice?  
Restructuring and Dynamism in Transition Economies‟, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, vol. 13 (2).      
 
Carlin Wendy, Fries Steven, Schaffer Mark and Seabright Paul (2001), 
„Competition and Enterprise Performance in Transition Economies:  
Evidence from a Cross-Country Survey‟, Working Paper no. 63, European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
  
Carlin Wendy, Van Reenen John and Wolfe Toby (1995) „Enterprise 
Restructuring in Early Transition:  The Case Study Evidence from Central 
and Eastern Europe‟, Economics of Transition, vol. 3 (4).   
 
Caves Douglas W. and Christensen Laurits R. (1980) „The Relative 
Efficiency of Public and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment:  The 
Case of Canadian Railroads‟, Journal of Political Economy, (88).   
 
Chef du Gouvernement (1995) „Instruction Relative aux Nouvelles 
Modalites, de Selection, de Choix, de Recrutement et d’Evaluation des 
Cadres Dirigeants’.   
 
Chetvernina T. (2003) „The Russian System of Unemployment Protection in 
the Context of International Experience‟, Problems of Economic Transition, 
vol. 46 (5) September.   
 
Chikhi Said (1987) „Les Ouvriers face au Travail au C.V.I.‟, Les Cahiers du 
CREAD, no. 9, 1er Trimestre. 
 
Chirikova A. E. (2001) „Russian Directors in Search of a Strategy‟, Problems 
of Economic Transition, vol. 44 (8) December.   
  
Claessens Stijin, Djankov Simeon (1999) „Enterprise Performance and 
Management Turnover in the Czech Republic‟, European Economic Review, 
(43). 
 
Claessens Stijin and Djankov Simeon (1998) „Politicians and Firms in Seven 
Central and Eastern European Countries‟, Policy Research Working Paper,  
no.1954, the World Bank.   
  
 380 
Claessens Stijin, Djankov Simeon and Pohl Gerhard (1997a) „Determinants 
of Performance of Manufacturing Firms in Seven European Transition 
Countries‟, Working Paper,  no. 74, the William Donalson Institute  at the 
University of Mechigan Business School, February.   
 
Claessens Stijin, Djankov Simeon, Pohl Gerhard (1997b) „Ownership and 
Corporate Governance:  Evidence from the Czech Republic‟, Note no. 111, 
the World Bank Group, May. 
 
Clark, Carol L. Baglione, and Lisa A.  (1998) „Men of Steel Meet the Market:  
Interpreting firm Behavior in Russia‟s Metallurgy Industry‟, Journal of 
Economic Issues, vol. 32 (4) December.   
 
Clegg Ian (1971) ‘Workers’Self-Management in Algeria’, Allen Lane the 
Penguin Press.     
 
CNES (1998) „Avis Relatif au Plan National de Lutte Contre le Chômage‟.     
 
CNES (1999) „Rapport Préliminaire sur les Effets Economiques et Sociaux 
du Programme d‟Ajustement Structurel‟, Bulletin Officiel, no. 6.   
 
CNES (2000) „Rapport Portant sur l’Evaluation des Dispositifs d’Emploi‟. 
 
CNES (2003) „Rapport : Pour une Politique de Developpement de la PME en 
Algerie‟. 
 
CNES (2004) „Les Exigences de Mutation du Système d‟Information 
Economique et Sociale : Contribution au Débat National‟, Projet de Rapport, 
Mai. 
  
CNES (2003) „Le Médicament Plate-Forme pour un Débat Social‟, 19ème 
Session Plénière du 11 et 12 Novembre 2001. 
  
CNES (2004) ‘Rapport : Le Secteur Informel : Illusions et Realites’.   
 
Coffe John C. Jr. (1999) „Privatization and Corporate Governance:  The 
Lessons f rom Securities Market Failure‟, the Journal of Law.     
 
Commander Simeon and Tolstopiakenko Andrei (1996) „Why is 
Unemployment Low in the Former Soviet Union?  Enterprise Restructuring 
and the Structure of Compensation,‟ Policy Research Working Paper, no. 
1617, June, the World Bank.   
 
Commander Simeon and Schankerman Mark (1997) „Enterprise 
Restructuring and Social Benefits‟, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, January.   
  
Commission Nationale pour la Géstion Socialiste des Entreprises (1975) 
„Géstion Socialiste des Entreprises‟, Charte et Textes d’Application. 
 
  
 381 
COREP (1989) „Autonomie des Entreprises-Fondements et Mise en Œuvre‟, 
Recueil des Textes Legislatifs et Reglementaires. 
 
Crain W. Mark and Zardkoohi Asghar (1978) „A Test of Property-Rights 
Theory of the Firm:  Water Utilities in the United States‟, the Journal of Law 
and Economicl, vol. XXI (2), October.   
 
Czaban Laszlo and Whitley Richard (2000) „Incremental, Organizational, 
Change in a Transforming Society:  Managing Turbulence in Hungary‟, 
Journal of Management Studies, vol. 37(3), May.   
 
Dana Leo Paul (2000) „The Hare and the Tortoise of Former Czechoslovakia:  
Reform and Enterprise in the Czech and Slovak Republics‟, European 
Business Review, vol. 12(6).   
 
De Alessi Louis (1980) „The Economics of Property Rights:  A Review of 
the Evidence‟, in: Zerbe jr. R. O. (ed.) (1980) Research in Law and 
Economics: A Research Annual, vol. 2.   
 
De Bernis Gérard Destanne (1971) „Deux Strategies pour l‟Industrialisation 
du Tiers Monde: Les Industries Industrialisantes et les Options Algeriennes‟, 
Revue Tiers Monde. 
   
Décret Législatif no. 94-10, 29 Mai (1994) „Réstituant la Retraite Anticipeé’. 
 
Décret no. 65-89 du 25 Mars (1965) ’Création, Organisation et Approuvant 
les Statuts de la Société Nationale des Semouleries, Meuneries, Fabriques 
des Pâtes Alimentaires et Couscous’.   
  
Décret Exécutif no. 01-282 du  24 Septembre (2001) ’Attribution, 
Organisation et Fonctionnement de L’Agence de Développement  de 
l’Investissement’.   
 
Décret Exécutif no. 02-295 du 15 Septembre (2002) „Modalités de 
Fonctionnement du Compte d’Affectation Speciale no. 302-107 Intitulé 
‘Fonds d’Appui aux Investissements ’’. 
 
Décret Exécutif no. 04-171 du 10 Juin (2004) „Organisation de 
l’Administration Centrale du Ministère Délégué auprès du Chef du 
Couvernement Chargé de la Participation et de la Promotion de 
l’Investissement’.   
 
Décret Executif no. 01-283 du 24 Septembre (2001) ‘Portant Forme 
d’Organe d’Administration et de Géstion des Entreprises Publiques 
Economiques’.   
 
Décret Executif no. 01-352 du 10 Novembre (2001) ‘Fixant les Conditions et 
Modalites d’Exercice de l’Action Spécifique’.  
  
  
 382 
Décret Executif no. 01-282 du 24 Septembre (2001) ‘Portant Attributions, 
Organisation et Fonctionnement de l’Agence Nationale de Developpement de 
l’Investissement’. 
 
Décret Legislatif no. 93-08 du 25 (1993) ‘Modifiant et Completant 
l’Ordonnance no. 75-59 du 26 Séptembre 1975 Portant Code de Commerce’. 
 
Denis David J. and Denis Diane K. (1995) „Performance Changes Following 
Top Management Dismissals‟, The Journal of Finance, vol. 1, no. 4.  
 
De‟Souza J. Megginson W. and Nash R. (2001) „Determinants of 
Performance Improvement in Privatized Firms:  The Role of Restructuring 
2001and Corporate Governance’, the World Bank, March.   
 
Djankov Simeon (1999) „Ownership Structure and Enterprise Restructuring 
in Six Newly Independent States.‟, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 
2047, the World Bank.   
 
Djankov Simeon and Murrell Peter (2000) „The Determinants of Enterprise 
Restructuring in Transition:  An Assessment of the Evidence‟, A World Free 
of Poverty, the World Bank.   
 
Djankov Simeon and Pohl Gerhard (1997) „The Restructuring of Large Firms 
in Slovakia‟, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1758, the World Bank. 
 
Djankov Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei 
Schleifer (2001) „The Regulation of Entry‟, Policy Research Working Paper, 
no. 2661, the World Bank. 
   
Djenane Abdel-Majid (1999) „Ajustement Structurel et Secteur Agricole‟, 
Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 46/47, 4ème Trimestre 1998 et 1er  Trimestre 
1999 
 
Dob, Jonathan P., Rodriguez Peter, Uhlenbruck, Klaus, Collins, Jamie Eden, 
Lorraine (2003) „Coping with Corruption in Foreign Markets‟, Academy of 
Management Executive, vol. 17(3) August.   
 
Dobrinsky Rumen (1996) „Enterprise Restructuring and Adjustment in the 
Transition to Market Economy:  Lessons from the Experience of Central and 
Eastern Europe‟, Economics of Transition, vol. 4(2), 
 
Dockery E. (2000) „Corporate Governance and Enterprise Restructuring in 
Transition Economies:  Evidence from Privatised Polish Companies‟, 
Managerial Finance, vol. 26(9). 
 
DRH (2003) ‘Procédure’, Eriad Alger, Filiale Béni-Mezghana, UPC Aissa-
Idir, 12 Mars.  
 
  
 383 
Dyck K. J. Alexander, Wruck, Karen H. (1999) „The Government as Venture 
Capitalist:  Organisational Structure and Contract Design in Germany‟s 
Privatisation Process‟, European Financial Management, vol. 5(1) March.   
 
Earle John S. and Estrin Saul (1996) „Employee Ownership in Transition‟, in:  
Frydman R., Gray Cheryl W., Rapaczynski A. (ed.) (1996) Corporate 
Governance in Central Europe and Russia:  Insiders and the State, vol. 2, 
Central European University Press.   
 
Earle John S., Estrin Saul and Leshchenko Larisa L. (1996) „Ownership and 
Enterprise Behavior in Russia‟, in: Simon Commander, Qimiao Fan and 
Schaffer Mark E. (ed.) (1996) Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy 
in Russia,  EDI Development Studies, the World Bank.   
 
Eickelpasch Alexamder (1998) „Enterprise Restructuring in East Germany‟, 
Economic Survey of Europe, no. 2.   
 
Ellerman David (2001) „Lessons from Eastern Europe‟s Voucher 
Privatization‟, Challenge,, vol. 44(4) July.   
 
Entelis John P. (1992) „The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa:  the 
Case of Algeria‟, Problems of Communism, May-June.   
 
Entreprise Nationale de Siderurgie/Sider (1997) „Accord Global, Plan de 
Redressement Interne’, 1997-2000. 
 
Entreprise des Industries Alimentaires Cérealières et Dérives Groupe Eriad-
Alger (2001) „La Charte de l’Audit Interne de l’Eriad Alger’.   
 
Eriad Alger SPA (1999) „Plan d’Action 2000’. 
 
Eriad Alger (1993-2000) „Synthèses des Rapports de Gestion‟.  
  
Eriad Alger SPA (1997) ‘Conventions Collective, 1997-2000’. 
 
Eriad Alger (2000) „Convention Collective, 2000-2003‟. . 
 
Eriad Alger SPA (2003) „Etat d’Execution des Résolutions des CA et AGO 
Exercice 2002’. 
 
Eriad Alger SPA (2001) „Réglement Interieur’. 
 
Eriad Alger SPA (2002) „Procés Verbal de l’Assemblée Générale Ordinaire 
du 26 Juin 2002’. 
 
Eriad Alger SPA (1998) „Charte des Responsabilités et des Niveaux 
Relationnels IntraGroupe Industriel Eriad-Centre’. 
 
Eriad Alger (2000) „Projet Organigramme des Filiales’. 
 
  
 384 
Eriad Alger (2000) „Organisation de l’Entreprise Mère Eriad Alger’.   
 
Eriad Alger (2001) „Bilan d’Activité Fonction Ressources Humaines Exercice 
2000, Plan d’Action 2001’. 
 
Eriad Alger SPA (2002) „Plan de Reconfiguration de la Société Eriad Alger’.   
 
Estrin Saul (2002) „Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition‟, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 16(1), Winter.   
 
Estrin Saul and Rosevear Adam (1999) „Enterprise Performance and 
Ownership:  The Case of Ukraine‟, European Economic Review, (43). 
 
Estrin Saul, Brada Josef C., Gelb Alan and Singh Inderjit (1995) 
„Restructuring and Privatization in Central Eastern Europe:  Case Studies of 
Firms in Transition‟,   M.E. Sharpe Inc.  
 
Estrin Saul, Gelb Alan and Singh Inderjit (1993) „Enterprises in Transition:  
Issues and Methods of Analysis‟, Eastern European Economics, Fall. 
 
Fahy John, Shipley David, Egan Colin and Neale Bill (1998) „Motives and 
Experiences of International Joint Venture Partners in Hungary‟, Journal of 
Business & Industrial Marketing, vol. 13(2).   
 
Fan Qimiao, Une J. Lee and Mark E. Schaffer (1996) „Firms, Banks and 
Credit in Russia‟, in: Simon Commander, Qimiao Fan and Mark E. Schaffer 
(ed.) (1996)  Enterprise Restructuring and Economic Policy in Russia,  EDI 
Development Studies, the World Bank. 
  
Fidrmuc Jana P. (2007) „Channels of Restructuring in Privatized Czech 
Companies‟, Economics of Transition, vol. 15(2). 
 
Fidrmuc Jana P. and Fidrmuc Jan (2007) „Fire the Manager to Improve 
Performance‟, Economics of Transition, vol. 15(3).   
 
Filatotchev Igor, Wright Mike, Buck Trevor (1995) „Corporate Governance 
and Voucher Buy-Outs in Russia‟, Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 66 (1).   
 
Filatotchev Igor, Hoskisson Robert E., Buck Trevor, Wright Mike (1996) 
„Corporate Restructuring in Russian Privatizations:  Implications for US. 
Investors‟, California Management Review, vol. 38(2), Winter.   
 
FLN (1976) „Receuil de Textes Fondamentaux Portant Géstion Socialiste des 
Entreprises’.   
 
Fonds de Participation „Biens d‟Equipement‟ (1995) „Assemblée Générale 
Annuelle 1995 : Projets de Résolutions’. 
 
  
 385 
Font de Libération Nationale, Bureau Politique (1980) „Commission Ad-Hoc 
Chargée de l’Etude sur l’Exercice du Monopole de l’Etat : Situation Actuelle 
et Mesures d’Amelioration, Rapport Final’,  Mars.   
 
Frech H. E. (1976) „The Property Rights Theory of the Firm:  Empirical 
Results from a Natural Experiment‟, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 84, 
(1).   
 
Fries Steven, Lysenko Tatiana and Polanec Saso (2003) „The 2002 Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey:  Results from a Survey of 
6,100 firms‟, Working Paper, no. 84, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.   
 
Frydman Roman, Gray Cheryl, Hessel Marek, Rapaczynski Andrzej (1999) 
„When does Privatization Work?  The Impact of Private Ownership on 
Corporate Performance in the Transition Economies‟, Quaterly Journal of 
Economics, November.   
 
Funkhouser Richard and MacAVOY Paul W. (1979) „A Sample of 
Observations on Comparative Prices in Public and Private Enterprises‟, 
Journal of Public Economics, (11).   
  
Garavan Thomas, Morley Michael, and Heraty Noreen (1998) „Managing 
Human Resources in a Post-Command Economy:  Personnel Administration 
or Strategic HRM‟, Personnel Review, vol. 27(3). 
 
Genne Marcelle (1979) „Les Priorités Industrielles de la Planification 
Algerienne sont-elles Vraiment « Industrialisantes » ?‟, Revue Tiers Monde, t. 
XX, no. 80. 
 
Giles Mark S. and Baxton Sally (1994) „Investment Funds and Privatization‟, 
in: Lieberman Ira W. and Nellis john (ed.) (1994) Creating Private 
Enterprises and Efficient Markets,   the World Market. 
  
Godson J. (1981) „The Role of the Trade Unions‟, in: Schapiro L. and 
Godson J. (ed.) (1981) The Soviet Worker:  Illusions & Realities, MacMillan 
Press Ltd.   
 
Gray Cheryl W. and Hendley Kathryn (1995) „Developing Commercial Law 
in Transition Economies:  Examples from Hungary and Russia‟,   Policy 
Research Working Paper, no. 1528, the World Bank.   
 
Gray Cheryl W. and Holle Arnold (1996) „Bank-Led Restructuring in 
Poland:  The Conciliation Process in Action‟, Economics of Transition, vol. 
4(2).   
 
Gray Cheryl, Hellman Joel and Ryterman Randi (2004) „Anti-Corruption in 
Transition 2:  Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and 
Central Asia 1999-2002‟, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the World Bank. 
  
 386 
Gregory, Frank, Brooke, Gerald (2000) „Policing Economic Transition and 
Increasing Revenue:  A Case Study of the Federal Tax Police Service of the 
Russian Federation 1992-1998‟, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52(3) May.   
 
Groupe Saidal (2001) „Rapport de Géstion’. 
Groupe Saidal (2002) „Rapport de Géstion’. 
Groupe Saidal (2003) „Rapport de Géstion’. 
Groupe Saidal (2004) „Rapport de Géstion’. 
Groupe Saidal (2001) „Réglement Interieur‟. 
 
Groupement d‟Interêt Communs et Syndicat National des Offices de 
Promotion et de Géstion Immobilière (1997) „Convention Collective’.   
 
Guendouzi Brahim and Kabri Khelifa (1999) „Ajustement Structurel et 
Secteur Agricole‟, Les Cahiers du CREAD, 4 em Trimestre 1998 et 1 er 
Trimestre 1999. 
  
Gupta Ail K. (1984) „Contingency Linkages between Strategy and General 
Manager Characteristics:  A Conceptual Examination‟, Academy of 
Management Review, vol. 9(3). 
  
Hadjseyd Mahrez (1985) „Quelques Aspects de l‟Evolution du Secteur Privé 
Industrièl, CENEAP, no. 2, Juin.   
 
Hambrick D. C. and Mason P. A. (1984) „Upper Echelons:  The Organization 
as a Reflection of its Top Managers‟, Academy of Management Review, vol. 
9(2).  
 
Hanon Bernard (1996) „The Path to Competitiveness:  Strategies for 
Investment in Central Europe‟, The Columbia Journal of World Business, 
Summer.   
 
Hanousek Jan and Kočenda Evien (2003) „The Impact of Czech Mass 
Privatisation on Corporate Governance‟, Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 
30(3/4).   
 
Hanousek Jan, Kocenda Evzen and Svejnar Jan (2007) „Origin and 
Concentration:  Corporate Ownership, Control and Performance in Firms 
after Privatization‟, Economics in Transition, vol. 15(1).   
 
Harchaoui Abdelkrim (2006) „Le Financement de l‟Economie Nationale et la 
Réforme du Sécteur Financier et Bancaire‟, Website published 2.12.2006. 
 
Hashi Iraj (1999) „The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass 
Privatisation with a Difference‟, Working Paper, no. 995, June. 
  
Helie D (1973) „Industrial Self-Management in Algeria‟, in:  Zartman I.W. 
(ed.) (1973) Men, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghreb, Pail Mail 
Press.   
 
  
 387 
Hellman Joel S., Geraint John and Kaufmann Daniel (2000) „Seize the State, 
Seize the Day‟, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2444, the World Bank.   
 
Hellman Joel S., Geraint John, Kaufmann Daniel and SchanKerman Mark 
(2000) „Measuring Governance and State Capture:  The Role of Bureaucrats 
and Firms in Shaping the Business Environment‟, Working Paper no. 81, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
 
Hemmam A. (1985) „Le Nouveau Secteur Privé en Algerie, CENEAP, no. 2, 
Juin.   
 
Hendley Kathryn (1998) „Struggling to Survive:  A Case Study of 
Adjustment at a Russian Enterprise‟, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50(1).   
 
Heristche Claire (2004), „The Islamic Discourse of FIS and the Democratic 
Experiment in Algeria‟, Democratization, vol. 14, no. 4, August.  
 
Hoekman Bernard and Pohl Gerhard (1995) „Enterprise Restructuring in 
Eastern Europe:  How Much?  How Fast?  Where?  Preliminary Evidence 
from Trade Date‟, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1433, the World 
Bank.   
 
Holding Chimie-Pharmacie-Engrais (1997) „Convention Collective(Accord 
Collectif) de la Branche Pharmacie’.   
 
Holding Public Agro-Alimentaire de Base et Divers (1997) „Convention 
Collective de Branche (Partie Juridique)’.  
 
Holding Public Regional Centre (1999). (these are a compilation of private 
correspondances between the Holding and the enterprises slated for 
privaisation operating in the central region).  
 
Holding Siderurgy/Metallurgie (1997) „ Convention Collective de Branche’.   
 
Holstrom Bengt (1979) „Moral Hazard and Observability‟ Bell Journal of 
Economics, (10). 
 
IMF (1995) „IMF Approves Credit under Extended Fund Facility for 
Algeria‟, Press Release, no. 95/31. 
 
Institut Nationale du Travail (1997) „Droit du Travail‟, Recueil de Textes 
Legislatifs et Reglementaires‟.  
 
Institut Nationale du Travail (1984) „Droit du Travail‟, Recueil de Textes 
Législatifs et Réglementaires du Travail 
 
Jensen M. and Meckling W. (1976) „Theory of the Firm, Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure‟, Journal of Financial 
Economics, (3).   
 
  
 388 
Jirasek Jaroslav (1972) „Management and Its Environment in 
Czechoslovakia‟, in: Massie Joseph L. and Luytjes Jan (ed.) (1972)  
Management in an International Context,  Harper and Row Publishers.     
 
Judith Thornton and Nadezhda N. Mikheeva (1996) „The Strategies of 
Foreign and foreign-Assisted Firms‟, Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 
38(4), Winter.   
 
Juthans, Fred, Welsh, Dianne H. B., Rosenkrantz, Stuart A. (1993) „What do 
Russian Managers Really Do?  An Observational Study with Comparisons to 
US Managers’, Journal of International Business Studies, vol. 24(4).   
 
Kabri Khelifa, Guendouzi Brahim (1999) „Les Retombées de l‟Ajustement 
Structurel sur le Développement Local en Algerie : Cas de la Wilaya de Tizi-
Ouzou‟, Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 46/47, 4ème Trimestre 1998 et 1er  
Trimestre 1999. 
 
Kaufmann D. and Siegelbaum P. (1997) „Privatization and Corruption in 
Transition Economies‟, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 50(2), Winter.   
 
Kay j.A. and Thompson D. j. (1986) „Privatisation:  A Policy in Search of a 
Rationale‟, The Economic Journal, 96(381). 
 
Khandwalla Pradip N. (1977), „The Design of Organizations’, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Korichi Abdelaziz (1980) „Le Statut Général du Travailleur en Algerie‟, 
Integration, no. 2. 
 
Koubek Josef and Brewster Chris (1995) „Human Resource Management in 
Turbulent Times:  HRM in the Czech Republic‟, The International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, vol. 6(2), May. 
 
Kuznetsova Olga and Kuznetsov Andrei (1999) „The State as a Shareholder:  
Responsibilities and Objectives‟, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51(3).   
  
Lane and O‟Dell (1978) „The Soviet Industrial Worker’, Martin Robertson, 
Oxford.   
  
Lawless R. I. (1984) „The Contradiction of Rapid Industrialisation‟, in: 
Lawless R. I. and Land Findlay A. (ed.) (1984) North Africa, Croom Helm.    
 
Leitzel, Jim, Gaddy, Clifford (1995) „Mafiosi and Matrioshki‟, Brookings 
Review, vol. 13(1), Winter.   
 
Leysen André (1991) „Privatization:  East Germany‟, Eastern European 
Economics, Fall.   
 
  
 389 
Lin Justin Yifu, Fan Cai Zhou Li (1998) „Competition, Policy Burdens and 
State-Owned Enterprise Reform‟, American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, 88(2). 
 
Linz Susan J. (2001) „Restructuring with what Success?  A Case Study of 
Russian Firms‟, Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 43(1), Spring.   
 
Lipton David and Sachs Jeffrey (1990) „Privatization in Eastern Europe:  The 
Case of Poland‟, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (2). 
 
Lizal L., Singer M., and Svejnar J. (2001) „Enterprise Break-ups and 
Performance during the Transition from Plan to Market‟, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 83(1).  
 
Loi no. 78-02 du 11 Fevrier (1978) „Relative au Monopole de l‟Etat sur le 
Commerce Exterieur (1976)‟,  JORA, Mardi 14 Fevrier 1978. 
 
Longenecker Clinton O. (2001) „Why Managers Fail in Post-Soviet Russia:  
Causes and Lessons‟, European Business Review, vol. 13(2). 
 
Longenecker Clinton O. and Popovski Serguei (1994) „Managerial Trials of 
Privatization:  Retooling Russian Managers‟, Business Horizons, 
November/December.   
 
Lorsch Jay W. and Lawrence Paul Roger (1967), „Organization and 
Innovation:  Managing Differentiation and Integration‟, Harvard UP. 
 
Lumley Roger (1993) „Labour Markets and Employment Relations in 
Transition :  The Case of German Unification‟, Employee Relations, vol. 
17(1).    
 
Miaille Michel (1972) „Contribution a une Réfléxion Théorique sur 
l‟Entreprise Socialiste Algerienne‟,  R.A.S.J.E.P., vol. IX, no. 1, Mars. 
  
Makboul E. H. (2000) „Les Effets du Plan d‟Adjustement Structurel sur le 
Niveau de Vie des Ménages en Algerie‟, La Revue du CENEAP, no. 17. 
 
Manfred Bock (1991) „Everything must go !  The Privatization of East 
German Industry‟, Harvard International Review, vol. 14(1). 
   
McCarthy Daniel J., Puffer Sheila M. and Naumov Alexander I. (2000) 
„Russia‟s Retreat „, Journal of World Business, vol. 35(3). 
 
Medjkoune Mohamed (1999), „Ajustement Structurel, Emploi et Chômage en 
Algerie‟, Les Cahiers du CREAD,  no. 46/47, 4ème Trimestre 1998 et 1er 
Trimestre 1999. 
 
Megginson William L. and Jeffry M. (2001) „From State to Market:  A 
Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization‟, Journal of Economic 
Literature, June. 
  
 390 
Mills Anne (1998) „Contextual Influences on Human Resource Management 
in the Czech „Republic‟, Personnel Review, vol. 27(3). 
 
Ministère de l‟Industrie et de l‟énérgie (1965) „Décret no. 65-89 du 25 Mars 
1965 Portant Creation, Organisation et Approuvant les Statuts de la Société 
Nationale des Semouleries, Meuneries, Fabriques de Pâtes Alimentaires et 
Couscous‟, JORA, Mardi, 13 Avril 1965. 
 
Ministère des Industries Légères (1975-1978) ‘S.N.SEMPAC’, Fonds 
Documentaire de l’Entreprise, 1 and 2. 
 
Ministère de l’Economie des Finances et de l’Industrie (2005) ‘L’Industrie 
Automobile Francaise au Maghreb’.   
   
Ministère des Travaux Publics et de la Construction (1984) ‘Statut du 
Personnel’. 
 
Ministère des Travaux Publics et de la Construction (1984) ‘Grille de Salaire 
et Statut du Personnel’, 6 Mars. 
 
Ministère de l’Industrie et de la Restructuration (1996) ‘Guide Général 
d’Application des Résolutions de l’Assemblée Général des Fonds de 
Participation’, Séance du 15 Aout.   
 
Ministère de l’Industrie et de la Restructuration (1999) ‘Colloque sur la 
Restructuration Industrielle’.  
 
Ministère de l’Industrie et de la Restructuration (1996) ‘Strategie 
Industrielle’, Rapport Final.  Juin. 
 
Ministère de la Restructuration Industrielle et de la Participation (1995) 
‘Redressement Economique et Restructuration Industrielle en Algerie’, 
Octobre. 
 
Ministère de la Restructuration Industrielle et de la Participation (1995) 
‘Strategie Economique Globale de la Phase de Transition’, Mars 
 
Ministère de la Restructuration Industrielle et de la Participation (1995) 
‘L’equilibre Financier de L’Entreprise’, Septembre.   
 
Ministère de la Restructuration Industrielle et de la Participation (1994) 
‘Redressement de l’Economie Nationale et Politique de Restructuration 
Industrielle’,  Decembre.   
 
Ministère de la Restructuration Industrielle et de la Participation (1995) 
‘Rapport d’Evaluation du Fonds de Participation ‘Mines, Hydrocarbures-
Hydraulique’. 
 
  
 391 
Ministère de la Restructuration Industrielle et de la Participation (1995) 
‘Situation Financière du Portefeuille des Fonds de Participation: Anneé 
1993’. 
 
Ministère de la Restructuration Industrielle et de la Participation (1995) 
‘Strategie Economique Globale de la Phase de Transition’,  Mars.   
 
Ministère de la Restructuration Industrielle et de la Participation (1995) 
‘Présenté par M. Mourad Benachenhou Ministère de la Restructuration 
Industrielle et de la Participation au Forum Mediterranéen de CRANS-
MONTANA’,  Malte, 12 au 15 Octobre.   
 
Ministère de L’Industrie et de la Restructuration (1996) ‘Manuel de 
L’Administrator’, Juin.   
 
Ministère de l’Industrie et de la Restructuration (1996)  ‘Le Role de 
l’Administrateur et du Conseil d’Administration de l’E.P.E.’,  Avril.   
 
Ministère de l’Information et de la Culture (1979) ‘The Nationale Charter’,  
(in Arabic language). 
 
MPAT (1983) ‘La Restructuration des Entreprises Publiques’, La Revue du 
CENEAP, no. 1, Mars.   
 
Moussa Rachid (1987) ‘Présentation du Complexe Vehicules Industriels: 
Organisation, Difficultés Principales et Perspectives’, Les Cahiers du 
‘CREAD, 1er Trimestre, no. 9. 
 
Muent Holger, Pissarides Francesca and Sanfey Peter (2000) ‘Taxes, 
Competition and Finance for Albanian Enterprises:  Evidence from a Field 
Study’, Working Paper, no. 54, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.     
 
Musette Saib, Hammouda Nacer Eddine (1999) ‘Evaluation des Effets du 
PAS sur le Marché du Travail en Algerie’, Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 46/47, 
4ème Trimestre 1998 et 1er Timestre 1999. 
 
Nellis John (2002) ‘Privatization and Enterprise Reform in Transition 
Economies::A Restrospective Analysis’, OED, no. 23737, the World Bank.   
 
Nellis John (1999) ‘Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies?’, 
IFC International Finance Corporation, discussion paper no. 38, the World 
Bank.   
 
Nesporova Alena (2002) ‘Unemployment in the Tranistion Economies’, 
Economic Survey of Europe, no. 2.   
 
  
 392 
Neuman Lawrence W. (2006), ‘Social Research Methods:  Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches’, Pearson Education Inc.   
 
Nickell Stephen J. (1996) ‘Competition and Corporate Performance’, Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 104(4).   
 
Ordonnance no. 01-04 du 20 Aout (2001) ‘ Relative a l’Organisation, la 
Géstion et la Privatisation des Entreprises Publiques Economiques’. 
 
Ordonnance no. 76-97 du 23 Novembre (1976) ’Portant Promulgation de la 
Constitution de la Republic Algerienne Democratique et Populaire’, JORA, 
Mercredi, 24 Novembre 1976. 
 
Ordonnance no. 01-03 du 20 Aout (2001) ‘Relative au Developpement de 
l’Investissement’. 
  
Osterkamp Rigmar (1982) ‘ L’Algerie entre le Plan du Marché:  Points de 
Vue Récents sur la Politique Economique de l’Algerie’, Revue Canadienne 
des Etudes Africaines/Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 16(1) 
 
Oufriha Fatima Zohra (1997) ‘Ajustement Structurel et Autonomie du 
Système de Santé : Quels Résultats ?’, Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 41, 3ème 
Trimestre. 
 
Oufriha Fatima Zohra (1997) ‘Ajustement Structurel, Privatisation et 
Dépenses de Santé en Algerie’, Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 41, 3ème 
Trimestre.  
 
Oufriha Fatima Zohra (1999) ‘Ajustement Structurel, Stabilisation et 
Politique Monétaire en Algerie’, Les Cahiers du CREAD, no. 46/47, 4eme 
Trimestre 1998 et 1er Trimestre 1999. 
 
Pantilie Constantine (1972) ‘Management and its Environment in Romania’, 
in:  Massie Joseph L. and Luytjes Jan (ed.) (1972) Management in an 
International Context,  Haper and Row Publishers.   
 
Parti du Front de Libération Nationale (1986) ‘La Charte Nationale’.   
 
Pavlínek Petr (2002) ‘Domestic Privatisation and its Effects on Industrial 
Enterprises in East-Central Europe:  Evidence from the Czech Motor 
Component Industry’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54(7).   
 
Pinto B, Belka M. and Krajewski S. (1993) ‘Transforming State Enterprises 
in Poland:  Macroeconomic Evidence on Adjustment’, Transition and Macro-
Adjustment, Working Paper no. 1101 
 
Pinto B. and S. Van Wijnbergen (1994) ‘Ownership and Control in Poland:  
Why State Firms Defied the Odds?’, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 
1308, the World Bank.   
  
 393 
 
Pittman Russell (2004) ‘Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of Central and 
Eastern European Competition Laws:  Have Fears of Over-Enforcement been 
Borne out?’, World Competition,  vol. 27(2).  
 
Pohl Gerhard, Anderson Robert E., Claessens Stijin and Djankov Simeon 
(1997) ‘Privatization and Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe’,  
World Bank Technical Paper, no. 368, the World Bank. 
 
Pohl Gerhard, Djankov Simeon and Anderson Robert E. (1996) 
‘Restructuring Large Industrial Firms in Central and Eastern Europe:  An 
Empirical Analysis’, World Bank Technical Paper, no. 332, the World Bank.   
  
Pribova Marie and Savitt Ronald (1995) ‘Attitudes of Czech Managers 
towards Markets and Marketing’, International Marketing Review, vol. 12(5).   
 
Rapacki Ryszard (1995) ‘Privatization in Poland:  Performance, Problems 
and Prospects’, Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 37(3).   
  
Redman T. and Keithley D. (1998) ‘Downsizing Goes East?  Employment 
Re-structuring in Post-Socialist Poland’, The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, vol. 9(2), April. 
 
 République Algerienne Démocratique et Populaire (1970) ‘Plan Quadrienal 
1970-1973’, Rapport Général, Janvier. 
 
République Algerienne Démocratique et Populaire (1974) ‘Plan Quadrienal 
1974-1977’, Rapport Général, Janvier.  
 
République Algerienne Démocratique et Populaire (1980) ‘Premier Plan 
Quinquennal 1980-1984’, Rapport Général, Janvier.  
 
Roland G. and Sekkat K. (2000) ‘Managerial Career Concerns, Privatization 
and Restructuring in Transition Countries’, European Economic Review, 44. 
 
Rondenelli, Dennis A., Yurkiewicz, Jay (1996) ‘Privatization and Economic 
Restructuring in Poland:  An Assessment of Transition Policies’, American 
Journal of Economics & Sociology,  vol. 55(2) April.   
 
Saadi Rabah Nourredine (1985) „L‟Entreprise Socialiste:  Essai d‟Evaluation 
d‟un Mode de Géstion‟, La Revue du C.E.N.E.A.P, no. 1, Mars.   
 
Sadi Nacer Eddine (2005) ‘La Privatisation des Entreprises Publiques en 
Algerie: Objectifs, Modalités et Enjeux’, Office des Publications 
Universitaires.   
 
Sari Mohamed (2002) ‘Algerie, Horizon 2002 : Vers une Autonmie 
Economique Minimale’,  Imprimerie El Maarif.     
  
 394 
 
Savitt Ronald (2001) ‘Understanding Marketing Develoopment in the Czech 
Republic’, European Journal of Marketing, vol. 35(11/12).   
 
Schaffer Mark E. (1998) ‘Do Firms in Transition Economies Have Soft 
Budget Constraints?  A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence’,  Journal 
of Comparative Economics, 26.   
 
Seeger M. (1981) ‘Eye-Witness to Failure’, in: Schapiro L. and Godson J. 
(ed.) (1981) The Soviet Worker:  Illusions & Realities, MacMillan Press Ltd.   
 
Services du Chef du Gouvernement (1991) ‘Programme du Gouvernement 
Présenté par Monsieur Sid Ahmed Ghozali et Réponses aux Quéstions des 
Députés de l’Assembléé Populaire Nationale’.   
 
Services du Chef du Gouvernement (1996) „Programme du Gouvernement 
Adopté par le Conseil National de Transition Reuni en Session 
Extraordinaire’,  du 12 au 20 Mars. 
 
Seibel Hans Dieter and Damachi Ukandi G. (1982) „Self-Management in 
Yugoslavia and the Developing World’, MacMillan Press Ltd. 
 
Shavell Steven (1979) „Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and 
Agent Relationship‟, Bell Journal of Economics, (10).   
 
Shipley David, Hooley Graham, Beracs Jozsef, Fonfara Krzysztof and Kolos 
Krizstina (1995) „Marketing Organizations in Hungarian and Polish Firms:  
Part 1‟, Journal of Marketing Practice:  Applied Marketing Science, vol.1(2).   
  
Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert W. (1994) „Politicians and Firms‟, The 
Quaterly Journal of Economics, November.   
 
Shleifer Andrei and Vasiliev Dmitry (1996), „Management Ownership and 
Russian Privatization‟, in:  Frydman R., Gray Cheryl W., Rapaczynski A. 
(ed.) (1996) Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia: Insiders 
and the State, vol. 2, Central European University Press.   
 
Sider (1997) „Accord Global, Plan de Redressement Interne 1997-2000’. 
 
Silverman David (2000) „Doing Qualitative Research :  A Practical 
Handbook’, Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Simoneti Marko (1993) „A Comparative Review of Privatisation Strategies in 
Four Former Socialist Countries‟, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 45(1).   
 
Socha Mieczyslaw W. and Weisberg Jacob (2002) „Labor Market Transition 
in Poland:  Changes in the Public and Private Sectors‟, International Journal 
of Manpower, vol. 23(6). 
 
  
 395 
Soulsby Anna and Clark Ed (1998) „Controlling Personnel:  Management and 
Motive in the Transformation of the Czech Enterprise‟, The International 
Journal of Human Resources Management, 9(1), February.   
 
Sprenger Carsten (2002) „Ownership and Corporate Governance in Russian 
Industry:  A Survey‟, Working Paper, no. 70, European Bank for   
Reconstruction and development.   
 
Stephen Frank H. and Bachhaus Jŭrgen G. (2003), „Corporate Governance 
and Mass Privatisation:  A theoretical Investigation in Legal and Economic 
Relationships‟, Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 39, no. 3/4.   
 
Stern Nicholas and Hicks John (1996) „The Transition in Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Unions:  Some Strategic Lessons from the Experience of 
25 Countries over Six Years‟, Working Paper, no. 18, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
   
Stiglitz Joseph (1999) „Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?‟, Challenge, vol. 
42(6). 
 
Stiglitz J.E. (1999) „Whither Reform?  Ten Years of the Transition‟, Annual 
Bank Conference on Development Economics, the World Bank. 
 
Sutton Keith (1981) „Algerie:  Centre Down Development, State Capitalism, 
and Emergent Decentralization‟, Development from Above and Below?‟, in:  
Stöhr W.  B. and D. R. Fraser Taylor (ed.) (1981) Development from Above 
and Below, John Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
 
Sutton Keith and Tidjane Bachir (1985) „The Spatial Structure of State-
Owned Industry in the Oran Region of Algeria‟, Tijdschrift vor Econ. En Soc. 
Geografie, 76, No. 4. 
 
Svejnar Jan (2002) „Transition Economies: Performance and Challenges‟, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, no. 16(1), Winter. 
 
Szilagyi A. D. Jr. and Schweiger D. M. (1984) „Matching Managers to 
Strategies:  A Review and Suggested Framework‟, Academy of Management 
Review, vol.9(4). 
 
Tashakkori Abbas and Teddlie Charles (1994) „Mixed Methodology:  
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches‟, Sage Publications 
 
Tas-Zemirli Rabia (1987) „Relation Technologie-Organisation du Travail et 
Formation Professionelle‟, Les Cahiers du CREAD, 1er Trimestre, no. 9. 
 
The World Bank Country Study (1999) ‘Czech Republic: Capital Market 
Review’, no. 19306, May.   
 
The World Bank (2000) ‘Anticorruption in Transition:  A Contribution to the 
Policy Debate’.   
  
 396 
 
The World Bank (2003) „People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria: A 
Medium-Term Macroeconomic Strategy for Algeria‟, vol. 1, Main Report no. 
26005-Al. 
 
The World Bank (2006) „Doing Business in 2006’. 
 
Taylor David and Walley E. E. (Liz) (2002) „Hijacking the Holy Grail?  
Emerging HR Practices in Croatia‟, European Business Review, vol. 14(4). 
  
Touat A. (1994) „Study of Availability and Price of Drugs in Algeria‟, Small 
Applied Research Paper, no. 15, HFS.   
  
Tung Rosalie L. and Havlovic Stephen J. (1996) „Human Resource 
Management in Transitional Economies:  The Case of Poland and the Czech 
Republic‟, The International Journal of Human Resource Management,  7(1), 
February.   
 
UGTA (1996) ‘Communication : Les Enjeus et Contraintes de l’Economie 
Nationale’,  29 Sept.-03 Octobre.   
   
UGTA (2003) ‘Dossier des Tripartites avec le Gouvernement  de Monsieur 
Ahmed Ouyahia’, (9-10) Octobre.   
 
UGTA (1996, 1998, 1999, 2002) (Compilation of correspondences on 
privatiwsation and corruptioin between the UGTA and the UGTA‟s 
representatives in different EPEs and between the UGTA and the head of the 
government and various public holdings) 
  
Uhlenbruck, Klaus, De Castro, Julio O. (2000) „Foreign Acquisitions in 
Central and Eastern Europe:  Outcomes of Privatization in Transitional 
Economies‟, Academy of Management Journal, vol. 43(3), June.   
Uwe Engfer (1996) „The Impact of Privatization and Change of Social 
Security Systems upon Living Conditions of East German Households‟,  
Innovation:  The European Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 9(3) September.   
 
Vagliasindi Maria (2001) „Competition Across Transition Economies:  An 
Enterprise-Level Analysis of the Main Policy and Structural Determinants‟, 
Working Paper, no. 68, The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
 
Vickers J. and Yarrow G. (1991) „Economic Perspectives on Privatization‟, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2).  
 
Vining Aidan R. and Boardman Anthory E. (1992) ‘Ownership versus 
Competition:  Efficiency in Public Enterprise‟, Public Choice, (72).   
 
Vlachoutsicos, Charalambos, Lawrence, Paul (1990) „What We Don‟t Know 
About Soviet Management‟, Harvard Business Review, vol. 68(6).   
 
  
 397 
Volgin Andrei and Milner Yuri (1994) „Voucher Investment Funds‟, in: 
Lieberman Ira W. and Nellis John (ed..) (1994) Russia: Creating Private 
Enterprises and Efficient Markets, the World Bank.    
 
Voszka Eva (1999) „Privatization in Hungary:  Results and Open Issues‟,  
Economic Reform Today, no. 2. 
  
Warner Jerold B., Watts Rose L. and Wruck Karen H. (1988) „Stock Prices 
and Top Management Changes‟, Journal of Financial Economics, (20). 
 
Wiersema M.F. and Bantel K.A. (1992) „Top Management Team 
Demography and Corporate Strategic Change‟, Academy of Management 
Journal, vol 35(1). 
 
Wright Mike, Buck Trevor, Filatotchev Igor (2002) ‘Post-Privatization 
Effects of Management and Employee Buy-Outs‟, Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, 73(3).   
 
Wright Mike, Filatotchev Igor, Buck Trevor and Robbie Ken (1994) 
„Accountability and Efficiency in Buy-Outs in Central and Eastern Europe‟, 
Financial Accountability & Management, 10(3).  
 
Yanat Abdelmajid (1979) „Les Finances de l‟Entreprise Socialiste 
Algerienne‟, Integration, no. 2. 
 
Yarrow George (1986) „Privatization in Theory and Practice‟, Economic 
Policy, April. 
 
Yin Robert K. (2003), „Case Study Research Design and Methods‟, Sage 
Publications Inc.   
 
Zemplinerovä Alena, Laŝtovička Radek,Marcinčin Anton (1995) 
„Restructuring of Czech Manufacturing Enterprises:  En Empirical Study‟, 
CERGE-EI, Prague, mimeo. 
  
(No Author) (1987) „Autonomy des Entreprises‟, Rapports, no. 1, 2, 3,  
Cahier no. 1.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 398 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Semi-structured interview questions 
 
These questions were asked to chief executives and the enterprise general 
secretaries.  The same questions were also asked to the appropriate 
managers.    
 
Part One 
 
1.  Historical background 
 
a. As a place to start, is it possible to describe in brief the history of your 
enterprise (ie. when it was created and how it evolved before the transition to 
the free market)? 
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               2.  Ownership structure 
 
a. Who are the owners of your enterprise and what control power do they 
have in the short, medium and long terms decisions? 
 
               3.  Extent of competition 
 
a. How could you characterise the industry in which your enterprise operates 
eg. Does it rely on constant innovation, promotion, price competition, or 
quality. 
(The same question was asked to the division, marketing, R & D and 
production managers) 
 
b. Who are your potential competitors? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, planning and 
production managers) 
 
c. What kind of problems firms like yours encounter in their markets?  
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, planning and 
production managers) 
 
d. How do they go about to resolve them? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, planning and 
production managers) 
 
e. Do you study the strengths and weaknesses of your competitors? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing and planning 
managers) 
 
f. What institutional problems companies like yours encounter? 
(The same question was asked division and all functional managers) 
 
                             
 
4.  Product Strategy 
 
a. On what characteristics of the product(s) the customer bases its choice, 
eg, quality, price, packaging and so forth? 
(The same question was asked division, marketing, R&D, planning and 
production managers) 
 
b. Who are your potential customers? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, planning and 
production managers) 
 
                          c. Who are your potential suppliers? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, planning and 
production managers) 
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                          d. How do you describe your relationship with your customers and 
suppliers eg, do you involve them in the specification of your products, in 
the quality of your products and services and so on? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, R&D, planning and 
production managers) 
 
e. What kind of information, companies like yours find it difficult to have 
or is inadequate and which is important in the specification of their 
products and services? 
(The same question was asked to division, planning, R&D, marketing and 
production managers). 
 
f. What products and services did you get rid off and those that you 
introduced since your enterprise was slated for privatisation? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, planning, R&D and 
production managers). 
 
g. Which functional department(s) has (have) seen more investments since 
your enterprise was slated for privatisation? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, R&D, planning and 
production managers). 
 
h. Do you export and what is (are) the product(s) that you export and to 
which countries? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, planning and 
production managers). 
 
i. What kind of tools companies like yours use to attract customers? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, planning and 
production managers). 
 
                                 5.  Organisational Structure 
 
a. Which department(s) has(ve) been installed since your enterprise has 
been slated for privatisation? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, R&D, planning, HR, 
and production managers). 
 
b. Which department(s) has(ve) suffered a lot in terms of the reduction of 
its work force  and investments since your enterprise was slated for 
privatisation and why? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, R&D, planning, HR 
and production managers). 
 
c. In which department(s) do you find difficulties to recruit skilled 
workers and managers? 
(The same question was asked to division, marketing, R&D, planning, HR 
and production managers). 
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d. How much discretion division and functional managers have in taking 
decision concerning the operations of their divisions or departments? 
(The same question was asked to division and all functional department 
managers). 
 
e. On what criteria do you evaluate the performance of the divisions and 
the functional departments? 
(The same question was asked to division, all functional managers, and 
managers at the trade union UGTA). 
 
f. On what criteria do you evaluate the performance of division and 
department managers? 
(The same question was asked to division, department managers and 
managers at the trade union UGTA  
 
g. What kind of strategies companies like yours follows to reduce costs? 
(The same question was asked to division, functional managers and to 
managers at the trade union UGTA).  
 
h. What kind of conflicts exist between the various divisions and 
functional departments and how these conflicts are resolved?  
(The same question was asked to department managers and managers at 
the trade union UGTA). 
 
 
6.  Employment Practices 
 
 
a. How much changes have been introduced since your enterprise has been 
slated for privatisation in the policies of recruitment, evaluation and 
compensation of managers and workers? 
(The same question was asked to division, department managers, 
managers at the CNAT and managers and workers at the trade union 
UGTA). 
 
b. How do you describe the participation of workers in the decision 
makings of the enterprise?  Has it decreased or increased since your 
enterprise was slated for privatisation? 
(The same question was asked to division, department managers and 
managers and workers at the trade union UGTA). 
 
c. Have you privatised any of the assets in your enterprise? 
(The same question was asked to division and department managers, 
managers at the ministry of industry and managers at the trade union 
UGTA). 
 
 
7. Miscellaneous 
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a. How do you describe the relationship between your enterprise and the 
government administration since your enterprise was slated for 
privatisation? 
(The same question was asked to division, department managers and 
managers at the trade union UGTA). 
 
b. What is your position towards the privatisation of the state enterprise in 
the country? 
(The same question was asked division, department managers, managers 
at the CNAT, managers at the ministry of industry and managers and 
workers at the trade union UGTA)  
 
c. How do you describe the institutional environment brought by the 
transition to the free market economic system? 
(The same question was asked division and department managers, 
managers at the CNAT and managers at the trade union UGTA). 
 
d. Do you have any advice you can give to the government policy makers 
regarding not only privatisation and enterprise restructuring but the whole 
process of transition to the free market economic system? 
(The same question was asked to division and department managers, 
managers at the CNAT, managers at the ministry of industry and 
managers and workers at the trade union UGTA). 
 
 
Part Two 
 
 
Additional questions asked to division and functional department 
managers 
 
 
1. What kind of participation do you have in the corporate strategic 
decision makings? 
 
2. What new technology and procedures were introduced in your division/ 
department since the enterprise was slated for privatisation? 
 
 3. What kind of skills are in short supply in your division/department and 
how do you go about to solve this shortage? 
 
4.  Do you have the power to retain any profit you make and reinvest it in 
your division/department? 
 
5. What should be done to improve the financial and efficiency 
performance of your division/department? 
 
 
Part Three 
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                                 Additional questions asked to the Human Resources managers. 
 
1. What kind of changes has been introduced in the labour market since 
the country has moved to the free market economic system?  
(The same question was asked to the managers at the CNAT and at the 
trade union UGTA). 
 
2. What means do you use to advertise for vacant position in your 
enterprise? 
(The same question was asked to managers at the CNAT and the trade 
union UGTA). 
 
3. What instruments do you use in the selection and recruitment of 
managers and workers? 
(The same question was asked managers at the CNAT and managers and 
workers at the trade union UGTA). 
 
4.  From which professional discipline the majority of managers come 
from and what skills needed in a competitive market do they lack? 
(The same question was asked to managers at the CNAT and the trade 
union UGTA). 
 
5. What are the welfare services to workers that have been abandoned and 
those that are still provided to workers? 
(The same question was asked to managers and workers at the trade union 
UGTA). 
 
6. Have worker turnovers increased or decreased since your enterprise has 
been slated for privatisation, and why? 
(The same question was asked to managers and workers at the trade union 
UGTA).  
 
7. On what criteria workers are promoted to managerial positions? 
(The same question was asked to managers and workers at the trade union 
UGTA). 
  
8. Which category of workers in your enterprise has had more training, 
and on what skills and why?                                  
 (The same question was asked to managers and workers at the trade 
union UGTA). 
 
9. What incentives should be put in place to motivate workers and 
managers to be efficient? 
(The same question was asked managers at the CNAT and managers and 
workers at the trade union UGTA). 
 
10. What institutional reforms would you like to see in place to improve 
the         
                                 performance of your department in particular and your enterprise in   
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                                  general? 
                                (The same question was asked to managers and workrs at the trade union                             
                                 UGTA).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Unstructured Interview Sample 
 
This is a sample of one of the questions asked to the manager of the 
conflicts and social affairs at the headquarters of the trade union UGTA.  
The question was about how the President General Managers were 
selected and recruited in the state and privatised enterprise in Algeria.   
 
 
Interviewer: Could you please describe to me how the PGMs in the 
public and privatised enterprises in Algeria are selected and 
recruited? 
 
Interviewee: Well, concerning this question, I can say that there is a      
                       special instruction, from the head of the government of the   
                       29 January 1995, which is related to the fundamental  
criteria for  the pre-selection of candidates.  That is to say, 
the holdings have to pre-select the candidates.  They should 
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study these candidates based on their level of training, their 
professional level, I mean their professional experience and 
also on specifique criteria and especially those relative to 
the protection and the security of the enterprise‟s assets and 
the history of the country.  There is for example the 
criterion of being sons of martyrs in the war for liberation 
of the country, the political past of the candidate or his 
family.  Well, these additional criteria in addition to the 
academic qualification and the professional experience 
have been re-underlined after 1990 where the state had to 
position the personnel which remained loyal to the state 
direction and therefore to its institutions.   
 
Interviewer: Do you mean the recruited candidates have to fulfil the 
state directives? 
 
Interviewee: In a way, yes.  They have to protect the public sector.  
Since the sixties, the state as the state chose the best 
managers for its institutions and the reservoir of these 
managers were the army and the party.  Managers were 
selected from two institutions, from the army, from the 
Armeé Populaire Nationale (ANP) and from the unique 
political party, from the Front de Libération National (FLN) 
because these two institutions had the cream of the 
population at that time.    It was since the second decade 
where Algeria started to yield the fruits of its strategy, 
where the Algerian university started to give its fruits, 
where the training of Algerians abroad started to give its 
fruits.  In the independent Algeria, the responsible 
[manager] must enter in the world of the system.  What do I 
mean by a system?  It is not a specific system for a dynasty 
but a system for a country which was colonialised where 
the tractor was something very significant.  We were in 
desperate need to catch up with the modern world and also 
to avoid the dispute over inputs.  We had to choose a 
system.  As far as the choice is concerned I am going to tell 
you in brief.  In 1967, Algeria prepared the first three years 
plan.  There was a question on the choice of plans.  Some 
opted for the development of agriculture, others culture and 
others for the industry.  Boumedienne asked them how to 
develop the sector of agriculture.  Each of them had given 
his philosophy but their philosophy was dependent on 
foreign countries.  Boumedienne had given them that to 
have a productive sector, this sector requires some 
conditions.  The first condition is the mechanisation of the 
sector.  Do we have an industry which ables us to create a 
mechanisation?  Of course, no.  Secondly, do we have 
chemical produits? Of course, no.  Do we have universities 
which produce skilled manpower in agriculture? Of course, 
no.  What concerns the culture, to have physicians, 
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ingeneers etc you have to have universities, did we have 
universities at that time? No.  To build universities, we 
need metal, mortar and we need and we need.  Do we have 
these means? No.  The only choice at that time was heavy 
industry.  We had to invest on EL Hadjar.  First, El Hadjar 
can absorb a good quantity of unemployment.  Second, it 
gives us the raw material.  This raw material allows us to 
build hospitals, primary and secondary schools and 
universities.  This choice allows us to create backward and 
forward factories.  The SNMETAL was created.  The 
SNMETAL created us the cranes, the SONACOME created 
us trucks and small vehicles.  This choice was the only 
choice, rational, objective and logique for a country which 
was colonised and its economy was entirely linked to the 
economy of the colonial powers.   
 
Pause:            The interview was interrupted by a phone call for the                 
                       interviewee.  
 
Interviewee:    Yes, I can say that if we can make an economic study since  
                       1962, from 1962 until 1970, we were in a phase where the state 
was looking for itself.  It tried to build up the pillars of the 
state, it tried to answer to the most oppressed of the population 
because in 1962, children had to eat, families had to work.  
Now Algeria is standing.  Now Algeria has a state which is 
standing.  If for example the black phase, or the black decade 
known to Algeria from 1992 to 1998 which had whistled on 
Algeria had also whistled on Morocco or on Tunisia, I swear 
to you that these two countries would have been lifted from 
the map.  The question now as Algerians we should carry out 
an analysis on this phase without any emotions and without 
any constraints.  This analysis should enveil what really 
happened in our country. 
   
Interviewer:    You mentioned that the PGMs in the public sector have  
                        been selected and recruited since independence from the    
                        army and the FLN to serve the objectives set by the state.                 
                       Are they   today still selected in the public and privatised   
                       enterprises from these two institutions? 
 
                                Interviewee:     Yes, they are still selected from the army and the FLN and  
also from other influential factions in the state.  These 
managers have to put in place what the state wants.  It is a 
sort of clans.  Every minister will select the PGMS he can 
trust and he can rely on to implement his decisions.  You 
do not have to see far our enterprises are full of anaam sidi 
[yes master]. 
 
                           
                               Interviewer:     On this point, I want to ask you on what criteria an   
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                                                        employee is promoted to a senior management position?  
 
Interviewee:  The answer is very simple.  In the public sector we have a  
written legislation.  The policies for promotion are written 
in the internal regulation of the enterprise and also in its 
conventions.  These instruments have been created with the 
promulgation of the law 90-11.  Before, it was the charter 
of the GSE.  I have already given you ordinance 71-74.  If 
you have read this ordinance, workers participated in 
different commissions.  They were given a lot of power to 
expose their problems.  But the decisions the workers took 
were not vitale.  They gave only their opinions because the 
worker who was elected in the worker councils did not 
have the intellectual capacity like the general manager.  
Perhaps there were some who were intellectual but not with 
a university level.  The legislator was deaf.  The Algerian 
worker his roots were a real paysant.  His mentality was a 
feudal mentality.  To change this mentality towards a 
political system very developed which was our main 
objective it was not easy.  I can say that after 1979, they 
have thrown all the problems for development on the table 
and it was very difficult to take back what was left to take 
back.  Even in 1989, the public did not ask for anything, the 
public had asked something noble.  It had asked the 
rehabilitation of the political notion.  It did not ask for 
bread.  We were not hungry.  A senior manager or any 
person with responsibility who commits a mistake should 
not be promoted, he should be punished but it was not the 
case between 1984 and 1988.  A worker who made a 
mistake he was right away punished and if he had stolen 
who was right away sent to the justice tribunale.  But when 
a minister put the whole economy to its knees, he is never 
punished.  I am going to give you the example of the head 
of government Abdel Hamid Brahimi.  The first five years 
plan (1980-84)  
 
Pause:      The interviewee asked one of the employees there to bring 
some water and asked me if I wanted coffee or some 
refreshments                                                                        
 
Interviewee:   Eh, what were we saying?  Yes, I was saying Brahimi, it  
                        was him who had elaborated the plan.  He based the plan  
for development on consumption with low regard to 
production without any regard to productive investments.  
He had created only unproductive positions and he had 
made an explosion in the number of public enterprises.  An 
enterprise which had 20,000 workers was restructured to 
give birth to five enterprises.  Rather than having one 
secretary, now we have five and rather than having one 
chauffeur, we have now five.  Before this happened, 
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Algeria was developing with steps of a geant.  Every day 
we saw inaugurations either of one plant of production or 
one enterprise.  At that time, there was someting to 
inaugurate, there were investments.  If there were five 
applications for jobs you would expect five recruitments.  
Today, Algeria has reached a level where unemployment 
has become unemployment of luxury.  What it means, 
unemployment of the intellectuals which means the 
university graduates.  I do not think this is the case in the 
capitalist countries.  The irony is that our country is in a 
desperate need of these graduated.  We need them 
everywhere.  We have 300,000 graduates unemployed.  
300,000 graduates who have been educated and trained 
from our national production and with tens of millions of 
dinars.  Why they are unemployed?  Because today we 
have given priority only to the quick needs of the 
population.  It is the consumption.  Eh, it is the 
consumption.  For me a centre for culture is not a project 
which brings me creation of employment.  For me a 
swimming pool is not a necessary project.  At the moment, 
the most important thing which we should create and put it 
on the rail of development is the intensification of 
investments in productive means.  They talk about the 
transition to the free market and they required us to follow 
their democracy in a short time of two years.  Them it took 
them almost two centuries to have this democracy they are 
talking about.  It is not possible.  Really, it is not possible. 
 
Pause:           He stood up to take a file from a cabinet 
                                  
                                 Interviewee:   Us, our religion dictates on us to have democracy.  Also, in  
our constitution.  Islam is the religion of our state.  Islam is 
the religion of collectivity.  Every science, every way of 
life is in our Koran.  For me somebody who does not faste 
should not be given a position of responsibility.  Somebody 
who does not do his prayer should not be given a position 
of responsibility.  To create a state it will take years.  Men 
come and go and we want a state which lasts.  But here in 
our country it is not the case.  A person with responsibility 
should be responsible and not the opposite.  The thing is 
that we do not have real men who can take responsibility.  
Our religion requires us to be educated.  Look at us we still 
have the majority illiterates.  Everything is in our Koran.  
Even our  imams (priests) are not all from the university.  
In real terms, they do not know what many verses of the 
Koran really mean in our modern life. 
 
 Interviewer:    Are you telling me that an employee is promoted not  
                        because of his competence but how much he can serve the  
                        political agenda of the minister? 
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Interviewee:    In short, the minister selects the PGM who is loyal to him  
and the PGM promotes the worker who is loyal to him and 
so on.  Loyalty is very important in our enterprises.  What 
can I say, this is how it works. 
 
Interviewer:    If the procedure for the selection of PGMs did not change  
much since independence, what about the compensation of 
the PGMs. Any changes have happened in their 
compensations? 
 
                                  Interviewee:   Before 1990, the salaries of managers were set by the SGT    
                                                         of the year 1978.  Did I give you last week the legislation    
                                                         of the SGT? 
 
Interviewer:      Yes, you gave me. 
 
Interviewee:   If you have read it, you noticed that jobs were divided into  
categories and the calculation of the salaries were based on 
these categories.  The legislation was enacted in 1978 and 
not long Boumedienne died.  It took five years before the 
SGT was implemented, only in 1984.  They delayed its 
implementation because they tried to empty the law from 
its economic conception.  This is a long story, I do not want 
to go on it now.  They have brought us the minimum wage 
and they want now to increase it by 100 percent.  If you 
earn 100 dinars and another person earns 10 thousand 
dinars, the gap between the two earnings is very big.  
Before salaries were controlled but today nothing is 
controlled except the minimum wage.  Now, I come back to 
your question.  The PGMs are paid in relation to the 
minimum wage.  A good increase in the minimum wage 
means that the PGMs and GMs will yield a very good fruit.  
The minimum wage concerns more the PGMs and the GMs 
than anybody else.  Today we have women who are 40 and 
more and men 50 and more who cannot get married 
because they do not have money.  They say that they do not 
want to bring children to this world to suffer like them.  If 
you ask me how to solve the problem, I can say that I am 
with people who say we have to stop investing in sectors 
which do not create employment and the wealth of nations.  
At the present time, investing in building construction 
sector is vital.  We should give more power to the 
Algerians and have a clear framework for building the 
country.  At the present, at the present, the boost which has 
made the Algerian society bursting is the problem of 
housing and salaries.  In my views, these two areas are 
important and the head of the country should put in place a 
strategy in order resolve these two areas.  I can summarise 
the answer to your question in one sentence.  The transition 
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has made the heads of the public enterprises and members 
of the government richers and the ones who are suffering 
most are the workers, the university graduates and the 
pensioners.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
 
Questionnaire Covering Letter 
 
 
This questionnaire is part of my research for a Phd degree in management.  
The topic for this research is about restructuring of the Algerian 
enterprises slated for privatisation.  I have already done interviews with 
the majority of managers in your enterprise.  This questionnaire is a 
complementary to these interviews and it is also an important part of this 
research.  I would be very grateful if you could spare some of your 
precious time and fill in this questionnaire.  You can give your answer by 
ticking the appropriate answer(s).  
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Questionnaire      
  
   
1.  Are you? 
 
 Female 
 Male 
 
 
2. Is your age between? 
 
  16-25 
  26-35 
  36-45 
  46-55 
  56-65 
  66-75 
 
 
3. What is your academic qualification? 
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 None  
 Middle school level 
 High school level 
 Bachelor degree 
 Master degree 
 Phd degree 
 Other, please specify 
 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
     
4. In which academic discipline did you obtain your     qualification? 
 
 Legal studies 
 Economic studies 
 Administrative studies 
 Ingineering 
 Other, please specify 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5.  What is your job position in this enterprise? 
 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
6.  For how long have you worked in this enterprise? 
 
 Less than a year 
 1 year 
 2 years 
 3 years 
 4 years 
 More, please specify 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
  
 413 
 
 
7.  Has your present enterprise been the only enterprise you have 
worked in since you started your working career? 
  
 Yes 
 No 
  
 
If your answer is no, please answer questions 8, 9 and 10.  
 
  
8.  In how many public enterprises have you worked? 
 
 None 
 One 
 Two 
 More, please specify 
 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9.  In how many private enterprises have you worked?                
 
 None 
 One 
 Two 
 More, please specify  
  
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
10.  In which of the following government ministries have you 
worked? 
 
 None 
 Ministry of commerce 
 Ministry of finance 
 Ministry of industry 
 Ministry of energy 
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 Ministry of agriculture 
 Ministry of planning 
 Other, please specify  
 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.  In which functional departments have you worked and for how 
long? 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
12. Have you been promoted to the position you are occupying now? 
Departments                         Number of years 
 0-1 2-6 7-11  12-16   17-21 More, please specify 
Production        
Research & 
Development 
       
Commercial/ 
Marketing 
       
Finance/ 
Accounting 
        
Human Resources       
Products 
inspection/control 
       
Purchases/Sales       
Planning        
Audit       
Legal       
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   Yes 
   No 
 
If your answer is yes, please answer the next question. 
  
 
13.  From which functional department have you been promoted? 
 
 Production 
 Commercial/Marketing 
 Research & Development 
 Personnel/Human resources 
 Planning 
 Finance/Accounting 
 Other, please specify 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.   In which skills have you had training and development in your 
present enterprise? 
 
 Finance/Accounting 
 Planning 
 Strategic  and quality management 
 Evaluation of cost and price 
 Marketing  
 Other, please specify  
 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation  
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